British manned ventral turrets?

[Mike Pryce]

Freeman Dyson was very droll on hypersonics. 'It will work, but only with a negative payload'.

Dyson died only a couple of weeks ago.

Yes. Very sad news.

Sometimes controversial. Always interesting.

 

[nuuumannn]

My impression is that Albemarle was a gap-filler in case one of the other medium bombers failed.

Pretty much; it was built out of the perceived need for an aircraft made from non-strategic materials. it wasn't designed to compete with or replace any existing design, except only if aircraft grade ali should become scarce. Then de Havilland designed ther Mosquito, which ok, it did in fact have a bit of ali in it, but was largely non-strategic materials.

 

[nuuumannn]

Once the belly turret was eliminated, one wonders why the fire-controller position was retained? Or, as you say, arm the tail position.

Well, the idea was for there not to be turrets at the extremities, with a compromise by having one up and another under, rather than having two maybe three. And with a crew of five as intended in the initial spec, keeping weight and crew down compared to existing bombers.

An interesting point about Schragemuzik and its use, the BP Defiant night fighter actually used the same tactics, of flying underneath the bomber and aiming its turret guns upwards at an oblique angle. In mid 1940, the air staff agreed that a potential modern night fighter should have guns that could be angled upwards at an agle of 80 degrees and in late 1940, the spec F.18/40, initially issued in October that year was issued with an addenda of its fixed armament being replaced with a turret.

 

[Hood]

I think the lack of a ventral turret was a mixture of factors. Some of it may of been official inertia, but the there were technical factors too. The early manual turrets on the Whitley and Wellington were not that effective. The extra drag was a factor when they were extended, adding to the drag just when you want the speed to get out of danger. The arrival of H2S required that space and arguably was a far more effective tool by increasing the offensive capability of the bomber and the bomber raid as a whole. Successful powered ventral turrets were quite rare, the Americans had their 'ball' turrets but they were cramped, most other nations used manual guns in gondolas or glazed sections. Then there was the adage that a good gunner wouldn't open fire first, better to detect the enemy and slip away than trying to use the defensive armament 'offensively' and send out a stream of tracer the enemy crew could home on to. Increased ventral visibility would have been more valuable. Only the advent of powered remotely-controlled barbettes as developed in Germany and the USA made ventral defence a viable solution, and Britain was quite behind those developments and its telling that British efforts eventually emerged as the engine nacelle barbettes on the Windsor rather than a specific dorsal/ventral solution.

 

[taildragger]

An interesting point about Schragemuzik and its use, the BP Defiant night fighter actually used the same tactics, of flying underneath the bomber and aiming its turret guns upwards at an oblique angle. In mid 1940, the air staff agreed that a potential modern night fighter should have guns that could be angled upwards at an agle of 80 degrees and in late 1940, the spec F.18/40, initially issued in October that year was issued with an addenda of its fixed armament being replaced with a turret.
[/QUOTE]
I've always wondered whether an obliquely firing single-round shotgun sort of weapon could have been effective during daylight interceptions. There was good data on how close to the target a flak burst needed to be in order to guarantee destruction of a heavy bomber. It seems to me that a charge sized to create a similar fragmentation pattern across maybe a 60 degree cone (up, down or sideways) would only require the interceptor to make a close, not terribly accurate, pass on the target with a high probability of success. If mounted away from the aircraft's aerodynamic center, in the rear fuselage for instance, control and structural problems could be minimized by firing a similar mass in the opposite direction simultaneously. With no feed mechanism, the device should be fairly cheap and lightweight, really nothing more than a mortar tube. Is anyone aware of any projects of this nature? If not, I may seek a patent because ya never know.

 

[Tony Williams]

I've always wondered whether an obliquely firing single-round shotgun sort of weapon could have been effective during daylight interceptions. There was good data on how close to the target a flak burst needed to be in order to guarantee destruction a heavy bomber. It seems to me that a charge sized to create a similar fragmentation pattern across maybe a 60 degree cone (up, down or sideways) would only require the interceptor to make a close, not terribly accurate, pass on the target with a high probability of success. If mounted away from the aircraft's aerodynamic center, in the rear fuselage for instance, control and structural problems could be minimized by firing a similar mass in the opposite direction simultaneously. With no feed mechanism, the device should be fairly cheap and lightweight, really nothing more than a mortar tube. Is anyone aware of any projects of this nature? If not, I may seek a patent because ya never know.

There were various German late-WW2 experiments in that category, with a cluster of recoilless gun barrels or rockets firing at an upwards angle. A pure shotgun approach was used by the French in WW1, with manually-loaded 37 mm cannon firing through the propeller hub, some of which had smoothbored barrels for use with big shotshells.

Lots of details of one of the German systems here: https://www.deutscheluftwaffe.com/archiv/Dokumente/ABC/s/SG Sondergeraete/SG 500/SG 500 Jagdfaust Jeagerfaust.htm

 

[PMN1]

My impression is that Albemarle was a gap-filler in case one of the other medium bombers failed. The numbers look roughly similar to early B-25s, but we are comparing Albemarle first flight numbers with mature B-25 production.
Albemarle arrived on the scene around the same time as North American Aviation ramped up B-25 Mitchell production. The RAF and RCAF flew dozens/hundreds of Mitchell’s as it proved to be one of the best medium bombers of WW2.

If you have a fully assembled Albermale that is no longer useful/needed in its original role, what would be involved in clealy removing the wings to put on another fuselage....dedicated transport orientated?

 

[Arjen]

Better build a new aicraft with new wings to the old design. Disassembly would have had to be done with such care, it probably would not be worth the effort.

 

[riggerrob]

Tha

Better build a new aicraft with new wings to the old design. Disassembly would have had to be done with such care, it probably would not be worth the effort.

Easy of diss-assembly depends upon whether the airplane was bolted, riveted, welded or glued together.

Since Albemarles included a variety of construction materials: wood, fabric, steel tube and a bit of aluminium, it is logical to hire sub-contractors to build sub-components (e.g. furniture factories building wooden wings), truck them to a final assemble facility and bolt them together.
Remember that during WW2 British repair depots re-built hundreds of Hurricanes and Lancasters by bolting together components salvaged from two or three wrecks.

 

[taildragger]

The Albermarle project started as a small-run demonstrator aimed at testing the feasibility of an aircraft built with non-strategic materials by organizations outside the aviation industry. It morhped into a large production program without any clear definition of the role(s) it was to fill and wound up not well suited to anything, being adapted to transport and glider-towing duties. Perversly, it was discovered that lumber from the British Isles was inadequate and so that non-strategic material had to be imported from Canada. One of the few positives to come out of the program was the formation of a woodworking organization that was later useful in supporting Mosquito production.
Like the Lancaster, the airframe was designed as an assembly of sub-components specifically so that production could be easily dispersed so the idea of attaching the wings to a new fuselage might have had merit. The design originated in the late 30's and was most closely comparable to the Wellington.
Good coverage of the Albermarle saga is found in Aircraft for the Royal Air Force by Michael J. F. Bowyer, Faber and Faber 1980 (ISBN 0-571-11515-2).

 

[CJGibson]

[/QUOTE]
I've always wondered whether an obliquely firing single-round shotgun sort of weapon could have been effective during daylight interceptions. ....... lightweight, really nothing more than a mortar tube. Is anyone aware of any projects of this nature? If not, I may seek a patent because ya never know.
[/QUOTE]

There was Sunflower Seed, fitted to Fortresses.

 

[RHVERNON]

HQ RAF Bomber Command were fully aware that most attacks on the Heavy Bombers were from underneath by mid 1943. Chapter 13 covers some of the issues on the below link .

https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/o...unsights-turrets-ammunition-and-pyrotechnics/

Apparently there are files at the national archives that cover in house development of under aircraft defences done by Bomber Command in 1943/44 including lashed up 0.5 Cal weapon mounts in the hole formally designed for the FN Ventral turret. The Preston Green turret being one of them. A program of installing them was carried out between October 1943 and March 1944 on all aircraft bar the Pathfinders fitted with H2S (who had Fishpond for under the aircraft cover rolled out from October 1943 onwards). As Aircraft on the main force were fitted with H2S, the guns were removed, but aircraft not fitted with H2S retained the Gun mounts (Mainly in 3 Group who got G-H, 5 Group that got LORAN and the Halifax Squadrons in 4 and 6 Group). Various Operations Record Books on some squadrons list the underside guns being fitted (and not manned for some reason). Apparently Bomber Command Left it up to the squadron commanders to decide how they were used.

Bomber Command ORS were aware of Schrage Musik as early as January 1944 as four bombers managed to get home after being attacked by night fighters equipped with the device that month and the crews reported that the Germans were using upward firing guns. In July 1944, they were fully aware how Schrage Musik worked, most likely from debriefs from the JU-88 crew who landed at RAF Woodbridge by mistake. Why the crews were not informed about it is unknown, The only reason I can think of is actually first found out about if via Ultra and thus the Air Ministry put a block on information being given to the crews seeing that somebody would tell the Germans when captured.

 

[iverson]

Bomber Command ORS were aware of Schrage Musik as early as January 1944 as four bombers managed to get home after being attacked by night fighters equipped with the device that month and the crews reported that the Germans were using upward firing guns. In July 1944, they were fully aware how Schrage Musik worked, most likely from debriefs from the JU-88 crew who landed at RAF Woodbridge by mistake. Why the crews were not informed about it is unknown, The only reason I can think of is actually first found out about if via Ultra and thus the Air Ministry put a block on information being given to the crews seeing that somebody would tell the Germans when captured.

If I recall correctly, in his Disturbing the Universe, Freeman Dyson says that RAF Operational Research (where he served) posited the existence of Schrage Musik based on a spike in loss statistics. They recommended a solution too: removing all but tail turrets from bombers to reduce weight and drag. They calculated that the resulting, modest increase in performance would be just enough to make upward firing attacks impossible, given the known performance of the principle German nightfighters.

These conclusions were heresy to an RAF devoted to the armed bomber and its power turrets, particularly when it came from a bunch of mobilized academics doing a job that the service did not understand and never asked to have done. So the OR was ignored.

Bomber Command was concerned about crew morale. So it withheld loss information--and conclusions based on it--from the crews for as long as possible.

 

[Rhinocrates]

If I recall correctly, in his Disturbing the Universe, Freeman Dyson says that RAF Operational Research (where he served) posited the existence of Schrage Musik based on a spike in loss statistics. They recommended a solution too: removing all but tail turrets from bombers to reduce weight and drag. They calculated that the resulting, modest increase in performance would be just enough to make upward firing attacks impossible, given the known performance of the principle German nightfighters.

These conclusions were heresy to an RAF devoted to the armed bomber and its power turrets, particularly when it came from a bunch of mobilized academics doing a job that the service did not understand and never asked to have done. So the OR was ignored.

Bomber Command was concerned about crew morale. So it withheld loss information--and conclusions based on it--from the crews for as long as possible.

Chapter 3, 'The Children's Crusade.' Nice quote there:

The whole weight of Air Force tradition and authority was designed to discourage the individual airman from figuring the odds.