Eurocopter now operates as Airbus Helicopters.
NH-90 is the product of NHI - a consortium of Airbus Helicopters, Leonardo and Fokker Aerostructures.
EC-665 is a product of Airbus Helicopters.
 
Eurocopter now operates as Airbus Helicopters.
NH-90 is the product of NHI - a consortium of Airbus Helicopters, Leonardo and Fokker Aerostructures.
EC-665 is a product of Airbus Helicopters.

Thanks Arjen, so easy to get confused these days.
 
Maybe it is not a matter of "having no option" but being truly satisfied with the type ? I should check the AdT Tiger maintenance / availability rates.

TBH, I'm shocked the NH-90 turned so bad, in Australia, France, Germany and elsewhere. I remember 25 years ago when it was to be "the helicopter of the future" beyond the Super Pumas / Caracals and the antiquated Pumas...

What went wrong with these two ? NH-90 first, and then Tiger ?

The NH-90 has been another mess-up along with the Tiger. Where did it all go wrong for Eurocopter now part of Airbus?
MBDA also have old problems with own product - PARS 3LR had demonstrate low reliability in US trials

  • MBDA and Diehl did not deliver the serial-produced missiles until the end of 2015, up to 5 years later than planned
  • tests at White Sands showed a large percent of misses, many missiles after launch lost their target and then incorrect lock on another objects
  • hits only 16% targets, in the 12 scenarios the missile met the requirements of only one test
  • another problems with the helicopter and the missile, for example, unsatisfactory sensor resolution and slow engage-launch procedures, difficults in salvo firing

France seems pretty happy of its Tigers
I know a couple reasons - their helicopters armed the Hellfires and cannons
 
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Maybe it is not a matter of "having no option" but being truly satisfied with the type ? I should check the AdT Tiger maintenance / availability rates.

TBH, I'm shocked the NH-90 turned so bad, in Australia, France, Germany and elsewhere. I remember 25 years ago when it was to be "the helicopter of the future" beyond the Super Pumas / Caracals and the antiquated Pumas...

What went wrong with these two ? NH-90 first, and then Tiger ?

The NH-90 has been another mess-up along with the Tiger. Where did it all go wrong for Eurocopter now part of Airbus?

The same could be said about Tonal, but sense prevailed.

Chris
 
I wonder if the constant changes of ownership haven't impacted on NH90 and Tiger given their original designer belonged to completely different companies and the fact that rationalisation of the industry seemed to happen around these two projects. On paper all of these are experienced companies but somehow its not gelled together.

Let's not forget that studies for NH90 began in the late 1970s for a helicopter for the 1990s (not a helicopter for the 2020s!!) before effort really kicked off in 1985.
Aérospatiale and DASA merged their helicopter interests as Eurocopter in 1992, the same year NHIndustries was created to oversee NH90.
In 1992, Fokker, in serious financial problems, entered an agreement with DASA but DASA's parent Daimler-Benz ditched Fokker in 1996 and they went bankrupt, Stork N.V taking over its airframe business.
Agusta merged with GKN-Westland in 2000 before becoming merged within Finmeccanica as Leonardo.

NHIndustries worksplit was:
  • Airbus Helicopters France 31.25% (Engines, Rotors, the Electrical, flight control and the core avionics systems)
  • Airbus Helicopters Deutschland 31.25% (Forward and centre fuselage, the fuel, communications and avionics control systems)
  • Fokker 5.5% (Tail structure, doors, sponsons, landing gear and the intermediate gearbox)
  • AgustaWestland 32% (Rear fuselage, main gearbox, hydraulic system, automatic flight control and plant management systems, power plant and the NFH mission system)
With no less than six final assembly facilities (Marignane, France; Tessera, Italy; Donauwörth, Germany; Halli, Finland; Brisbane, Australia).

The Tiger was a more simple Aérospatiale and DASA project begun in 1984, in 1992 of course both became Eurocopter. There are two assembly facilities (Marignane and Donauwörth).
Thomson CSF who were responsible for the avionics was privatised in 1999, soon took over Racal and then became Thales in 2000.
The Tiger was complicated by so many versions and changes that there wasn't really a standard baseline to build on. Plus both parties were new to gunship choppers and the avionics and systems required. It wasn't like bolting weapons to a Gazelle or Puma.
And the vagaries of Trigat and its piecemeal chopping hasn't helped.

But as others have said, Germany's military seems to have widespread issues with maintenance and readiness so that can't be helping.
 
@Hood - a a superbly precise appreciation of the conundrum that has come about with the widespread contraction of the aerospace industries, pretty much everywhere. I suspect that the challenges for NH-90 are compounded by the multitude of variations of the platform that would likely be an issue for any aerospace company. If I recall correctly the UK had issues with Boeing on the CH-47 a number of years ago. While Apache seems to have had fewer international issues I suspect that is because, for the most part, they are all relatively the same platform and accoutrements .
 
I wonder if the constant changes of ownership haven't impacted on NH90 and Tiger given their original designer belonged to completely different companies and the fact that rationalisation of the industry seemed to happen around these two projects. On paper all of these are experienced companies but somehow its not gelled together.

Let's not forget that studies for NH90 began in the late 1970s for a helicopter for the 1990s (not a helicopter for the 2020s!!) before effort really kicked off in 1985.
Aérospatiale and DASA merged their helicopter interests as Eurocopter in 1992, the same year NHIndustries was created to oversee NH90.
In 1992, Fokker, in serious financial problems, entered an agreement with DASA but DASA's parent Daimler-Benz ditched Fokker in 1996 and they went bankrupt, Stork N.V taking over its airframe business.
Agusta merged with GKN-Westland in 2000 before becoming merged within Finmeccanica as Leonardo.

NHIndustries worksplit was:
  • Airbus Helicopters France 31.25% (Engines, Rotors, the Electrical, flight control and the core avionics systems)
  • Airbus Helicopters Deutschland 31.25% (Forward and centre fuselage, the fuel, communications and avionics control systems)
  • Fokker 5.5% (Tail structure, doors, sponsons, landing gear and the intermediate gearbox)
  • AgustaWestland 32% (Rear fuselage, main gearbox, hydraulic system, automatic flight control and plant management systems, power plant and the NFH mission system)
With no less than six final assembly facilities (Marignane, France; Tessera, Italy; Donauwörth, Germany; Halli, Finland; Brisbane, Australia).

The Tiger was a more simple Aérospatiale and DASA project begun in 1984, in 1992 of course both became Eurocopter. There are two assembly facilities (Marignane and Donauwörth).
Thomson CSF who were responsible for the avionics was privatised in 1999, soon took over Racal and then became Thales in 2000.
The Tiger was complicated by so many versions and changes that there wasn't really a standard baseline to build on. Plus both parties were new to gunship choppers and the avionics and systems required. It wasn't like bolting weapons to a Gazelle or Puma.
And the vagaries of Trigat and its piecemeal chopping hasn't helped.

But as others have said, Germany's military seems to have widespread issues with maintenance and readiness so that can't be helping.
Another factor is the damage the Global Financial Crisis did to many companies. Many for instance forced older workers to retire early promoting younger less experienced people to replace them. This led to the advancement of what I refer to as the Teflon cockroach, i.e. the professional survivors in industry who somehow mange to outlast much more capable and competent people by the simple expedient of doing virtually nothing, staying totally within their comfort zones, and specialise in not rocking the boat.

End result, smaller, overall less experienced teams, led by overly cautious, less experienced managers, who either would never have risen to that level without significantly more professional development, or would have been weeded out and never promoted, had the older, wiser heads still been there. Then you throw in highly complex multinational projects that were still very much developmental when they entered service, provide them with inadequate support and assume the newly appointed project / product managers actually have sufficient relevant experience.
 
I'm actually finding out my father was correct about a lot of things I thought I knew better about but was wrong.

Loss of institutional knowledge is a big problem in any industry but an absolute killer in defence. It is also compounded in defence because industry rely heavily on ex defence personnel, as well as government trained technical people for their workforces. As more and more defence and government functions were privatised the industry workforces grew and the uniformed / government work forces shrunk, with fewer trainees being taken on, and those who were, not being trained in the same specialties as their predecessors because the deeper maintenance work, project work and design work was being outsourced.

Government employs close to 50% contractors because it want ready trained experts, when the contractors are only expert in two or three of the areas instead of several, instead of training and upskilling them they turf them out the door and hire another contractor who has no hope of getting up to speed. Result is they end up not being able to get the work done, they blame the contractors and skills shortages, satisfied they have a plausible excuse for not performing, not caring, in fact actively resisting any effort to professionalize the work force with the aim of getting the work done.

The industry workforce ages and starts retiring while the defence workforce they used to recruit from is smaller and less experienced than it once was. Throw in a management team with MBAs but limited, if any, technical knowledge, who see people as replaceable/disposable resources rather than difficult to replace teams and you have a world of pain.

In comes the Teflon Cockroach, wasn't particularly good when in uniform but tells a good yarn, tells management what they want to hear, willing to undertake any workaround, cut any corner like a good little lap dog, know less than their younger subordinates and no where near what the now retired redundant grey hairs knew, but are now running the show and telling the More Bugger All (MBA) brigade what they want to hear.
 
Mk 3 Upgrade luanched by France and Spain


cheers
 

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Mk 3 Upgrade luanched by France and Spain


cheers

I see from the graphic that there is not going to be a millimetre wave radar which would further aid the air to air missiles.
 
I wonder which UAS they have in mind for MUM-T. The helo in the picture appears to be a VRS700 , which is currently non existent and intended as a naval UAS.
 

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Also unbelievable: how botched is the wording here:

The Tigre won't have any world equivalent*



*yes, the only attack helo in the world barely operational after 20years in service that need to be replaced by older design... Truly out of scope!
 

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Let's hope the MKIII will be their chef d'oeuvre

I noticed how the model in the animation hasn't any re-inforcent or bracing struts under the roof part supporting the EO turret. Let's hope that there is some in reality.

I will remind all the horrible death of Gazelle gunners killed, crushed, by their roof mounted targeting system.
 
I noticed how the model in the animation hasn't any re-inforcent or bracing struts under the roof part supporting the EO turret. Let's hope that there is some in reality.

The Euroflir 510 is replacing the Strix rooftop sight so the structural supports must already exist. It shouldn’t be too difficult to integrate as long as it’s in the same weight range as the Strix.
 
I like the fact that they are calling the Tiger Mk.3 the most modern helicopter there is, I think that they have forgotten about the AH-64E Apache Guardian. Or why Australia ditched their Tigers for the Apache instead.
Screenshot_20220928_132645.jpg
 
I'm actually finding out my father was correct about a lot of things I thought I knew better about but was wrong.

It's amazing how much smarter our parents become as we get older...
I was pretty grumpy when I wrote that, I was working under a particularly obnoxious, and thoroughly incompetent, retired E-9 who could only have been promoted during a skills shortage. Things are much better now I am working directly for a professional engineer O-6 on a complex project.

The further I get away from aviation the better things get as well. Fewer egos, higher levels of professionalism, better team environments, less hierarchical BS from failed wannabe aerosexuals.
 
Let's hope the MKIII will be their chef d'oeuvre

I noticed how the model in the animation hasn't any re-inforcent or bracing struts under the roof part supporting the EO turret. Let's hope that there is some in reality.

I will remind all the horrible death of Gazelle gunners killed, crushed, by their roof mounted targeting system.
It's actually an extremely robust and survivable airframe, much more modern and survivable than the Apache airframe. Ironically Tiger is a rare case where Australia would have been better off doing a truly unique version with as many US systems as possible, that way they could have hooked into the US spiral developments for the systems they shared with Apache and Venom, making Tiger much more sustainable.

Apparently, T-700 would have been a comparatively easy installation, I was even told by someone on the project that it was a possibility for the life extension had it proceeded.
 

I like the fact that they are calling the Tiger Mk.3 the most modern helicopter there is, I think that they have forgotten about the AH-64E Apache Guardian. Or why Australia ditched their Tigers for the Apache instead.
Interestingly at an army aviation conference the RASM (Regiment Artificer Sergent Major), the senior technical soldier at 1 Aviation Regiment, was told by his US Army equivalents that the Guardian has its issues and Australia may be better off sticking with Tiger for the time being.

The reality is any extensively upgraded, as opposed to new platform, is by its very nature a compromise. It's still an old platform, just with new gear shoehorned in. The Tiger is a newer platform design than the Apache and does somethings very well, the stuff it could improve on, well it can be improved and upgraded, perhaps more easily and effectively than Apache.

Above all the move away from Tiger was political, the love affair with all things French from the 2000s and early 2010s (Tiger, MRH, MU90, Attack class submarine) ended and instead we had a new DEFMIN who wanted to buy everything from the corner FMS store, while puffing up his chest and talking about China. The irony is the party that ordered all the French gear is the party that cancelled all the French gear a decade later, they just hoped enough time had passed that everyone would assume it was the other side that ordered it in the first place.

Should Australia have bought Tiger in the first place, probably not, should they be replacing it early and more the point with Apache, again probably not. The big concern is maritime operations, Tiger has been very successful operating from the LHDs, Apache's record, particularly the UKs experience operating off Ocean, not so good. There was a very solid argument than when you look at how the ADF operates Tiger, if it needed to be replaced, then AH-1Z would have been the way to go.
 
The big concern is maritime operations, Tiger has been very successful operating from the LHDs, Apache's record, particularly the UKs experience operating off Ocean, not so good.

Yes and with both France and Spain also operating their Tigers off LHDs, including the Canberras’ sister-ship Juan Carlos, that should be another argument to stick with a known quantity rather than starting all over with a whole new platform.
 
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Cockpit's roof bracing and reinforced structure (notice also the ballistic shoulder mounted protections for the pilot):

CIrbI1VXAAAvcrC.jpg


I don't know if all models got the same definition.
 

Above all the move away from Tiger was political, the love affair with all things French from the 2000s and early 2010s (Tiger, MRH, MU90, Attack class submarine) ended and instead we had a new DEFMIN who wanted to buy everything from the corner FMS store, while puffing up his chest and talking about China. The irony is the party that ordered all the French gear is the party that cancelled all the French gear a decade later, they just hoped enough time had passed that everyone would assume it was the other side that ordered it in the first place.
While I agree that the previous Govt did a lot of questionable things on the Defence side and has actually left Australia far less prepared then we should be, the move away from the Tiger was not purely political. Airbus has had an atrocious record supporting both the Tiger and MRH90 in Australia (and arguably elsewhere - see NH90 saga). Their bid for LAND 4503 also had multiple non-compliances which led them to be dropped in the first round.

Should Australia have bought Tiger in the first place, probably not
Technically the ARH Tiger fit the original AIR87 project perfectly. The ADF was after a replacement for their Kiowas first and foremost with a secondary requirement to replace the Bushrangers. The ARH title (Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter) sums it up. Despite what people seem to think, the original requirement was never for a dedicated attack helicopter in the mood of the AH-64.
 
The 665 is inherently agile. It's a new generation (at least it was in the 1990's) and got less armor. However, with 10+ percent of availability, it remains the same as not much, Military wise.
 
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Above all the move away from Tiger was political, the love affair with all things French from the 2000s and early 2010s (Tiger, MRH, MU90, Attack class submarine) ended and instead we had a new DEFMIN who wanted to buy everything from the corner FMS store, while puffing up his chest and talking about China. The irony is the party that ordered all the French gear is the party that cancelled all the French gear a decade later, they just hoped enough time had passed that everyone would assume it was the other side that ordered it in the first place.
While I agree that the previous Govt did a lot of questionable things on the Defence side and has actually left Australia far less prepared then we should be, the move away from the Tiger was not purely political. Airbus has had an atrocious record supporting both the Tiger and MRH90 in Australia (and arguably elsewhere - see NH90 saga). Their bid for LAND 4503 also had multiple non-compliances which led them to be dropped in the first round.

Should Australia have bought Tiger in the first place, probably not
Technically the ARH Tiger fit the original AIR87 project perfectly. The ADF was after a replacement for their Kiowas first and foremost with a secondary requirement to replace the Bushrangers. The ARH title (Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter) sums it up. Despite what people seem to think, the original requirement was never for a dedicated attack helicopter in the mood of the AH-64.
Sadly, whatever was acquired was going to have issues. The late 90s through the 2000s saw a lot of delays due to the perceived "Peace Dividend" project cancellations, privatizations of government owned companies and facilities, shrinking of inhouse technical and engineering capability, contracting out and outsourcing etc. When combined with the acquisition of bleeding edge tech to replace 1950s developed capabilities, it was a perfect storm for troubled and failed programs.

The jump from the Kiowa and Iroquois "Bushranger" to Tiger, was like trading a Series I Landrover for a Tesla, it was hard enough for the operators, but hell for the maintainers. Even today the only reason Tiger has improved as much as it has in recent years is the hard work put in by Airbus staff. They are literally filling roles that were intended to be Army to increase availability. Defence had their work force cut back and deskilled at the same time they were introducing not just the most advanced equipment the ADF has ever had, but some of the most advanced used anywhere in the world.
 
Don't you know that poor availability rate for the Tiger is not specific to Australia?
Yes, and I also know that the Apache had a lot of issues for its first decade or so and that the Guardian has had problems too. Australia actually found themselves ahead of the curve in a number of areas on Tiger, hitting milestones and unfortunately problems, before the parent operators. The US used to operate the same way as the French appear to still be doing these days, get the early models into service, find the in-service issues and fix them in follow on versions.

Tiger was over the hump, but there weren't enough airframes to meet the refined requirements, the crazy thing is I don't know how anyone could have determined that 22 airframes were anywhere near sufficient to replace the Kiowa and the Bushranger.
 
the crazy thing is I don't know how anyone could have determined that 22 airframes were anywhere near sufficient to replace the Kiowa and the Bushranger.
There was modelling done at the time.
The succession of procurement disasters from the late 90s onwards appears to demonstrate the prevalence of GIGO (garbage in, garbage out) in terms of modelling. There were some quite unexpected to outright bizarre answers to selection questions during that period, sometimes it was down to the bidding companies being allowed to determine the numbers required to deliver the contracted capability.

Although it wasn't used in the Tigers selection, there was the much-maligned Kinard process (I have harped on about it often and extensively), that I discovered was actually bastardised from its initial intent and design. It had initially been intended to be used to determine which way to go in terms of COTS, MOTS Modified MOTS and bespoke design of military equipment, i.e. A and B vehicles (military and COTS trucks) etc. but then used to select the RANs new destroyers. The "modelling" led to a run off between the G&C International Frigate "evolved design" and the F-104 "existing design" after eliminating the Arliegh Burke in modified and FMS forms as well as the modified F-100.

It was a time of very poor risk analysis, combined with a low risk appetite, leading to poor decisions and the delusion that if you contractually pushed responsibility for all the thinking and technical acumen onto primes everything would work magically. If it failed, all good, just blame the contractor. Sort of lost sight of the whole concept of defence procurement being meant to deliver capability.
 
the crazy thing is I don't know how anyone could have determined that 22 airframes were anywhere near sufficient to replace the Kiowa and the Bushranger.
There was modelling done at the time.
The succession of procurement disasters from the late 90s onwards appears to demonstrate the prevalence of GIGO (garbage in, garbage out) in terms of modelling. There were some quite unexpected to outright bizarre answers to selection questions during that period, sometimes it was down to the bidding companies being allowed to determine the numbers required to deliver the contracted capability.

Although it wasn't used in the Tigers selection, there was the much-maligned Kinard process (I have harped on about it often and extensively), that I discovered was actually bastardised from its initial intent and design. It had initially been intended to be used to determine which way to go in terms of COTS, MOTS Modified MOTS and bespoke design of military equipment, i.e. A and B vehicles (military and COTS trucks) etc. but then used to select the RANs new destroyers. The "modelling" led to a run off between the G&C International Frigate "evolved design" and the F-104 "existing design" after eliminating the Arliegh Burke in modified and FMS forms as well as the modified F-100.

It was a time of very poor risk analysis, combined with a low risk appetite, leading to poor decisions and the delusion that if you contractually pushed responsibility for all the thinking and technical acumen onto primes everything would work magically. If it failed, all good, just blame the contractor. Sort of lost sight of the whole concept of defence procurement being meant to deliver capability.
Sadly this appears to be endemic across most of the liberal democracies. The initial analysis means are usually poor, designed to demonstrate a specific product or capability, and crumble under acute scrutiny. However if they fit the politics of the day this observation is kept from public view.
 
Germany to replace their Tigers with H145Ms
on the one hand, the H145M seems to be getting popular. We just had another country replace their NH-90s with them.

On the other hand, replacing attack helicopters with H145Ms seems very questionable .

 

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