That's not information either of us have.
Going down this route of "could it intercept AShMs" will only make the 14 look worse though, so if you're trying to defend the reputation of the tomcat, this isn't going to go well. There are COUNTLESS reports of AWG-9 having trouble with low altitude targets. One comes from a USAF document on fighting the Tomcat in ACM, which states that F-15s should stay low and drop chaff to hide in the ground clutter.
it could have been more susceptible to the onboard defensive ECM of a missile.
So, these posts show very little relation to reality at all. You ascribe all the limitations to one one side and grant all possible capability to the other.
1) The original 1965 Kh-22 is launched from a Tu-22 or Tu-22M flying at 8-12km and flies at 22km cruise altitude, above the Tomcat, at high closing speed, diving onto the target from height, making both bomber and missile as perfect targets for a High PRF / pulse radar like AWG-9 / AWG-10 while in flight. This is not surprising as this is exactly the kind of threat these systems was designed to counter.
Original 1965 Kh-22 has no defensive ECM - height and speed were its only defences - nor any ECCM in the radar seeker, which made it vulnerable to ship-based jamming in the terminal phase and unable to counter AWG-9 or AIM-54A locks.
2) As the Tomcat and improved F-4J versions came into service, the USSR redesigned the Kh-22 missiles for low level launches. Concerned that the high flying bomber aircraft would be too easily shot down, it was intended to fly them at 1000m - 8000m. From low altitudes, the upgraded Kh-22 missiles would cruise at 12km instead of 22km, but speed and range were significantly reduced in this mode - Mach 2 cruise, and 110km range at 1000m launch and 240km at 8000m. The improved missiles had ECCM capability added to the seeker of the radar homing version, but still no defensive ECM.
Now lets talk about guidance options of these missiles.
A) The inertial guided version was fairly certain to miss a moving target (and not terribly accurate against stationary ones), so needed a nuclear warhead to have any chance of utility.
B) The active radar guided version needed its host aircraft to detect the carrier from 350km range, just about doable in a Tu-22M with PN-A radar flying at 12km, then receive mid-course corrections from said carrier aircraft, which has to be able to resist any jamming from the carrier group to track the carrier as the missile flies out until the active radar on the missile takes over. Not sure how a far a Tu-22M at 1000m would be able to detect a carrier.
C) The passive radar homing version was intended to counter Nike-Ajax and Bomarc, and was not very successful nor used much - the Tu-22M3 dropped the improved Kurs-NM Elint station needed to support it and its seeker wasn't really useful.
The modern Kh-32 version uses modern guidance systems and is a very much more useful missile.
All this is leaving out the Carrier groups assets like the EA-6.
Tomcat + AWG-9 + AIM-54 was a perfectly sensible system for the threat in 1976. With the USSR switching to low level attacks, the AWG-71 + AIM-54C was a sensible improvement over it.
The Kh-22 wasn't some super-weapon, but it wasn't a negligible threat either. The acquisition of the Tomcat/AWG-9/AIM-54 system was a huge expense.
I suggest reading
КРЫЛАТЫЕ РАКЕТЫ СССР И РОССИИ Виктор Марковский / Игорь Приходченко
CRUISE MISSILES OF THE USSR AND RUSSIA Viktor Markovsky / Igor Prikhodchenko (Eksmo 2016)
for a detailed account of the Kh-22 missile development testing and operations.
