Army Wants 'Air Droppable' Light Tank & Ultra-Light Vehicles

I'm won6ering why GD decided to reduce the number of road wheels to 6 per side on its Griffin variants of the ASCOD/Ajax? Was it a means to reduce the overall weight of the vehicle?
 
Looks like someone has stuck a Abrams turret on the hull of a Marder to me....


Regards
Pioneer
It essentially is an Abrams turret, just made out of aluminum instead of steel and without the armor package.

Do you know which aluminum alloy(s)?
As far as Im aware, this has not been released

I'm won6ering why GD decided to reduce the number of road wheels to 6 per side on its Griffin variants of the ASCOD/Ajax? Was it a means to reduce the overall weight of the vehicle?
Weight would seem to be among the main reasons. Its also an entirely different suspension, Hostman InArm instead of Ajax's torsion bars.
 

"It’s not just PowerPoint” anymore, Maj. Gen. Bryan Cummings, the Army’s Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems (PEO-GCS), told me in an interview. “

That the follow-on soldier test is called a Touchpoint still makes me chuckle.
 
A bit disappointed in the BAE hp/t numbers, would like to have seen them put some more "go" in it, especially considering the monster GDLS has under their hood. But I still really like their compactness and lightness, assuming no dramatic performance deficit appears I'll definitely be pulling for the Buford to get it's due.
 
A bit disappointed in the BAE hp/t numbers, would like to have seen them put some more "go" in it, especially considering the monster GDLS has under their hood. But I still really like their compactness and lightness, assuming no dramatic performance deficit appears I'll definitely be pulling for the Buford to get it's due.

Will pardonable exaggeration, I think about half of what light tanks do is towing immobilized (wheeled) vehicles.
 
It is a great article in pointing out what has not been done.
 
It is a great article in pointing out what has not been done.
It has been done. Not with great fanfare and vindication for those who have espoused this for some years. Nor (to your point I think) has it been promulgated as a primary method of operation by major units (i.e. 101st Air Mech Division).
 
again on this thread

Neither the USArmy or USMC have anywhere near what could be called an immediate reaction force that would not be characterized as "too dumb to run and too light to fight" in even a Hybrid, let alone a High Intensity contingency. Shamefull. No "not runway dependent" transport is even on the horizon.
 
Happy to be told this is a silly suggestion, but it would seem that the Toyota Hilux is available all around the world.

Maybe the marines could just jump in with say $100,000 and buy a hilux.

Saving 150K on the Flyer prices.
 
Happy to be told this is a silly suggestion, but it would seem that the Toyota Hilux is available all around the world.

Maybe the marines could just jump in with say $100,000 and buy a hilux.

Saving 150K on the Flyer prices.

Hilux is too big in height and width to fit inside a V-22. The Flyer 60 fits with just enough room to load reasonable easily (10 cm on either side, basically).
 
How much does a fully-loaded Toyota Hi-Lux weight?
... with crew, ammo, spare fuel and a decent-sized gun (say 14.5 mm)?
 
SOF communities have been putting vehicles inside of helicopters for years. I do believe that HILUX have been moved via CH-47 over the last two decades, but cannot immediately find and supporting documentation. Quad bikes are routinely moved. The challenge is finding vehicles that can survive on a larger more complex battlefield that fit inside of the rotorcraft. I can tell you from actual experience that sling loading in combat is daft as the aircraft cannot maneuver and the only option if engaged is to dump the load.
 
the lower sensor turret is bullet trap ..bad juju.
I doubt that this is the final config. And really they will need multiple sensor turrets, on some sort of rotating system, otherwise everyone will be loading shrapnel rounds....
 
The second type of AI was used for fire control, and is represented by FIRES Synchronization to Optimize Responses in Multi-Domain Operations, or FIRESTORM. Taking in the targeting data from the other AI systems, FIRESTORM automatically looks at the weapons at the Army’s disposal and recommends the best one to respond to any given threat.
FIRESTORM appears to be focused on genuine AI enabled net-centric.
 
the lower sensor turret is bullet trap ..bad juju.
I doubt that this is the final config. And really they will need multiple sensor turrets, on some sort of rotating system, otherwise everyone will be loading shrapnel rounds....
Its not anywhere near a final configuration, this is a prototype for testing the fire control system with plenty of stuff just bolted on.
 
the lower sensor turret is bullet trap ..bad juju.
What kinda bullets are you worried about trapping exactly?

Because apfsds straight up don't care about bullet traps with their auto bounce angles being so close to 90 degrees as not to matter.

And for smaller caliber stuff like you might actually worry about, a decent chunk of the cost of a sensor ball like that is the housings which are deceptively strong.
 
the lower sensor turret is bullet trap ..bad juju.
What kinda bullets are you worried about trapping exactly?

Because apfsds straight up don't care about bullet traps with their auto bounce angles being so close to 90 degrees as not to matter.

And for smaller caliber stuff like you might actually worry about, a decent chunk of the cost of a sensor ball like that is the housings which are deceptively strong.
against 12.7mm 14.5mm and 23mm ?
 
The Army could have CEC back when JH APL and company wanted the Army to join CEC back in the early 2000s.

Some lead RCV (H) are going to have withstand more than med cal autocannon..try 57mm auto from a modified BMP-3. ...talk about not enough store electric power for a counter drone DEW, RCV (H) in going to need EM armor.

We are back to whether robots do the vast majority of fighting or not as they (UGVs) are going to need to heavy and expensive just to survive.. Speed and agility is not specified survival it is just the favor of the month. Speed is for deep interdiction raids, thus full autonomy. Protecting troops and crews still need be monster vehicles.

 
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Re-inventing the wheel seems to apply here. The US Army has tried ever since the 50s to develop and deploy airborne light armor and lightweight scout vehicles. The M551 Sheridan and M114 recce track were introduced and proved pretty useless. The Bradley finally served as the scout track.
The UK stayed simple with Ferrets and then the Scorpion family.
 
And now the Ferret is long gone, and the Scorpion family is being replaced by vehicles more than 4 times its weight?!?!?!
 
The FCS FOOB gun is still very much around in one form or another.

Hawkeye and Brutus are both great. Realistically, with the other advances Being made as well as in consideration of the prevailing threats artillery is the proper place to focus foob stuff first.

It would be quite nice if eventually the MPF gets it too, but there's other areas that need it first.

In the interim especially for breaching Pele and Pele ALP style rounds are nearly ideal for breaching if it's called for. Especially where there is no or minimal explosives involved in the warhead.

Not clear why a 30 ton vehicle would need FOOB; the 105mm round isn't particularly "hot"

And I would think they would just scale AMP down to 105mm; PELE leaves the rebar substantially intact.

https://www.nacconsortium.org/awards-2/


1904 INIT 4240 BAMM-19-04-019105mm Advanced Multi-Purpose (AMP) Munition PrototypingATK (Northrop Grumman)$3.40 M
 
If I may, just my personal thoughts....

I've come to the conclusion, although obviously not ideal, that any modern 'Air Droppable' Light Tank will need to be designed with the reality that's it's survivability is going to be limited in terms of armoured protection. That it's operator - the US Army must come to the conclusion that it can not and will not have the armoured protection of an M1 Abrams, no matter how hard they try - period.
I think the Soviet/Russian Airborne sensibly knew and appreciated this as far back as the ASU-57.
Am I right to say that any Airborne Light Tank realistically has to rely on its compact size, shaping, speed, and armament to maximise it's survival rate? To employ it's firepower for as long as practically/tactically possible, until either their shock tactic of capturing a given target is completed or they are relived by heavier/more numerically larger conventional forces, which can meet enemy with like for like combat capability and firepower.....
Again, I think the Soviet's/Russian's appreciate d and came to this conclusion some 60-years ago.
Also, if I may, I think it's safe to say, that the lack of serious use of the M551 Sheridan by the US Army in any real/serious combat operations throughout its use within the US Army Airborne ORBAT, let alone any real emphasis to replace it, seems to emphasis to me that either the US Army is reluctant to use its Airborne forces in any serious matter or they instinctively know and appreciate the futility of such limited/vulnerable airborne armoured assault vehicles period.....

So personally, I've come to the conclusion that:
1/ The US Military/Political willingness to actually employ the likes of the 82nd Airborne Division in its intended role and capability as an airborne shock force in its entirety makes me question the money, time and effort for such a program.

2/ Any Airborne Light Tank has a limited survivability from its conception, due to the realistic need for its size, dimensions and weight limitations.
Although all means possible should be practically sorted to maximise the survival of such a Airborne Light Tank, the US Army should not, can not lose sight of the reality that a Airborne Light Tank can not and will not be a M1 MBT no matter how much time, effort and money they spend.

3/ US Army doctrine seriously has to determine tactically where and when the employment of Airborne forces will actually be employed and what the real calculated offs of their survival are.

4/ The principle purpose of an Airborne Light Tank is to facilitate the carrying and employment of heavy/high velocity weapons for both assault and defence. If there is a reluctance to employ such a vehicle/weapons platform because of its perceived 'survival' vs its intended role and purpose of employment as a weapons platform, then is it really needed at all?

5/ Going by actual combat history from Post-WWII of the actual intended use and employment of the 82nd Airborne Division in its parachute deployed role and intent, I guess the true question that needs to be asked - if the US Army/Political Administrations aren't prepared to use the 82nd Airborne as a shock unit in mass, by means of parachute, is it's existence and the cost of its existence really warranted?

Anyway, these are just my thoughts and I apologise if I've detracted from the principle topic/subject.

Regards
Pioneer
 
Perhaps another route to the same point:

So you decide to drop your 82nd airborne into combat.

Either the local enemy wont have MBT or they will.

If they dont, you dont need a 'near' MBT with you.

If they do, you have lots of atgm, drones, etc to take them out.

The whole point of a heavily armoured tank is to 'face-off' with similar. So avoid 'facing-off' and you wont need one.
 

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