B-70A Valkyrie in service

uk 75

ACCESS: Above Top Secret
Senior Member
Joined
27 September 2006
Messages
5,744
Reaction score
5,640
Stretching what-if but given the long life of the B52 I have been imagining what might have happened if a small number of B70A Valkyries had been delivered to SAC in the early 60s forming a specialised high level penetrator wing able to deliver heavy nuclear freefall bombs.
No other aircraft was able to do this and by introducing the B70A the USAF would have forced the Soviet Union to deploy more SAMs and fighters to cope with these wide roaming aircraft.
 
Stretching what-if but given the long life of the B52 I have been imagining what might have happened if a small number of B70A Valkyries had been delivered to SAC in the early 60s forming a specialised high level penetrator wing able to deliver heavy nuclear freefall bombs.
No other aircraft was able to do this and by introducing the B70A the USAF would have forced the Soviet Union to deploy more SAMs and fighters to cope with these wide roaming aircraft.
That is a really interesting thought, but did you know that the MiG-25 foxbat was designed solely for the purpose of intercepting the B-70?
 
Last edited:
Also, I’m sure that if the XB-70 prototypes were not constantly falling apart, the B-70 would be part of America‘s bomber fleet.
 
The realities of high-performance SAMs like the S-200/SA-5 + the over reaction to the MiG-25 would still force SAC's fleet into a stand-off role. Though a B-70 launching SRAMs supersonically would see a significant range improvement over the B-52. I think you're right on the money @uk 75 that the Soviets would be forced to divert even more resources into defensive measures like SAMs and ABMs site for Urban/Industrial sites.

There was a good thread now a few years old by @Archibald on the B-70 armed with SRAMs and more!
 
i guess “riddled with problems“ is a more accurate explanation
Even that is inaccurate considering what it was and what it was doing. It didn't really have any systemic problems. Most of it was the usual stuff you find in prototypes.
 
The realities of high-performance SAMs like the S-200/SA-5 + the over reaction to the MiG-25 would still force SAC's fleet into a stand-off role. Though a B-70 launching SRAMs supersonically would see a significant range improvement over the B-52. I think you're right on the money @uk 75 that the Soviets would be forced to divert even more resources into defensive measures like SAMs and ABMs site for Urban/Industrial sites.

There was a good thread now a few years old by @Archibald on the B-70 armed with SRAMs and more!
SA-5 was no joke but the MiG-25? Eh. I'm skeptical. But SRAMs from Mach 3 and 80,000 feet? Oh yeah. (Don't know how much truth there is to the notion of the B-70 carrying a pair of Skybolts though.)

Figure12.gif
 
Stretching what-if but given the long life of the B52 I have been imagining what might have happened if a small number of B70A Valkyries had been delivered to SAC in the early 60s forming a specialised high level penetrator wing able to deliver heavy nuclear freefall bombs.
No other aircraft was able to do this and by introducing the B70A the USAF would have forced the Soviet Union to deploy more SAMs and fighters to cope with these wide roaming aircraft.

Enormous amount of money would be wasted on the project, that:

A - would be extremely costly and complex to maintain, being essentially build on technology NOT adequate for the task

B - would be of dubious value, since cruise/aeroballistic missiles, launched from cheaper subsonic bombers, would do the job better

C - would not be a viable deterrence, since it would be both more costly, more vulnerable and in less numbers than ballistic missiles

Basically, adopting the B-70 could very well spell doom to SAC. They would be stuck with extremely costly and unreliable bomber, designed for outdated schemes of warfare, and simply too expensive to use it in any kind of local conflicts. Something would need to be cut to pay for it, and most likely it would be the B-52 fleet to get axed (since the B-52 was viewed as intermediate design between B-36 and B-70, USAF would most likely be extremely driven to get rid of them to avoid situations like "you asking too much for Valkyries, didn't you have a perfectly well Stratofortress in storage?")
 
Enormous amount of money would be wasted on the project, that:

A - would be extremely costly and complex to maintain, being essentially build on technology NOT adequate for the task

B - would be of dubious value, since cruise/aeroballistic missiles, launched from cheaper subsonic bombers, would do the job better

C - would not be a viable deterrence, since it would be both more costly, more vulnerable and in less numbers than ballistic missiles

Basically, adopting the B-70 could very well spell doom to SAC. They would be stuck with extremely costly and unreliable bomber, designed for outdated schemes of warfare, and simply too expensive to use it in any kind of local conflicts. Something would need to be cut to pay for it, and most likely it would be the B-52 fleet to get axed (since the B-52 was viewed as intermediate design between B-36 and B-70, USAF would most likely be extremely driven to get rid of them to avoid situations like "you asking too much for Valkyries, didn't you have a perfectly well Stratofortress in storage?")
The funds for such a B-70 buy and deployment would have have been ripped out of the guts of the concurrent USAFs ICBM programs, resulting in a smaller less powerful land based ICBM force in the 60s and 70s.

The B-70 also had a lot of development problems to still overcome that they never really had the chance to. For example the prototypes had a lot of issues with shedding skin/ parts with clear manufacturing issues that needed to be resolved. Given time and money I’m sure these issues could and would have been overcome but would a limited production run actually allowed for this or at least equally possible/ likely that this small fleet would have carried at least some these issues into service in a manner that was not readily and/or cheaply remedied?

Also in the real world the B-70 prototypes that flew already represented a significant scaling back of the project (fewer prototypes, effective abandonment of some items of the originally intended equipment/ systems, etc). Considerable extra effort, money and time would have required just in the development program to make an actual procurement decision a practical proposition.

And the likely impact on Soviet decision making and procurement is far less than some posters appears to believe. In the real history USSR already fielded systems likely intended to counter the B-70 such as the MIG-25 and the SA-5. Given the deployment of the SR-71 and the nature of internal Soviet politics/ power structures they deployed these “counter systems” in large numbers anyway. A small B-70 force would have likely made relatively little difference or impact in that context.

And I don’t real see what advantage a small B-70 force would provide to the US, certainly nothing in proportion to its costs when compared to the same funds instead spent on ICBMs and B-52 updates etc.
Plus this theoretical small B-70 force would have, in terms of procurement and in-service costs, overlapped in timing with the costs associated with the Vietnam war.

All in all not a promising or wise proposition. As much I am fond of and admire the B-70 as an aircraft actually putting the thing into service in its real-world context makes no real sense and its abandonment is one of the most clear-sighted and correct decisions the US made in the defence realm during this time period. And it is a decision that was vindicated by subsequent history.
 
My idea for an upgrade: swap the 6*J93s, afterburning; for 4*GE4s from Boeing SST. No need for afterburning: 13*6 = 78 but 22*4 = 88.
(yes, the GE4 was 22 tons thrust with no AB. With AB, it was almost 30 tons.
End result: a B-70 that can supercruise with only 4 engines.
 
Thanks to everyone who has replied to this rather stretched proposition. It is good to tease out so much info on the B70 programme.
I accept both the technical and budget issues are a hard call and the impact of a wing of B70s with heavy free fall bombs might not have been worth the effort.
I did not see SAC sacrificing B52 or the ICBM programme but rather ditching the B58 Hustler and not bothering with AMSA/B1. But this does need B70 to be perform well.
 
The funds for such a B-70 buy and deployment would have have been ripped out of the guts of the concurrent USAFs ICBM programs, resulting in a smaller less powerful land based ICBM force in the 60s and 70s.
I'm not sure USAF would risk that. Reducing the ICBM force - while everyone is under impression of "missile gap" and Navy is working out "Polaris" - could have rather disastrous consequeces. Up to the risk that the whole USAF strategic missile program would be declared "mismanaged" and given back to the Army (with drastic reduction of USAF finances as a result). No, such risk is highly improbable.

Most likely, as I mentioned above - USAF would get rid of B-52 as fast as possible. The high-cost program like A-12/YF-12/SR-71 may also be scrapped, perhaps to funnel more money into B-70 under concept of RB-70 recon plane. USAF may also decide to left the Army transport & utility planes under Army control - just to avoid spending more on them (maybe even Army would be able to get back CAS planes).
And I don’t real see what advantage a small B-70 force would provide to the US, certainly nothing in proportion to its costs when compared to the same funds instead spent on ICBMs and B-52 updates etc.
Plus this theoretical small B-70 force would have, in terms of procurement and in-service costs, overlapped in timing with the costs associated with the Vietnam war.
All true. Basically adopting the B-70 would be a REALLY BIG MISTAKE, maybe biggest USAF could potentially made in 1960s. They would be placing all their bets on the transient-technology plane, based on 1950s understanding of aerodynamic, very expensive to maintain, very hard to modernize and refit.

And yes, it would overpalled with Vietnam War, most likely negatively affecting the USAF other developments. B-70 would almost certainly be considered too costly and too scare to use them in Vietnam, so USAF may be forced to rely soley on remains of B-52 fleet (which would almost certainly be mostly dismantled by late 1960s) and F-105's to carry strike missions.
 
I did not see SAC sacrificing B52 or the ICBM programme but rather ditching the B58 Hustler and not bothering with AMSA/B1. But this does need B70 to be perform well.

B-52 would be sacrificed almost certainly. You see, the problem was, that B-52 was from the very beginning envisioned as "intermediate" strategic bomber - just to serve about a decade, to fill the niche between B-36 (which became obsolete by late 1950s) and future B-70 (which was supposed to become available in mid 1960s).

The USAF simply could not insist on retaining B-52 while still demanding funds for B-70. It would be viewed by Congress (as well as everyone else) as lack of confidence in their most costly project, the B-70. They would not be able to answer the obvious question satisfactory: "if B-70 is so good for its money, then why you insist on retaining B-52?" Most importantly, all possible opposition in USAF themselves (and B-70 would clearly meet a lot of such) would almost certainly railed around B-52 armed with standoff missiles as cheaper and more reliable alternative.

So no. To get the Valkirye, USAF need to kill the B-52 starting from mid 1960s at most. To create an impression of confidence in B-70, they would probably insist on scrapping all early models by mid-1960s, and leaving only a B-52G and B-52H in service till late 1960s ("when they would be replaced by our ultimate bomber, the B-70"). By the end of Veitnam War, the last B-52 would be going to scrapyard.

Even if the SAC would realize the truth - that Valkirye is not the wonder weapon they viewed it before - they would most likely attempt to push forward, hoping to remedy its problems in future, rather than back down and try to preserve B-52.
 
I was assuming that the B52 would retain its roles as a conventional bomber and missile carrier (much as it did when AMSA and B1 were developed) with the B70 Wing taking on long range penetration with heavy weapons.
But I fear your logic is right.
 
was assuming that the B52 would retain its roles as a conventional bomber and missile carrier (much as it did when AMSA and B1 were developed) with the B70 Wing taking on long range penetration with heavy weapons.
While this solution is, indeed, more logical from practical point of view, it would be absolutely impossible from 1960s political and financial points of view, I'm afraid. B-70 would be a VERY costly program in basically every aspect. To justify such spending, USAF would be forced to present it as "only possible solution", dismissing all alternatives as impractical or inefficient. Missile-armed B-52 would be too obvious, too glaring alternative to NOT get killed in favor of Valkyrie.
 
The way I see it, with the B-70 funding secured in 1961-1962, USAF most likely would cut the B-52 production. The B-52G would be the last produced model. In 1962-1965, the earlier models would be actvely retired - and most likely scrapped immediately.

As soon as first production B-70 would start to roll out, the USAF would start to retire the B-52 of E and G series. A small number of them would remain as Hound Dog carriers, but I doubt any major refit would be given to them. By late 1960s, there probably wouldn't be more than a 100 B-52G in service.
 
That is a really interesting thought, but did you know that the MiG-25 foxbat was designed solely for the purpose of intercepting the B-70?

Given that the MiG-25 lacked the 50%+ margin of acceleration and speed generally required for interceptors versus their targets, I doubt that's accurate.

The Foxbat was just about performant enough to take on the B-58, Vigilante and Mirage IV.
 
Given that the MiG-25 lacked the 50%+ margin of acceleration and speed generally required for interceptors versus their targets, I doubt that's accurate.

The Foxbat was just about performant enough to take on the B-58, Vigilante and Mirage IV.
no, it was the B-70. That was documented.
 
The B52 role as a conventional bomber is also relevant. My understanding is that this only came about because of the Vietnam War.
Assuming Vietnam still happens as in our timeline the B52D and F would still do arclight missions and Gs would join them in the Nixon bombing of Hanoi.
B70 on the other hand would be solely allocated to the SIOP. Somewhere there is a what-if drawing of a B70 in SEAC camo like the B52D but that is just for fun.
 
The maximum speed of a typical air target for the MiG-25P is 2500 k/h. The picture shows the profile of the interception flight.
Gt - is the mass of fuel, ' - is the time in minutes
Набор - разгон на ПФ (полный форсаж) - climb - acceleration PF (full afterburner)
 

Attachments

  • profile.jpg
    profile.jpg
    35.1 KB · Views: 33
A change in the B-70 history probably wouldn't be as simple as a single decision being changed. Perhaps the whole political calculus was changed... Nixon instead of Kennedy in 60, or Kennedy not getting shot, or LBJ losing in 64.

No JFK in 60, Nixon gets in, doesn't cancel B-70 in March of '61. Following, NASA/Apollo is funded, but at a lower level (no JFK= no Bay of Pigs failure, with no need to divert public attention with Apollo announcement); Viet Nam remains low level, no Great Society. This *could* lead to a 60's much less filled with strife due to lack of VN war and draft, which would improve the overall economy and let the expensive B-70 remain affordable. Apollo probably still happens, but in the early 70s', perhaps even beaten by the Soviets resulting in "For All Mankind." Simple lack of VN and GS would free up *vast* sums for military and tech development (as well as generally improving society and the economy); the same political change needed to permit B-70 to become operational might lead to Dyna Soar, NERVA, Boeing 2707 flying. These would tend to suggest that a smaller, more reliable and cheaper Shuttle could still fly by '80, with manned Mars missions by 85 or so.

With an accelerated and successful NERVA program by the mid 70's, the American nuclear reactor program is in better shape. With no or greatly reduced VN war, the anti-nuclear forces would be considerably reduced, so the US cranks out reactor after reactor. Perhaps we've done away with coal and natural gas for power generation by 2000. With Nixon out of office by 69, he doesn't go to China, and China remains an economic and technological backwater. So by 2023, much of the industrial world is nuclearized, and China is spewing out far less CO2. 2023 goes down in history as one of the coldest years in history, with serious concerns of a forthcoming ice age.

Silly speculation? Sure. But the small changes needed to get the B-70 operational lead to changes elsewhere.
 
Last edited:
no, it was the B-70. That was documented.

Can you give a reference?

It simply hasn't the performance to defend against a Mach 3.1 target except in a very difficult and lucky head-on geometry, which the B-70 could void with a slight change in course.
 
Given that the MiG-25 lacked the 50%+ margin of acceleration and speed generally required for interceptors versus their targets, I doubt that's accurate.
No, it's pretty much the whole reason for Mig-25 existence; it was designed to dealt with potential threat from USAF Mach 3+ planes.
 
In 1946 the main weapon of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the Boeing B-29 bomber, but this model reached the obsolescence when 57 Superfortress were destroyed by MiG-15 Soviet fighters during the Korean War.

In 1947 the USAF memorandum ‘Global Strategy Concept’ calling for a new intercontinental bomber able to perform nuclear attacks against the Soviet Union if the Red Army invaded Western Europe.

In June 1948, the Convair B-36, a 410,600 pounds (186,000 kg) heavy bomber entered in service. It tripled the gross weight of the B-29 and was able to carry two Mark III atomic bombs and had 8,000 miles (12,900 km) of range.

At the time, the main Soviet air defense radar was the American-supplied SCR-270 which were only effective up to 39,360 ft (12,000 m) and the main Sovietinterceptor was the Lavochkin La-9 with 35,400 ft (10,792 m) service ceiling.

The B-36 proved that it could fly at 40,000 ft (12,195 m) over the Soviet air space without being intercepted and the Truman Administration ordered the construction of 386 machines under the Cold War policy of nuclear deterrence.

Unfortunately for the SAC the Soviet fighter MiG-15A, with 50,840 ft (15,500 m) ceiling was delivered to operational units early 1949, followed by the MiG-17 (15,850 m) late in 1953, the MiG-19S (17,900 m) and the MiG-19 PM (17,000 m) armed with four K-5MS Akali air-to-air missiles in 1957. The B-36 served for only ten years.

In 1955 the USAF issued the specification GOR No. 48 calling for a supersonic bomber, with 6,000 miles range, to penetrate the Soviet air defense system. Six months later, the company North American Aviation Inc. proposed a six-engine canard-delta aircraft capable of cruising at Mach 3+ while flying at 70,000 ft (21,341 m).

It was expected that the new bomber would practically be immune to the cannon-armed Soviet interceptors, but it had also been planned to install a five-element defensive system embodying active and passive warning devices to be capable of noise jamming 30 Soviet radars operating simultaneously, threat evaluation equipment, electronic countermeasures, infrared countermeasures as chaff dispersing rockets and plastic smoke to screen the engine exhaust.

In August 1958, the proposal had been approved by the USAF under the codename Weapons System 110A and was expected to enter service in 1963 as the B-70 Valkyrie.

On February 26, 1955, the Soviet CPSU Central Committee ordered the development of weapons system Uragan-5, for the automatic guidance interception of enemy supersonic bombers flying at 82,000 ft (25,000 m) and 1,234 mph (2,000 kph).

The system was to be formed by 59 early warning ground radar stations with P-14(5N84A) Tall King VHF radar sets and 400 km of detection range, digital control computer, IFF interrogation system, command data link and a point-defense interceptor with 120 km combat range fitted with TsKB Almaz fire-control radar.

On March 7, 1957, the Mikoyan-Gurevich bureau was charged with the design of the new interceptor, under the codename Ye-150. The prototype was flown on July 8, 1960 reaching a top speed of 2,816 kph (Mach 2.65) and 73,000 ft (22,500 m) ceiling.

The combat version Ye-152-1 was flown on May 16, 1961 reaching Mach 2.28 armed with two underwing air-to-air missiles MKB Raduga K-9-51.

On July 7, 1962, the aircraft established the absolute speed record flying at 1,666 mph (2,681 kph) under the fictitious designation Ye-166.

The K-9 (NATO AA-4 Awl) was a beam-riding air-to-air missile with 5.6 miles (9 km) operational range, 3,130 mph (5,040 kph) top speed and only 55 per cent estimated accuracy because its GOS guidance system was vulnerable to the electronic countermeasures of the SAC bombers.

In 1959 entered service the first Soviet strategic air defense system, deployed around Moscow with 56 launch sites of SA-1 Guild surface-to-air missiles.

The SA-1 had Mach 2.5 top speed, 23 miles (37 km) range, 60,000 ft (18,300 m) operational ceiling and high explosive warhead with 120 ft kill ratios. Their B-200 guidance system was type track-while-scan.

The new surface-to-air missile SA-2 Guideline was deployed in 600 launch sites around the Soviet Union between 1960 and 1964.

The SA-2 had Mach 4 top speed, 21.7 miles (35 km) range, 131,200 ft (40,000 m) ceiling and high explosive warhead with 200 ft kill ratio. Their VHF guidance system P-12 Spoon Rest was type semi-active radar command.

On May 1, 1960 six MiG-19 fighters failed when trying to intercept a high-altitude reconnaissance U-2 piloted by Gary Powers, but the spy plane was shot down little afterwards by two SA-2.

By 1964 the Soviets already possessed small nuclear warheads capable of extending the kill ratio of the SA-2 to 19,680 ft and the ceiling to 80,000 ft.

The Valkyrie program suffered numerous delays due to inexperience with the new heat-resistant materials, as well as political and budgetary reasons. When the prototype XB-70 AV-1 was flown on September 21, 1964 the Soviet air defense system was already so consolidated that the WS110A specification was meaningless and the B-70 was cancelled by the Kennedy Administration.

In August 1958, the North American project office submitted the proposal Defensive Antimissile System (DAMS) using air-to-air missiles launched by the Valkyrie.

The Defense Feasibility Study was completed in March 1959 and published by the Air Proving Ground Center-Eglin AFB the same month the U-2 incident occurred.

In 1948 the first experimental AAM-A-2 air-to-air missile was launched and entered in service with the USAF in 1955 as the Hughes AIM-4 Falcon.

The original purpose of the Falcon was a Mach 3.8 self-defense weapon for the B-52 bomber and was shortly revived during the B-70 development. The rail-launched missile was not a particularly maneuverable and needed to be pointed in the right direction of the target.

Due to the B-70 speed the Falcon could just be used against any threat coming from its forward hemisphere, but the Valkyrie would have to defend itself against threats from all direction with spherical coverage.

The Falcon was a cylindrical rocket with four delta wings. Would it have been thrown sideways from a B-70 flying to Mach 3 it would have been destroyed by the crosswind shock waves.

North American proposed the Weapons System WS-740A, a wingless lenticular-form rocket with omnidirectional launch capabilities, capable of engaging incoming missiles at relative speeds of Mach 10 and being able to survive and maneuver at 250g accelerations.

The project was awarded to the Convair Division of General Dynamics Corporation, under the codename Pye Wacket in June 1959.

A general aerodynamic evaluation was conducted to determine the technical feasibility of lenticular cross section/circular planform configuration. Wind tunnel tests with several 1/3 scale models were conducted in the Arnold Engineering Development Centre.

The results indicated that the lenticular configuration with blunted trailing edge, sharp leading edge and modified tangent contours, have best aerodynamic characteristics than the symmetrical lenticular cross section, and the most desirable volume distribution for the propulsion system.

The lenticular configuration was efficient at hypersonic velocities with good maneuverability at altitude. Additional tests demonstrated that the aerodynamic controls are not suitable for use in the omnidirectional launch phase of flight, due to the necessity of alignment with the relative wind.

One reaction-jet control system was used, control in yaw, roll and pitch could be obtained by means of the thrust forces generated by four nitrogen-injected binary thrusters, with exhaust through the top and bottom surfaces of the disc.

Pye Wacket had an inertial midcourse guidance system with terminal infrared homing. The Redeye IR seeker was mounted in the leading edge behind an IR window with a look angle of 40 degrees and cooling system.

The USAF determined that internal carriage of eight wingless missiles could be installed in the Valkyrie with no range penalty.

The weapon was to be structurally rigid to withstand extremely high launch accelerations, rapid change of thrust direction for quick maneuver, maximum flight duration of 50 seconds, cruising at Mach 6.5+ and terminal velocities of Mach 10.

The expected aerodynamic heating of 3,300 ºF at 11 seconds of flight, requires the use of a leading edge made of Pyrographite. The outer skin of the disc was made of polyester resin, with Titanium B-120 alloy honeycomb core, protected by a layer of Teflon ablating material to restrict skin temperatures to under 800ºF. The internal structure was made of magnesium-alloy.

Three Pye Wacket configurations were proposed in 1961:

60-inch diameter, 21 per cent thickness-to-chord ratio configuration

Power plant: three Thiokol M58A2 solid-fuel rocket motors with 10,200 lbf thrust each. Launch weight: 830 pounds. Warhead: one W54 nuclear device with 50 pounds weight. Range: 100,000 ft at 60,000 ft altitude.

60-inch diameter, 14 per cent thickness-to-chord ratio configuration

Power plant: one integral pancake-shaped solid-fuel rocket motor with 9,700 lbf thrust. Launch weight: 581 pounds. Warhead: 20 pounds of H.E. with impact fuse. Range: 120,000 ft at 60,000 ft altitude.

36-inch diameter, 21 per cent thickness-to-chord ratio configuration

Power plant: one integral pancake-shaped solid-fuel rocket motor with 5,000 lbf thrust. Launch weight: 200 pounds. Warhead: 20 pounds of H.E. with impact fuse. Range: 50,000 ft at 60,000 ft altitude.
 

Attachments

  • 412.jpg
    412.jpg
    151.9 KB · Views: 22
Would modernizing the B-70 be worth it?
Depends. The B-1A was "modernized" into a slower, stealthier, lower-altitude B-1B aircraft with considerable success. Doing this with the B-70 would almost certainly be damn near impossible. Some stealthifying could be possible... get rid of the considerable corner reflectors, *some* materials changes. Certainly aerodynamics could be tweaked and the engines improved, leading to reduced fuel burn for supercruise.

But the B-70 will only ever be useful flying high and fast, and the market for such things kinda went away in the 1960's as SAMs got far better. So a modernized B-70 might be optimized not to go flitting over the Soviet countryside, but to stay outside the USSR borders while carrying Interesting Mobile Payloads. Maybe this means big ballistic missiles. Maybe it means a number of smaller ones. Maybe it means orbital payloads... weapons or, more likely, single- or double-pass recon systems that can get over a target quickly, so long as they can be loaded onto the back of the B-70 carrier at a moments notice. The B-70B with much greater range could leave bases in California or Japan and wander about the western Pacific too fast to reliably track for a short time.
 
In 1946 the main weapon of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the Boeing B-29 bomber, but this model reached the obsolescence when 57 Superfortress were destroyed by MiG-15 Soviet fighters during the Korean War.

In 1947 the USAF memorandum ‘Global Strategy Concept’ calling for a new intercontinental bomber able to perform nuclear attacks against the Soviet Union if the Red Army invaded Western Europe.

In June 1948, the Convair B-36, a 410,600 pounds (186,000 kg) heavy bomber entered in service. It tripled the gross weight of the B-29 and was able to carry two Mark III atomic bombs and had 8,000 miles (12,900 km) of range.

At the time, the main Soviet air defense radar was the American-supplied SCR-270 which were only effective up to 39,360 ft (12,000 m) and the main Sovietinterceptor was the Lavochkin La-9 with 35,400 ft (10,792 m) service ceiling.

The B-36 proved that it could fly at 40,000 ft (12,195 m) over the Soviet air space without being intercepted and the Truman Administration ordered the construction of 386 machines under the Cold War policy of nuclear deterrence.

Unfortunately for the SAC the Soviet fighter MiG-15A, with 50,840 ft (15,500 m) ceiling was delivered to operational units early 1949, followed by the MiG-17 (15,850 m) late in 1953, the MiG-19S (17,900 m) and the MiG-19 PM (17,000 m) armed with four K-5MS Akali air-to-air missiles in 1957. The B-36 served for only ten years.

Also in 1949 the USN flew 2 bog-standard F2H-1 Banshees (4 x 20mm cannon) to intercept a B-36 - moving into formation with it for photos at 51,000 feet (the Banshee's design cruise altitude was 40,000 feet, and the "service ceiling" was 48,500 feet), with 52,000 feet being reached by the Banshees during the intercept.

So yeah... B-36s were simply high-altitude targets right when they entered service!
 
Would modernizing the B-70 be worth it?
To what extent? It's major problems aren't the ones that could go away with modernization, I think. The main problem was, that B-70 was a cutting-edge project designed on basic of transient technology, using a mix or brute force approach and forced solutions. Just a decade late, and you have B-1 and Tu-160 - perfectly serviceable, reliable supersonic bombers. Technology evolved, and better, more practical solutions became available.
 
Also in 1949 the USN flew 2 bog-standard F2H-1 Banshees (4 x 20mm cannon) to intercept a B-36 - moving into formation with it for photos at 51,000 feet (the Banshee's design cruise altitude was 40,000 feet, and the "service ceiling" was 48,500 feet), with 52,000 feet being reached by the Banshees during the intercept.

So yeah... B-36s were simply high-altitude targets right when they entered service!
Actually no. They were quite hard to attack. On high altitude, straight-wing bomber was actually more agile than angled-wing fighter. On its max static ceiling, B-36 could actually outmaneuver Mig-15/F-86 simply by having smaller radius of turn and motors that did not choke so easily in thin air. At most, each fighter could do one attack run against B-36 - facing all its impressive gun battery.

The Banshee were straight-wing, subsonic fighters. They weren't actually good planes for point interception - their rate of climb was almost 1/3 worse than Mig-15 (and almost half worse than Mig-15bis). Launched on alarm, they would just took too much time to climb on interception altitude, that bomber would be able to strike the target already. And having Banshee constantly flying patrols in search for bombers... simply wasn't practical. While USSR worked with barraging interceptors also (the Yak-25), it was costly plane, designed mainly as addition to point defense interceptors, not their replacement.
 
To what extent? It's major problems aren't the ones that could go away with modernization, I think. The main problem was, that B-70 was a cutting-edge project designed on basic of transient technology, using a mix or brute force approach and forced solutions. Just a decade late, and you have B-1 and Tu-160 - perfectly serviceable, reliable supersonic bombers. Technology evolved, and better, more practical solutions became available.
Much slower supersonic speeds than the B-70 was designed for.
B-70: M 3.1
B-1: M 2 (-A), 1.2 (-B)
Tu-160: M 2.05
 
Much slower supersonic speeds than the B-70 was designed for.
B-70: M 3.1
B-1: M 2 (-A), 1.2 (-B)
Tu-160: M 2.05

Not because Mach 3 is impossible; because it's not practical. It would not gave any significant advantages over Mach 2, while making plane itslef a lot more costly and complicated.
 
B-70 would have needed to be dramatically scaled back due to extreme costs of purchase AND maintenance. You probably operate 20 at the cost of retiring everything else including B-52.
 
Since this is a purely speculative topic, I'm taking the liberty to include a photomontage I did years ago, showing three B-70 aircraft in flying formation. It doesn't put any valuable information on the table, but hopefully it stimulates the imagination...

1704804082530.png
 
Since we have fun with alt history... in my TL I have the Valkyrie three prototypes (yes, three - in your face, McNamara) finding themselves an all-important role: interim Aerospaceplane.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aerospaceplane

It had been calculated that with some kerosene offloaded, a B-70 could carry and drop a 200 000 pounds rocket booster package. Which falls right between a Titan I and a Titan II first stage - the one with Aerojet LR87s.

So - Titan I first stage: off the shelf, loaded into a XB-70 belly fairing, and dropped at Mach 3.

End result ? 16 000 pounds to orbit right off a SAC runway. You bet that the National Reconnaissance Office was quite interested. To launch cut-down / weight trimmed KH-9, KH-10 and KH-11 "camera packages" spysats for crisis reconnaissance.

Later the second and third XB-70s are upgraded with non-afterburning GE4s from the canned Boeing SST. Why non-afterburning ? because that's 4*22 tons of thrust, 88 tons; instead of 6*13 tons of J93s, 78 tons of thrust.

The GE4 was a monster. Check out the advanced variants here. https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=752231

GE4/J6H: 75,000 lb.* (dry turbojet)

Up to 75 000 pounds of thrust. Plenty enough for a XB-70. In fact a pair of such GE4s could almost fly a XB-70 instead of 6*J93s. 75 000 pounds is 37.5 tons, per two that's 75 tons of thrust... very close from the 6*J93s 78 tons.

Crazy ! So now we have a Valkyrie that can supercruise at Mach 3 while throwing large payloads into orbit. :cool:

Cherries on the cakes
1-GE4 was a scaled up J93, by General Electric
2-XB-70 was proposed as a GE4 testbed to Mach 3, which made tons of good sense.
3-It would makes a surviving XB-70 a "consolation prize" after SST cancellation in 1971
4-GE4 was ground tested as early as 1966.

A 4*GE4s B-70 would have had crazy amounts of jet power. Plenty enough to hit Mach 4 (airframe couldn't stand it, I KNOW) or supercruise to Mach 3 and beyond.
 
Last edited:
End result ? 16 000 pounds to orbit right off a SAC runway. You bet that the National Reconnaissance Office was quite interested. To launch cut-down / weight trimmed KH-9, KH-10 and KH-11 "camera packages" spysats for crisis reconnaissance.
Erm... just redesigning Titan I first stage for horizontal handling under the supersonic bomber would be such a headache, that it would probably be simpler to design a new rocket from scratch.
 
End result ? 16 000 pounds to orbit right off a SAC runway. You bet that the National Reconnaissance Office was quite interested. To launch cut-down / weight trimmed KH-9, KH-10 and KH-11 "camera packages" spysats for crisis reconnaissance.
I doubt it. They looked at other ways to do it for crisis that would have been easier and cheaper, Staged on orbit or on pad alert. Would have been easier and cheaper. Just ended up waiting for EOI.
 
Since we have fun with alt history... in my TL I have the Valkyrie three prototypes (yes, three - in your face, McNamara) finding themselves an all-important role: interim Aerospaceplane.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aerospaceplane

It had been calculated that with some kerosene offloaded, a B-70 could carry and drop a 200 000 pounds rocket booster package. Which falls right between a Titan I and a Titan II first stage - the one with Aerojet LR87s.

So - Titan I first stage: off the shelf, loaded into a XB-70 belly fairing, and dropped at Mach 3.

End result ? 16 000 pounds to orbit right off a SAC runway. You bet that the National Reconnaissance Office was quite interested. To launch cut-down / weight trimmed KH-9, KH-10 and KH-11 "camera packages" spysats for crisis reconnaissance.

Later the second and third XB-70s are upgraded with non-afterburning GE4s from the canned Boeing SST. Why non-afterburning ? because that's 4*22 tons of thrust, 88 tons; instead of 6*13 tons of J93s, 78 tons of thrust.

The GE4 was a monster. Check out the advanced variants here. https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=752231



Up to 75 000 pounds of thrust. Plenty enough for a XB-70. In fact a pair of such GE4s could almost fly a XB-70 instead of 6*J93s. 75 000 pounds is 37.5 tons, per two that's 75 tons of thrust... very close from the 6*J93s 78 tons.

Crazy ! So now we have a Valkyrie that can supercruise at Mach 3 while throwing large payloads into orbit. :cool:

Cherries on the cakes
1-GE4 was a scaled up J93, by General Electric
2-XB-70 was proposed as a GE4 testbed to Mach 3, which made tons of good sense.
3-It would makes a surviving XB-70 a "consolation prize" after SST cancellation in 1971
4-GE4 was ground tested as early as 1966.

A 4*GE4s B-70 would have had crazy amounts of jet power. Plenty enough to hit Mach 4 (airframe couldn't stand it, I KNOW) or supercruise to Mach 3 and beyond.
I severely doubt that an XB-70 with a sizeable belly fairing and associated additional aerodynamic drag would still be able to achieve Mach 3.
 

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom