China has little leverage beyond military action to force Japan to even acknowledge there is a dispute to sovereignty. China also has little capacity to garner international support because the last thing the third world nations ever want the UN to do is to start interfering with borders. And besides the UNGA does not make anything other than noise and China can’t make the UNSC do anything.Triton said:Will we see the equivalent of the Munich Agreement as a resolution to this territorial dispute in the East China Sea? Or will the situation escalate into a Third Sino-Japanese War?
I consider it unwise to discount any wacky motives of a nation with a self esteem issue and forty million excess males of military age.Abraham Gubler said:But an invasion of Taiwan with American resistance would be near impossible and anywhere else would just widen the conflict with no clear gain.
This would all be true - if the US had the spine to stand by Japan. I'm not seeing it with this administration.Abraham Gubler said:China has little leverage beyond military action to force Japan to even acknowledge there is a dispute to sovereignty. China also has little capacity to garner international support because the last thing the third world nations ever want the UN to do is to start interfering with borders. And besides the UNGA does not make anything other than noise and China can’t make the UNSC do anything.Triton said:Will we see the equivalent of the Munich Agreement as a resolution to this territorial dispute in the East China Sea? Or will the situation escalate into a Third Sino-Japanese War?
So for China the options are to try and bribe Japan with sweetness and cash. Which they aren’t doing. Try and threaten Japan with brinkmanship, which they are doing now and which doesn’t seem to be working well. Or invade and occupy the islands.
The last step would be disastrous. If Japan and the USA were unwilling to back down over this they could blockade China. Which would result in Chinese economic collapse. 80% of Chinese exports are consumer items: textile and personal electronics. While their loss to the west would be very harsh on the retail sector it would not cause significant economic dislocation Enforced savings in place of consumption due to a massive shortage in consumer goods would probably be a good thing.
Despite all the media burble China has no serious access denial capability to stop American lead forces from free reign over its littorals. Deep strikes via stealth capability are also available to cause significant disruption and attrition to key Chinese military capabilities. The only option on China’s slate would be to invade another neighbour. But an invasion of Taiwan with American resistance would be near impossible and anywhere else would just widen the conflict with no clear gain.
I'm not saying they won't try and do it just that if they did it wouldn't work for them.Orionblamblam said:
Well this dispute plays to all of America's strengths. Not the aggressor, on the side of democracy vs dictatorship, air and sea battles not a land occupation, strong vs weak and against the primary holder of American debt. It will be like WWI and WWII all over again. America gets to wipe its debt slate clean at someone else’s expense.sferrin said:
Are you sure? If you impute to the ChiComs motivations that would make sense to western nations, you might be surprised. If China was ruled like a western power, an invasion of Taiwan would be for the purpose of actually *taking* Taiwan, and coming out of the process better/richer/stronger than they went in. But China... *maybe* an invasion of Taiwan or a war with Japan would not be for material gain, but just to create a meat grinder. It would of course wear down Japanese/Taiwanese economic ability... and it would rid China of a great many excess males who, if left at home, might eventually create trouble at home.Abraham Gubler said:
So far the US Administration has walked the walk and talked the talk:sferrin said:
Are you really this politically naive? Hitler was a fascist, Stalin and Mao at least nominally Communist. They are at opposite ends of the political spectrum.Orionblamblam said:Are you sure? If you impute to the ChiComs motivations that would make sense to western nations, you might be surprised. If China was ruled like a western power, an invasion of Taiwan would be for the purpose of actually *taking* Taiwan, and coming out of the process better/richer/stronger than they went in. But China... *maybe* an invasion of Taiwan or a war with Japan would not be for material gain, but just to create a meat grinder. It would of course wear down Japanese/Taiwanese economic ability... and it would rid China of a great many excess males who, if left at home, might eventually create trouble at home.Abraham Gubler said:
Given how many millions Mao was willing to simply exterminate for his cultural goals (as were his fellow travelers Stalin and Hitler), I would not be so quick to suggest a war that looks insane to *us* would look insane to the ChiComs.
Hmmm ... here's an interesting analysis ! ... and as such back to the topic please !Abraham Gubler said:No it became problematical in your first and second sentences. The above may be what the Chinese government puts about as their claim to the sovereignty of the Senkaku islands but its total fiction.Deino said:In the opinion on China Japan illegally seized Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands through the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Based on the “Cairo Declaration” after WW II it was stated in explicit terms that: “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories she has taken by violence and greed.” Nearly two years later in the “Potsdam Proclamation” these points were reaffirmed and the Japanese government accepted both these “contracts”. As such in accordance to the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, Diaoyu Dao, as affiliated islands of Taiwan, should be returned, together with Taiwan, to China.
Now it becomes problematic !
Japan’s claim to the Senkakus is independent of the Sino-China War and is based on Terra Nullis. The islands were incorporated into Japan before the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the transfer of Formosa (Taiwan) and associated islands. Further the Senkakus are not considered geographically part of Formosa so not associated islands. This was never disputed by China, either PRC or RoC, until the 1970s, including the geographic nature of the Senkakus as part of the Ryuku Islands.
These islands may have been on Chinese maps and the like going back to whenever but first discovery is not grounds for a claim to sovereignty under international law. One needs to be in active possession of the islands via occupation or practical control. Which is why Danzig was German. Because tens of thousands of Germans lived there.
Japan and U.S. Ignored Chinese Signals and History, Blundering into the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis
Former students of Asian politics and international relations of a certain age (my age, or a bit older), would in college or graduate school have heard of, if not carefully read, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, by Allen S. Whiting (1960). This was a seminal study of formal or–mainly–informal signals sent by China in 1950 warning with increasing clarity and vehemence the officially U.N. (but overwhelmingly U.S.) forces under command of Douglas MacArthur, then beating back North Korea invaders and advancing up the Korea peninsula, that China was prepared to and would intervene on behalf of North Korea if its territory or vital interests were threatened.
In the event, on October 25,1950, 25 days after U.N. forces had crossed the 38th parallel, 200,000 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (redesignated by Mao Zedong the People’s Volunteer Army) soldiers, having secretly crossed the Yalu River on October 19, attacked U.N. forces, beginning an engagement that would vastly increase casualties on both sides, but especially for the PLA. Whiting’s book sought to discern at what point China’s in many cases subtle and indirect warnings might have been heeded or responded so that intervention might have been avoided.
I have been reminded of China Crosses the Yalu as I have worked through the new book on the Senkaku/Diaoyu island crisis by Yabuki Susumu (矢吹晋), professor emeritus of Yokohama City University, one of Japan’s most eminent China scholars. The book (written in Japanese) is entitled:「尖閣問題の核心 」(The Core of the Senkaku Issue), and bears a subtitle:「日中関係はどうなる」 (What is to Become of Japan-China Relations). I believe that the book is the fairest and most objective, as well as the most thorough, exposition of the positions of both Japan and China, and–critically–the U.S., on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute.
At the risk of oversimplifying, I think I can summarize Professor Yabuki’s analysis and conclusions as follows:
1. The Japanese position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue is indefensible on several counts, including most fundamentally Japan’s unconditional acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration (which required the return of all territories “stolen” from China).
2. The Meiji government’s annexation of the Ryuku Islands (theretofore an autonomous kingdom) in January 1885, within which the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were identified, followed three months later by the Qing Dynasty’s surrender of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (ending the Sino-Japanese War) are both mooted by the terms of Potsdam. The islands were and are clearly part of Taiwan, which in addition has the most legitimate claim to continuous use/occupation.
3. The Japanese position that Senkaku/Diaoyu is part of Japanese territory because it was awarded to Japan by the U.S. in the Okinawa Reversion agreement of 1971 is similarly contrary to fact. The U.S. awarded to Japan only administrative authority over the islands, not sovereignty. Sovereignty was specifically not transferred. The U.S. continued to maintain was undetermined between the three claimants and would only be determined through discussion and agreement. (As I noted in the last post, the Obama administration–in a monumental blunder–effectively changed this policy by failing to object to and stop Japanese “nationalization.”)
4. Japanese policy–and particularly public misunderstanding–has been based on the false assertion, uttered by then foreign minister Fukuda Takeo in testimony to the Upper House of Diet on December 15, 1971 that Okinawa Reversion had accomplished the restoration of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Whether Fukuda misunderstood the issue, or intended to deliberately deceive the country through this testimony is unclear.
5. The Chinese position on handling the territorial issue was, before Japanese “nationalization,” grounded on the 1972 agreement between Prime Minister Tanaka Kakue-Premier Zhou Enlai, when the terms of Japan-China diplomatic relations were determined, to “shelve” the issue–i.e., to avoid any acts that sought to enforce one side’s claim to sovereignty.
6. Yabuki cites his own research and authoritative third party sources to charge that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs removed from official transcripts of the Tanaka-Zhou discussions that agreement to “shelve” the issue, allowing future Japanese governments to fraudulently claim that the issue was not discussed and that China asserted a claim over the islands.
7. Under the circumstances above, the decision of the Noda government to “nationalize” the islands was a grave provocation, a fundamental change in the status quo, tantamount from the Chinese point of view to aggression and forceful annexation of Chinese territory. An equivalently forceful Chinese response to “balance” the level of its sovereign claim was inevitable.
What has reminded me of Whiting’s study are the many signals sent by China since the beginning of the current crisis (which might be traced back to the fishing boat incidence in 2010). In December 2011 I posted on the humiliation meted out to PM Noda during a short, seemingly purposeless–and certainly fruitless–trip made to Beijing. Already, Japan-China relations had cooled to near freezing.
Professor Yabuki chronicles the many signals of trouble as Chinese concern over the direction of Japanese policy grew. These included the refusal of Hu Jintao in February in to meet a top level delegation of seven of Japan organizations’ heads in Beijing to commemorate the 40th anniversary of restoration of diplomatic relations. The last minute cancellations of a scheduled visit to Hu Deping, son of Japan’s last “sympathizer” in the Beijing leadership, Hu Yaobang, and a visit of China’s most senior uniformed military officer, Guo Boxiong, in May.
What concerns Yabuki most is that these signals, among many others, were hardly noticed or appreciated in Japan. Yet, they were leading to what became almost a complete breakdown in communications with China. The almost farcical, but deeply tragic, denouement of this breakdown was the “16 minute standing dialogue” between Hu Jintao and Noda held on the sidelines of the APEC conference in Vladivostok on September 9 at which each side delivered its ultimatum.
The Noda Cabinet decided the next day to implement nationalization and the following day paid the money and signed documentation. It is now very hard to believe that anyone expected Japan’s decision to have the effect of de-escalating the crisis. If anyone did they were making the same mistakes as Truman and MacArthur in 1950.
Ahem . . .starviking said:So far the US Administration has walked the walk and talked the talk:sferrin said:
Yeah, just as I thought. The United States is unwilling to jeopardize economic interests in the People's Republic of China to support Japan in this territorial dispute. There is no doubt that the United States could blockade the People's Republic of China or institute sanctions, but is unwilling to take the economic hit.sferrin said:
Fascism and communisim are right next to each other on the political spectrum. Both are highly collectivist ideologies. Both exalt the State over the individual. The only real difference is that fascism permits *some* private ownership of factories and companies and such... so long as the private owners make what the State tells them to make and sells at the price the State tells them to sell at.Kadija_Man said:Hitler was a fascist, Stalin and Mao at least nominally Communist. They are at opposite ends of the political spectrum.
What's hard to fathom about "power?"As for your inability to fathom Mao's political goals,
sublight is back said:Top Obama administration and Pentagon officials signaled a willingness to temporarily accept China's new, controversial air defense identification zone ...
There were fundamental differences between their ideologies and therefore their motivations. Perhaps the most important was private ownership of the means of production. This is first year political theory.JFC Fuller said:Oh please, with the exception of the body count there is hardly a cigarette paper between Hitler's National Socialism and Stalin's Socialism in One Country.Kadija_Man said:Are you really this politically naive? Hitler was a fascist, Stalin and Mao at least nominally Communist. They are at opposite ends of the political spectrum.
I have noticed before your rather bizarre views on political theory. Only on your political spectrum could you place Communism and Fascism side by side. Even since the inception of the political spectrum during the French Revolution in the National Assembly, progressives have been on the left and conservatives on the right. Fascism is considered by most political philosophers a right wing philosophy based on its social and economic policies, whereas Communism has been considered a left wing one again because of its social and economic policies. Only someone who subscribes to the Libertarianism could perhaps come to the conclusions that you do.Orionblamblam said:Fascism and communisim are right next to each other on the political spectrum. Both are highly collectivist ideologies. Both exalt the State over the individual. The only real difference is that fascism permits *some* private ownership of factories and companies and such... so long as the private owners make what the State tells them to make and sells at the price the State tells them to sell at.Kadija_Man said:Hitler was a fascist, Stalin and Mao at least nominally Communist. They are at opposite ends of the political spectrum.
You appear to have problems with it considering your characterisation of Mao's and today's Chinese leadership's motivations.
Indeed so. And while democracies, republics, and whatnot that operate under capitalist systems allow the private ownership of the means of production, fascism scoots to the left as it allows private ownership... but State Control. It's curious that you seem oblivious to that. Fascism is a step towards the left... *far* to the left in that regard.Kadija_Man said:Allowing private ownership of the means of production under fascism is perhaps the most important and greatest point of difference between it and Communism.
Or they will fall back on inadequate definitions of political ideologies, without actually tryign to understand them. Thus you have people who think that fascism is right wing because... why? Because fascists didn't like regulations? Fascsts liked small government? Fascists wanted minimum control over peoples lives? Nope. In most of the ways that matter, fascism is far to the left and *right* *next* *to* communism. When the Italian fascists first started up 90 or so years ago, fascism was clearly seen as, and publicly called, a left-wing ideology due to the policies that it actually supported. It went three quarters of the way to outright communism, only letting people keep businesses. So long as those businesses did what the government told them to do.Those who won't make the effort to understand other cultures and societies will obvious always attempt to dehumanise them. It's just easier for them.
It is the topic. You know the dispute over the Senkaku islands. Otherwise Kadija/Rickshaw would be right when he mused he didn’t understand what all the fuss over the ADIZ was about.Deino said:Hmmm ... here's an interesting analysis ! ... and as such back to the topic please !
Yet every political philosopher other than you, identifies them as a right wing political movement. That includes most Europeans who you'd think would have first hand experience of their policies and beliefs.Orionblamblam said:Indeed so. And while democracies, republics, and whatnot that operate under capitalist systems allow the private ownership of the means of production, fascism scoots to the left as it allows private ownership... but State Control. It's curious that you seem oblivious to that. Fascism is a step towards the left... *far* to the left in that regard.Kadija_Man said:Allowing private ownership of the means of production under fascism is perhaps the most important and greatest point of difference between it and Communism.
Again, I point out your views are at variance with every noted political philosopher of the late 20th century.Or they will fall back on inadequate definitions of political ideologies, without actually tryign to understand them.Those who won't make the effort to understand other cultures and societies will obvious always attempt to dehumanise them. It's just easier for them.
What is Communism and Fascism? Communism is a system or a theory of social organizations where the holding of all property is common, with actual ownership ascribed to the community or state.
Fascism is a system where the government is led by a dictator. The dictator has complete authority and forcibly oppressing opposition and criticism, regimenting all industry and emphasizing an aggressive nationalism.
Philosophy Communists believe that a utopian (perfect) society can be achieved if, and only if, the proletariat (or working classes) overthrow the capitalist system in a social-revolution, usually using armed rebellion. Communism is an extreme form of socialism.
Fascism is based around the glory of the nation state. Fascists believe that constant conquest of other nations is necessary to uphold this glory. Fascist parties and movements in various countries differed significantly from each other. But they also had many characteristics in common, including extreme militaristic nationalism, opposition to parliamentary democracy, conservative economic policy that favored the wealthy, contempt for political and cultural liberalism, a belief in natural social hierarchy and the rule of elites, and the desire to create a Volksgemeinschaft (German: “people’s community”), in which individual interests would be subordinated to the good of the nation.
Social Structure and Class Hierarchies Communists inspired by Karl Marx believe class hierarchies must be abolished by the state seizing control of private property and industry, thereby abolishing the capitalist class. Oh the other hand, fascists believed in a rigid class hierarchy, especially rule by an elite, and were opposed to socialist movements. Fascism upholds a strict class structure, ensuring that every member of society has a specific, unchangeable role. Often in fascist societies a certain racial group is considered superior and national and ethnic unity is encouraged at the expense of individuality. For example, Hitler's fascist regime glorified the Aryan race and called for the extermination of Jews during World War II.
Political System Both fascism and communism are against the democratic process but with some differences. Fascism looks down upon parliamentary democracy. Fascist leaders like Hitler and Mussolini participated in electoral politics before coming to power. But after seizing power, fascist leaders tended to abolish political parties, oppose universal suffrage and became dictators and rulers for life.
In a communist system, there is rule -- in theory -- by a single party. Democracy was to be practiced only within the party, constrained by the policy of democratic centralism i.e. full and vigorous debate would lead to a decision that would determine the party’s “line” on an issue, whereupon the party’s central leadership would close off debate and require adherence to the party line. In short, the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat had to be a dictatorship of the communist party in the name of the proletariat.
Economic System Communism is based on the equal distribution of wealth. The tenet of Marxian communism was "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." Everyone in society receives an equal share of the benefits derived from labor, e.g. food and money. In order to ensure that everyone receives an equal amount, all means of production are controlled by the state.
Fascism allows for private enterprise, but its economic system is focused entirely on strengthening and glorifying the state. Both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany aimed for self-sufficiency, so that each country could survive entirely without trade with other nations. See Fascist corporatism
Individual Rights In both communism and fascism, individual choice or preference matter less than society as a whole. In communism, religion and private property are both abolished, the government controls all labor and wealth, and individual choices such as job or education are dictated by the government. While private property is permitted in fascism, most other choices are also controlled to increase the strength of the State.
I will simply point out that you've made no effort to refute the facts. You just Appeal To Authority.Kadija_Man said:Yet every political philosopher other than you, identifies them as a right wing political movement.
Sorry but first of all in the same way You say I repeat only the Chinese propaganda can anyone else say You are only repeating the Japanese point of view ! As such no discussion is possible and even more when I look at the other posts in this tread I ask if on this topic is a normal discussion possible in any way here in THIS forum ... at least I have my daubts.Abraham Gubler said:It is the topic. You know the dispute over the Senkaku islands. Otherwise Kadija/Rickshaw would be right when he mused he didn’t understand what all the fuss over the ADIZ was about.Deino said:Hmmm ... here's an interesting analysis ! ... and as such back to the topic please !
Thanks for quoting the Chinese propaganda position back at us. Everyone else in the world is happy with Japanese sovereignty over the Ryuku islands. The extended American occupation of the Ryukus may muddy the waters somewhat but regardless the islands are clearly Japanese. The Senkaku islands are also clearly part of the Ryukus geographically and since 1885 politically.
Sorry Deino but there is a big difference. What you call the Japanese point of view is the objective recorded history. The Chinese position avoids a few specific facts in order to create its narrative. Facts like the actual process Japan used to acquire the Senkakus in the first place. And the specific identification of the Senakakus as part of the Ryukus and therefore Japanese in the WWII surrender process.Deino said:Sorry but first of all in the same way You say I repeat only the Chinese propaganda can anyone else say You are only repeating the Japanese point of view !
via: http://www.jamestown.org/chinabrief/China’s East China Sea ADIZ: Framing Japan to Help Washington Understand Publication:
China Brief Volume: 13 Issue: 24 December 5, 2013 04:04 PM Age: 3 days By: Peter Mattis
On November 23, Beijing announced that a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) would go into effect over the East China Sea, overlapping existing Japanese and South Korean ADIZ, requiring all air traffic passing through the zone to file flight information irrespective of its destination. Despite eliciting strong responses from Tokyo and Washington as well as restrained but negative responses from Seoul, Taipei and Canberra, China claimed the ADIZ was a routine measure for improving awareness of its airspace and protecting its national security without any ulterior motive (China Daily, November 30; PLA Daily, November 27; Xinhua, November 25; Yonhap News, November 25, Xinhua, November 23). Maintaining an ADIZ is a relatively common practice, but Beijing’s justification for the new zone rested explicitly on its disputed claim over the Diaoyu (or Senkaku) Islands (Xinhua, November 25). From the beginning, Beijing has appeared prepared to address specific foreign concerns, manage diplomatic backlash, and coordinate the launching and publicizing of air patrols. This suggests a deliberate action, even if the reasons for why now remain mysterious. The ways in which Beijing described the ADIZ’s establishment indicates China has used this opportunity not only to reinforce its claim on the Diaoyu Islands, but also to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States.
The Execution of Policy, Not the Incitement of Crisis
One of the most notable features of China’s presentation of the ADIZ and its policies is the absence of crisis language. As Paul Godwin and Alice Miller have chronicled, Beijing makes steadily escalating statements prior to using military force—a feature noted in China’s wars since 1949.  The principle mouthpieces of the party, while refuting Japanese and U.S. protestations, have remained relatively tame in their language. Only one statement in an institutional, unsigned editorial in the military’s paper evoked this kind of warning: We especially hope that some individual countries will give up their pride and prejudice. They shouldn’t be blinded by their own selfishness so as to underestimate the Chinese people and the Chinese military’s resolute determination to safeguard China’s national sovereignty and security as well as the regional peace and stability” (PLA Daily, November 25).In addition to the absence of crisis language from authoritative outlets, the ADIZ story was not initially played up in China media web portals and required deliberate interest in defense news to find. This further demonstrates China’s effort to present the formation of the ADIZ in a low-key manner.
Indeed, Beijing’s entire presentation of the ADIZ focuses on establishing China’s action as normal and legal as well as expressing China’s concern for peace. Institutional and expert commentaries in the days that followed the announcement were filled with annotations such as “having no intention to generate tensions,” “a move of justice to safeguard regional peace and stability” and the assertion the ADIZ “cannot be described as a threat to another country” (China Military Online, November 28; Xinhua, November 25; PLA Daily, November 25). The hawkish defense commentator Luo Yuan and National Defense University professor Meng Xiangqing even suggested the ADIZ, in the words of the latter, “will in fact bring more security for aircraft flying over the East China Sea. The zone will help reduce military misjudgment”—a position reiterated by the defense ministry this week (Xinhua, December 3; China-US Focus, November 27; Xinhua, November 26).
Four indicators strongly suggest the declaration of the ADIZ was a well-planned policy action that was coordinated across the government, or least among senior policymakers. Although China may be getting vastly better at crisis management and getting its message out, these indicators buttress the hypothesis that the ADIZ was deliberate, considered policy:
Framing Tokyo for Washington’s Benefit
- Xinhua announced the ADIZ as a “Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China,” which is relatively rare and suggests a policy coordinated at the highest levels—the Politburo Standing Committee and possibly the Central Military Commission (Xinhua, November 23).
- Chinese diplomats in at least three countries—the United States, Japan and Australia—had prepared talking points to downplay the implications of the ADIZ as well as any suggestion that it affected the sovereignty disputes in the East China Sea (Xinhua, November 26; Xinhua, November 25; The Australian, November 25; South China Morning Post, November 25).
- A variety of Chinese military and legal experts across the PLA’s different institutions were prepared to discuss the ADIZ, its implications as well as its consistency with domestic and international law and treaty commitments. In addition to the Ministry of National Defense spokesmen, Beijing presented comments from the PLA Air Force, the PLA Navy and National Defense University as well as their affiliated education establishments (Xinhua, November 26; People’s Daily, November 24; Xinhua, November 24; Xinhua, November 23).
- Shortly after announcement of the ADIZ, Beijing dispatched and publicized its first aerial patrol of the newly-designated zone (People’s Daily, November 24; Xinhua, November 24).
The careful control of the ADIZ presentation indicates that China’s story has a calculated message for a targeted audience. Although Beijing is demonstrating once again that the Diaoyu Islands are, in fact, disputed, the main messaging appears directed at Washington and its commitment to Japan. In many respects, the U.S.-Japan alliance and the basing of U.S. military forces is one of the keys to the military aspects of Washington’s “rebalancing toward Asia”—a feature recognized as such by Chinese analysts (PLA Daily, February 2; Dang Jian, January 18).
China’s propaganda presentation contains three themes relevant to the United States and aimed at driving a wedge between it and Japan. Although none of these are necessarily new, the ADIZ declaration offered an opportunity to use them within the context of an emerging crisis:
Japan, not China, is the Threat to Regional Peace and Stability:
- Japan, not China, is the threat to regional peace and stability
- Washington is failing to live up to its commitments in the post-World War II world
- Tokyo is dragging the United States toward conflict
Consistent with its past conflicts, Beijing has painted its actions as defensive and the internationally-recognized, appropriate reaction to the provocation of Japan’s military activities on its periphery (PLA Daily, November 27). Tokyo rather than Beijing, especially because of the government’s purchase of Diaoyu Islands last year, is portrayed as the real threat to the status quo and regional stability. MND spokesman Yang Yujun stated “Facts have proven that it is Japan who has been creating tense situations” or, as one unsigned editorial put it, “[Washington] should pin the blame on the real offender for changing the status quo in the East China Sea and undermining regional peace and stability” (Xinhua, November 25). In Beijing’s telling, the situation is only going to get worse as the return of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe presages a more firm Japanese policy—a process already begun. One of the institutional editorials protesting China’s innocence noted “Abe has taken a series of worrisome actions, including increasing Japan's military budget for the first time in 11 years, staging more military exercises and even openly announcing the intention to revise Japan's pacifist constitution” (Xinhua, November 25).
Washington is Failing to Live Up to Its Commitments in the Post-World War II World:
China has attempted to frame controlling Japan (and restraining its militarism) as part of the U.S. post-World War II international system. An unsigned Xinhua editorial stated Tokyo “has also rejected and challenged the outcomes of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War” (Xinhua, November 25). MND spokesman Yang added “Japan also boosted its military capacity under various disguises, attempting to change the post-World War II international order” (Xinhua, November 29). One article appearing on a Central Party School-run news portal before the ADIZ announcement even equated Washington’s tolerance of rising Japanese militarism with appeasing Germany prior to the outbreak of World War II—something that provides an immediate palliative at the expense of long-term stability (Seeking Truth Online, October 23).
Beyond the issue of Japanese militarism, the 70th anniversary of the Cairo Declaration this month offered the opportunity to invoke the Allies’ commitment to restoring Chinese territories lost to Japan. The declaration stated “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and Pescadores,” which was later reaffirmed by the Potsdam Declaration in 1945. China’s current interpretation is that this includes the Diaoyu, so “in international law, the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands have been returned to China since then” (Xinhua, December 1; Xinhua, November 25).
The other, more current, U.S. failure relates to China’s assessment that Washington has acted in bad faith over its commitment to not take a position on the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. The official statements reacting to the ADIZ delivered by Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel along with the B-52 flights suggest, at least to Chinese analysts, that Washington already has taken a clear stand against China. As Su Xiaohui, a researcher at the MFA-run China Institute for International Studies, wrote, “[the United States] even pretended to have forgotten its consistent claim of holding no positions in the issue of the Diaoyu Islands while making stress on its obligation to its allied country” and reiterated its treaty commitment to help Japan defend the islands (People’s Daily Overseas Edition, November 28).
Tokyo is Dragging the United States toward Conflict:
The official Chinese press have castigated Washington’s responses to the establishment of the ADIZ, suggesting that the United States is emboldening an increasingly militaristic Japan and moving Beijing and Washington closer to conflict. Xinhua opined that “The U.S. overreaction has bolstered Japan intentionally or unintentionally,” allowing Tokyo to malignly influence U.S.-China relations (Xinhua, November 27). According to an English-language editorial, “Washington’s ‘message’ will only add fuel to Tokyo's dangerous belligerence and further eliminate room for diplomatic maneuvers. More importantly, it may put China and [the United States] on a collision course” (China Daily, November 28). Elsewhere, Xinhua warned the United States that “keeping a blind eye to the dangerous tendency in Japan could prove to be risky and might even jeopardize the U.S. national interests” (Xinhua, November 25).
This theme raises the hope that, should Washington not support Japan, Sino-American competition and/or conflict may be averted. An editorial in the English-language China Daily addressed this directly: “The ‘more collaborative and less confrontational future in the Pacific’ [Kerry] envisages rests more on Japan being sensible and peaceful” (China Daily, November 26). A Japan not confident of U.S. support, according to the Chinese media, would be less prone to militarism and more likely to deal fairly with China over the future of the Diaoyu Islands.
At this early date, there seem to be few clear conclusions about Beijing’s intensions in announcing an ADIZ. First, there seems little doubt that this was a coordinated policy that was executed at a time of Beijing’s choosing. It is not a policy free-for-all, but rather another calculated step that reinforces Chinese territorial claims and cannot be easily turned back, as the White House’s recommendation for U.S. commercial airlines to abide by China’s ADIZ regulations recognizes. Second, the way in which China has framed the issue suggests a deliberate effort to convince the United States that its interests are not aligned with Japan’s. The U.S.-Japan alliance is key to the U.S. rebalancing toward Asia, and many Chinese analysts have long seen this policy as little more than a prelude to—or a façade for—containment, or at least as destabilizing East Asia (Xinhua, November 26; “Pivot and Parry: China's Response to America's New Defense Strategy,” China Brief, March 15, 2012).
Beijing’s arguments rely on Washington’s privileging Sino-U.S. cooperation on a range of global issues above other commitments. As it has been presented, Japan appears to join a set of issues—including Taiwan and export controls—that Beijing claims inhibit progress in the Sino-American relationship. The framework that Beijing has put forward for reconciling problems in U.S.-China Relations—the “New Type of Great Power Relations” or “New Model of Relations among Major Countries” (xinxing daguo guanxi)—reinforces this kind of thinking, because it speaks to the long-held hope of a partnership and avoiding the pessimistic repetition of great power conflict (“Chinese Dreams: An Ideological Bulwark, Not a Framework for Sino-American Relations,” China Brief, June 7; “China’s Search for a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship’,” China Brief, September 7, 2012). Yet, Beijing’s behavior in the South and East China Seas suggests this hope will come at the cost of acceding to Chinese pressure on the international system. Thus, the choice is not between U.S. relations with China or countries on its periphery, but rather between a partnership with China and preserving the international system Washington created.
Deino said:Strangely, there are even some in the US, who seem to take a wider view ...
via: http://www.jamestown.org/chinabrief/Framing Tokyo for Washington’s Benefit
Consistent with its past conflicts, Beijing has painted its actions as defensive and the internationally-recognized, appropriate reaction to the provocation of Japan’s military activities on its periphery (PLA Daily, November 27). Tokyo rather than Beijing, especially because of the government’s purchase of Diaoyu Islands last year, is portrayed as the real threat to the status quo and regional stability. MND spokesman Yang Yujun stated “Facts have proven that it is Japan who has been creating tense situations"
If the President of the US declared that Shanghai was sovereign US territory, would that mean that the territorial status of Shanghai is "disputed?"Deino said:Again that does not mean the situation around the Island is "not disputed" !
I believe that a Romney Administration would have made similar decisions. Does a United States administration really want to jeopardize the trade and investment relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China?Grey Havoc said:I think the one thing that everyone will agree on is the fact that, yet again, the current US administration has thrown it's allies under the bus. Along with whatever credibility the supporters of the post-war Japanese constitution (especially Article Nine) had left.
If the President wants to think long-term? Then, yes. If China starts throwing its weight around, the US has a few options. One option is to piss and moan but otherwise do nothing in the hopes of preserving trade. Long-term, that results in an increasingly belligerent and powerful China and an increasingly weak US. Not good. The alternative is to smack 'em down *now,* and potentially preclude the need for future all-out war, or all-out economic capitulation.Triton said:. Does a United States administration really want to jeopardize the trade and investment relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China?
10 hours ago
BEIJING (Reuters) - China expressed "regret" on Monday that South Korea had extended its air defense zone to partially overlap with a similar zone declared by Beijing two weeks ago that has raised regional tensions.
China says SKorea's expanded air zone regrettable Associated Press
South Korea expands air defense zone to partially overlap China's Reuters
SKorea announces expanded air defense zone Associated Press
SKorea expands air defense zone after Chinese move Associated Press
South Korea to make announcement on air zone; expansion is anticipated Reuters
China's declaration of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea that includes islands at the heart of a territorial dispute with Japan has triggered protests from the United States and its close allies Japan and South Korea.
South Korea said on Sunday that its move to expand its own zone would not infringe on neighboring countries' sovereignty.
"China expresses regret over South Korea's expansion of its air defense identification zone," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters at a regular press briefing.
China had immediately conveyed its concerns to South Korea and requested that Seoul handles the matter "safely and cautiously", Hong said.
Hong said the zones, which overlap in an area that includes a submerged reef, called the Suyan Rock by China and Ieodo by South Korea, did not constitute territorial airspace.
"There currently does not exist a territorial dispute between China and South Korea on this issue," Hong said, but noted that the reef was situated in portions of both countries' exclusive economic zones.
"This can only be resolved through maritime negotiations," Hong said of the economic zone issue, which puts at stake rights to potential underwater oil and gas reserves.
South Korea objected to China's November 23 move as unacceptable because of the reef, which has a research station platform built atop it and is controlled by Seoul.
Under the Chinese zone's rules, all aircraft have to report flight plans to Chinese authorities, maintain radio contact and reply promptly to identification inquiries.
The extension of South Korea's zone, which was originally established by the U.S. Air Force in 1951 during the Korean War, will not apply any restrictions to the operation of commercial flights when it takes effect on December 15.
(Reporting by Michael Martina; Editing by Alex Richardson)
...and if the world starts to believe that the US will stand with an ally unless doing so might be uncomfortable or might damage a trade and investment relationship? What values is it then to stand with the US? Watch the greatest shift of power and influence the world has seen since WWII happen real fast.Triton said:I believe that a Romney Administration would have made similar decisions. Does a United States administration really want to jeopardize the trade and investment relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China?