California and Virginia Classes, hobbled by armament?

isayyo2

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Something that's always struck me as odd was the lack of longer range RIM-67s on these nuclear powered Frigates/Cruisers, was it simply cost cutting or was there a deeper philosophy behind their design?
 
Something that's always struck me as odd was the lack of longer range RIM-67s on these nuclear powered Frigates/Cruisers, was it simply cost cutting or was there a deeper philosophy behind their design?
The RIM-67 was fitted on ships which had the Guided Missile Launching System (GMLS) Mk 10 that was originally intended for Terrier. The California class's Mk13 GMLS and the Virginia class's Mk26 GMLS were designed around Tartar and SM-2 sized missiles, and hence did not have space for the RIM-67s with their longer boosters.
 
Good question. SM-2 ER (The RIM-67 one) had way more range than the radars of the day could take advantage of. (Outside of NTU apparently.) A Virginia with RIM-67, Aegis, and NTU would probably make a surface guy weep. Apparently NTU could do stuff Aegis is only now getting around to.


Aside from that though. . . who knows? A RIM-67 probably cost more, and would likely have a longer minimum range. Maybe sea-skimmers got rid of it. (Having both would be ideal but then you'd need an interesting feed system and launcher.)
 
Something that's always struck me as odd was the lack of longer range RIM-67s on these nuclear powered Frigates/Cruisers, was it simply cost cutting or was there a deeper philosophy behind their design?
The RIM-67 was fitted on ships which had the Guided Missile Launching System (GMLS) Mk 10 that was originally intended for Terrier. The California class's Mk13 GMLS and the Virginia class's Mk26 GMLS were designed around Tartar and SM-2 sized missiles, and hence did not have space for the RIM-67s with their longer boosters.
Okay so why not just install Mk10s?
 
Something that's always struck me as odd was the lack of longer range RIM-67s on these nuclear powered Frigates/Cruisers, was it simply cost cutting or was there a deeper philosophy behind their design?
The RIM-67 was fitted on ships which had the Guided Missile Launching System (GMLS) Mk 10 that was originally intended for Terrier. The California class's Mk13 GMLS and the Virginia class's Mk26 GMLS were designed around Tartar and SM-2 sized missiles, and hence did not have space for the RIM-67s with their longer boosters.
Okay so why not just install Mk10s?

The magazines were different for Mk26's and Mk10's. IIRC the Mk26's missiles were vertical and concentric around the launcher while the Mk10's magazines were horizontal and behind/ahead of the launcher.
 
Something that's always struck me as odd was the lack of longer range RIM-67s on these nuclear powered Frigates/Cruisers, was it simply cost cutting or was there a deeper philosophy behind their design?
The RIM-67 was fitted on ships which had the Guided Missile Launching System (GMLS) Mk 10 that was originally intended for Terrier. The California class's Mk13 GMLS and the Virginia class's Mk26 GMLS were designed around Tartar and SM-2 sized missiles, and hence did not have space for the RIM-67s with their longer boosters.
Okay so why not just install Mk10s?

The magazines were different for Mk26's and Mk10's. IIRC the Mk26's missiles were vertical and concentric around the launcher while the Mk10's magazines were horizontal and behind/ahead of the launcher.

Well yeah. That's why you'd need Mk10 (because you aren't going to fit RIM-67s vertical).
 
Something that's always struck me as odd was the lack of longer range RIM-67s on these nuclear powered Frigates/Cruisers, was it simply cost cutting or was there a deeper philosophy behind their design?
The RIM-67 was fitted on ships which had the Guided Missile Launching System (GMLS) Mk 10 that was originally intended for Terrier. The California class's Mk13 GMLS and the Virginia class's Mk26 GMLS were designed around Tartar and SM-2 sized missiles, and hence did not have space for the RIM-67s with their longer boosters.
That's essentially the crux of my question. Why put in all the expense of a nuclear powered cruiser and then arm them with Mk 13s and Mk 26s? The hulls were plenty spacious for a Mk 10 as seen with Truxtun and yet, they go with lightweight launchers...
 
You can probably draw a pretty direct line from the Soviet introduction of anti-carrier SSGNs to the USN's switch to Standard-MR for the DLGNs (and the slightly later DDG/CG-47).

Up to that point, the above-surface threat to CVBGs was almost entirely from bombers and bomber-launched missiles. For those threats, "kill the archer" was the key principle -- engage the bombers (and their supporting recce aircraft and jammers) as far out as possible, preferably before they can launch their missiles. That drove the USN to Talos, Terrier, Typhon-LR, Standard-ER, etc.

Echo II was the first sign of trouble, but AIUI, it was still pretty dependent on off-board targeting that long-range SAMs could help deal with. Then along came Charlie, which it pretty much self-contained and could launch its missiles from well inside the maximum range of missiles like SM-1ER. Countering that threat put a premium on rate-of-fire and reaction time; the USN needed to be able to pump out defensive missiles extremely quickly at pop-up targets showing up anywhere around the CVBG's defensive bubble. They also need to have missiles with as near zero minimum range as possible, so the DLGNs could ride shotgun on a high-value target and engage inbounds right until the last minute.

That means they wanted a fast-cycling launcher and a single-stage missile with no booster -- hence Mk 13 and Mk 26 with Standard-MR.

To me, the really odd thing that that they never put Tartar or SM-1MR on the carriers. Sea Sparrow was obviously near useless for most of its life, and Phalanx was incredibly late (and limited). They fitted Terrier, briefly, then pulled the area defense missiles off entirely. Mk 13 (or even the smaller Mk 22) with Tartar or SM-1MR would have been a huge improvement for the carriers with very limited ship impact given their size.

Edit: The perfectionist in me had to clean up some tense issues.
 
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Okay so why not just install Mk10s?

That's essentially the crux of my question. Why put in all the expense of a nuclear powered cruiser and then arm them with Mk 13s and Mk 26s? The hulls were plenty spacious for a Mk 10 as seen with Truxtun and yet, they go with lightweight launchers...

1)Size of Launchers (both in terms volume and centerline space)

The Mk10 consisted of 2-4 horizontal-rotating rings stored deep inside the hull, with considerable deck penetration, and as a result of the legacy of Terrier, required considerable working space around the loading area to attach fins.

The Mk 13 and 26 stored their shorter missiles vertically, and the shorter folding missile fins removed the requirement to fully assemble the missiles before launch. The Mk13, for example, is a relatively compact rotating drum of 40 missiles with the single-arm launcher above it, and takes up as much space as a 5"/54 gun.

The Mk26 was apparently designed to include a little more room for growth beyond the standard series, including blended rocket-ramjet missiles, but actually saves ship length compared to the Mk13 (quoting Friedman, who goes on to say that despite that, DLGN 38 ended up being longer than DLGN 36)

If you want to see how different the amount of volume the two different launchers consumed compared on the same ship, then this picture of SCB 227 is useful. The three-ring Mk10 Launcher takes up the entirety of a compartment, from the upper deck to the keep. The Mk13 in comparison, penetrates two decks, and takes up a fraction of the length. Guided missile-armed ships of this generation were already centerline space-critical due to the Air Search and Missile Guidance radars they required.

2)Size of Radars

The SPG-51 Illuminators used for Tartar and later SM-2 were considerably smaller and lighter than SPG-55 used for Terrier, and later SM-2 ER. For ships that are centerline-space-critical, this is a problem.

3)Fire Rate

The Mk10 could maintain fire rate of two salvos per minute, with a 30 second reload. The Mk13 could maintain a fire rate of one every 7 seconds. With reaction time being vital to deal with pop-up threats, it makes sense to focus on smaller rapid firing launchers, especially when considering the point immediately below.

4)Improvements in Missile Design

As a result of the development of Typhon MR, improvements such as a new rocket motor, and the programmable autopilot developed for SM-2, which enabled the missile to fly a more energy-efficient trajectory, meant that a Tartar-sized missile had performance equivalent to that of Terrier.

5)Problems inherent to Nuclear-Powered Surface Combatant Design

In conventional ship design, naval architects can get around unexpected changes in weight during construction by adjusting the amounts of liquid fuel and feedwater, which can overcome considerable errors in in estimated weights and center of gravity. In Nuclear ships theses liquids are scarce, and cannot be adjusted at will. There are also requirements for clear deck space to allow access to the reactor for servicing and refueling. Radiation standards prevent areas around the reactors from being used for crew spaces.

I don't feel I need to stress why suddenly changing the volume requirements and weight distribution of a ship designed for Mk13 or Mk26 launchers, by insisting that Mk10 Launchers be installed, along with the superstructure to accommodate SPG-55s, as @sferrin is suggesting will be a bad idea.
 
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To me, the really odd thing that that they never put Tartar or SM-1MR on the carriers. Sea Sparrow was obviously near useless for most of its life, and Phalanx was incredibly late (and limited). They fitted Terrier, briefly, then pulled the area defense missiles off entirely. Mk 13 (or even the smaller Mk 22) with Tartar or SM-1MR would have been a huge improvement for the carriers with very limited ship impact given their size.
Typhon MR and later Tartar (and 5"/54s to deal with MTBs) were considered for CVA-67.
 
Okay so why not just install Mk10s?

1)Size of Launchers (both in terms volume and centerline space)

Guided missile-armed ships of this generation were already centerline space-critical due to the Air Search and Missile Guidance radars they required.

Yeah, none of that really holds much water. The Leahy's had a dual rail at both ends and were much smaller than the Virginia.

3)Fire Rate

The Mk10 could maintain fire rate of two salvos per minute, with a 30 second reload. The Mk13 could maintain a fire rate of one every 7 seconds. With reaction time being vital to deal with pop-up threats, it makes sense to focus on smaller rapid firing launchers, especially when considering the point immediately below.

This, sea-skimmers, and minimum range are probably it. Though if they could make a new Mk26 there's no reason it couldn't have been a new Mk10 instead.

4)Improvements in Missile Design

As a result of the development of Typhon MR, improvements such as a new rocket motor, and the programmable autopilot developed for SM-2, which enabled the missile to fly a more energy-efficient trajectory, meant that a Tartar-sized missile had performance equivalent to that of Terrier.[/QUOTE]

And RIM-67 had far more.

5)Problems inherent to Nuclear-Powered Surface Combatant Design
In conventional ship design, naval architects can get around unexpected changes in weight during construction by adjusting the amounts of liquid fuel and feedwater, which can overcome considerable errors in in estimated weights and center of gravity. In Nuclear ships theses liquids are scarce, and cannot be adjusted at will. There are also requirements for clear deck space to allow access to the reactor for servicing and refueling. Radiation standards prevent areas around the reactors from being used for crew spaces.

That explains why Long Beach, Truxtun, and Bainbridge were all nuclear powered and had Terrier.

I don't feel I need to stress why suddenly changing the volume requirements and weight distribution of a ship designed for Mk13 or Mk26 launchers, by insisting that Mk10 Launchers be installed, along with the superstructure to accommodate SPG-55s, as @sferrin is suggesting will be a bad idea.

Straw man. Nobody suggested ripping out the Mk26s and replacing them with Mk10s. The question was why didn't they put the Mk 10s (or a newer launcher) in from the get go.
 
Okay so why not just install Mk10s?

1)Size of Launchers (both in terms volume and centerline space)

Guided missile-armed ships of this generation were already centerline space-critical due to the Air Search and Missile Guidance radars they required.

Yeah, none of that really holds much water. The Leahy's had a dual rail at both ends and were much smaller than the Virginia.

3)Fire Rate

The Mk10 could maintain fire rate of two salvos per minute, with a 30 second reload. The Mk13 could maintain a fire rate of one every 7 seconds. With reaction time being vital to deal with pop-up threats, it makes sense to focus on smaller rapid firing launchers, especially when considering the point immediately below.

This, sea-skimmers, and minimum range are probably it. Though if they could make a new Mk26 there's no reason it couldn't have been a new Mk10 instead.

4)Improvements in Missile Design

As a result of the development of Typhon MR, improvements such as a new rocket motor, and the programmable autopilot developed for SM-2, which enabled the missile to fly a more energy-efficient trajectory, meant that a Tartar-sized missile had performance equivalent to that of Terrier.

And RIM-67 had far more.

5)Problems inherent to Nuclear-Powered Surface Combatant Design
In conventional ship design, naval architects can get around unexpected changes in weight during construction by adjusting the amounts of liquid fuel and feedwater, which can overcome considerable errors in in estimated weights and center of gravity. In Nuclear ships theses liquids are scarce, and cannot be adjusted at will. There are also requirements for clear deck space to allow access to the reactor for servicing and refueling. Radiation standards prevent areas around the reactors from being used for crew spaces.

That explains why Long Beach, Truxtun, and Bainbridge were all nuclear powered and had Terrier.

I don't feel I need to stress why suddenly changing the volume requirements and weight distribution of a ship designed for Mk13 or Mk26 launchers, by insisting that Mk10 Launchers be installed, along with the superstructure to accommodate SPG-55s, as @sferrin is suggesting will be a bad idea.

Straw man. Nobody suggested ripping out the Mk26s and replacing them with Mk10s. The question was why didn't they put the Mk 10s (or a newer launcher) in from the get go.
[/QUOTE]
Leahys had no 5" guns, the Californias and Virginias had two each.
Rate of fire was critical against saturation attacks, response time was critical against pop up threats.

Nuclear powered surface vessels are more difficult to design than conventionally powered ones, all the ships you listed were designed from the outset with Terrier, not converted part way through.

Mk 10 was already in service in numbers in the fairly new Leahy, Belknap classes, their nuc derivatives, Long Beach, as well as the Coontz/Dewey class, it was well covered. All received SM-1ER and many were upgraded with NTU for service through the 90s and into the 2000s(only the end of the cold war ended this), with AEGIS coming on line initially with Mk26 equipped vessels being supplemented with the Mk41, hence SM-2ER vessels in the 90s.

The Californias and Virginias filled a need, they provided doubled ended escorts against saturation attacks, for the planned number of CVNs in service / build at the time. Incidentally the California was basically a nuclear variant of the cancelled 1967 DDG and the Virginas in many ways were nuclear powered equivalents to the Spruance type DDG, where Bainbridge and Truxton were nuc derivatives of DLGs.
 
Pretty sure SCB240.65 (designed in November 1962, and intended to be built in FY 1965) is the last US Surface Combatant design to have a Mk10 GMLS for Typhon LR, along with a pair of Mk13s for Typhon MR. The Californias are built with funds from FY 66 and FY 67, although the funding is not released until 1968, so it seems the Mk10 dies (at least in terms of inclusion on new construction) around 1963 with the cancellation of Typhon.

If we want to find out why they didn't persist with the Mk10, that answer probably lies in the minds of the now dead design team. It likely has to do with the requirements rapid reaction, and zero minimum range as suggested by @TomS above.

This is conjecture, but with the death of Typhon, and more importantly, Typhon LR, the US is left without a new generation long range missile to use with the Mk10. The requirement to deal with pop-up threats, and therefore, the requirements for rapid reaction time and rapid fire-rate leads to the focus on launchers firing smaller missiles throughout the 60s and 70s. Given the ISD of RIM-67/SM-2ER is in 1981, I would suggest the it's introduced as a means of making legacy Terrier-armed ships useful AAW escorts, and that throughout the 1960s and possibly into the the early 70s, there was no serious intention of designing larger longer-ranged missiles to use the Mk10.
 
Leahys had no 5" guns, the Californias and Virginias had two each.
Are you telling me you don't think you could squeeze in two 5" guns with an additional 4,000 tons displacement? (7,800 for Leahy, 12,700 for Virginia.)

Nuclear powered surface vessels are more difficult to design than conventionally powered ones, all the ships you listed were designed from the outset with Terrier, not converted part way through.

And why would you think doing so with the Virginias would have been unpossible? Is there some law of the universe forbidding them from starting with Terrier?

Mk 10 was already in service in numbers in the fairly new Leahy, Belknap classes, their nuc derivatives, Long Beach, as well as the Coontz/Dewey class, it was well covered. All received SM-1ER and many were upgraded with NTU for service through the 90s and into the 2000s(only the end of the cold war ended this), with AEGIS coming on line initially with Mk26 equipped vessels being supplemented with the Mk41, hence SM-2ER vessels in the 90s.

Yeah, none of that explains why they went with RIM-66 instead of RIM-67.
 
You can probably draw a pretty direct line from the Soviet introduction of anti-carrier SSGNs to the USN's switch to Standard-MR for the DLGNs (and the slightly later DDG/CG-47).

Up to that point, the above-surface threat to CVBGs was almost entirely from bombers and bomber-launched missiles. For those threats, "kill the archer" was the key principle -- engage the bombers (and their supporting recce aircraft and jammers) as far out as possible, preferably before they can launch their missiles. That drove the USN to Talos, Terrier, Typhon-LR, Standard-ER, etc.

Echo II was the first sign of trouble, but AIUI, it was still pretty dependent on off-board targeting that long-range SAMs could help deal with. Then along came Charlie, which it pretty much self-contained and could launch its missiles from well inside the maximum range of missiles like SM-1ER. Countering that threat put a premium on rate-of-fire and reaction time; the USN needed to be able to pump out defensive missiles extremely quickly at pop-up targets showing up anywhere around the CVBG's defensive bubble. They also need to have missiles with as near zero minimum range as possible, so the DLGNs could ride shotgun on a high-value target and engage inbounds right until the last minute.

That means they wanted a fast-cycling launcher and a single-stage missile with no booster -- hence Mk 13 and Mk 26 with Standard-MR.

To me, the really odd thing that that they never put Tartar or SM-1MR on the carriers. Sea Sparrow was obviously near useless for most of its life, and Phalanx was incredibly late (and limited). They fitted Terrier, briefly, then pulled the area defense missiles off entirely. Mk 13 (or even the smaller Mk 22) with Tartar or SM-1MR would have been a huge improvement for the carriers with very limited ship impact given their size.

Edit: The perfectionist in me had to clean up some tense issues.
RIM-67-Standard-Missile-002.jpg
 
Yeah, none of that explains why they went with RIM-66 instead of RIM-67.

Because they didn't fit in the in production missile launching systems available when they were built and the Mk 41 VLS, which could handle ER, was sized to replace the Mk 26 GMLS.

By all means do up a Virginia using the out of production Mk-10 launchers and submit it to the USN to build as a Ticonderoga replacement.
 
You can probably draw a pretty direct line from the Soviet introduction of anti-carrier SSGNs to the USN's switch to Standard-MR for the DLGNs (and the slightly later DDG/CG-47).

Up to that point, the above-surface threat to CVBGs was almost entirely from bombers and bomber-launched missiles. For those threats, "kill the archer" was the key principle -- engage the bombers (and their supporting recce aircraft and jammers) as far out as possible, preferably before they can launch their missiles. That drove the USN to Talos, Terrier, Typhon-LR, Standard-ER, etc.

Echo II was the first sign of trouble, but AIUI, it was still pretty dependent on off-board targeting that long-range SAMs could help deal with. Then along came Charlie, which it pretty much self-contained and could launch its missiles from well inside the maximum range of missiles like SM-1ER. Countering that threat put a premium on rate-of-fire and reaction time; the USN needed to be able to pump out defensive missiles extremely quickly at pop-up targets showing up anywhere around the CVBG's defensive bubble. They also need to have missiles with as near zero minimum range as possible, so the DLGNs could ride shotgun on a high-value target and engage inbounds right until the last minute.

That means they wanted a fast-cycling launcher and a single-stage missile with no booster -- hence Mk 13 and Mk 26 with Standard-MR.

To me, the really odd thing that that they never put Tartar or SM-1MR on the carriers. Sea Sparrow was obviously near useless for most of its life, and Phalanx was incredibly late (and limited). They fitted Terrier, briefly, then pulled the area defense missiles off entirely. Mk 13 (or even the smaller Mk 22) with Tartar or SM-1MR would have been a huge improvement for the carriers with very limited ship impact given their size.

Edit: The perfectionist in me had to clean up some tense issues.
View attachment 641212
Yep, thats Terrier as he mentioned having been fitted initially, but still no Tartar or SM-1MR
 
Yeah, none of that explains why they went with RIM-66 instead of RIM-67.

Because they didn't fit in the in production missile launching systems available when they were built and the Mk 41 VLS, which could handle ER, was sized to replace the Mk 26 GMLS.

By all means do up a Virginia using the out of production Mk-10 launchers and submit it to the USN to build as a Ticonderoga replacement.

The Mk41 VLS didn't exist when then Virginias were built. The Mk 26 was a new launcher. Could have just as easily been built for RIM-67 as RIM-66 (though the magazine would have required a different orientation). The question was, why wasn't it. (No, don't answer. You don't know.)

"By all means do up a Virginia using the out of production Mk-10 launchers and submit it to the USN to build as a Ticonderoga replacement."

Who suggested anything like this?
 
You can probably draw a pretty direct line from the Soviet introduction of anti-carrier SSGNs to the USN's switch to Standard-MR for the DLGNs (and the slightly later DDG/CG-47).

Up to that point, the above-surface threat to CVBGs was almost entirely from bombers and bomber-launched missiles. For those threats, "kill the archer" was the key principle -- engage the bombers (and their supporting recce aircraft and jammers) as far out as possible, preferably before they can launch their missiles. That drove the USN to Talos, Terrier, Typhon-LR, Standard-ER, etc.

Echo II was the first sign of trouble, but AIUI, it was still pretty dependent on off-board targeting that long-range SAMs could help deal with. Then along came Charlie, which it pretty much self-contained and could launch its missiles from well inside the maximum range of missiles like SM-1ER. Countering that threat put a premium on rate-of-fire and reaction time; the USN needed to be able to pump out defensive missiles extremely quickly at pop-up targets showing up anywhere around the CVBG's defensive bubble. They also need to have missiles with as near zero minimum range as possible, so the DLGNs could ride shotgun on a high-value target and engage inbounds right until the last minute.

That means they wanted a fast-cycling launcher and a single-stage missile with no booster -- hence Mk 13 and Mk 26 with Standard-MR.

To me, the really odd thing that that they never put Tartar or SM-1MR on the carriers. Sea Sparrow was obviously near useless for most of its life, and Phalanx was incredibly late (and limited). They fitted Terrier, briefly, then pulled the area defense missiles off entirely. Mk 13 (or even the smaller Mk 22) with Tartar or SM-1MR would have been a huge improvement for the carriers with very limited ship impact given their size.

Edit: The perfectionist in me had to clean up some tense issues.
View attachment 641212
Yep, thats Terrier as he mentioned having been fitted initially, but still no Tartar or SM-1MR

Nothing gets past you.
 
Yeah, none of that explains why they went with RIM-66 instead of RIM-67.

Because they didn't fit in the in production missile launching systems available when they were built and the Mk 41 VLS, which could handle ER, was sized to replace the Mk 26 GMLS.

By all means do up a Virginia using the out of production Mk-10 launchers and submit it to the USN to build as a Ticonderoga replacement.

The Mk41 VLS didn't exist when then Virginias were built. The Mk 26 was a new launcher. Could have just as easily been built for RIM-67 as RIM-66 (though the magazine would have required a different orientation). The question was, why wasn't it. (No, don't answer. You don't know.)

"By all means do up a Virginia using the out of production Mk-10 launchers and submit it to the USN to build as a Ticonderoga replacement."

Who suggested anything like this?
Do you know?

I think not.

You have been answered but don't like the answers you are getting pretty much across the board, hard luck. SM-1ER (and SM-2ER for that matter) is a two stage Standard missile, it is longer, heavier, greater diameter. It requires the use of an out of production launchers or the redesign of in service launchers, which incidentally, would make them incompatible for their initial intended use in FFGs and DDGs. But that's cool, you know best so jump in a time machine and go tell the USN they have it wrong and should do what you want them to.

Again, with the Leahys, Belknaps, Coontz, Bainbridge, Truxton and Long Beach the USN had a lot of high end escorts with Terrier / SM-1ER and following NTU SM-2ER. The story with Tartar / SM-1MR wasn't as good with the Adams class being quite limited in many ways, too tight and lacking the required C3I systems to make them the ship Australia for instance thought they were buying, the FFG-7 was even more limited (i.e. no 3-D radar). This left a gap in the inner defensive zone for CBGs, a gap filled by the Californias, Virginias and eventually the Ticonderogas .

NTU Adams would have helped fill the gap until the Burkes arrived en-mass, while the NTU Cruisers (former DLGs) would have remained as the long shooters. Try doing some reading on USN surface combatant development, most of the answers are in there.

Time for an awkward analogy, a .308" Sniper rifle has a much longer effective range than a .223" carbine, so why doesn't the army and marines replace all carbines with sniper rifles?

Just had another thought, if your opinion is correct and the the USN made an error arming their last DLGN/CGNs with SM-1MR instead of SM-1ER, why then do current day upgraded VLS Ticonderogas and Burkes carry a mix of SM-2MR and ESSM in addition to SM-2ER, why do the Spanish F-100s and Australian Hobarts carry mostly ESSM and SM-2MR instead of a loadout consisting solely of SM-2ER?
 
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The Mk41 VLS didn't exist when then Virginias were built. The Mk 26 was a new launcher. Could have just as easily been built for RIM-67 as RIM-66 (though the magazine would have required a different orientation). The question was, why wasn't it. (No, don't answer. You don't know.)

We don't know, but we can make some educated guesses based on the acquisition history of the ships.

The DLGNs-38s were expected to be a fairly large class, and were initially ordered right about the same time that Advanced Surface Missile System (later AEGIS) was just beginning development, after the collapse of Typhon. ASMS was initially supposed to be built into modular deckhouses that could be dropped straight onto a suitable hull, either late in construction or conceivably as a retrofit. The DLGNs were seen as the logical host for ASMS, so they needed to be designed with that in mind. And ASMS was all about rapid reaction and ROF, which definitely called for a quick-firing launcher and a Tarter-sized missile. So it makes sense for the DLGNs, as potential ASMS platforms, to be built around ASMS-appropriate launchers.

Now, it turned out that AEGIS as built was not suitable for retrofitting onto the DLGNs, but the ships were already built by that point, making the issue of whether they would have been better off with Mk 10 and ER missiles entirely moot.

Source: When Computers Went to Sea, US Destroyers (Revised Edition), and some hazily remembered discussions with Dr. Friedman many many years ago.
 
The Mk41 VLS didn't exist when then Virginias were built. The Mk 26 was a new launcher. Could have just as easily been built for RIM-67 as RIM-66 (though the magazine would have required a different orientation). The question was, why wasn't it. (No, don't answer. You don't know.)

We don't know, but we can make some educated guesses based on the acquisition history of the ships.

The DLGNs-38s were expected to be a fairly large class, and were initially ordered right about the same time that Advanced Surface Missile System (later AEGIS) was just beginning development, after the collapse of Typhon. ASMS was initially supposed to be built into modular deckhouses that could be dropped straight onto a suitable hull, either late in construction or conceivably as a retrofit. The DLGNs were seen as the logical host for ASMS, so they needed to be designed with that in mind. And ASMS was all about rapid reaction and ROF, which definitely called for a quick-firing launcher and a Tarter-sized missile. So it makes sense for the DLGNs, as potential ASMS platforms, to be built around ASMS-appropriate launchers.

Now, it turned out that AEGIS as built was not suitable for retrofitting onto the DLGNs, but the ships were already built by that point, making the issue of whether they would have been better off with Mk 10 and ER missiles entirely moot.

Source: When Computers Went to Sea, US Destroyers (Revised Edition), and some hazily remembered discussions with Dr. Friedman many many years ago.
Friedman is someone I would love to meet and definitely love to hear speak.
 
The DLGNs-38s were expected to be a fairly large class, and were initially ordered right about the same time that Advanced Surface Missile System (later AEGIS) was just beginning development, after the collapse of Typhon. ASMS was initially supposed to be built into modular deckhouses that could be dropped straight onto a suitable hull, either late in construction or conceivably as a retrofit. The DLGNs were seen as the logical host for ASMS, so they needed to be designed with that in mind. And ASMS was all about rapid reaction and ROF, which definitely called for a quick-firing launcher and a Tarter-sized missile. So it makes sense for the DLGNs, as potential ASMS platforms, to be built around ASMS-appropriate launchers.

That sort of makes sense

Now, it turned out that AEGIS as built was not suitable for retrofitting onto the DLGNs,

Why is that? They were able to drop the VLS into Spruance hulls, and CGN-42 was considered for the Aegis system.
 
Now, it turned out that AEGIS as built was not suitable for retrofitting onto the DLGNs,
Why is that? They were able to drop the VLS into Spruance hulls, and CGN-42 was considered for the Aegis system.

The 36s were exceptionally tight ships. The 38s less so, but the level of effort required to retrofit was just too expensive given the small number of ships. It didn't help that CNO Holloway was hoping to use AEGIS as a lever to pry lose nuclear strike cruisers, which made and effort to retrofit AEGIS to existing ships unhelpful to the cause. CGN-42 was seen as a sort fo budget Strike Cruiser, but it wasn't very budget. The ships Holloway really wanted were even more expensive.

Then when the CSGNs proved unaffordable, they looked around and found that the best economical solution was the DDG-47, since the Spruances had been designed with that degree of modularity in mind. Even so, the DDG-47s took some serious reengineering to keep stability acceptable with those big deckhouses.
 
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Now, it turned out that AEGIS as built was not suitable for retrofitting onto the DLGNs,
Why is that? They were able to drop the VLS into Spruance hulls, and CGN-42 was considered for the Aegis system.

The 36s were exceptionally tight ships. The 38s less so, but the level of effort required to retrofit was just too expensive given the small number of ships. It didn't help that CNO Holloway was hoping to use AEGIS as a lever to pry lose nuclear strike cruisers, which made and effort to retrofit AEGIS to existing ships unhelpful to the cause. CGN-42 was seen as a sort fo budget Strike Cruiser, but it wasn't very budget. The ships Holloway really wanted were even more expensive.

Then when the CGSNs proved unaffordable, they looked around and found that the best economical solution was the DDG-47, since the Spruances had been designed with that degree of modularity in mind. Even so, the DDG-47s took some serious reengineering to keep stability acceptable with those big deckhouses.

Bummer. Still wish they'd kept the Spruances and put the planned 8" gun up front. Together with their VLS they would have been very versatile destroyers.
 
Actually, I'm afraid that there is some confusion there, particularly over the CGN-42 designation. What was to become the Virginia-class DLGN was designed as a dedicated escort for those CBGs that were to be built around the CVN-68 (Nimitz) class CVNs, with four DLGNs per battle group, with a minimum of 32 hulls to be procured (originally it was only planned to build 8 examples of the CVN-68 class). From the outset it was planned that this new frigate class would be built around ASMS (what became Aegis), though scoop creep began creating some technical & other delays. Though this contributed to the decision around 1967 to have early examples of the new class initially fitted for but not with ASMS, this was not the only, or even primary reason. A major issue was that McNamara hated the CVN-68 class and wanted it cancelled so he that could spend the money on 'his' priorities. This hatred naturally carried over to the DLGN class that was intended to help defend the new CVNs. McNamara routinely raided the budgets of both programs for money for various pet projects of his, causing further ongoing delays and attendant cost overruns. Matters weren't helped by McNamara viewing ASMS as a very low priority program at best, with him even trying at one stage to have it merged with the U.S. Army's SAM-D program. He failed, but the botched attempt hardly helped already stretched budgets and schedules.

The plan with DLGN-42, later CGN-42, was for it to be the first ship in the class to be fitted with ASMS/Aegis, with the previous ships then being progressively retrofitted. In 1976 however with procurement already having rather ill-advisedly been reduced to 11 hulls, CGN-42 was cancelled, with the designation being reassigned later in the year to the Strike Cruiser program. Confusing matters further was that this new incarnation of CGN-42 was initially supposed to use the Virginia class hull as the basis for it's design, though it soon evolved into a new bigger hull design altogether.
 
Actually, I'm afraid that there is some confusion there, particularly over the CGN-42 designation. What was to become the Virginia-class DLGN was designed as a dedicated escort for those CBGs that were to be built around the CVN-68 (Nimitz) class CVNs, with four DLGNs per battle group, with a minimum of 32 hulls to be procured (originally it was only planned to build 8 examples of the CVN-68 class). From the outset it was planned that this new frigate class would be built around ASMS (what became Aegis), though scoop creep began creating some technical & other delays. Though this contributed to the decision around 1967 to have early examples of the new class initially fitted for but not with ASMS, this was not the only, or even primary reason. A major issue was that McNamara hated the CVN-68 class and wanted it cancelled so he that could spend the money on 'his' priorities. This hatred naturally carried over to the DLGN class that was intended to help defend the new CVNs. McNamara routinely raided the budgets of both programs for money for various pet projects of his, causing further ongoing delays and attendant cost overruns. Matters weren't helped by McNamara viewing ASMS as a very low priority program at best, with him even trying at one stage to have it merged with the U.S. Army's SAM-D program. He failed, but the botched attempt hardly helped already stretched budgets and schedules.

The plan with DLGN-42, later CGN-42, was for it to be the first ship in the class to be fitted with ASMS/Aegis, with the previous ships then being progressively retrofitted. In 1976 however with procurement already having rather ill-advisedly been reduced to 11 hulls, CGN-42 was cancelled, with the designation being reassigned later in the year to the Strike Cruiser program. Confusing matters further was that this new incarnation of CGN-42 was initially supposed to use the Virginia class hull as the basis for it's design, though it soon evolved into a new bigger hull design altogether.
Yes thanks, I recall reading the requirement of four DLGNs per CVN and if I am not drawing to long a bow, Truxton, Bainbridge and the two Californias were to have catered for Enterprise and the Virginias for Nimitz. Long Beach was to have received an AEGIS conversion, where her Mk-10s would have been removed and replaced with Mk-26s and an 8" Gun.
 
Now, it turned out that AEGIS as built was not suitable for retrofitting onto the DLGNs,
Why is that? They were able to drop the VLS into Spruance hulls, and CGN-42 was considered for the Aegis system.

The 36s were exceptionally tight ships. The 38s less so, but the level of effort required to retrofit was just too expensive given the small number of ships. It didn't help that CNO Holloway was hoping to use AEGIS as a lever to pry lose nuclear strike cruisers, which made and effort to retrofit AEGIS to existing ships unhelpful to the cause. CGN-42 was seen as a sort fo budget Strike Cruiser, but it wasn't very budget. The ships Holloway really wanted were even more expensive.

Then when the CSGNs proved unaffordable, they looked around and found that the best economical solution was the DDG-47, since the Spruances had been designed with that degree of modularity in mind. Even so, the DDG-47s took some serious reengineering to keep stability acceptable with those big deckhouses.
Every Spruance had the potential to be upgraded to a similar configuration to the Kidd class DDGs and could technically have been upgraded with Mk-41 fore and aft and NTU, making them into pretty much super Kidds. I recall that when the Kidds were offered to Australia there was talk of upgrading them with Mk-41and cancelling the proposed FFG MLU or FFGUP as it was known.
 
It's a shame that the Kidds never got a couple of Mk 41s.
 
Every Spruance had the potential to be upgraded to a similar configuration to the Kidd class DDGs and could technically have been upgraded with Mk-41 fore and aft and NTU, making them into pretty much super Kidds. I recall that when the Kidds were offered to Australia there was talk of upgrading them with Mk-41and cancelling the proposed FFG MLU or FFGUP as it was known.

I remember the Australian plans. They might well have run into weight issues if they had gotten too carried away, since the Tartar conversion and the NTU added quite a bit of weight high in the ship. IIRC, the idea was to put in rather small VLS -- they might even have lost missiles compared to the Mk 26 install (2x32-cell VLS versus 1x24- and 1x44-round Mk 26). (but I could be wrong -- it's been a long time)

Remember that the Ticos had some extensive modifications, including things like heavier hull plating and a cross-flooding duct, to keep their stability at acceptable levels. They ultimately needed ballast, at least at first. If you look at reference books, you'll see the Tico's are even slightly longer than the Spruances -- that's not a hull stretch, it's because of the raised coamings around the bow pulpit needed to preserve stability in a seaway due to their increased draft and displacement.
 
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Every Spruance had the potential to be upgraded to a similar configuration to the Kidd class DDGs and could technically have been upgraded with Mk-41 fore and aft and NTU, making them into pretty much super Kidds. I recall that when the Kidds were offered to Australia there was talk of upgrading them with Mk-41and cancelling the proposed FFG MLU or FFGUP as it was known.

I remember the Australian plans. They might well have run into weight issues if they had gotten too carried away, since the Tsrtar cponversion and the NTU added quite a bit of weight high in the ship. IIRC, the idea was to put in rather small VLS -- they might even have lost missiles compared to the Mk 26 install (2x32-cell VLS versus 1x24- and 1x44-round Mk 26). (but I could be wrong -- it's been a long time)

Remember that the Ticos had some extensive modifications, including things like heavier hull plating and a cross-flooding duct, to keep their stability at acceptable levels. They ultimately needed ballast, at least at first. If you look at reference books, you'll see the Tico's are even slightly longer than the Spruances -- that's not a hull stretch, it's because of the raised coamings around the bow pulpit needed to preserve stability in a seaway due to their increased draft and displacement.
Fairly sure the Kidds already had NTU.

Mk-41 weighs in at 262000lb for a 61 cell, vs 218000 lb for the Mk-26 Mod 1 (44 rounds), and the weight is lower down. Going off the linked references on http://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Weapons/US_GMLS.htm. Maybe a pair of 48 VLS could have been used.
 
Right, what I meant was that they had already eaten up their margins with things like NTU. Adding VLS might have been more than they could handle.

Retrofits sometimes aren't as straightforward as looking at the total system weight. The VLS boxes might require reinforcing structure around the deck openings, where the Mk 26 didn't, for example. When Cruiser Conversion was still considering retrofitting VLS to the lead five Ticos (late 1990s), there was a version of the plan that required putting many fewer cells (like half as many) in the first two ships, because they just didn't have the margins to accommodate the full 61-cell modules, even though they were only slightly heavier than the Mk 26 they would replace.
 
I believe that by around 1984 the Mk 26 equipped Ticonderoga-class cruisers were all able to fire the Standard SM-2ER in addition to the MR variant (I think that particular Mk 26 upgrade originated in the Strike Cruiser program). I'm not altogther sure if the USN got around to rolling out that upgrade to the Virginia-class cruisers though.

On another interesting note, when the CSGN design for the Strike Cruiser program was shelved, a new scaled down (in comparison to the CSGN) CGN-47 design was briefly proposed to fill the gap. It was closer in a number of respects to the 'original' Aegis equipped Virginia, though still with evident differences caused by trying to keep Strike Cruiser requirements such as Flag facilities, expanded aviation spaces and enlarged magazines in some form or another, for a displacement of around 12,100 tons. See below for an artist's impression from around 1978, showing the design beside the then also unbuilt Ticonderoga design.
View: https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/1vjldz/a_never_realized_nuclear_aegis_cruiser_cgn42_next/
 
I believe that by around 1984 the Mk 26 equipped Ticonderoga-class cruisers were all able to fire the Standard SM-2ER in addition to the MR variant (I think that particular Mk 26 upgrade originated in the Strike Cruiser program). I'm not altogther sure if the USN got around to rolling out that upgrade to the Virginia-class cruisers though.

No, SM-2ER was absolutely incompatible with the Mk 26. The two-stage missile is 314 inches long and weighs 2960 pounds; the Mk 26 launcher can only accomodate missiles up to 200 inches and 2200 pounds. Plus of course, SM-2ER still required manual finning of the lower stage, which Mk 26 could not do (there was no place for it to happen and nowhere to stow the fins).

There were at one point plans to create an AEGIS ER missile that could fit both Mk 26 and VLS. But that was before Mk 41 grew to accommodate Tomahawk (the original plan had been to cap it at a 228-inch canister, which was enlarged to 264-inches for Tomahawk). At that point, AEGIS ER (later SM-2 Block IV) also grew to make better use of the longer canister and became too long for the Mk 26 as well. Edit: And this missile didn't ultimately reach IOC until 1999.
 
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Every Spruance had the potential to be upgraded to a similar configuration to the Kidd class DDGs and could technically have been upgraded with Mk-41 fore and aft and NTU, making them into pretty much super Kidds. I recall that when the Kidds were offered to Australia there was talk of upgrading them with Mk-41and cancelling the proposed FFG MLU or FFGUP as it was known.

I remember the Australian plans. They might well have run into weight issues if they had gotten too carried away, since the Tsrtar cponversion and the NTU added quite a bit of weight high in the ship. IIRC, the idea was to put in rather small VLS -- they might even have lost missiles compared to the Mk 26 install (2x32-cell VLS versus 1x24- and 1x44-round Mk 26). (but I could be wrong -- it's been a long time)

Remember that the Ticos had some extensive modifications, including things like heavier hull plating and a cross-flooding duct, to keep their stability at acceptable levels. They ultimately needed ballast, at least at first. If you look at reference books, you'll see the Tico's are even slightly longer than the Spruances -- that's not a hull stretch, it's because of the raised coamings around the bow pulpit needed to preserve stability in a seaway due to their increased draft and displacement.
Fairly sure the Kidds already had NTU.

Mk-41 weighs in at 262000lb for a 61 cell, vs 218000 lb for the Mk-26 Mod 1 (44 rounds), and the weight is lower down. Going off the linked references on http://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Weapons/US_GMLS.htm. Maybe a pair of 48 VLS could have been used.
Anyone have any idea how much a VGAS module was estimated to weigh? I was under the impression they could have been fitted to Spruance/Tico/Kidd, so you could have wound up with Spruances with a Mk41 64 vls module and a VGAS module when they came on line. Assuming they wouldn't tip over of course.
 
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