Choose your own adventure: Cold War US Aviation

[Desertfox]

It is 1962, you have been placed in charge of all US military aviation related decisions with absolute dictatorial powers over all branches. For the next 50 years, where do you take US aviation? You do not get extra money but you can move money around. History progresses as historically.

What never-built projects see the light of day? What tracks get explored more fully?

 

[Rule of cool]

I'd delay the USAF F111 program to perfect it before ordering it into production, and then ordering it in much larger batches resulting in much larger numbers overall.

 

[riggerrob]

Avro is forced to build Jetliners, CF-100, then a the single-seat, single-engine interceptor that they sketched before building the Arrow.

Meanwhile DHC continues to focus on STOL cargo planes.

Canadair focusses on passenger planes.

When the bankrupt British Empire can no longer support colonies in the Caribbean, the RCAF and TCA fly regular flights between Canada and the Caribbean. When an American politician gets his nose out of joint, TCA demands airliners that can fly the Canada-to-Bahamas route non-stop.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Avro is forced to build Jetliners, CF-100, then a the single-seat, single-engine interceptor that they sketched before building the Arrow.

Meanwhile DHC continues to focus on STOL cargo planes.

Canadair focusses on passenger planes.

When the bankrupt British Empire can no longer support colonies in the Caribbean, the RCAF and TCA fly regular flights between Canada and the Caribbean. When an American politician gets his nose out of joint, TCA demands airliners that can fly the Canada-to-Bahamas route non-stop.

Erm.... US Military Aviation?

 

[CV12Hornet]

In general, I would submit that 1962-1991 is a time when the US is mostly making the right decisions when it comes to aviation and I don't have much to change. That said, I do have a few bugbears I'd want to tackle.

- Tell that Georgia Senator to fuck off and hand the SOR182 contract to Douglas instead of Lockheed. The C-141's volume limitations thanks to its narrow fuselage had significant knock-on effects down the line - it's a major reason why the C-17 is the way it is and why the USAF is still flying the C-130. Hopefully then we can get either the YC-14 or YC-15 into production to start replacing the C-130, and then we can have a C-17 with relaxed tactical requirements.

- Pick the Convair 200 instead of the Rockwell XFV-12 for the new VTOL fighter. That plane is far more likely to actually work. This also has significant knock-on effects on NavAir - no Harrier II, potentially no Hornet, F401 survives and gets into the F-14 as planned. Lots of potential knock-on effects here as well.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It is 1962, you have been placed in charge of all US military aviation related decisions with absolute dictatorial powers over all branches. For the next 50 years, where do you take US aviation? You do not get extra money but you can move money around. History progresses as historically.

What never-built projects see the light of day? What tracks get explored more fully?

1) F-12B interceptors are delivered. Congress paid for them. No SECDEF gets to withhold Congressionally-apportioned funds without explaining himself to Congress. Yes, they're not really needed till the 1980s, when low altitude cruise missiles show up en masse. But we paid for 100 of them in the 1960s so we're getting them in the 1960s. More Blackbirds!!!

2) US Army gets to complete the AH-56 Cheyenne, including the ability to self-deploy across the Atlantic(!). This will probably cause what became the UH60 to be a pusher compound as well. AH-64 doesn't happen, instead the AH-56 gets refitted for Hellfires in the 1980s and likely refitted again with Longbow in the 1990s.

Notable trickle-down here is that the US Army would be divesting from AH-1s in the 1970s as AH-56s came in, so NATO could get used Cobras on the cheap instead of whatever ATGM-hauling helicopters they chose. ​

Second possible trickle-down is the USMC getting twin-engined AH-56s instead of Sea Cobras.​

3) It'd be a really tough fight between Harrier and Convair 200 for the VTOL aircraft. Harrier is functionally a VTOL Skyhawk. Mostly a bomb truck that happens to be maneuverable and have some pretty impressive specific excess power for a subsonic aircraft. Thing is, the Pegasus engine is reliable and the P&W F401 was not. Which makes the Convair 200 utterly dependent on P&W getting the F401 actually working, not just egregiously gaming the system how they did the F100 engine for the USAF. Note that it took the threat (and significant contract losses) of the F101DFE/F110 before the F100 actually met the reliability standards.

If AA systems are included, we're sticking the M247 turret on Abrams chassis not M48 when that comes along. Having a response ready for the Atlantic hit-piece, possibly including espionage and foreign agent charges for the authors. And also pursuing more SAMs, and fully mobile SAMs on TELs, like HAWK on the MLRS/Chapparal chassis.

And now we're really into the 1980s, I'd love to have TACIT BLUE actually flying operationally and not the glorified 707 that is the JSTARS. It would require someone to sigh and admit that the program just flat cannot work if the shape of the airframe is sight sensitive and the output is classified to stupid levels. Making the program work would require openly flying TACIT BLUEs around, and that the planes were generating positional data of some type was not a secret.

Now we can unsnarl the USN ATA program by having NG win it. No Super Hornet as an A-6 replacement. And either Super Tomcats or some flavor of stealthy replacement like NATF in the 1990s. F-14Ds if the USSR collapses in the mid-1990s. But enough Tomcats or NATF to actually have 2 squadrons per CVN.

And we're buying enough ATFs to 1-for-1 replace all the F-15s.

 

[H_K]

In general, I would submit that 1962-1991 is a time when the US is mostly making the right decisions when it comes to aviation and I don't have much to change.

USAF and USN fighters performed terribly in the early Vietnam years. 1962 would be early enough to fix some of the most glaring gaps. Before talking about platforms, there are a number of critical systems upgrades that would have helped immensely:

- Guns: Desperately needed on the Phantom… 2000+ F-4B/C/D would be delivered without guns. Also working guns needed for the 450+ F-8E/H/Js that served in Vietnam. My solution would be to adopt the 30mm Aden or DEFA… could replace the Colt 20mm and easier to integrate than an M61

- Smokeless engines: Easy fix for the J79 that help immensely with combat performance

- Maneuverability improvements such as combat slats on the F-4

- Missiles: Fixing the Aim-4 Falcon would have been a good place to start. Not sure the Aim-9 or Aim-7 series could have been improved much faster than historical.

Once all that was done personally I would have wanted a big buy of 1,000 F-8 Crusaders with J79 engines and cut the F-4B/C/D numbers by the same number.

 

[CV12Hornet]

- Guns: Desperately needed on the Phantom… 2000+ F-4B/C/D would be delivered without guns. Also working guns needed for the 450+ F-8E/H/Js that served in Vietnam. My solution would be to adopt the 30mm Aden or DEFA… could replace the Colt 20mm and easier to integrate than an M61

Guns are not desperately needed. Guns were of little value on Phantoms compared to improvements in ACM training - the Navy outdid the Air Force in Phantom combat over the back half of the war despite having no guns on their Phantoms because of this.

Once all that was done personally I would have wanted a big buy of 1,000 F-8 Crusaders with J79 engines and cut the F-4B/C/D numbers by the same number.

The Crusader is straight-up inferior for the jobs asked of the Phantom in Vietnam. Also, rebuilding them with J79s is a massive headache.

 

[1635yankee]

Guns are not desperately needed. Guns were of little value on Phantoms compared to improvements in ACM training - the Navy outdid the Air Force in Phantom combat over the back half of the war despite having no guns on their Phantoms because of this.


The Crusader is straight-up inferior for the jobs asked of the Phantom in Vietnam. Also, rebuilding them with J79s is a massive headache.

It's more than a massive headache; it's replacing an engine that was robust and highly reliable with one that -- at the time -- wasn't. In USAF service, the F-104 had a much greater loss due to engine failure than the F-100. The J-79 was also much lighter, which would cause a massive c/g problem.

The major air-to-air problem the USAF and USN had was training, not hardware. The Crusaders did well not because of their guns. Whether the problem was the gun or the feed, they frequently didn't work. Also, despite being "the last gunfighter," there were a lot of issues that made the Crusader problematic: poor rearwards visibility and truly nasty departure characteristics. The F11F Tiger would probably have been a better dogfighter, but it wasn't in front-line service at the time.

 

[Scott Kenny]

USAF and USN fighters performed terribly in the early Vietnam years. 1962 would be early enough to fix some of the most glaring gaps. Before talking about platforms, there are a number of critical systems upgrades that would have helped immensely:

No, that was almost 100% training, not missile failure.

USAF especially was being forced to use missiles way outside the way they trained to use them.

So was the USN, but they still trained in Basic Fighter Maneuvering.

USAF was training for engaging bombers at BVR. Not for the political requirements of positive visual ID and therefore WVR engagements. Get the USAF dogfighting again and you greatly fix one problem.

But the Sparrows were basically dead weight in a dogfight until the E2 I think, and even then it's not easy keeping your radar pointed at the target. (In the sims, even with a big "keep the target within this circle" on the HUD it's a pain in the butt to actually do)

You could teach the pilots how Sidewinders needed to work, instead of pulling the trigger as soon as they heard a lock.

Though I will note that having the US jump in on funding and developing Taildog would be awesome. I suspect that Colonel Olds would have cried tears of joy if he'd seen "the gun that shoots around corners", aka a missile that would hit any time it indicated a lock.

Though I'd want all 3 types of missiles onboard. Sparrows for BVR, Sidewinders for the start of WVR, and Taildogs for the gun-range furball.

- Also working guns needed for the 450+ F-8E/H/Js that served in Vietnam. My solution would be to adopt the 30mm Aden or DEFA… could replace the Colt 20mm and easier to integrate than an M61

Once the A-7D integration was worked out, apply that to the F-8s. Yes, it likely requires a complete rebuild of the forward fuselage. It's better than guns that don't work.

Now the whole of DOD is using 20x102mm.

- Smokeless engines: Easy fix for the J79 that help immensely with combat performance

"Easy"? not so much.

Big improvement, yes.

- Maneuverability improvements such as combat slats on the F-4

Not sure getting those sooner would help.

Fixing the Aim-4 Falcon would have been a good place to start. Not sure the Aim-9 or Aim-7 series could have been improved much faster than historical.

Just giving Falcons a proximity fuze in 1962 would likely fix a whole lot and get them close to AIM-9 hit rates.

But I still think that the harder problem to get fixed was the coolant supply time, and likely the lack of automatic fire control on the F-4Ds. Maybe changing to a larger coolant supply while waiting for the automatic fire control to get developed would work? It may require modifying the Hughes MA-1 from the F-106 instead of using a Westinghouse APQ-120 in the F-4Es.

But again, the big problem was that Falcons in general were designed around a ground-controlled intercept of a bomber, and there wasn't a GCI network in Vietnam. I know the idea of AWACS was developed out of the EC-121s in Vietnam, could we push this idea up sooner in time, to get a "flying GCI network" for stopping communism?

 

[Rule of cool]

I'd give the JFK nuclear propulsion, sadly its a touch too late to have the America as a repeat Enterprise.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I'd give the JFK nuclear propulsion, sadly its a touch too late to have the America as a repeat Enterprise.

No, Enterprise is how to absolutely NOT build a nuclear carrier.

On that point, getting 15 nuclear carriers would be really nice.

 

[H_K]

Guns are not desperately needed. Guns were of little value on Phantoms compared to improvements in ACM training - the Navy outdid the Air Force in Phantom combat over the back half of the war despite having no guns on their Phantoms because of this.

No, that was almost 100% training, not missile failure.

No missiles, guns and training are all linked. A fighter force with guns is going to train to use them and is going to be more focused on ACM. A fighter force with missiles that can't be used in dogfights isn't going to learn how to dogfight.

By 1972 the guns, missiles and training (plus improvements such as maneuvering slats) had all evolved together to deliver much improved results. But in 1962-68 the missiles were crap, most of the pilots didn't train for ACM, and they didn't have reliable guns (or any guns at all) to make proper training a better investment.

The Israeli Air Force in 1967 did massively better against Migs with a combo of guns + ACM training. Perhaps they weren't encumbered by RoE, but I don't think one can blame it all on training and RoE.

As for F-8s with J79s, I meant new builds (similar to the later V1000 proposal). By buying fewer F-4B/C/Ds you could buy a lot more F-8s. The F-4s would probably end up focusing more on self-escorted bomber missions, with the F-8s flying top cover similar to how the Israelis used the Mirage/F-4 combo until the mid-70s.

 

[CV12Hornet]

No missiles, guns and training are all linked. A fighter force with guns is going to train to use them and is going to be more focused on ACM. A fighter force with missiles that can't be used in dogfights isn't going to learn how to dogfight.

By 1972 the guns, missiles and training (plus improvements such as maneuvering slats) had all evolved together to deliver much improved results. But in 1962-68 the missiles were crap, most of the pilots didn't train for ACM, and they didn't have reliable guns (or any guns at all) to make proper training a better investment.

Again: the Navy were part of those improved results, and they didn't use guns at all on their Phantoms and by 1972 had almost entirely phased out the Crusader.

 

[Archibald]

Fighter jets
-F6D : use Skywarrior or Prowler airframe
-Phantom: Crusader III instead
-Crusader: M61 Vulcan guns & J79 turbojet
-F-5A : fine but M61 guns too
-F-5E : J101 turbofan (or Vought V-1000)
-F-104S: italian Starfighters for Vietnam
-no bloody F-111B
-no fucking TF30 for Tomcats but TF41
-no Hornet but Mirage G instead
-Convair 200/201/218 in place of XVF-12 Hornet and F-16

Attack
- A-7 Corsair II : TF41 / Spey with afterburner ( = A-7F !)
- Same engines for F-111
- big wing Harrier rather than AV-8B

Cargo planes
-HS.681 with BS.100s
-C-5A goes to Boeing
-Canadair CL-84 & Breguet 941

 

[Rule of cool]

No, Enterprise is how to absolutely NOT build a nuclear carrier.

On that point, getting 15 nuclear carriers would be really nice.

The Enterprise was successful enough, and despite her great expense I don't think there was a better way to build a nuclear carrier until the A3W reactor matured in time for the JFK.

If you want to get 15 nuke carriers building America as a repeat Enterprise is how to do it.

 

[GeorgeA]

POD FY1962

Background

• Ike wins 1956 election on balanced budget ticket.
• Congress beginning to balk at projected costs of ongoing buildup (BOMARC, ADC interceptor program, SAGE centers, WS-110).
• Missile development across all three departments is beginning to eat up the available money for everything else.
• Sputnik panic confuses DoD in terms of strategy and procurement.
• 1958 recession, ironically brought on by military spending cutbacks, tightens the budget even further. Ike will not budge on his balanced budget stance, opening the door to “bomber gap” and “missile gap” attacks from Democrats.
• Neil McElroy is 1st Sec Def to implement provisions of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, centralizing some decision-making at the DoD level and reducing the latitude of the military departments to spend money as they see fit. This is later weaponized by McNamara IRL.
• 1960 election, perhaps the most consequential of the 20th century, pits the postwar status quo against the New Frontier/”pay any price, bear any burden” boys. The latter wins by a hair.

Per the OP ground rules, I take office as Viceroy of Defense and Cool Airplanes Plenipotentiary. On my first day in office, I begin breaking furniture in the E Ring.

Assumptions:

• Per the OP, history evolves more or less as it did IRL. The butterfly effect means history will, however, change over time.
• This means I cannot stop the Vietnam tragedy from occurring, but I sure as hell can make the tactics non-stupid and the weapons work.
• I can tell the difference between the F4D and the F4H, so the designation system doesn’t change.
• I am not addressing the Navy or Army’s overall needs here because I can’t, really.
  • I assume the Navy gets a FAD platform in the early sixties and VFAX to replace the F-4 in the 70s.
  • Follow-ons would be ATA/AX to replace the A-6 and a fighter to replace VFAX.
  • Would like to see a dedicated ASuW aircraft that becomes available when the Soviet surface fleet really gets going in the 1970s, perhaps as a derivative of an Air Force platform.
  • I’d also include a common support aircraft to supplant the S-3/C-2/KA-6 fleet.
  • The FBM system probably evolves as IOTL.
  • Army fixed wing probably evolves into something like the A-10 and eventually, maybe, RPVs?

Initial actions:

• Reverse some of the 1958 DPA centralization decisions.
• Have any project office that uses the term “commonality” bulldozed and the earth around it salted.
• Use one of those newfangled Bernz-O-Matic torches and smoke the Key West Agreement (more on that below).

Come with me now and revisit the thrilling days of yesteryear.

AF Tactical:

1. As noted, the TFX program is no more. The future “F-111” evolves from USAF pre-TFX planning, with an emphasis on deep strike. Options include:
   1. Boeing original tandem-cockpit 818.
   2. NA-247 Retaliator, possibly with J58-P-2s or J93s for additional smoke and noise.
   3. 1.2, but with VG wings.
2. F-4 becomes the standard TAC fighter bomber as IRL, but I bring forward the aerodynamic improvements of the E-model and the blessed gun.
3. Preliminary work on F-X, but the second air superiority-focused iteration, i.e., the F-15, which eventuates mostly as IOTL.
4. Buy several wings of land-based A2Fs (more on this later).
5. After enduring 20 years of anti-USAF hate on the forum, I’ve given in. The Army gets CAS within X miles of FEBA. Initial platforms are from the 1961 flyoff: N-156, G.91, or A4D. It’s up to the Army to decide if they go ahead with AAFSS in this scenario, or pivot to something like Twin Cobra or an early iteration of AAH. It's now their budget and their problem.

AF strategic

1. Continue B-52H procurement, at least 100 more aircraft.
2. Develop and deploy ALBMs in three variants. This will take the remainder of the 1960s to fund and execute.
   1. GAM-87 as in IOTL.
   2. Skybolt B, with twice the range. (WS-325 role, but air-launched.)
   3. TOWN HALL-style Minuteman with advanced carrier aircraft (see 5.1 below).
3. Cap silo-deployed LGM-35 at 1000 as IOTL.
4. On a reduced-urgency timeline, develop a true Titan replacement from somewhere on the Golden Arrow/WS-120/BGM-75 continuum, with 100 missiles deployed in silos beginning around 1976. Include ABRES and BGRV warhead options. This will probably be larger than LGM-118.
5. Develop two future bombers:
   1. Large supersonic missile carrier (see 2.3 above) leveraging XB-70 and SST investments. Three to six engines, intercontinental dash-to-loiter range. Can carry all Step 2 weapons. Officially, I am not a fan of CHROME DOME, but this and the B-52H force are its effective replacements.
   2. Small penetrator, essentially a B-58 replacement. 2-3 crew, two Mk 43 and four SRAMs. Provides assured SIOP target destruction if the ALBM force is (somehow) unsuccessful. Ideally the ALBM barrage has wiped out the Soviet IADS by that point.
6. Transfer Nike-X to USAF. IOTL, no deployment decisions are made, and the program is continually rescoped until it becomes a bargaining chip. As Supreme Leader of Missiles, I accept the radar limitations and establish a crash program to get at least six sites in the Northeast US built and functional before the Soviet propaganda capture of the American intellectual class succeeds, so I have a window of 9 years. Ideally, we deploy 18-24 sites, but we’ll probably run out of time before that happens. Continually iterate with newer radars, processors, and evolved Spartan and Sprint missiles.

AF R&D

1. Fund two or three XB-70Bs to address structural and performance issues. Goal is to establish a strong database of large-vehicle Mach 3 flight. Use to develop technical baseline for big missile carrier and SST.
2. Build a series of X-20s to evaluate winged exoatmospheric flight and military utility of man-in-space. Emphasize the DS II and III missions vs. DORIAN resupply (which is probably superseded by Keyhole capabilities as IOTL).
3. Begin long-range planning for advanced TSTO (propulsion, structures, thermal mgmt.) with goal of an operational system in the mid-1980s. This might include a ground- or air-launched X-15-like follow on demonstrator.
4. Build various SNAP systems for space power. Focus is on high-powered radars, EW, directed energy. Again, deployment goal is the mid-1980s and might be subsumed into SDI if that eventuates in my timeline.

Special effort: preparation for Southeast Asia

1. Rebuild B-58 fleet to B-58E standard, with the SR-195 tactical avionics suite. Build more of these if we can possibly afford it. These will be the primary strike aircraft for Route Pack 6 targets.
2. Pull forward RPV work to include both recon and attack variants. Ensure an initial capability is ready in 1965. Key problem to solve: guidance and targeting.
3. Establish early night interdiction capability with B-57s, B-66s, and/or AC-130s. Focus on lower route packs, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and other supply points. Accept that the enemy logistics system is formidable and resilient, but painfully increase the cost to the Communists to operate it at a very large scale.
4. As noted, buy some land-based A2Fs (A-6s). These are more suited for all-weather conventional attack than anything programmed in the near term on the USAF side.
5. Develop a J-69-powered conventional cruise missile for low-level attacks on the hardest targets. Lauch platforms can be B-52s or DC-130s. Again, guidance and targeting are the primary issues.
6. Establish a crash program to test the AAM inventory and ensure that the missiles work as intended. Lock contractor and program office people in a room and slowly reduce the oxygen until they accept that product performance in combat is their one and only key performance indicator, and people can and will be court-marshalled or jailed for producing inferior products that get US pilots killed.

NOTE: My objective is to win the air war, or at least not lose it. My take on "Rolling Thunder” is not a signaling exercise or gradual escalation but is instead a full-boat air campaign. Tactics emphasize early OCA and SEAD, night attack, dispersal, heavy wave attacks with aircraft, RPVs, and cruise missiles, and harbor mining by both the AF and Navy. Daylight attacks on industrial targets at altitude are stupid and will be discouraged. Restrictive ROEs will be terminated with extreme prejudice. The USSR will be informed that we would very much regret loss of life by their forces in North Vietnam, and they should exit the building promptly.​

AF Support

1. CX-HLS goes to Douglas or Boeing.
2. Procure KC-135Y, advanced 707, or Advanced C-135 to augment the tanker and special missions forces.
3. Build a U-2/WB-57 follow on with greater SWAP capability.

Evolution 1980s-2000

1. Not The TFX replaced by FB-23/RTA.
2. F-X replaced by F-22/ATF.
3. A2F replaced by stealthy interdictor a la the larger F-117 evolutions.
4. B-52H sees a couple of upgrade cycles to and beyond B-52J spec, since it will continue to fly until the end of time.
5. Minuteman replaced by LGM-134.
6. Heavy ICBM replaced by a smaller post-Cold War silo-based medium-heavy ICBM.
7. Missile carrier may be retired or replaced by a smaller platform.
8. Small penetrator is replaced by the B-2.
9. Nike-X Upgraded on a continuous cycle (missiles, radars, processors, repeat).
10. RPV force evolves into X-45 class.
11. Tankers and special missions aircraft replaced by 767 derivatives.

[Edits: typos and formatting.]

 

[Scott Kenny]

The Enterprise was successful enough, and despite her great expense I don't think there was a better way to build a nuclear carrier until the A3W reactor matured in time for the JFK.

If you want to get 15 nuke carriers building America as a repeat Enterprise is how to do it.

Grumble. Very expensive way to do it, even beyond the nasty way the USN accounts for all development spending as part of first ship of class costs.

AF Tactical:

1. As noted, the TFX program is no more. The future “F-111” evolves from USAF pre-TFX planning, with an emphasis on deep strike. Options include:
   1. Boeing original tandem-cockpit 818.
   2. NA-247 Retaliator, possibly with J58-P-2s or J93s for additional smoke and noise.
   3. 1.2, but with VG wings.
2. [...]
3. [...]
4. Buy several wings of land-based A2Fs (more on this later).

Why do you need A2F Intruders when you have F-111s that do the same job but 1/3 faster?

Pulling from wiki because I can copy-paste it:

In June 1960, the USAF issued specification SOR 183 for a long-range, interdiction/strike aircraft able to penetrate Soviet air defenses at very low altitudes and high speeds.[9] Specifically, it was to be capable of at least 800 mi (1,300 km) of low-level flight, half of which was to be at a speed of no less than Mach 1.2.[10] Furthermore, the specification also called for the aircraft to possess short takeoff-and-landing (STOL) capabilities to permit operations from short, unprepared airstrips that had a length of no more than 3,000 ft (900 m).[8] An internal payload of 1,000 lb (450 kg) was to be carried in the primary mission role. A variant suitable for aerial reconnaissance flights was also included in the specification.[11]

Just buy lots more F-111s to replace the F-105s!

Also, eww, Navy plane! USAF will not want it. Bad enough making the USAF buy F-110s/F-4s, but it was a really good plane. Then later on the USAF gets stuck buying the A-7D.

Special effort: preparation for Southeast Asia

1. Rebuild B-58 fleet to B-58E standard, with SR-195 tactical avionics suite. Build more of these if we can possibly afford it. These will be the primary strike aircraft for Route Pack 6 targets.

I assume you mean same size as B-58As but refitted for conventional weapons delivery? RP6 is Hanoi/Haiphong, that's going to be messy.

I think a better answer would be proper tactical employment and never using the same ingress route twice.

Pull forward RPV work to include both recon and attack variants. Ensure an initial capability is ready in 1965. Key problem to solve: guidance and targeting.
[...]
[...]
Develop a J-69-powered conventional cruise missile for low-level attacks on the hardest targets. Lauch platforms can be B-52s or DC-130s. Again, guidance and targeting are the primary issues.

Low level cruise missiles are going to be a big problem in the 1960s and 70s. There isn't a good navigation system, at least not one cheap enough to be disposable.

Assuming that you can develop TERCOM and DSMAC 10-15 years early, your next challenge is to get the terrain countour images from Vietnam. Heavy cloud cover, heavy foliage. Maybe a PESA terrain-following radar or synthetic-aperture radar to get the images on the route? This may require sending a manned recon plane in at 500ft or less to get the correct angles for the cruise missiles to track.

 

[GeorgeA]

I need bombers in 1965 and the F-111 is probably not operational until 1967. The A2F is in production and the Air Force can begin receiving them right after the Navy gets its first couple wings. Plus, the F-111’s first order of business is tactical nuclear strike in Europe, so the first examples are going there.

B-58E is essentially the same fuselage, sans pods, with a new wing and two J58s. The SR-195 tactical strike and recon package was intended for retrofit to existing aircraft. And, by 1965, SAC doesn’t really want them anyway.

No quarrel with your comment about ingress routes. As I said, stupid tactics shouldn’t be tolerated.

Agree also that cruise missile guidance in this era is a very big hurdle to clear. I’m just looking for a way to address fixed targets without putting air crews in harm’s way.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I need bombers in 1965 and the F-111 is probably not operational until 1967. The A2F is in production and the Air Force can begin receiving them right after the Navy gets its first couple wings. Plus, the F-111’s first order of business is tactical nuclear strike in Europe, so the first examples are going there.

Expect lots of pushback about buying or borrowing Navy planes. You may have better luck fitting the A-6's avionics to the F-111s in order to get them working sooner. (Remembering that the F-111A was the interim avionics, the -D was supposed to be the definitive version)

B-58E is essentially the same fuselage, sans pods, with a new wing and two J58s. The SR-195 tactical strike and recon package was intended for retrofit to existing aircraft. And, by 1965, SAC doesn’t really want them anyway.

Oh, that version! Okay, I'm following but I'm struggling to see how TAC is going to get them converted and paid for. That's a lot of money.

Agree also that cruise missile guidance in this era is a very big hurdle to clear. I’m just looking for a way to address fixed targets without putting air crews in harm’s way.

I mean, a solid push to develop the guidance and/or remote piloting would really help out the US for the 1990s and GWOT.

 

[GeorgeA]

Scott, remember this is my timeline non-TFX quasi-F-111, not the real thing. It’s going to be the tactical nuclear system TAC has been looking for since WS-300 and XB-68. That’s why I need an off-the-shelf conventional option by 1965.

I’m not taking anything from the Navy. Grumman’s gotta tool up for a big bi-service program, whether that means expanding Calverton or setting up a second line somewhere else. Everybody gets what they need.

As for the Air Force not wanting a Navy plane, well, the OP has anointed me with Grand Poobah of Aviation status, so they get what they get, and if I get pushback, I go full “early retirement” on them till they get the message. Plus, they’re getting a bunch of other whiz bang shit that they need to execute on.

 

[Rule of cool]

Grumble. Very expensive way to do it, even beyond the nasty way the USN accounts for all development spending as part of first ship of class costs.

I agree on the costs; it took a while for nuclear carriers to be blindingly obvious, in comparison with SSN where it was that obvious.

Here's a table I put together a couple of years ago from several sources when digging around the earliest nuclear reactors for surface ships. It basically shows that until the A3W grew from 45,000shp in 1959 to 65,000shp in 1963 a repeat Enterprise was the only option for a full-size nuclear carrier. The presumably cheaper to buy and run A3W designs were all to austere, small and slow.

SCB #	1st FY	Type	N C	SCB Dir.	Initial approval	Funded: Qty (FY)	Remarks (in N-C column: N=new, C=conv.)
127	56	CVA	N	89	12.5.55	1 (56)	CVA 63 class Attack Aircraft Carrier. Kitty Hawk (CVA 63)
127A	57	CVA	N	99	3.2.56	1 (57)	Attack Aircraft Carrier, CVA 64. Constellation (CVA 64)
160	58	CVA(N)	N	100	14.3.56	1 (58)	Attack Aircraft Carrier, CVA(N). Enterprise, CVA(N) 65: 8 x A2W reactors 280,000shp, 1040 ft waterline length and 1123 ft length overall, 133ft waterline beam, and 255ft extreme beam, 93,284t FL
203	59	CVAN	N	-	-	-	Austere CVAN with 4 x A3W reactors 180,000shp for FY59 (the FY58 CVAN was a repeat SCB 160). Was in a FY60 list of 7/58. BS reported its design study for a 4-reactor carrier in May 1959 for FY60, then FY61. (Friedman p.317.) 950 x 125 feet on the waterline, and 66,000t FL
211	-	CVAN	N	-	-	-	Austere CVAN with 4 x A3W reactors 200,000shp, 1020 ft waterline length and 1068 ft length overall, 131ft waterline beam, and 238ft extreme beam, 76,600t FL; rejected for low speed and smaller deck angle/area: Friedman p.317.
127B	61	CVA	N	148	18.6.59	1 (61)	Attack Aircraft Carrier (CVA 66). America
211A	-	CVAN	N	-	-	-	Austere CVAN with 4 x A3W reactors 200,000shp, same size as 211, 78,600t FL; more aviation fuel, ordnance and Typhon/SPG59 - paid for by a reduction in habitability standards and escort fuel. 5,160 crew .5 knot slower
250	63	CVAN	N	203	16.7.63	-	Attack Aircraft Carrier, CVA(N) 67. Full-sized CVAN with 4 A3W reactors ~260,000shp 1,040 x 133 feet on the waterline, and 87,400t FL for FY63. McNamara chose CVA 67 instead.
127C	63	CVA	N	179	25.5.62	1 (63)	Attack Aircraft Carrier (CVA 67). John F. Kennedy

 

[H_K]

remember this is my timeline non-TFX quasi-F-111, not the real thing. It’s going to be the tactical nuclear system TAC has been looking for since WS-300 and XB-68. That’s why I need an off-the-shelf conventional option by 1965.

Hmm… if you’re going for a Navy design how about a land based A-5 Vigilante with TF30 engines and Intruder avionics? Should be available before F-111.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Scott, remember this is my timeline non-TFX quasi-F-111, not the real thing. It’s going to be the tactical nuclear system TAC has been looking for since WS-300 and XB-68. That’s why I need an off-the-shelf conventional option by 1965.

It's my understanding that the overwhelming majority of the TFX requirements were the USAF ones. The only two USN requirements that went through were parallel seating so that the two crew could share one radar scope and the big 48" radar dish up front for the AWG-9 (in the F-111B, anyways).

So even the SOR183 is going to be very close to TFX. (See also the TSR2 role being picked up by F-111Ks). Just with tandem seating like an F-15E.

Hmm… if you’re going for a Navy design how about a land based A-5 Vigilante with TF30 engines and Intruder avionics? Should be available before F-111.

You'd need to modify the bomb bay to conventional drop-out-the-belly. Vigilante was set up for dropping a single large bomb out the back, between the engines, and that didn't work well for conventional bombs. Didn't work well for nukes, either, but the blast was big enough it usually didn't matter.

But I wouldn't be surprised to see a North American F-111 proposal that was basically that.

=========================

Oh, one thing I would push for would be development of more precision-guided weapons like Paveway and eventually JDAM. Build more, build sooner, maybe figure out how to make a laser and FLIR pod that is smaller than Pave Tack before the 1990s and LANTIRN.

 

[yeetmahboi]

I need bombers in 1965 and the F-111 is probably not operational until 1967. The A2F is in production and the Air Force can begin receiving them right after the Navy gets its first couple wings. Plus, the F-111’s first order of business is tactical nuclear strike in Europe, so the first examples are going there.

Injecting myself here, I like the idea of Intruders as a B-66 replacement and a supplement until a proper operational class striker is in theater. There’s probably a role for a subsonic bomb truck with simpler basing and mission planning arrangements than a BUFF, and optimized/trained for bombing and not attacking like a fast jet.

 

[H_K]

You'd need to modify the bomb bay to conventional drop-out-the-belly. Vigilante was set up for dropping a single large bomb out the back, between the engines, and that didn't work well for conventional bombs. Didn't work well for nukes, either, but the blast was big enough it usually didn't matter.

Instead of a conventional weapons bay, conformal carriage would be possible by adapting the RA-5C's canoe fairing to carry 2x nukes or 2,000lb bombs (or 6x 500lb Mk82s) in a tandem (fore & aft) low drag arrangement.

 

[GeorgeA]

Hmm… if you’re going for a Navy design how about a land based A-5 Vigilante with TF30 engines and Intruder avionics? Should be available before F-111.

I did spec a bombed-up Retaliator with more advanced engines, or a VG version of same, as one of the options for the Not The TFX.

 

[GeorgeA]

You'd need to modify the bomb bay to conventional drop-out-the-belly. Vigilante was set up for dropping a single large bomb out the back, between the engines, and that didn't work well for conventional bombs. Didn't work well for nukes, either, but the blast was big enough it usually didn't matter.

But I wouldn't be surprised to see a North American F-111 proposal that was basically that.

=========================

Oh, one thing I would push for would be development of more precision-guided weapons like Paveway and eventually JDAM. Build more, build sooner, maybe figure out how to make a laser and FLIR pod that is smaller than Pave Tack before the 1990s and LANTIRN.

Yes, given that I want to use more powerful engines, we'd have to redesign that rear forging anyway. We could then address the weapons bay configuration and any dorsal or ventral add-ons at the point.

Yes, the precision weapons push is part of my effort to do everything I can to improve the effectiveness of the bombing campaign. The realities of 1960s technology will limit what we can do even under a crash program.

 

[yeetmahboi]

Oh, one thing I would push for would be development of more precision-guided weapons like Paveway and eventually JDAM. Build more, build sooner, maybe figure out how to make a laser and FLIR pod that is smaller than Pave Tack before the 1990s and LANTIRN.

Also LORAN guided bombs. Would be a cool site to see directing sites built across the heights of the West side leading bomb and missile strikes.

 

[Archibald]

A few years ago I learned that the first batch A-7D (67 of them) were to have an afterburner on their TF30 to compensate its limited dry power - not to go supersonic. The TF41 fixed that issue.

I think this fact could help the case for an afterburning TF41, supersonic A-7E as a F-105 replacement. (= an A-7F two decades earlier !)

 

[Rule of cool]

No, that was almost 100% training, not missile failure.

USAF especially was being forced to use missiles way outside the way they trained to use them.

So was the USN, but they still trained in Basic Fighter Maneuvering.

USAF was training for engaging bombers at BVR. Not for the political requirements of positive visual ID and therefore WVR engagements. Get the USAF dogfighting again and you greatly fix one problem.

But the Sparrows were basically dead weight in a dogfight until the E2 I think, and even then it's not easy keeping your radar pointed at the target. (In the sims, even with a big "keep the target within this circle" on the HUD it's a pain in the butt to actually do)

You could teach the pilots how Sidewinders needed to work, instead of pulling the trigger as soon as they heard a lock.

Though I will note that having the US jump in on funding and developing Taildog would be awesome. I suspect that Colonel Olds would have cried tears of joy if he'd seen "the gun that shoots around corners", aka a missile that would hit any time it indicated a lock.

Though I'd want all 3 types of missiles onboard. Sparrows for BVR, Sidewinders for the start of WVR, and Taildogs for the gun-range furball.

IIUC the USAF in particular had stopped or drastically reduced 'dogfighting' in fighter squadrons flight programmes in an effort to foster safety, their planes were crashing a lot.

Early US AAMs did have a lot of reliability issues, a rigorous testing programme under difficult conditions would likely have identified and ironed out the multitude of problems. The Ault Report's terms of reference, which famously resulted in Top Gun, had huge sections about missile quality as delivered, missile rework pipelines, line maintenance in squadrons, practical use in squadrons (IIRC there was no sparrow loader in the mid 60s, every squadron was winging it), weapons system usage and reliability. As well as Top Gun it resulted in a thorough shake through of the whole weapons system and AAM handling and use in squadrons, things like if a Phantom's weapons system was 'down' the whole plane was 'down', which had been A6 but not F4 practice 1965-68.

 

[Scott Kenny]

IIUC the USAF in particular had stopped or drastically reduced 'dogfighting' in fighter squadrons flight programmes in an effort to foster safety, their planes were crashing a lot.

Which says their training sucks. Which we also know.

 

[Rule of cool]

Which says their training sucks. Which we also know.

I read not too long ago that the USAFF was far from the dismal performer they've been made out to be. Whenever the odds were more or less even your average USAF line pilot was as good as the best NVAF pilots and on average better than the average NVAF line pilot.

Where they suffered was operating on the offensive with minimal support against an enemy with all sorts of home-ground advantages, who didn't engage unless the conditions were favourable. Even then the NVAF lost 2.5 planes for every one they shot down.

https://www.afhistory.org/airpowerhistory/Air_Power_History_2005_fall.pdf

 

[Scott Kenny]

I read not too long ago that the USAFF was far from the dismal performer they've been made out to be. Whenever the odds were more or less even your average USAF line pilot was as good as the best NVAF pilots and on average better than the average NVAF line pilot.

That is not the endorsement you think it is.

"The average USAF line pilot was [...] on average better than the average third world line pilot."

 

[Rule of cool]

That is not the endorsement you think it is.

"The average USAF line pilot was [...] on average better than the average third world line pilot."

Those 3rd world pilots gained a mystical reputation they likely didn't deserve.

In any case the USAF came to the conclusion they had a technology problem that things like RWRs and AWACS would address rather than their pilots being total duds.

 

[RedLegion]

I wonder what Moscow's reaction would have been to the appearance of the YF-12 in Alaska and their deployment over the Bering Strait. Would they have reinforced their presence over Kamchatka and the Pacific Fleet?