Best Battleships of WWII

[Grey Havoc]

It's been a while since we've had a good debate on Battleships, so....

[PHOTO CREDIT: MARITIMEQUEST]

Here's an update of an interesting article over at the Nihon Kaigun website:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

Comments?

 

[pathology_doc]

If we're going to debate how (for example) the HMS Lion (9x16") or the G3 class battlecruisers might have stacked up in a long range main-armament duel against the Bismarck or Yamato, I'm all ears. (I suspect the G3s would have made mincemeat of Bismarck; the Yamato, perhaps not so convincingly).

Otherwise, it doesn't really seem the right debate for the unbuilt-designs forum.

(If we are talking a very short range "stumble upon you in the mist" encounter, I'll take the Agamemnon or Lord Nelson from WW1 - that 9.2 inch gun had a flat trajectory and fired a heavy shell fast. Look what the Americans did to the Hiei with 8-inch. Now imagine five of those 9.2 inch blazing away on each side, with 12" for backup. At that short range, you want the most medium-heavy to heavy shells per minute going out until your opponent is hors de combat and you can finish him at leisure. On the other hand, the Lord Nelson class had excellent all-over armour protection and might not have suffered too badly against most secondary batteries.)

 

[Grey Havoc]

G3 verus Bismarck. Sounds interesting.

For newcomers to the forum who may not know what a G3 was (supposed to be):

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,1747.0.html
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,10583.0.html

 

[Caravellarella]

Wouldn't this all be subjective?

 

[Grey Havoc]

On the other hand, there is a fair bit of hard data available on both designs, especially Bismarck which was actually built. And some of the weapons and other systems intended for the G3 were fitted to later ships, or were developments of existing equipment in service, giving us more of a baseline of how the G3 might have performed in combat.

 

[Triton]

Shouldn't this topic be moved to the Bar?

 

[Grey Havoc]

Shouldn't this topic be moved to the Bar?

I wouldn't have thought so since it has become a topic on the perfomance of built battleships V unbuilt projects. Anyway, somehow the Bar doesn't seem to be the right place to discuss battleships, although that could be just me.

 

[Grey Havoc]

:'( We got banished to the cold environs of the Bar after all.

Ah, well, back to business. Maybe we should start with known weaknesses of the two designs we're currently comparing. Bismarck first. Bismarck could be said to have had two, no three, big weaknesses. The first was that she was somewhat overweight, which meant that she had a wet deck forward, which could be a problem, especially in the North Atlantic. This was actually a result of Bismarck's major weakness, and arguably the one that would seal her doom, i.e. her three screw layout, which not only forced comprises in her armor and machinery layouts (hence, a bit overweight), but also caused the structural weakness that made her rudder so vulnerable. The three screw layout had been chosen over the more common two screw layout so that existing machinery could be used in her propulsion, with savings in time and resources that would have been required for the development of new more powerful machinery. That could, however be said to be a classic case of 'pennywise, pound foolish'.
(The more things change.....)

A third weakness could be said to lie in her fire control, i.e. no dedicated radar (Rangefinding FuMO 23 sets only), although given her performance in her first battle, that was arguably not quite as bad as it would seem, at least during the first half of the war. The Germans did after all have excellent optical FC systems incorporating mechanical computing that made up for the deficiency to some degree, although she would be of course at a disadvantage in night battles and poor weather (in theory). Then again, FC radars in the first half of WWII could be extremely unreliable.....

As to the G3, fans, critics, experts please?

 

[pathology_doc]

My understanding is that the Rodney and Nelson were compromise designs, incorporating G3 thinking into a platform that would be acceptable under the Washington Treaty, i.e. imagine a 30+-knot Rodney with a different armament disposition and you basically have the G3.

The thing that always seemed odd to me is that the same Bismarck which blew Hood to smithereens and badly mauled Prince of Wales in short order, didn't get a single significant hit in on KGV or Rodney IIRC. Sure, her power to manoeuvre was reduced, but no telling hits at all??? Just what happened there?

 

[JFC Fuller]

Sure, her power to manoeuvre was reduced, but no telling hits at all??? Just what happened there?

Depending on which author (and Bismark crew member) you believe crew morale on Bismark collapsed in the build-up to her final battle which would have reduced combat effectiveness. Not to mention the overwhelming volume of fire she faced- outnumbered 2-1 in terms of battleships and 2.375-1 in terms of main guns, before you even take into account the sixteen 8 inch guns of the heavy cruisers. And those British guns were all manned by fully worked up and experienced crews unlike in her first engagement. Furthermore she could barely manoeuvre (there were heavy seas meaning that Bismark had unpredictable motions making gunnery even harder) and had a slow speed whilst her opponents chose their positions virtually at will (Bismark between the sun and the British ships [giving the RN vessels better visibility for targeting], British ships abreast and spaced to provide both plunging and more direct fire for duality of effect). The final act was less of a battle and more of a turkey shoot. She lost her centralised fire control, most of her senior officers and 25% of her main armament just 10 mins after the first British salvo and from then on it was really just a case of smashing her to pieces whilst the last few guns sputtered out uncoordinated shots through their local fire control systems.

A good account: http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Bismarck_p2.htm

 

[pathology_doc]

That would tend to explain things, yes.

And those British guns were all manned by fully worked up and experienced crews

What does this say about Hood, had she not been so unfortunate as to blow up when she did? (IIRC she'd just found the range, and would soon have started to fire for effect, when she exploded.)

For all that she blew up one battleship and mauled another, Bismarck took hits that sent her packing for home and contributed to her eventual destruction. Little wonder that it was considered effective to put an R-class battleship with the tastier convoys: what happened to Bismarck would have been on the mind of the captains of all the other German capital ships - all it takes is for that old battlewagon to put a few shells in the right place and you're not going home, even if you sink her.

 

[JFC Fuller]

What does this say about Hood, had she not been so unfortunate as to blow up when she did? (IIRC she'd just found the range, and would soon have started to fire for effect, when she exploded.)

Difficult to say, PoW was suffering severe main armament malfunctions and her shell output was declining dramatically, simultaneously the British ships had entered the action sailing into the wind which which effected their use of their range finders, even if Norfolk and Suffolk had managed to engage in a meaningful manner the battle of the Denmark Straight would still have been a long slog with an uncertain outcome. Nelson spirit very much at work IMO.

For all that she blew up one battleship and mauled another, Bismarck took hits that sent her packing for home and contributed to her eventual destruction.

No need to overstate Bismarck's achievement, she sunk a virtually un-modernised WW1 designed battlecruiser, success maybe but still a lesser ship than herself. Prince of Wales was not that badly mauled, she took some damage but her biggest issue seems to have been the problems with her main armament which were not caused by enemy action.

Little wonder that it was considered effective to put an R-class battleship with the tastier convoys: what happened to Bismarck would have been on the mind of the captains of all the other German capital ships - all it takes is for that old battlewagon to put a few shells in the right place and you're not going home, even if you sink her.

It certainly was, in fact the entire mission raised fundamental questions about the use of long range commerce raiders in the mechanical/radio age. Bismarck proved that even minor battle damage could critically damage a capital unit, damage that could prove fatal when that far from a friendly port. Prinz Eugen then demonstrated what Prince of Wales already had, that mechanical issues can occur without being inflicted by enemy fire, her engine issues mid Atlantic sent her home without sinking a single merchant ship. Then there is the stress that this puts on a commanding officer, those officers who actually undertook genuinely successful commerce raiding missions, Captain von Müller in Emden for example, were not just good commanders, not even great, but amongst the most outstanding of their generation.

 

[bobbymike]

The problem with comparing major weapons systems is there can be so many tangential issues, but for my money ;D OK they sunk her but she was a beauty.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1Ufc2hI4FM

 

[Grey Havoc]

A couple of points.

It certainly was, in fact the entire mission raised fundamental questions about the use of long range commerce raiders in the mechanical/radio age.

I'm not so sure about that.

Bismarck proved that even minor battle damage could critically damage a capital unit, damage that could prove fatal when that far from a friendly port.

The reason that Bismarck was so badly affected by what would otherwise would have been normal battle damage was the design flaw in the stern I mentioned earlier. Most capital units of that era, Allied or Axis, weren't quite that vulnerable. (Those that shared that flaw [all German vessels!] eventually got a partial fix through post-Bismarck retrofits, albeit only after Prinz Eugen proved that flaw anew the hard way!) And, if it hadn't been for enigma (helped by some poor EMCON on the part of Admiral Lütjens, who perhaps should have ignored certain standing orders), Bismarck would have had a very good chance of reaching France and relative safety, even with the damage she had substained, based on the disposition of the British forces hunting her.

Prinz Eugen then demonstrated what Prince of Wales already had, that mechanical issues can occur without being inflicted by enemy fire, her engine issues mid Atlantic sent her home without sinking a single merchant ship.

Prinz Eugen had been added to the operation as a subsitute at the last moment, despite her engines being not fully broken in yet, with predictable results.

Then there is the stress that this puts on a commanding officer, those officers who actually undertook genuinely successful commerce raiding missions, Emden for example, were not just good commanders, not even great, but amongst the most outstanding of their generation.

Very true.

By the way, it would have been interesting to see how HMS Hood would have performed against the Bismarck if she had her modernisation (ironically scheduled for 1941) prewar instead.

 

[JFC Fuller]

I'm not so sure about that.

IMO that German's never launched a major long range surface raid again, only short range dash and slash attacks against the Arctic convoys underscores the point.

The reason that Bismarck was so badly affected by what would otherwise would have been normal battle damage was the design flaw in the stern I mentioned earlier. Most capital units of that era, Allied or Axis, weren't quite that vulnerable. (Those that shared that flaw [all German vessels!] eventually got a partial fix through post-Bismarck retrofits, albeit only after Prinz Eugen proved that flaw anew the hard way!) And, if it hadn't been for enigma (helped by some poor EMCON on the part of Admiral Lütjens, who perhaps should have ignored certain standing orders), Bismarck would have had a very good chance of reaching France and relative safety, even with the damage she had substained, based on the disposition of the British forces hunting her.

Prinz Eugen had been added to the operation as a subsitute at the last moment, despite her engines being not fully broken in yet, with predictable results.

The individuality of the issues does not explain away the generality, all hips have potential vulnerable points and in Bismarck, if it had not been the rudder it could have been something else, a lucky destroyer or submarine torpedo hit (as happened to Prinz Eugen Scharnhorst and Gneisnau at various points in the war), a lucky shell from Hood or PoW taking out the main fire control apparatus as Rodney achieved in the final sinking or Renown achieved against Gneisnau etc. And mechanical problems can crop up at any point. Then there is the reliance on support ships for such heavy formations, 7 out of the 9 dispatched for the Bismarck mission were rounded up and sunk in just two weeks, something else that would have made the forces life very difficult.

 

[Caravellarella]

Wouldn't this all be subjective?

Subjectively; for looks, innovation, performance and sheer grace......

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Grey Havoc]

Seconded.

IMO that German's never launched a major long range surface raid again, only short range dash and slash attacks against the Arctic convoys underscores the point.

I would think that was more of a function of limited resources in terms of surface ships (both combatatants and support vessels), especially after the Eastern Front opened up, rather than a flaw in the general concept of surface raiders. Remember, WWII began as something of a surprise to the Germans, with their surface fleet still in the early stages of it's planned buildup. They quite literally never had enough, especially after the Norwegian campaign. The fact that they, for the most part, didn't really get the priority they needed didn't help matters. And after 1943, Hitler and the Kreigsmarine thought they could achieve the same goals with U-Boats as their sole primary weapon. That proved to be optimistic.

And even without sortieing in force, the remaining surface capital ships did play valuable roles up until Hitler effectively discarded them and the rest of the surface fleet. Remember that Tirpitz alone was able to tie down a ridiculous amount of British combat power (and intel resources) just by existing as a 'Fleet in Being' while staying in port for much of the war! Not to mention Operation Cerberus, which, although more of a 'fighting withdrawal' rather than a engagement, still showed what was possible, even on what was literally the enemy's front doorstep.

The individuality of the issues does not explain away the generality, all hips have potential vulnerable points and in Bismarck, if it had not been the rudder it could have been something else, a lucky destroyer or submarine torpedo hit (as happened to Prinz Eugen Scharnhorst and Gneisnau at various points in the war), a lucky shell from Hood or PoW taking out the main fire control apparatus as Rodney achieved in the final sinking or Renown achieved against Gneisnau etc.

Vulnerability to gremlins and plain old bad luck applies to the other side too.

Then there is the reliance on support ships for such heavy formations, 7 out of the 9 dispatched for the Bismarck mission were rounded up and sunk in just two weeks, something else that would have made the forces life very difficult.

A mixture of bad luck and arguably faulty planning. By the way, was it just the one 'milch cow' U-Boat that was lost during this time, or two, do you know?


[IMAGE CREDIT: Wikipedia Commons/US Navy]

 

[Jemiba]

First of all

:'( We got banished to the cold environs of the Bar after all.

How can a bar be cold ?? Isn't it one of the warmest and most comfortable places at all ?

As the discussion centered mainly centered mainly on the Bismarck class, my two cent about those
ships:

- Even with a two or four screw layout the Bismarck would have been hardly more maneuverable after
he rudder had been locked. It was a lucky hit, which was regarded as very unlikely before and would
principally have affected every other battleship in the same way, too.

- That this class principally suffered from the same design flaw regarding the stern, as other large german ships,
was only discovered, when Robert Ballard found Bismarcks wreckage on the Atlantic seabed, I think. as he noticed,
that the whole stern had broken away, as had been the case after the Lützow was hit by a torpedo. But of course,
maybe the quite weak construction at this place had contributed to the failure of the rudder.

- Another weakness of the design, that perhaps in a certain sense was responsible for the torpedo hit, was the
out-dated concept of the medium artillery/heavy flak, which were still separated. IF Bismarck already would have
had dual-purpose guns, as the British KGV-class or the US South Dakota class, it MIGHT have been able to repel
an air attack with more guns of a larger Calibre at a longer range. But the Bismarck class actually was a modernized
Ersatz-York class from the end of WW I, the construction teams lacking nearly 20 years of experience

- "Somewhat overweight" to my opinion is quite a palliation with regards to this class ! When it was designed the
maximum displacement for battleships still was 35.000 ts (raised to 45.000 ts only in June 1938) and probably apart
from the very first sketches, this design never fit into this limit and probably never was really intended to do so.

- Other weaknesses were the distribution of the horizontal armour, of the heavy artillery and the design of the bridge,
which still was very much like that, on the last german capital ships from WW I, making communication between
the ships commander and the fire control and other teams more difficult, than in contemporary british ships,
with their large command towers. But again, the design of the Bismarck class was frozen at least two years before
that of the KGV class and the G 3 class probably would have suffered from similar weaknesses.

 

[JFC Fuller]

I would think that was more of a function of limited resources in terms of surface ships (both combatatants and support vessels), especially after the Eastern Front opened up, rather than a flaw in the general concept of surface raiders. Remember, WWII began as something of a surprise to the Germans, with their surface fleet still in the early stages of it's planned buildup. They quite literally never had enough, especially after the Norwegian campaign. The fact that they, for the most part, didn't really get the priority they needed didn't help matters. And after 1943, Hitler and the Kreigsmarine thought they could achieve the same goals with U-Boats as their sole primary weapon. That proved to be optimistic.

And even without sortieing in force, the remaining surface capital ships did play valuable roles up until Hitler effectively discarded them and the rest of the surface fleet. Remember that Tirpitz alone was able to tie down a ridiculous amount of British combat power (and intel resources) just by existing as a 'Fleet in Being' while staying in port for much of the war! Not to mention Operation Cerberus, which, although more of a 'fighting withdrawal' rather than a engagement, still showed what was possible, even on what was literally the enemy's front doorstep.

The Germans still had plenty of resources, Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, Tirpitz, Scheer and Lutzow were all still afloat and not doing very much, the German's could have launched a sortie into the Atlantic relatively easily with what they had available- the problem was that they risked being found and destroyed as the Bismarck mission aptly demonstrated. In 1914 all Emden had to do was stay out of sight of enemy surface warships, by 1941 the North Atlantic is being prowled by long range patrol aircraft, carrier based aircraft and a multitude of other ships. Not to mention a much more highly evolved intelligence network- both code breaking and HUMINT. The harsh reality was that it was incredibly difficult for long range German raiders to operate in the North Atlantic and so they ceased trying. It is telling that the most successful conventional German surface raider of the war was the Scheer and she found most of her prey in the much sparser (in terms of RN/RAF presence) waters of the mid/south Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

The German navy had always expected to fight from a position of numerical inferiority and in the same way the KM had not come close to completing its construction programme neither had the RN, the tentative programme got nowhere near completion. No Lion's were ever completed and a number of the ships planned for reconstruction never got it not to mention the other vessels considered for construction.

The problem with the Fleet in being concept is the cost benefit ratio, it cost the German's as well as the British who expended considerable resources maintaining and protecting their heavy surface units, and the overall effect of this fleet in being was limited- after all the allied were still able to run convoys to Murmansk straight past the German fleet with only periodic interference (occasional disasters such as PQ17 not withstanding). Cerberus can not be seen as a standalone act- rather it was part of a wider problem for the German surface raiders, wherever they docked in Europe they were a magnet for Allied aircraft- both Gneisnau and Scharnhorst took bomb damage in France, and whenever they tried to move they frequently got torpedoed. Cerberus was really just one successful attempt at finding somewhere safer for the German heavy units as the RN/RAF had managed to close down their potential areas of operation.

Vulnerability to gremlins and plain old bad luck applies to the other side too.

Yes, but the overside is numerically superior and much closer to friendly ports, an RN ship with broken engines mid-atlantic was in a much less perilous situation than a German one.

A mixture of bad luck and arguably faulty planning.

That does not change the fact that the at-sea infrastructure required to support such a mission was highly vulnerable.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Interesting analysis SLL, and you make some good points, but I think we better leave further discussion of this issue to a new topic. I'll set it up later when I get a chance.

Now back to the issue currently at hand: G3 V Bismarck. Now, as the Navweps/INRO article, "Bismarck's Final Battle" mentions, the Bismarck was considered dangerous enough that Battleships of the new King George V class were considered incapable of taking on the Bismarck (or her sister Tirpitz) one on one. Would a G3 battlecruiser have fared any better against Bismarck? Taking into account the fact that, as Jemiba pointed out, the two opposing classes would have likely shared certain design weaknesses.

By the way, I've been in some very cold bars in my time. ;D

 

[JFC Fuller]

I actually have a question about Jemiba's point, every interpretation of the G3 class that I have seen to date has shown a ship with the Nelson style tower superstructure rather than the array of bridges that were present on earlier ships and Bismarck, so perhaps that particular issue was not present in the G3?

Furthermore, do not interpret the navweaps statement as Bismarck being some wonder ship, Bismarck and KGV would have been very closely matched in a one-on-one engagement- the desire to have numerical superiority in such an engagement was to assure as far as possible the desired outcome, not because Bismarck was a markedly superior ship, because she was not.

 

[Jemiba]

I actually have a question about Jemiba's point, every interpretation of the G3 class that I have seen to date has shown a ship with the Nelson style tower superstructure rather than the array of bridges that were present on earlier ships and Bismarck, so perhaps that particular issue was not present in the G3?

I have only seen drawings of the G3 with such a "tower bridge", too, so it was ahead of the Bismarck with regards to that point.

I fully agree, that Bismarck wasn't a "wonder ship" or a super battleship. For me, it's fame is very much the result of propaganda,
both German (which claimed it as "unsinkable") and British (to sink a "wonder ship" is better for public morale, than to sink quite
a standard, slightly outdated battle ship).

Hard to say, how a G3 would have stould up against Bismarck or Tirpitz, it was a much more radical design, with lessons from
the Doggerbank and Jutland incorporated. So, the built-in knowledge would have been about the same in both ships.

Just for fun (and not to be taken seriously !!) I sketched the look of Bismarck, after it's modernisation, finished in 1944, after
it very nearly had limped home from the Atlantic and participated in Operation Zerberus.

Main changes were the enlarged bridge and the replacement of the medium 15cm artillery and the 10.5cm AA guns by the then
new 12.8cm dp gun, tested on the destroyer Z 52, which had been finished hastily mainly for this reason. The aircraft and
catapult had been removed, as they had proven to be more of a hazard, than an asset, the now available deck space was
used for two additional twin mountings. The large number of such twin-mounts (8 on every side) made an additional AA fire
control tower desirable, which was installed on the enlarged bridge, especially for a better coverage of the forward sector.
The much increased danger of air attacks was recognisable by the installation of two Freya early warning radars, with their
"bedstead" antennas on the range finders on the main mast and on the aft one. The AA fire control towers were fitted with
Würzburg C AA gunlaying radars, greatly increasing efficiency of the AA fire. After all, Bismarck hadn't gained much more fighting
power against other ships, but the modernisation helped her to survive the hide-and-seek in Norwegian fjords, that Tirpitz
already had lost.

(For the drawing I spoiled drawings of Erich Gröner from "Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe 1815 - 1945")

 

[pathology_doc]

Bismarck was certainly incredibly difficult (if not impossible) to sink by gunfire. On the other hand, reduction to complete uselessness as a mobile fighting unit was quite another matter. That, IIRC, was accomplished fairly quickly.

Now that we're in the Bar and we can get away from the unbuilts, I think Bismarck vs. a KGV at peak fighting efficiency with all or most of her guns working would be a pretty even fight. Ditto Vanguard, which has the advantage of being directly comparable in terms of top speed and main armament.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Jemiba,

I understand that the 128mm guns were planned for the Gneisenau reconstruction as well, with 22 of the weapons mounted in 11 turrets, I am not aware of any other planned use beyond the two destroyers started but never finished.

Just to add to the earlier criticism of Bismarck's secondary armament, it is often forgotten that a large part of her light AA battery was also woeful as it came in the form of sixteen SK C/30 weapons which were only capable of semi-automatic fire and had to have each shell individually and manually loaded giving an awfully low rate of fire for weapon of that calibre. The most credible weapons in Bismarck's AA armament were the 20mm guns.

Pathology_doc,

Quite right, all the European battleships of that generation, KGV, Richelieu, Bismarck, and Vittorio Veneto, were all much of a muchness and the outcome of any entirely hypothetical engagement, assuming equality in crew skill, would likely be determined by the way shots fell and any tactical advantage either side had managed to take. What is striking though is how little the Germans go for all that extra metal they put into Bismarck.

 

[Hoo-2b-2day]

The G3 vs the Bismark, not a valid consideration. Had the G3 ships been built then either the Washington naval treaty had not come into force or the capital ships limit would have been around 50,000 tons.

If the Royal navy got the G3's then ISN and IJN would have insisted on ships of similar qualities (I doubt the USN would have completed the Lexington class with ships like the G3 type already being built). As G3 compatible ships would be in service it seems impossible that come the 1930's the various navies would agree to building smaller less capable ships such as the Bismark (the KGV and the North Carlolina. At the London naval conferences the USN and IJN objected to the RN proposal of smaller battleships with 12" guns due to the same augment. Had the G3's been built and Germany followed a similar history to that which happened I would suggest that the "Bismark" design would have been much closer to the H39 type than a nominal 35,000 ton ship.

Therefor it seems more appropriate to compare the G3 to the H39.

Another point of consideration, if the G3's had been built and the other major navies followed suit therefore capital ships of around 50,000 tons would have been in existence when the IJN started planning its "super battleship" projects. I must question weather the IJN would still consider this option with such a reduced margin of superiority in quality.

 

[Hoo-2b-2day]

SLL, in regard to your comment -"I understand that the 128mm guns were planned for the Gneisenau reconstruction as well, with 22 of the weapons mounted in 11 turrets, I am not aware of any other planned use beyond the two destroyers started but never finished.” Can you please advise as to the source of your information.

I have numerous books that cover these ships and I have never seen this mentioned before except in internet forums that are either alternate histories or fictional ships. In fact photographs of the Gneisenau under reconstruction show the original 15cm and 10.5 cm weapons still in place.

The change to the 12.8 cm weapons seem to be a partial retrograde step as the mounting, ( as per the destroyers) only had a maximum elevation of around 45 degrees as opposed to the 10.5cm weapons 85 degree.

 

[pathology_doc]

Pathology_doc,

Quite right, all the European battleships of that generation, KGV, Richelieu, Bismarck, and Vittorio Veneto, were all much of a muchness and the outcome of any entirely hypothetical engagement, assuming equality in crew skill, would likely be determined by the way shots fell and any tactical advantage either side had managed to take. What is striking though is how little the Germans go for all that extra metal they put into Bismarck.

I'm imagining a situation whereby Britain offers e.g. to scrap the Revenge-class 15" ships and maybe some Queen Elizabeths and does not build the Rodney/Nelson, and is return allowed to build 3 or 4 G3 and bring Hood up to full battleship armour standards. IIRC at the time, the three powers who were in any position to talk were Britain, US and Japan; Germany wasn't a player, and might (with the appropriate strong-arming) still have been found out and kept in line.

Part of the problem was the absurdity the US and Britain engaged in of pretending that each might be the other's enemy, whereas in fact the likely story was that either or both would be fighting Japan. That was the time for them to talk to each other and agree on what to do - Britain would be allowed to reduce capital ship numbers but replace older units not fit for the next war, while the US agrees not to regard Britain as an enemy, and either to come to the other's aid if attacked by Japan. With this in place the RN could have reduced its numbers across the board while gaining in quality ships, knowing the US could build capital ships (cruisers, BB's and carriers) fast enough to swamp Japan when push came to shove (and indeed it DID come to shove for both the US and the UK vs, Japan at the same time).

Meanwhile Japan could be told "You can build a deterrent fleet big enough to wreck the Britsh Asiatic Fleet if it attacks you, or to make things too expensive for the US to try, but not big enough to attack and defeat us both." It would have been best to allow agreed tonnages in each class so that designers were constantly not having to shave margins off to get under magical figures and thus compromising themselves. So you can build a 20,000ton 8x9.2" cruiser or you can build two Treaty cruisers in its place... You can build five KGV's or you can build four super-KGV's impervious to 15" with three quad turrets and 32kts and heaps of AA, and so forth.

Ultimately Germany and Japan were lying their backsides off about ship tonnages and being somewhat deceitful about armament (e.g. Japanese 6" cruisers set up from the start to take 8" turrets; Scharnhorst-class built with an eye to three twin 15"), but what else to do to punish them than go to war?

 

[Caravellarella]

Maybe you should all visit Warship Projects on http://www.phpbbplanet.com/warshipprojects/index.php?mforum=warshipprojects

They discuss such things in great detail with "Spring Form" analysis and drawings to back it all up......

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[JFC Fuller]

Maybe you should all visit Warship Projects on http://www.phpbbplanet.com/warshipprojects/index.php?mforum=warshipprojects

They discuss such things in great detail with "Spring Form" analysis and drawings to back it all up......

I know, I have been a member there for several years, an outstanding forum, x versus y discussions tend not to be undertaken though.

Hoo-2b-2day

It is one of those things that I have seen somewhere at some point but I cannot remember where and may just have been an internet forum. However, remember that work on Gneisenau never really got that far. Also, I understood that the 12.7 cm/45 (5") SK C/41 were to have had 60 degree elevation? Still not great though.

 

[pathology_doc]

I agree Gneisenau's rearmament never came to anything - but I was talking as much about the intent as the actualization (which is why I said "with an eye to...").

 

[Grey Havoc]

Ultimately Germany and Japan were lying their backsides off about ship tonnages and being somewhat deceitful about armament (e.g. Japanese 6" cruisers set up from the start to take 8" turrets; Scharnhorst-class built with an eye to three twin 15"), but what else to do to punish them than go to war?

There are arguments for and against the Washington Naval Treaty. For the record, I tend to come down the side of the anti-treaty brigade.

 

[blackstar]

There are arguments for and against the Washington Naval Treaty. For the record, I tend to come down the side of the anti-treaty brigade.

What are the arguments for it? Is there a body of literature on this subject?

I'm no expert on those old treaties, although I'm much more familiar with more recent ones. The obvious problem with the Naval Treaty is that there was no way to monitor it. It wasn't just the Germans and Japanese who lied about it. My understanding is that at least some US warships violated it, apparently due to an inability to precisely determine ship displacement at the design stage.

My guess is that any argument (now) in favor of the treaty would be that even though there was cheating, the treaty still established boundary limits and numbers, thereby keeping the powers somewhat in check before the war broke out. Without the treaty, all sides might have built a lot more ships early on and the naval war would have been bloodier from the start.

 

[Grey Havoc]

There are arguments for and against the Washington Naval Treaty. For the record, I tend to come down the side of the anti-treaty brigade.

What are the arguments for it? Is there a body of literature on this subject?

I'm no expert on those old treaties, although I'm much more familiar with more recent ones. The obvious problem with the Naval Treaty is that there was no way to monitor it. It wasn't just the Germans and Japanese who lied about it. My understanding is that at least some US warships violated it, apparently due to an inability to precisely determine ship displacement at the design stage.

As I understand it, the idea was that the US (at least in the short term) gained a major advantage from the treaty by forcing Great Britain to scrap a large chunk of it's combat power and placing limits on the remainder, especially in areas where the USA could not hope to, or else not easily, compete with GB. I came across this body of thought when I was doing some research on warship design/construction a fair while back. I think one of the articles mentioning this theory was somewhere on Navweps or a site related to it. I have also come across separate claims that the treaty actually helped both GB and the US by reducing the amount of obsolescent/obsolete warships that they had to upgrade or replace in the run up to, and after war broke out. Personally, I was a bit dubious about it all, to say the least.

My guess is that any argument (now) in favor of the treaty would be that even though there was cheating, the treaty still established boundary limits and numbers, thereby keeping the powers somewhat in check before the war broke out. Without the treaty, all sides might have built a lot more ships early on and the naval war would have been bloodier from the start.

That argument has also been used, I believe.

 

[Grey Havoc]

For the Yamato fans: http://ajw.asahi.com/article/cool_japan/fun_spots/AJ201307270044

 

[carsinamerica]

What are the arguments for it? Is there a body of literature on this subject?

I'm no expert on those old treaties, although I'm much more familiar with more recent ones. The obvious problem with the Naval Treaty is that there was no way to monitor it. It wasn't just the Germans and Japanese who lied about it. My understanding is that at least some US warships violated it, apparently due to an inability to precisely determine ship displacement at the design stage.

My guess is that any argument (now) in favor of the treaty would be that even though there was cheating, the treaty still established boundary limits and numbers, thereby keeping the powers somewhat in check before the war broke out. Without the treaty, all sides might have built a lot more ships early on and the naval war would have been bloodier from the start.

A truly belated reply, but I'll throw in my tuppence. The best argument for the Treaty is that it halted a massive wave of competitive construction programs that nobody, particularly the European powers, could really afford, but felt compelled to undertake. By the time the Washington Naval Treaty was being negotiated, Britain had to consider construction 4 of the G3 class, plus another 4 of the N3 battleships. The Japanese were moving into their 8-8 Fleet plan, with 16 fast battleships. The United States had the 1916 Program, of course, with its 10 battleships and 6 battle cruisers, but the General Board and some members of Congress were arguing for a duplicate of that program, as well, which would have meant 32 dreadnought-weight warships. The French and Italians, of course, were also planning new rivalries. It would have been a colossal waste of resources, especially when one considers the vulnerability of even the most gargantuan, Treaty-violating battleships to massed aerial attack. If those building programs had continued, the European naval war might have been much shorter, since Germany would have had no chance to compete, but the war in the Pacific would have been much bloodier.

The construction holiday also permitted the development of new technology at a more measured pace. It spurred the development of fleet carriers on converted battleship hulls, which ultimately were the prototypes for the weapons that were decisive, especially in the Pacific war.

Finally, it set out the structure for future arms control agreements, and showed that they were workable, even with some cheating. SALT and START both owed something to the Washington Treaty, and even though I'm a fan of the big military systems -- particularly the what-if designs -- I would still argue that we're better off with ceilings on them than without.

A counter-argument to the Treaty, which was not appreciated at the time, was that it strengthened Japan's positions in some ways. The Japanese were furious about the Treaty's 10:10:6 ratio, feeling that it was a direct insult. It fueled militant resentment of the West. More importantly, though, they fought hard to wring additional concessions. The most important of these was that the USA agreed not to fortify its bases in the Philippines. In the end, that was probably worth several battleships to the Japanese, though not even they fully grasped the import of it at the time.

If you want to read a very thorough account of the Treaty and the building programs that preceded it, check out Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy by Robert O'Connell (Oxford University Press, 1993). It stakes out a generally pro-Treaty position, but explores the arguments for and against in several chapters. The whole book is fascinating, and it has a superb account of the battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland, too. However, its section on the Treaty is the most well-written, well-sourced account I've seen, and considers both the military and political/economic implications.