Difference in US and China's arms purchases, production and defense budgets

[bobbymike]

And yes, China is also putting additional nukes/icbms in service while US is not. But the difference there is so huge that US can wait another decade or two, start increasing its arsenal only then and still be ahead of China.

Doesn't work that way. In ten, twenty years... who is the US going to have who knows how to manufacture nukes? What companies are we going to have that have the expertise, knowledge and *equipment* to manufacture nukes?

Complex items like nukes and ICBMs *must* be kept in more or less constant production or you lose the tribal knowledge and *tools* to make them, and you have to start from scratch. And if you start from scratch, how do you know the things will actually work? It's not like we're actually *testing* nukes anymore.

There's an article I'll post later that shows how we underestimated the former USSRs nukes by 20,000 or so warheads. This was the most spied upon nation and most rigorous decadal study of military capabilities ever undertaken. Yet we were off by tens of thousands.

I truly believe this continued use of "China has only 300 warheads" given the size of their infrastructure allotted to nukes is wishful thinking at best and gross negligence and naivity at worst.

 

[GTX]

The US acts in a much more predictable way. We also haven't challenged International law at sea. There is no reason for the PRC to feel concerned about US actions. On the other hand, the PRC is acting provocatively.

One could argue that from a non-US perspective the view might be different.

 

[Airplane]

And yes, China is also putting additional nukes/icbms in service while US is not. But the difference there is so huge that US can wait another decade or two, start increasing its arsenal only then and still be ahead of China.

Doesn't work that way. In ten, twenty years... who is the US going to have who knows how to manufacture nukes? What companies are we going to have that have the expertise, knowledge and *equipment* to manufacture nukes?

Complex items like nukes and ICBMs *must* be kept in more or less constant production or you lose the tribal knowledge and *tools* to make them, and you have to start from scratch. And if you start from scratch, how do you know the things will actually work? It's not like we're actually *testing* nukes anymore.

There's an article I'll post later that shows how we underestimated the former USSRs nukes by 20,000 or so warheads. This was the most spied upon nation and most rigorous decadal study of military capabilities ever undertaken. Yet we were off by tens of thousands.

I truly believe this continued use of "China has only 300 warheads" given the size of their infrastructure allotted to nukes is wishful thinking at best and gross negligence and naivity at worst.

And their nukes are newer with newer pits that are likely to still work. You can't say that about all of the US's nuke pits.

 

[riggerrob]

Judging by the OP's numbers, the USA is barely producing enough to keep production lines open ...... replace normal wear-and-tear.
And a later poster was correct in stating that complex weapons require skilled workers with dozens of years experience.
This is where China is gaining advantage. As globalize do manufacturing reduces costs, the USA loses skilled workers (tool and die makers, shop smiths, etc.) as they retire. With no new factories/production lines in the USA, no new production workers get trained.

 

[sferrin]

Judging by the OP's numbers, the USA is barely producing enough to keep production lines open ...... replace normal wear-and-tear.
And a later poster was correct in stating that complex weapons require skilled workers with dozens of years experience.
This is where China is gaining advantage. As globalize do manufacturing reduces costs, the USA loses skilled workers (tool and die makers, shop smiths, etc.) as they retire. With no new factories/production lines in the USA, no new production workers get trained.

The US isn't producing any. The last newly manufactured warhead was a W88 (the design of which was stolen by China) back in the late 80s.

 

[sferrin]

The US acts in a much more predictable way. We also haven't challenged International law at sea. There is no reason for the PRC to feel concerned about US actions. On the other hand, the PRC is acting provocatively.

One could argue that from a non-US perspective the view might be different.

Both China and Russia are objectively less predictable than the US. There's a reason why their neighbors have mostly scrambled to participate in large military alliances against them while the US's neighbors have not.

 

[NeilChapman]

The US acts in a much more predictable way. We also haven't challenged International law at sea. There is no reason for the PRC to feel concerned about US actions. On the other hand, the PRC is acting provocatively.

One could argue that from a non-US perspective the view might be different.

It would definitely be different if you're objective is maintaining an authoritarian regime and not promoting the welfare of other states in the region.

The long game by the PRC seems to be to convince countries around the SCS that the US will not defend the interests of "other" nations. We see this by the lawless actions of the PRC civilian and paramilitary "naval forces". Creating the circumstances that negatively affect the harmony around the SCS is not the actions of a responsible "big brother". The PRC is expected to act as a great power if they wish the honorable respect of a great power. Not acting honorably results in the opposite. For instance, >80% of Japanese oil comes from the middle east. The threat of closing the SCS and subjecting Japan to a cut-off is not an option.

The 2030 Flight Plan seems pretty clear to me as far as NGAD goes. "We're determining what we need". US requirements for air dominance in this region will depend on how those threats can be mitigated. But that goes hand-in-hand with the continuing cultivation of US relationships in the regions where global threats exist - currently around Russia, the PRC, N. Korea and Iran. Relationships with Vietnam, the PI, Malaysia and Indonesia seem particularly crucial re the SCS. Encouraging the PRC there is "another way" is also crucial. In the mean time, the PRC is acting provocatively and that government is alone responsible for the results of its actions.

 

[NeilChapman]

I would like to understand how "flight testing" has been improved over the last decade. It seems that we have made great strides in

digital design
prototyping &
manufacturing techniques.

Is there anyone that can shed some light on the newer techniques or systems for the testing and verification processes that would enable us to get airframes to IOC faster? Or, if this is confidential, then what type of time frame reduction we might expect for new airframes - post F-35? I've read that Saab has made some advances for the Grippen-E but not read any examples.

 

[Triton]

How much of an adversary's incoming nuclear force would be destroyed by ABM missiles, lasers and directed-energy weapons, railguns, and stealth fighter aircraft? Hasn't the United States moved away from Mutually Assured Destruction as a deterrent to war and moved to an era of warhead defense?

 

[totoro]

No one wants to comment the conventional arms production where US has a significant production lead in pretty much everything but combat planes (that too will change within a few years as f35 production ramps up and b21 comes online) and navy matters where there's something close to a parity (number of ships wise) though total tonnage of US vessels is still greater?

 

[NeilChapman]

No one wants to comment the conventional arms production where US has a significant production lead in pretty much everything but combat planes (that too will change within a few years as f35 production ramps up and b21 comes online) and navy matters where there's something close to a parity (number of ships wise) though total tonnage of US vessels is still greater?

Comment in what way? The US has global responsibilities. They're going to have a production lead in pretty much everything. Would you expect something different?

 

[sferrin]

How much of an adversary's incoming nuclear force would be destroyed by ABM missiles, lasers and directed-energy weapons, railguns, and stealth fighter aircraft? Hasn't the United States moved away from Mutually Assured Destruction as a deterrent to war and moved to an era of warhead defense?

Any defenses would be for an attack by lunatics or an accidental launch. No way is there enough right now to repel a large scale assault. MAD is far, FAR more effective at preventing an attack by a rational state actor.

 

[Moose]

How much of an adversary's incoming nuclear force would be destroyed by ABM missiles, lasers and directed-energy weapons, railguns, and stealth fighter aircraft? Hasn't the United States moved away from Mutually Assured Destruction as a deterrent to war and moved to an era of warhead defense?

We're a long, long way from being able to take out more than a handful of inbound ballistic targets. Aegis and GMD are focused on rouge states, Railgun and Solid-State DEW BMD is still at a conceptual phase. The potential is there, but we're a long way.

 

[totoro]

Comment in what way? The US has global responsibilities. They're going to have a production lead in pretty much everything. Would you expect something different?

This whole topic was created because of the discussion started by a claim that China is currently outproducing US military hardware wise. In some areas that may be true, but in most areas it is not true.

 

[sferrin]

This whole topic was created because of the discussion started by a claim that China is currently outproducing US military hardware wise. In some areas that may be true, but in most areas it is not true.

In the ones that count it is. They are producing far more ballistic missile systems, nuclear systems, etc. Most importantly of all though, their R&D program is FAR larger than that of the US. Compare how many new systems China has introduced in the last 10 years to the US.

 

[NeilChapman]

Comment in what way? The US has global responsibilities. They're going to have a production lead in pretty much everything. Would you expect something different?

This whole topic was created because of the discussion started by a claim that China is currently outproducing US military hardware wise. In some areas that may be true, but in most areas it is not true.

Let's not call the country China. Taiwan considers themselves Chinese as well. Taiwan does not act provocatively as the PRC does. Words mean things.

The PRC is not acting in a responsible way. As such, it becomes necessary for other countries to respond to its threatening behavior. Frankly, they are acting as one would expect an adolescent - no wisdom. Since the PRC is not an adolescent the world has to assume that they have ulterior motives.

The PRC President flat out lied to the President of the United States - stating that they would not be militarizing disputed areas.

This calls for the United States to create and deploy specific capabilities to counter the threatening, adolescent behavior of the PRC. The PRC is solely responsible for this response. They will continue to isolate themselves and not achieve the "wise big brother" status they long to promote.

So - yes, the US has "more stuff". But the US will need to build and deploy the even "more stuff" required to counter this PRC asinine activity. One would not expect the US to neglect its responsibilities in other parts of the world because the PRC is behaving erratically.

As we have seen, other nations in the region are willing to participate in the required "management" of the PRC's erratic behavior. It's likely that we will even see greater cooperation between the US and India moving forward.

We shall see.

 

[GTX]

The US has global responsibilities.

"responsibilities"? I would say more of "interests". More-over, these are largely self-imposed.

 

[bobbymike]

The US has global responsibilities.

"responsibilities"? I would say more of "interests". More-over, these are largely self-imposed.

Treaties could be more described as 'responsibilities" although those are intertwined with economic interests of course. No wrong answer unless we want to debate how to 'weight' each aspect of US global strategic doctrine along with economic interests.

 

[sferrin]

The US has global responsibilities.

"responsibilities"? I would say more of "interests". More-over, these are largely self-imposed.

Pretty sure we'd prefer things as they are vs retreating to Fortress America and leaving the sea lanes and our allies at the mercy of Russia and China.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/6/us-dangerously-miscalculating-chinas-military-goal/

 

[RyanC]

There's an article I'll post later that shows how we underestimated the former USSRs nukes by 20,000 or so warheads. This was the most spied upon nation and most rigorous decadal study of military capabilities ever undertaken. Yet we were off by tens of thousands.

I truly believe this continued use of "China has only 300 warheads" given the size of their infrastructure allotted to nukes is wishful thinking at best and gross negligence and naivity at worst.

While it's possible that China's warhead stockpile might be 1,000 instead of 300; there's no way they can have a significant order of magnitude more, given all the other modernization efforts going on at the same time.

 

[RyanC]

8,500 jdam kits (no proof or similar satnav guided bomb in use)

BBB...bbbbullllshiiit.

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-GBU.html

 

[sferrin]

\While it's possible that China's warhead stockpile might be 1,000 instead of 300; there's no way they can have a significant order of magnitude more, given all the other modernization efforts going on at the same time.

Why not? Especially if they just focused on two or three warhead models. We built thousands of W80s over the space of a few years, and there's no reason they couldn't have been gradually increasing their stockpile for the last decade.

 

[NeilChapman]

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/6/us-dangerously-miscalculating-chinas-military-goal/

If so - then it's time to up the "state craft".

Perhaps this is an opportunity for the US to work with the ASEAN member states in coordinating, planning and executing large scale biennial Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Response (HADR) exercises. The first year is planning, the second is a live full scale exercise including amphibious landings and air support. This could be coordinated through the AHA Centre in Indonesia. The Centre was established by 10 ASEAN Member States; Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam in 2011 specifically to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management and emergency response in the region.

1. With the devastation seen by tidal waves, typhoons, earthquakes and other natural disasters it is a logical coordination between ASEAN Member States and the United States.
2. This program can be executed by the US Navy/Marines or by using the US Coast Guard if necessary. The Coast Guard reports to Homeland Security during peacetime. It's not technically part of the Department of Defense and therefore provides political latitude, again, if that's necessary, for the US Government and the ASEAN member states in the eyes of the rest of the world.
3. Having this HADR training, coordination and presence would send a clear signal from the people of the United States of their intent to aid and assist the people of the region in times of peace, tragedy and other unforeseen events.
4. The US can use a couple of LSD's and associated relevant equipment, or transfer them to the Coast Guard, for this training. At ~15k tons and 600' they are substantial ships with wide capabilities whose crews have been used for years in HADR actions. They are in line to be replaced by San Antonio Class ships in the near future and are deployed in the Pacific routinely anyway.
5. The US Pacific Command has done HADR when required but not training of this scale and sophistication. This would be very inexpensive for the amount of capability it would generate in the region. It also builds coordination, communication and mutual respect between the participants - not things you want to build from scratch when tragedy and other unforeseen events occur.

Just a thought...

 

[bobbymike]

There's an article I'll post later that shows how we underestimated the former USSRs nukes by 20,000 or so warheads. This was the most spied upon nation and most rigorous decadal study of military capabilities ever undertaken. Yet we were off by tens of thousands.

I truly believe this continued use of "China has only 300 warheads" given the size of their infrastructure allotted to nukes is wishful thinking at best and gross negligence and naivity at worst.

While it's possible that China's warhead stockpile might be 1,000 instead of 300; there's no way they can have a significant order of magnitude more, given all the other modernization efforts going on at the same time.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1612348211/ref=pd_luc_rh_wl_02_02_t_img_lh?ie=UTF8&psc=1

While the world’s attention is focused on the nuclearization of North Korea and Iran and the nuclear brinkmanship between India and Pakistan, China is believed to have doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal, making it “the forgotten nuclear power,” as described in Foreign Affairs. Susan Turner Haynes analyzes China’s buildup and its diversification of increasingly mobile, precise, and sophisticated nuclear weapons. Haynes provides context and clarity on this complex global issue through an analysis of extensive primary source research and lends insight into questions about why China is the only nuclear weapon state recognized under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that continues to pursue qualitative and quantitative advancements to its nuclear force.

As the gap between China’s nuclear force and the forces of the nuclear superpowers narrows against the expressed interest of many nuclear and nonnuclear states, Chinese Nuclear Proliferation offers policy prescriptions to curtail China’s nuclear growth and to assuage fears that the “American world order” presents a direct threat to China’s national security. Presenting technical concepts with minimal jargon in a straightforward style, this book will be of use to casual China watchers and military experts alike

 

[SOC]

The 300 warhead estimate is based on a few factors:

1. The number of missiles produced (some were conventional models, some nuclear; figure a warhead per nuclear missile)

2. The possibility of a few extras

3. The aount of fissile material produced by the Chinese nuclear industry

#3 is the one that people can't get to rationalize a 1,000+ warhead arsenal. Most non-ICBM airframes in development and production are conventional systems these days anyway, and there just aren't a lot of nuclear IR/SL/ICBMs.

 

[totoro]

I would say mpa/asw and asw helicopters matter a lot. AEW matter a lot. SSN matter a lot. Stealth planes matter a lot. And so on.

So it's far from just nuclear arsenal mattering, despite this thread degenerating into political bickering and talk only of nuclear arsenal.

As far as chinese satnav guided bombs - their commercial companies produce them, sure. They export them. But to date there haven't been images of such bombs on active duty PLA planes. They may use them, but we've no proof yet.

 

[sferrin]

I would say mpa/asw and asw helicopters matter a lot. AEW matter a lot. SSN matter a lot. Stealth planes matter a lot. And so on.

So it's far from just nuclear arsenal mattering, despite this thread degenerating into political bickering and talk only of nuclear arsenal.

Because it's not the threat of Chinese conventional weapons that's allowing China to do whatever it wants in the South China Sea. This should be obvious.

 

[sferrin]

The 300 warhead estimate is based on a few factors:

1. The number of missiles produced (some were conventional models, some nuclear; figure a warhead per nuclear missile)

2. The possibility of a few extras

3. The aount of fissile material produced by the Chinese nuclear industry

#3 is the one that people can't get to rationalize a 1,000+ warhead arsenal. Most non-ICBM airframes in development and production are conventional systems these days anyway, and there just aren't a lot of nuclear IR/SL/ICBMs.

I'd agree with #3 however what about replacing old large warheads with smaller, more efficient warheads using recycled materials, in addition to the uranium/plutonium they produced each year? You could make quite a few W80s with the contents of one W53 for example.

 

[SOC]

Numbers are still not going to get you close to 1,000. The older ones they'd recycle aren't going to amount to a whole lot as there aren't that many to recycle in the first place. DF-4/5 warheads will still be stockpiled until the missiles are wholly replaced. DF-3 tops might be recyclable, but there weren't tons and tons of those to begin with.

 

[RyanC]

Why not?

Because China has carefully threaded the nuclear business for some time now -- they've kept to a careful stated policy of minimum deterrence, to avoid $$$ being consumed by the strategic forces; yet at the same time, they've been in the nuclear business for a long time now, and are an aspiring world power (TM).

It's why I believe they have a lot more than they actually are given credit for (1,000 vs 300), but not huge amounts more (on the order of 3,000-4000+); because if they did have 4,000 nukes, you'd need a lot more nuclear storage areas to store all the nukes; and those storage areas have to be carefully controlled -- one of the ways old school photo intelligence people found important things (TM) in the Soviet Union was looking for places with heavy security, like quadruple lines of chain link fences.

 

[sferrin]

Why not?

Because China has carefully threaded the nuclear business for some time now -- they've kept to a careful stated policy of minimum deterrence, to avoid $$$ being consumed by the strategic forces; yet at the same time, they've been in the nuclear business for a long time now, and are an aspiring world power (TM).

It's why I believe they have a lot more than they actually are given credit for (1,000 vs 300), but not huge amounts more (on the order of 3,000-4000+); because if they did have 4,000 nukes, you'd need a lot more nuclear storage areas to store all the nukes; and those storage areas have to be carefully controlled -- one of the ways old school photo intelligence people found important things (TM) in the Soviet Union was looking for places with heavy security, like quadruple lines of chain link fences.

What of the rumors of hundreds (or thousands) of miles of underground tunnels? Not sure what to think of it myself but something similar (on a much smaller scale) was looked at for the MX missile.

 

[totoro]

Because it's not the threat of Chinese conventional weapons that's allowing China to do whatever it wants in the South China Sea. This should be obvious.

It's definitely not the threat of chinese nuclear arsenal either. Because if these 150 or so ICBM/SLBM based warheads are allowing it - then one can only imagine what 300 or 600 such warheads would do in 10 or 20 years time.

Conventional arsenal IS a bigger threat to US right now as that's what's been upgraded much faster. 10 years ago US could have hoped to win a limited conventional weapons skirmish in SCS with little to no casualties. Today, though victory itself isn't really questioned, the same would be achieved with greater casualties.

Of course, the biggest reason why US isn't doing much in response to Chinese activities in SCS is strength of chinese economy. They don't see those salami slicing tactics as threat that would justify badly injuring US economy. It doesn't matter here how injured Chinese economy would be in the same economic war, the investors in US (or any other country) aren't interested in 10 year or 20 year plans where someone else replacing those investors in US might have it better. They want to earn money right now and don't want to risk wars if they can avoid it.

 

[NeilChapman]

Because it's not the threat of Chinese conventional weapons that's allowing China to do whatever it wants in the South China Sea. This should be obvious.

It's definitely not the threat of chinese nuclear arsenal either. Because if these 150 or so ICBM/SLBM based warheads are allowing it - then one can only imagine what 300 or 600 such warheads would do in 10 or 20 years time.

Conventional arsenal IS a bigger threat to US right now as that's what's been upgraded much faster. 10 years ago US could have hoped to win a limited conventional weapons skirmish in SCS with little to no casualties. Today, though victory itself isn't really questioned, the same would be achieved with greater casualties.

Of course, the biggest reason why US isn't doing much in response to Chinese activities in SCS is strength of chinese economy. They don't see those salami slicing tactics as threat that would justify badly injuring US economy. It doesn't matter here how injured Chinese economy would be in the same economic war, the investors in US (or any other country) aren't interested in 10 year or 20 year plans where someone else replacing those investors in US might have it better. They want to earn money right now and don't want to risk wars if they can avoid it.

Again - PRC, not Chinese.

I disagree with your analysis.

The US is trying to encourage the PRC to act responsibly. Hopefully they learn.

 

[bobbymike]

Why not?

Because China has carefully threaded the nuclear business for some time now -- they've kept to a careful stated policy of minimum deterrence, to avoid $$$ being consumed by the strategic forces; yet at the same time, they've been in the nuclear business for a long time now, and are an aspiring world power (TM).

It's why I believe they have a lot more than they actually are given credit for (1,000 vs 300), but not huge amounts more (on the order of 3,000-4000+); because if they did have 4,000 nukes, you'd need a lot more nuclear storage areas to store all the nukes; and those storage areas have to be carefully controlled -- one of the ways old school photo intelligence people found important things (TM) in the Soviet Union was looking for places with heavy security, like quadruple lines of chain link fences.

Excerpt from "Rethinking the Unthinkable" December 2014 LANL National Security Science magazine.

We must have missed a lot of quadruple lines of chain link fencing to be off by 61%?

 

[totoro]

A tactical nuke can be much more easely hidden than a strategic one. Strategic nuke needs large fixed silos, or large ground units with dozens of very large trucks and their infrastructure, or large submarines with their infrastructure. All of the above is single role - for ICBM/SLBM use.

Tactical nukes use dual purpose platforms and infrastructure. They use same planes, same ships, same medium range ballistic missile brigades, same SAM brigades (maybe in the past). One can't assess number of actual tactical warheads by just looking at recce images of those units. Which is also why US assesment of Soviet nukes was off, because US didn't know the scope of Soviet doctrine of nuke usage - Soviets used nukes on everything in greater numbers than US - from torpedoes, tactical missiles, SAM missile, ABM missiles, artillery rounds etc.

So chinese could have more tactical nuke warheads, or theoretically they could have (and will have shortly as they've started to go down that route) more MIRV warheads for ICBM - but actual number of ICBM/SLBM should be more easy to track.

Within 10 years time, the strategic warhead count is bound to increase for them. DF41 programme is real, DF5b programme is real. Even if df31b (mirved variant) is only a rumor - we're still looking at least 2 brigades of df41 (they added two of df31 within 10 years), as well as remainder of older df5a being remanufactured to df5b. With just 3 warheads per missile (and there could be 6 or 8) we're looking at close to 200 MIRVed warheads. (older df31 and SLBM jl2 add another 80-ish warheads) They seem likely to double the number of their strategic warheads compared to today within 10 years, and that's a low estimate on just 3 warheads per missile.

 

[Void]

It is relevant that the most commonly cited budget figures are nominal. Which is utterly worthless for comparing US, with Russian/Chinese spending as both countries buy most of their stuff at home and do not pay anything like US prices; anyone who has been to either country can attest that a US dollar goes a lot farther there than it does in the US, let alone other western countries.

During the Cold War US intelligence relied on what were effectively military PPP calculations to determine Soviet spending. Which was not perfect but it gave a much better indication of the scope of their activities than the nominal figures that are relied on today. There does not seem to have been any effort by the western intelligence community to create up to date military PPP indexes for Russia or China, at least publicly, for... some reason or other.

Probably because the figures would look much less reassuring.* Especially for US allies in Europe whose very meager investments would be more obvious.**

*If you multiply China's defense spending by the Big Max index for example it's spending would rise 66% of US.
**Again using the Big Max index Russia's defense expenditures exceed all non-US NATO members combined.

 

[sferrin]

A tactical nuke can be much more easely hidden than a strategic one. Strategic nuke needs large fixed silos, or large ground units with dozens of very large trucks and their infrastructure, or large submarines with their infrastructure. All of the above is single role - for ICBM/SLBM use.

Not so at all. First of all there are lots of large trucks out there, and when your ICBMs are mobile they're essentially invisible for practical purposes. China has many types of TELs, some with long range conventional ballistic missiles (which nobody bats an eye out but if the US talks about doing the same it's going to cause the Apocalypse and begin WWIII), some with nuclear warheads, both MRBMs and ICBMs. Bombs take no space at all aside from bunkers. And a cruise missile armed with a nuclear warhead, fired from just off the coast of Continental US is a strategic weapon, no bones about it.

 

[SOC]

What of the rumors of hundreds (or thousands) of miles of underground tunnels? Not sure what to think of it myself but something similar (on a much smaller scale) was looked at for the MX missile.

That's based on the idea that building a tunnel can only ever be used to store a nuclear missile, not for things like, say, rail lines...

It's why I believe they have a lot more than they actually are given credit for (1,000 vs 300), but not huge amounts more (on the order of 3,000-4000+); because if they did have 4,000 nukes, you'd need a lot more nuclear storage areas to store all the nukes; and those storage areas have to be carefully controlled -- one of the ways old school photo intelligence people found important things (TM) in the Soviet Union was looking for places with heavy security, like quadruple lines of chain link fences.

Chain link fences don't help find Chinese warheads (although the premise is accurate, and still used today to ID high-security complexes). They're stored in a centralized UGF complex for stockpiling, and dispersed to regional UGFs for mating to missiles when needed. Only exception would possibly be the silo-based DF-5s and SLBMs.

 

[sferrin]

What of the rumors of hundreds (or thousands) of miles of underground tunnels? Not sure what to think of it myself but something similar (on a much smaller scale) was looked at for the MX missile.

That's based on the idea that building a tunnel can only ever be used to store a nuclear missile, not for things like, say, rail lines...

Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar? Impossible! I was just putting it out there as I'd seen in some writings that it was suspected China was using an extensive system of tunnels for hiding their nuclear weapons, much like was looked at for MX.