Post-war JMSDF Fire Support Ship Concepts

[Scott Kenny]

Furthermore, the MSDF did not conduct the kind of naval gunfire support training against land targets that the U.S. Navy performed. The MSDF only began land-attack training after a 2015 agreement with the U.S. military allowed access to the U.S. firing range on Oki-Daito Island(沖大東島); prior to that, there were no ranges available for such training (while the U.S. Navy possessed them, the Self-Defense Forces could not use them as no agreement was in place).
Consequently, had the MSDF planned such a capability, it would have been solely for air defense purposes—a notion that was refuted during the course of this investigation.

Wow, that's really surprising that there wasn't an agreement before then...

 

[Dilandu]

Wow, that's really surprising that there wasn't an agreement before then...

Most likely JMSDF preferred to not press the nonessential points, that could cause additional accusations about "nuturing Japanese militarism"

 

[ayatsuji]

Wow, that's really surprising that there wasn't an agreement before then...

Most likely JMSDF preferred to not press the nonessential points, that could cause additional accusations about "nuturing Japanese militarism"

The Status of Forces Agreement between the U.S. and Japan has remained unchanged since 1960; the simple fact is that Japan has not exercised the rights granted to it under the agreement. The 2015 agreement is based on the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (the previous phrasing was misleading).
This likely stems from Japan's "aversion to ground-attack capabilities."

 

[Scott Kenny]

The Status of Forces Agreement between the U.S. and Japan has remained unchanged since 1960; the simple fact is that Japan has not exercised the rights granted to it under the agreement. The 2015 agreement is based on the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (the previous phrasing was misleading).
This likely stems from Japan's "aversion to ground-attack capabilities."

Still seems very strange, given that they would likely have to retake islands in a conflict.

 

[ayatsuji]

Still seems very strange, given that they would likely have to retake islands in a conflict.

This reflects Japan's fundamental perception of the Soviet Union's amphibious landing capabilities at the time.

Japan's defense strategy against a potential Soviet invasion centered on securing key straits.
The rationale was that the Soviet Union would likely launch limited incursions into specific straits to ensure the safety of its fleet's movements—securing safe passage for entry and exit while preventing Japanese and U.S. naval forces from advancing into the Sea of Okhotsk.
The straits in question were the Soya（宗谷海峡）, Tsugaru（津軽海峡）, and Tsushima Straits（対馬海峡）. Although Tsushima is an island, it was a large, mountainous one and was situated far too great a distance from the Soviet Union.

In short, because combat operations in the areas surrounding the Tsushima and Soya Straits would involve land-connected territories, Japan likely did not prioritize surface-to-ground capabilities for its naval vessels.