Preliminary assessment of the NGSW system by the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation 2024 report issued January, not favorable.

• The 6.8mm GP ammunitionprovides increased lethalityover the M855A1 (i.e., the GPammunition for the legacyM4A1 weapon) against the tested targets,
• Soldiers assessed the usabilityof the XM157 as below average/failing, and
• The XM7 with mounted XM157demonstrated a low probabilityof completing one 72-hourwartime mission without incurring a critical failure.

 
Might be an opportune time to gracefully terminate the program.

The XM250 in 7.62 looks like the best thing to emerge from this whole escapade. Perhaps renegotiate the contract value to that weapon?
 
Might be an opportune time to gracefully terminate the program.

The XM250 in 7.62 looks like the best thing to emerge from this whole escapade.

Seems like the main failure point is the scope. Not surprising given how sophisticated it is.
 
I know this post is years old at this point, but putting a can on a carbine remains shorter than putting a can on a full length rifle…that’s the point.
I know such a carbine length is desirable, I'm just saying I think such requirements were unrealistic considering the lofty ballistic performance desired from NGSW. It has technically been achieved, but resulted in questionable compromises as did many NGSW requirements. A lot like the way the Army wanted the M14 to do everything but replacing carbines and submachine guns with a full caliber service rifle is impossible while keeping the characteristics desired out of the latter two weapons.

Might be an opportune time to gracefully terminate the program.

The XM250 in 7.62 looks like the best thing to emerge from this whole escapade. Perhaps renegotiate the contract value to that weapon?
I think some things could be salvaged from the whole effort. Perhaps the XM7 could be re-tuned into a squad-level DMR while the XM250 with some modifications like a quick-change barrel could be adopted. I like what I heard about that steel alloy case Federal is promoting so maybe the high performance 6.8x51mm could still be feasible as an eventual replacement for 7.62x51mm.

If the scope doesn't work well enough, then the whole basis of this idea that NGSW will allow the average infantryman to be outranging the opposition and taking them out before they're within effective range falls apart.
 
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And this is about what I expected.

NGSW was M14 all over again. It'll probably stay as the DMR, but I see the majority of troops continuing to carry M4s or even full length M16s. You'd have one XM7 per squad, maybe two, a pair of M250s instead of the SAWs, a pair of M4/M320s, and three or four plain M4s (Squad Leader, two team leaders, and maybe one dude who is the Antitank gunner).

Unless of course the Army pulls head out of ass and enlarges the infantry squad to 15.
 
My guess is that that most of the people who are involved in this project have no understanding whatsoever of the various projects that came before them stretching back as far as the late 1940's.
History may not always repeat it self but it often rhymes.
Btw way Canadian Army currently has a research project developing a truly fugly bullpup some of it's developers honestly think it has chance of being turned into a service rifle.
Anyone who has ever been an end-user...not so much.
Turns out that when asked about the Ross Rifle they hadn't heard of it......
 
Have we gotten any good data out of Ukraine at this point? I would imagine that's telling the dod that ranges for gun fights are actually like and wether the ngsw is the right requirement.
 
Have we gotten any good data out of Ukraine at this point? I would imagine that's telling the dod that ranges for gun fights are actually like and wether the ngsw is the right requirement.

Remember that neither side has a lot of long-service professional infantry.

Anecdotal reporting seems to be that there is a lot of spray-and-pray shooting, often at rather short range, because much of the fighting is essentially trench warfare with occasional spurts of mobile combat.
 
Remember that neither side has a lot of long-service professional infantry.
Point of order!

There's no small number of former US soldiers "volunteering" into Ukrainian service. US troops abilities to find IEDs has been called outright supernatural, for example. And I don't mean Azov Battalion [expletives deleted], I mean people signing contracts with Ukrainian Armed Forces directly.


Anecdotal reporting seems to be that there is a lot of spray-and-pray shooting, often at rather short range, because much of the fighting is essentially trench warfare with occasional spurts of mobile combat.
I expect that even with mobile combat, we're going to see that 90+% of infantry combat happens within 300m.
 
There's no small number of former US soldiers "volunteering" into Ukrainian service. US troops abilities to find IEDs has been called outright supernatural, for example.

I stand by that characterization. At most there are a few thousand total ex-US service members, not all of whom were infantry soldiers before Ukraine (and many who are still not, I would expect). Out of nearly a million people under arms in the Ukraine military, that's not a lot.
 
With the kind of accuracy talked about in that report it will be a terrible DMR too.
That's likely correctable. Especially if the US goes to monometal steel cases for the 6.8x51, see the Federal 7mm Backcountry for an example. The "randomly throwing a round somewhere" is usually an issue with ammo consistency, and I do not have confidence in the 2-part cases used by SIG.
 
That's likely correctable. Especially if the US goes to monometal steel cases for the 6.8x51, see the Federal 7mm Backcountry for an example. The "randomly throwing a round somewhere" is usually an issue with ammo consistency, and I do not have confidence in the 2-part cases used by SIG.
Considering the reports of busted cases, that's a reasonable position to take...
 
If the scope doesn't work well enough, then the whole basis of this idea that NGSW will allow the average infantryman to be outranging the opposition and taking them out before they're within effective range falls apart.

Wasn't the superior ballistic performance of the new caliber supposed to provide that edge? With the sci-fi scope meant to increase the accuracy of the average grunt?
 
With all the criticism of the M7, I feel like the vast majority of that criticism can be fixed with an iterative approach. Very few service rifles came out of the box perfect, for many it took several years and multiple iterations to improve upon a basic, very decent idea. Heck, the UK had to overhaul their service rifle extensively and the M4 in it's initial form wasn't really that impressive either. Grunts will always bitch and moan about anything that's new and different. There are valid points of criticisms that need to be addressed in future improvements, but overall the army would be somewhat foolish to abandon another multi billion dollar program right at the end just to stick with wholly inadequate and arguably obsolete options from multiple decades ago.

The army is probably the worst offender with regards to this habit (looks a several failed efforts to replace the M109, M4, M1, a bunch of failed attack helo programs).
 
With all the criticism of the M7, I feel like the vast majority of that criticism can be fixed with an iterative approach.

It's not particularly the rifle, which can be fixed with money and metallurgy - though it will always be a heavy beast.

It's the concept, ammunition and impact to tactics, ops and logistics, which can't be fixed. The US Army should not be in a position where it requires infantry to make torso hits at 500m to win the battle. That's the job of crew-served weapons.
 
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There are valid points of criticisms that need to be addressed in future improvements, but overall the army would be somewhat foolish to abandon another multi billion dollar program right at the end just to stick with wholly inadequate and arguably obsolete options from multiple decades ago.
Here's the thing. "multiple decades ago" is not "obsolete". An M4 URGI puts lead into a ribcage or leg just as good as an M7. Both will put a person under. And no, what we need is people with the ego to stop the steamroller. Investing in boondoggles, flawed from the onset, results in nothing good. One service is already enough, officials/generals shouldn't be encouraged to gather power to force their wet dreams forward, burn billions and then argue "we already threw enough money at it just finish the job duh".
 
Remember that neither side has a lot of long-service professional infantry.

Anecdotal reporting seems to be that there is a lot of spray-and-pray shooting, often at rather short range, because much of the fighting is essentially trench warfare with occasional spurts of mobile combat.
Ukraine can only tell us so much.
The war started without Ukraine having access to modern high end systems which largely resulted in the current stalemate/trench warfare we’re seeing now.
 
I stand by that characterization. At most there are a few thousand total ex-US service members, not all of whom were infantry soldiers before Ukraine (and many who are still not, I would expect). Out of nearly a million people under arms in the Ukraine military, that's not a lot.
A few thousand is still no small number.
 
But not enough to teach many lessons about infantry tactics. Everything I hear about US fighters in the UAF suggests they are not considered very special. Except that extraordinary efforts are made to recover their bodies.
The ones who are good at identifying IEDs are seen as damn near supernatural.
 
And how many of those are there?
Enough that US soldiers got that rep from the Ukrainians they serve with and been widely spread around.

Throw in that the US been dealing with IEDs for the last two damn decades, full on class everyone takes repeatedly every other year with Ukraine soldiers now going too in Europe, and those are staying around cause Detecting IEDs skill translate REAL GOOD to detect mines and booby traps...

Enough to make a decent difference.
 
It's not particularly the rifle, which can be fixed with money and metallurgy - though it will always be a heavy beast.

It's the concept, ammunition and impact to tactics, ops and logistics, which can't be fixed. The US Army should not be in a position where it requires infantry to make torso hits at 500m to win the battle. That's the job of crew-served weapons.
What about the concerns of supposed really tough Russian body armor?
 
Was it ever answered why the GD-OTS RM227 (the bullpup) lost?
It seems like the most straightforward solution.
Ammo design was innovative as requested, and is the main feature of the program anyway, is it not?
And a bullpup is the most logical solution given the requirements.

Unless I misread and the XM7's conventional layout, and lethality requirements aren't mutually exclusive? Complaints about excessive pressure resulting in all sorts of problems seems like an indictment to the combo.

Wasn't there some preliminary test for such things early on? To see if the rifle can pass reliability tests?

And if the 6.8mm is just a conventional design (in 2 pieces) that doesn't get you any breakthrough in key parameters like weight, size, or pressure or whatever - what's the point of going for a different caliber?

I'm asking all this as someone who only fired a couple times in his life and understands pretty much nothing about firearms and ammo.
 
What about the concerns of supposed really tough Russian body armor?
Nobody wore that stuff in the attacks on Ukraine.

Nobody.

Not the VDV, not the Spetsnaz.



Was it ever answered why the GD-OTS RM227 (the bullpup) lost?
It seems like the most straightforward solution.
Ammo design was innovative as requested, and is the main feature of the program anyway, is it not?
And a bullpup is the most logical solution given the requirements.
Having to develop a whole new manual of arms for drill and ceremony, plus general operator familiarity with the AR-style layout.



And if the 6.8mm is just a conventional design (in 2 pieces) that doesn't get you any breakthrough in key parameters like weight, size, or pressure or whatever - what's the point of going for a different caliber?

I'm asking all this as someone who only fired a couple times in his life and understands pretty much nothing about firearms and ammo.
This is gonna get a lot nerdy, I'm going to try to keep it to "ballistics 101" level.

So, the most stable bullets for long range shooting are long for whatever weight you're using.

6.5mm diameter instead of 7.62mm means a very long projectile for the same weight (+50% to almost twice as long, IIRC!). So the bullet doesn't get blown as far off course by crosswinds. It also loses less speed over distance so it can actually hit as hard or harder even when starting at a lower speed. See the 6.5mm Grendel cartridge for the modern example of this, but note that the Grendel when loaded with a 140gr bullet has the same muzzle velocity as the 6.5 Arisaka or Mannlicher-Schoenaur(sp?).

However, a 6.5mm bullet makes a smaller wound compared to 7.62mm. See the discussion about the "weak" Japanese 6.5mm rifles versus the American .30cal rifles during and after WW2. Nevermind that the 6.5mm rifles killed plenty of people.

7mm bullets have a better sized wound track than either 6.5 or 7.62mm for the same weight. See also the .280 British and the 7mm Optimum cartridge concepts.

And so 6.8mm is kinda the happy medium between 6.5 for long range and 7mm for terminal effect.
 
And if the 6.8mm is just a conventional design (in 2 pieces) that doesn't get you any breakthrough in key parameters like weight, size, or pressure or whatever

Wasn't the two piece cartridge chosen so that higher chamber pressure could be achieved? If I remember correctly that's why there's the steel base. Training ammo, which operates at lower pressures is single piece as far as I know.

The caliber is an overall ballistic improvement over 5.56mm, but the XM7 is heavier and the individual cartridges are heavier and obviously a bit more expensive to produce as they're two part casings.
 
Having to develop a whole new manual of arms for drill and ceremony, plus general operator familiarity with the AR-style layout.
Oh damn a new manual. Yeah ok I see why that's more difficult than introducing a brand new caliber.
Familiarity should hardly be a factor if you just issue those to new recruits and don't try to convert people. I remember hearing infantrymen input on the Tavor vs M4 in IDF service, and it turned out the vast majority of complaints regarding the Tavor came from converts, while those who stuck with the same rifle throughout their service showed similar approval of the M4 and Tavor.
And when I say M4 I mean it and various derivatives.

And so 6.8mm is kinda the happy medium between 6.5 for long range and 7mm for terminal effect.
So it's only about terminal effect, and introducing new efficiencies is very much secondary?
 
Oh damn a new manual. Yeah ok I see why that's more difficult than introducing a brand new caliber.
Not really a huge slippery slope, but still a slippery slope, so DA gravitated to the obviously "safer" choice. Safer in quotation because the Fury turns out to be a big disaster (bimetallic gimped together catridge yeah) and the SIG is way too heavy, duh. How do they weighed (worse catridge proposal, classic no-more-growth configuration) against (we will have to call the documentation specialist) and decided 1 over 2 is worthy of Darwin Awards in getting unemployed, but people are dumb.
 
So it's only about terminal effect, and introducing new efficiencies is very much secondary?

Yes it was a laser-like focus on the terminal effects that led to this situation. To achieve the required effects at range, the 6.8 bullet has to be driven at 3000fps.

To do that out of a 13" barrel required SIG to employ 80,000psi chamber pressure. That necessitated a heavy bimetallic round and lots of metal in the chalber.

The GD bullpup had > 20" of barrel and therefore 60-64,000psi was sufficient, in the same region as current 5.56 and 7.62 proof pressures.

The TVC rounds from the GD submission have already been tested in rebarrelled M240 and AR-10 ( see attachment ), impossible for the SIG round as it would blow them open.
 

Attachments

  • tva_switchbarrel_specsheet_2024.pdf
    8.2 MB · Views: 29
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So why was this alarm sounded?
Concerns were more toward the Chinese. But, the Ruskies did wore various forms of heavy duty body armour in Ukraine (either spare stuff leeching to the frontline or field test), so Milley's claim is not really unfounded. Stuff only truly headed down south when this is magnified a thousandth fold by his lackeys to pump up the funding flow. Milley himself probably already got a nice position at SIG now.
 
Concerns were more toward the Chinese. But, the Ruskies did wore various forms of heavy duty body armour in Ukraine (either spare stuff leeching to the frontline or field test), so Milley's claim is not really unfounded. Stuff only truly headed down south when this is magnified a thousandth fold by his lackeys to pump up the funding flow. Milley himself probably already got a nice position at SIG now.
Actually wasn’t it Robert Scales ~2015 that brought up the new Russian body armor?



 
The cold hard fact is that 6.8 NGSW is not gonna penetrate level IV plate any better than 7.62x51. Commercially available level IV can already stop multiple hits of M2 AP bullets from .300 win mag loadings. The only way NGSW can do better is by using exotic penetrator materials (ensuring that the round will never be produced in the needed quantities) and/or bullet construction (which begs the question of why not just use said novel bullet construction in existing NATO calibers).

This is the dirty little secret of the whole NGSW endeavor.
 
Oh damn a new manual. Yeah ok I see why that's more difficult than introducing a brand new caliber.
Sorry, technical term. I don't mean the paper manuals.

I mean drill movements. Same thing the Brits and French had to do when they adopted the SA80 and FAMAS.



So it's only about terminal effect, and introducing new efficiencies is very much secondary?
There are new efficiencies in there, but yes the primary driver was terminal effect. You'd kinda expect that for almost any cartridge, but especially military.

It drops less than 7.62x51 so it's easier to get hits with at varying ranges.



So why was this alarm sounded?
Because the US military "understood" that Russia etc was going to be issuing that superheavy armor to every infantryman, just like how the US issued SAPI/ESAPI etc to every single soldier.




The cold hard fact is that 6.8 NGSW is not gonna penetrate level IV plate any better than 7.62x51. Commercially available level IV can already stop multiple hits of M2 AP bullets from .300 win mag loadings. The only way NGSW can do better is by using exotic penetrator materials (ensuring that the round will never be produced in the needed quantities) and/or bullet construction (which begs the question of why not just use said novel bullet construction in existing NATO calibers).

This is the dirty little secret of the whole NGSW endeavor.
Clear back in the 1940s or 50s, the UK figured out that 7mm 140gr at ~2400fps was just about ideal for a 0-600m cartridge to replace the .303.

For that matter, the 6.5 Arisaka and 6.5 M-S were also throwing 140gr at 2400fps, even the 6.5x55 Swede (military loading).

But yes, the NGSW specs to outrange the Afghans have been known to be bullshit for a long, long time.
 

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