Falklands War fought today?

[H_K]

As I said - use old attack planes, converted into attack drones. No need to fly back at all, could be done with commercial-grade equipment. Perfectly doable even with Argentinean industrial capabilities (they aready produce recon drones, by the way, even export them).

P.S. IA-63 Pampa III have fully-digital avionic, so turning it into pilotless drone would require relatively small efforts

You miss the critical point of time to target. Most attack drones (including any converted trainer like the Pampa) will be too slow, giving the QRA Typhoons plenty of time to take off and intercept them.

The difference between a 550 knot ingress and a 350 knot ingress is ~2.5 minutes additional warning time. The 550 knot aircraft will be operating well inside the 5min QRA reaction time. The 350 knot aircraft never stands a chance of getting inside the defenses’ OODA loop.

 

[Dilandu]

You miss the critical point of time to target. Most attack drones (including any converted trainer like the Pampa) will be too slow, giving the QRA Typhoons plenty of time to take off and intercept them.

The difference between a 550 knot ingress and a 350 knot ingress is ~2.5 minutes additional warning time. The 550 knot aircraft will be operating well inside the 5min QRA reaction time. The 350 knot aircraft never stands a chance of getting inside the defenses’ OODA loop.

Okay, let's use A-4AR Fightinghawk as drones instead. There are certainly enough airframes that could be nursed back for one final flight. Enough range, 580 knots max speed, and could carry enough Durandal's to really wreck the airfield.

 

[Owens Z]

Sharkey Ward sad a lot of things, however only Black Buck dropped bombs from a flight profile that damaged the runway, something the Sea Harriers couldn't/didn't do, so added to what the Task Force could achieve.

I have always been a big fan of the splendid Avro Vulcan, so I'm not unbiased. But as you must have heard, Nigel 'Sharkey' Ward is not the only British person to have cast doubt upon the wisdom of convoluted Operation Black Buck since the war. And their mission to knock out the runway was not accomplished: Argentine planes continued flying from Stanley airfield until the day before the surrender.

Nimrod MR 1 & 2s flew 111 sorties in 67 days, including from 9 May, 21 in-flight refueled missions deep into the South Atlantic, one of which lasted 18h50m.

Thanks, Rule. Please provide your source for this info; I want to read up about the Nimrod in action. (Unless your source is 1983's Air War South Atlantic by Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, still one of my favorite books about the campaign. Pages 88, 92, 93, 100, 128 describe flights by RAF Wing Commander David Emmerson and his Nimrod MR.2 crews, some of record duration. Ward did not specify the "certain misguided journalistic records of the air fighting" containing "absolute poppycock" about Nimrods (p218), but reading his 1992 book recently, I guessed Ward was referring to Air War South Atlantic , which I am very familiar with, as at least one of those.)

 

[Rule of cool]

I have always been a big fan of the splendid Avro Vulcan, so I'm not unbiased. But as you must have heard, Nigel 'Sharkey' Ward is not the only British person to have cast doubt upon the wisdom of convoluted Operation Black Buck since the war. And their mission to knock out the runway was not accomplished: Argentine planes continued flying from Stanley airfield until the day before the surrender.

Hindsight is 20-20, and saying after the war that BB1 failed therefore shouldn't have been attempted is the ultimate expression of hindsight. American's call it Monday morning quarterbacking. BB1 did hit the runway and put a hole in it, this added to the weight of the mere 20 priceless Sea Harriers could deliver. This hole, as repairable as it was, was the most significant damage done to the runway despite numerous Sea Harrier and GR3 attacks.

Thanks, Rule. Please provide your source for this info; I want to read up about the Nimrod in action. (Unless your source is 1983's Air War South Atlantic by Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, still one of my favorite books about the campaign. Pages 88, 92, 93, 100, 128 describe flights by RAF Wing Commander David Emmerson and his Nimrod MR.2 crews, some of record duration. Ward did not specify the "certain misguided journalistic records of the air fighting" containing "absolute poppycock" about Nimrods (p218), but reading his 1992 book recently, I guessed Ward was referring to Air War South Atlantic , which I am very familiar with, as at least one of those.)

I can't quote a source, I haven't had access to these books since before Covid, so I used AI to refresh my memory. However over the years (decades really) I've done enough reading to believe those figures more or less.

The vast majority of the Nimrod missions were 'standard'~10 hour maritime patrols of the type a lot of Air Forces?Navies do/did every day with their P3s, Atlantics and Nimrods. These covered the the first half or so of the shipping route from Ascension to the Tug, Repair and Logistic Area (TRALA), a moving patch of ocean near-ish to the TEZ where shipping would rendezvous.

Nimrods were fitted with ex-Vulcan IFR probes attached to the forward fuselage escape hatch, with a standard black rubber hose going through the cabin interior, past all the operators, to connect with a fuel tank somewhere. They did paint yellow stripes on this black hose so the crew wouldn't knock it accidentally, but they didn't have an escape hatch anymore.

The RAF could only put 1 large aircraft in the region of the Falklands per day, either Victor (for the radar recce of South Georgia before BB1), Vulcan, Nimrod or Hercules. We know there were 6 Black Bucks and we know how many days of fighting there was, so we only need to figure out many many Hercules parachute drops and what's left were IFR Nimrod missions.

Sharkey is really quibbling over semantics.

 

[Owens Z]

Hindsight is 20-20, and saying after the war that BB1 failed therefore shouldn't have been attempted is the ultimate expression of hindsight. American's call it Monday morning quarterbacking. BB1 did hit the runway and put a hole in it, this added to the weight of the mere 20 priceless Sea Harriers could deliver. This hole, as repairable as it was, was the most significant damage done to the runway despite numerous Sea Harrier and GR3 attacks.

Agreed. As I think I made clear, I myself don't believe that Operation Black Buck was a mistake. Even if some fraction of it was a desire to have the RAF visible as active in the South Atlantic campaign, which seems plausible given human nature, to attempt the complex missions appeared (and appears) worthwhile to me. I was merely pointing out to readers here, for clarity, that Nigel 'Sharkey' Ward is far from alone in maintaining that the great effort and expense could have been more efficiently used in other channels to win the war.

In fairness, Ward (as he later wrote) believed Operation Black Buck was mistaken while it was happening. To say that Ward's squadron of Sea Harriers aboard carrier HMS Invincible on station would be better employed striking nearby Stanley airfield directly, instead of holding back as fighter escort for a lone Vulcan bomber if that became needed (as per the orders Ward received), is hardly the prima facie absurdity that Yellow Palace sneerily made it out to be. And unlike Yellow Palace, you, and me, Ward was there. I find Ward's strongly expressed views to be valuably thought-provoking.

I can't quote a source, I haven't had access to these books since before Covid, so I used AI to refresh my memory. However over the years (decades really) I've done enough reading to believe those figures more or less...

That's disappointing to learn. As Secret Projects Forum members can see, I take pains to cite my authoritative sources, so that those who might be interested can check for themselves. I ask members that henceforth no AI slop be used for ripostes to me. (In all my threads, a commenter who doesn't need to cite book/article pages like me but rather can convey his own life's eyewitness testimony is especially welcome.)

For the specific question of Nimrod service, readers are referred to post #1199 under 'Some Future Titles of Interest for SPF Members'.

 

[Rule of cool]

I ask members that henceforth no AI slop be used for ripostes to me.

AI Slop? I gained my knowledge on this topic before AI was invented. Are we not allowed to use sophisticated internet search tools to find exact dates and mission numbers, or would you prefer a vague answer that hasn't been double checked?

 

[Dilandu]

That's disappointing to learn. As Secret Projects Forum members can see, I take pains to cite my authoritative sources, so that those who might be interested can check for themselves. I ask members that henceforth no AI slop be used for ripostes to me. (In all my threads, a commenter who doesn't need to cite book/article pages like me but rather can convey his own life's eyewitness testimony is especially welcome.)

WIth all respect, but this anti-AI rant in the theme not related to AI, and aimed at fellow user who merely stated that he used AI to find exact dates and numbers, since he did not have access to referred sources - its improper and at least mildly offensive.

 

[timmymagic]

Agreed. As I think I made clear, I myself don't believe that Operation Black Buck was a mistake. Even if some fraction of it was a desire to have the RAF visible as active in the South Atlantic campaign, which seems plausible given human nature, to attempt the complex missions appeared (and appears) worthwhile to me.

I've sympathy for both viewpoints on Black Buck. They were an incredible accomplishment, and they did have some effect.

Ultimately Ascension Island had the fuel and the aircraft there so unless there was a mission for another platform (Nimrod, Victor or Hercules) that didn't go ahead as a result, then why not do it? I think history shows that further Nimrod or Victor flights would have been unlikely to have produced more effect....could Hercules have delivered more to the fleet that would have tipped the scale elsewhere? I don't think so...

What would have been interesting is the effect of later Black Buck if they'd been able to employ Shrike, Jamming Pods (as they did) and Paveway II from altitude. Realistically though without Pave Spike it would have meant reliance on ground lasing, which by default means the war was as good as over.

 

[Hood]

I'll link to a post I made back in 2021 on the subject of the runway: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...ome-of-the-falklands.37036/page-4#post-454922

The runway became a fixation.

Saying that, the Vulcan was the only available tool to increase the weapons drop capacity not already in-theatre (the Shars and Harriers on the two carriers) and due to its antiquated systems it wasn't suited for tactical employment, so those dumb 1,000lbs had to go somewhere where they would do damage and not kill civilians and that meant dropping them on the airfield.
The later attempts to cobble together a SEAD capability with Shrike and a precision bombing capability with Paveway (guided by ground-observers) were perhaps more operationally relevant but too ad hoc to be of much use.

 

[Rule of cool]

The runway became a fixation.

To be fair the runway was extremely important to the Argentine war effort and provided the forces on the islands with extra teeth once the shooting started. Two and later four 155mm artillery pieces to counter the naval gunfire were flown in from 15 May and the Exocet launcher trailer was flown in from May 31. This launcher fired Exocets which struck the Glamorgan and killed 13 sailors on 13 June.

 

[Jemiba]

As said in „…It is not intended as a general purpose "Alternative History" forum to discuss any conceivable topic.“