Sorry I'm coming into the conversation late, but I recently just found time to start on the profiles again.
Abraham Gubler said:
If you replace the guns and LORAN system with fuel you are still only going to be able to marginly improve the B-51's range. Maybe as much as 1,200 NM range (not radius) Hi-Hi-Hi with a 4,000-6,000 lbs bomb load (up from 1,000 NM) . You can't sling wing tanks on a B-51 because the clean varible incidence wing is not stressed for it.
Even with IFR tanking you are going to have an aircraft requiring more tanking support than the FB-111 to make strategic strikes. Since the only rationale for having B-51s in place of B-47s is for its improved low level penetration performance then radius of action goes down. Even with the extra fuselage fuel your Hi-Lo-Hi radius is going to be ~450 NM. Which is still about half the range needed even for a Turkey to Russian Heartland strike mission.
The B-51 was designed to be a great tactical strike aircraft, very much in the mould of the solid nose B-25s and A-26s of WW2.
I agree with some of this, Abraham, and if I had read this a few months ago, I'd have agreed 100%. From what I've studied about the B-51 since then, however, I would disagree with some of the range issues. Now, if we limit all of your comments to the XB-51, it's absolutely true. I had believed the same thing about wing tanks, too, until I saw studies that showed Martin had planned both a tandem-cockpit variant and a production model with wing tanks! The XB-51's wing may not have been stressed for it, but the production models would have been, it seems. Furthermore, in reading some comments by one of the aircraft's test pilots, he felt that the range issue was never adequately addressed but certainly could have been if they tried. Finally, the podded engine configuration made it natural to swap out the cheek engines for J57s. Put all of those together and throw in air-to-air refueling and it actually does become a practical bomber.
I will agree that it's only good as a trainer or a test/trials aircraft until you do all those things, however, which is reflected by the profiles we have done. The J57 was quite competitive with the J47 for fuel economy, so with J57s up front, you can run them at a lower % of power than the J47s, saving on fuel that way. Also, after take-off, you can shut down the #2 engine in the tail and reduce your fuel consumption by a third for the cruise to target. Over the target you can start it back up for the dash, much like the J47s on the later B-36s were used.
The intention here is that SAC originally buys the thing as a cheap trainer to do the same job that the B-47s were doing training guys but for a lot less money, especially in operating costs and base construction. The gear and crew configuration make it a natural for a lead-in trainer for the B-47, freeing them up for the long-range missions. Martin, however, would soon make the aircraft more enticing to SAC by proposing a J57-powered, IFR-equipped, low-level strike platform fitted with wing tanks. The thing that really makes it great compared to SAC's inventory is its takeoff performance. You're at least tripling the number of airfields SAC can strike from. You can actually use those forward fields in Turkey, take off, fill your tanks, head in low and fast to Sevastopol, drop the nuclear payload, get out of there, tank again if need be, or just divert to a closer airfield for landing (the landing roll for the B-51 was very short--shorter than the Canberra--due to the variable incidence wing and great brakes).
I'm not saying SAC would prefer the B-51 over the B-47 or the B-52, but when every dollar counted in the wake of the Revolt of the Admirals and SAC was constantly pushing Boeing to get the cost of their planes down, the ability to equip three wings with B-51s instead of two wings with B-47s or one with B-52s and it may have been worth it for SAC to go with a few wings of B-51s. Throw in the end of the Korean War and the Air Force may have even forced SAC's hand. Now, I don't see LeMay liking the plane or preferring it to other types, but buying B-51s instead of B-47s for a couple of wings would mean that many more B-52s for SAC--what LeMay REALLY wanted.
All that having been said, both Talos and I intend to do most of the profiles in the scheme of tactical aircraft, primarily in the high-speed, low-level nuclear strike role. This would be the sort of thing that TAC would later get the F-100C, F-101, and B-66 to do. Also, while I love the Canberra and think the aircraft was far more practical than the B-51 could ever have hoped to be, that didn't seem to be a sentiment shared by many in the late '50s and '60s when it was believed that aircraft wouldn't make it to Day 2 if the balloon ever went up. The RAF, RAAF, and USAF came to love and hold dearly to their Canberras, but they were all looking to its replacement almost as soon as it entered service because it was MiG-15 bait down low from the day the MiG-15 debuted. Not only that, but it didn't take long to prove that altitude was no guarantee of safety either.
Do I think the Air Force made the right choice not picking the B-51? In hindsight, yes. Luckily the Cold War never got REALLY ugly, so its best attributes were never required. Do I think it could have been made into a practical, effective bomber? Absolutely.
Fact is, however, that it's so beautiful that it just screams to be profiled, which is 95% of the reason Talos and I decided to do just that.
Cheers,
Logan
