Alternative RAF, 1936-41?

[Hood]

Hurricane was designed to hold 4 guns per side. It was not designed to hold 2 cannons per side, that happened after the fact, and after the wing structure was changed, and skinning material was changed to light alloy instead of canvas.

True but Camm had offered the modified Hurricane with four Oerlikon to meet F.7/35 in 1936.
On this basis is should have known better but seemingly not.
Although of all the F.7/35 entries the only other ones with wing cannon were Boulton Paul's P.88 (looks much like a Defiant wing), Bristol Type 153 (with wing gondolas but quickly rejected in favour of the twin-engine 153A) and Supermarine's Type 312 (modified Spitfire wing).

 

[Nieuport]

...... and the Botha was too lethal to its own crew to even use as a trainer due to poor stability and control - my grandfather turned down a chance to fly in one for that reason. .....

Except the Botha was used as a trainer. No 10 (Observers) Advanced Flying Unit was formed as late as May 1942 with 44 Bothas and 21 Battles in its fleet of some 120 aircraft based at Dumfries and Annan in South West Scotland. The Battles were replaced first, by the end of the year, with withdrawal of the Bothas started but not completed until Aug 1943. The replacement for both types was the Anson. The last of the Bothas weren't withdrawn from second line duties until Sept 1944.

Yes, for around a year because they were desperate to find a role - any role, to use it in, and it was so bad that they withdrew them despite still having a need for the airframes. My grandfather (as a rigger) refused a ride in one, they had such a terrible and well earned reputation as a death trap, and the statistics bear that out as a very high proportion were lost in fatal accidents. Even then, I would not be surprised to learn that for much of that time, most were being used as ground instructional airframes rather than as flight/crew trainers. I had heard the "why bother" comment from him via my father (my grandfather died before I was born).

 

[Nieuport]

Many of the suggestions here come from 20/20 hindsight but lessons had to be learned before a correct decision could be made. Aircraft being ordered off the drawing boards out of desperation to speed up rearmament went surprisingly well, considering the possibilities and alternatives where things could have gone way worse.

Ideologies surrounding various ideas (dive bombers, turret fighters, biplanes, multi-role naval aircraft, X engines, unescorted bombers, flying fortresses, precision bombing and area bombing) all needed to be re-evaluated in the light of experience, and while we now know their problems, in many cases politics and egos and unrealistic war games encouraged bad ideas. With rare exceptions, government and industry were both overly conservative in their designs, refusing to use steel and aluminium for a long time, even penalizing their use by requiring higher strength margins than for wood, and refusing to move away from biplanes to monoplanes, and even when forced to do so, they went with overly thick wings often set at very high angles of incidence - Hawker was not alone with the Typhoon. A lot of narrow minding thinking predominated.

With Imperial Airways, where similar attitudes prevailed, aircraft were seen to only need to be faster than the ships they replaced, which blinded them to the possibilities of much faster, longer range aircraft, and so even into the late 1930s they were content with plodding along in absurdly slow biplanes like the HP 42 of 1931, and when they did finally get monoplanes, such as the AW Atalanta in 1932, it was little more a warmed over Zeppelin E/4.20 of 1919 with bigger engines - 13 years later. Meanwhile the Americans were starting to really pile on the speed - and even the German Junkers Ju 52 which was already flying (and which wasn't exactly ground breaking by then) cruised almost 50% faster.

Conservationism fed into every other bad decision that was made. The continental powers had all switched to monoplanes years before the RAF did - even Poland, and while Brits like to make fun of the boxy early 1930s French monoplane bombers, their bombers had their own much worse aerodynamic flaws, almost all of them still being biplanes whose sad and rather limited attempts at streamlining could never make up for the drag of the extra wings and the struts. That meant they had a lot of design lessons to learn in a very short period of time. It took several tries to get the Spitfire right, the Hurricane was little more than a Fury with a monoplane wing - and those were the success stories.

Imagine if instead of feeling threatened by German design ideas in WW1, that they had embraced them. Monoplane fighters and bombers in the RAF by the mid-20s. By the mid-1930s, they could have already worked out solutions to all the problems with thinner wings, stall behaviour, tapered wings, incidence, and flaps, and the Typhoon's tail falling off. That would leave a lot fewer lessons to be learned as war approached - and a lot more successful designs.

Some of the other silly ideas that took too long to die might have disappeared early enough to make huge changes - like the nonsense about the bombers always getting through. With fighters not held back by the ideology of being overly polished WW1 type biplanes with too light a weapon load and far to slow to catch the monoplane bombers, they might not have had to lose the Low Countries to learn some of the lessons, and the Fairey Battle may have been recognized as being in need of a fighter escort, and the RAF might have had long range fighters to send with the heavies, instead of having to wait for the Mustang.

The roots of bad decisions run deep, and even if someone showed up with advice they would have been ignored.

I have attached what the Swordfish could have been. Fairey submitted multiple monoplane designs for consideration including this one, but a biplane was chosen instead. Add retractable undercarriage to this and a larger engine and the FAA would not have had to buy Grumman Avengers. Not every company was as forward thinking as they were though.

 

[robunos]

And yet the Swordfish was successful . . .

cheers,
Robin.

 

[HoHun]

Hi,

Imagine if instead of feeling threatened by German design ideas in WW1, that they had embraced them. Monoplane fighters and bombers in the RAF by the mid-20s. By the mid-1930s, they could have already worked out solutions to all the problems with thinner wings, stall behaviour, tapered wings, incidence, and flaps, and the Typhoon's tail falling off. That would leave a lot fewer lessons to be learned as war approached - and a lot more successful designs.

Good point. A while back I came across a 1920s' article on a presentation by the Junkers company before a British audience, which discussed the Junkers F13's high altitude record. One of the British VIPs present really considered that (monoplane) record as "nothing special", and criticized the thick wing Junkers was using. My impression was that this demonstrated a certain "engineering cultural" bias towards the thin sections the British used in WW1. Apparently, at some time a paradigm change took place, and the pendulum swung far the other way.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Tony Williams]

And yet the Swordfish was successful . . .

Yes - most especially later in the war when used from Merchant Aircraft Carrier ships in the convoy protection, anti-sub role. It could carry on operating in weather conditions much worse than later aircraft with higher landing and take-off speeds.

 

[Hood]

And yet the Swordfish was successful . . .

Luckily they never faced a naval opponent with carrier-based air cover (the monoplane Devastator had its reputation killed at Midway, though the Avenger recovered from its inauspicious start), raids like Taranto were at night for maximum protection.
It was a tough bird though and easy to maintain, could lug any type of ordnance you care to mention and as Tony says proved suited to small MAC flight decks later in the war. Skuas had some early success but lacked any growth potential to remain relevant.

Monoplane vs biplane doesn't really seem relevant in some cases. Were Hinds and Hectors any less vulnerable than Lysanders for example? It would seem not based on the losses in France and ops in East Africa.
But Swordfish and Lysanders had enough plus points to earn themselves a profitable niche in roles not originally intended - you can#t really design that in, that comes with a mix of sound basic design and luck.

Conservatism runs deep in the entire history of Britain's aerospace industry, I'm not sure why but it seems to be the case even by many of those pioneer designers and founders that were at the heart of the initial aviation revolution. I don't think it helped that the RAE sometimes had a narrow view and tended to impose their ideas on wing profiles and aerodynamics.

 

[alertken]

HH #20 recommended J James, The Paladins. Well, he was right and many thanks. In essence: Expansion Plan A was all there ever was. Others were fiction, sources of money but not...men, airfields, aircraft. The fighter or bomber argument behind some of the Plans is not discussed at all: author has Staffs unwavering from establishing the Force we actually had by mid-'39, bar only to add the Expeditionary Force...on Battle/Blenheim. He bases his thesis on dissecting Officer postings in the RAF Lists, 1933-39. Before "compulsion", 4/38, shutting down much civil work, such as auto, to transfer resources into Aero, and before conscription, 26/4/39, strength was only in number plates.

 

[Nieuport]

And yet the Swordfish was successful . . .

cheers,
Robin.

Except against German Battlecruisers, or when there was aerial opposition, it wasn't so successful. They were ineffectual when the dash through the channel was being made, not least because its performance was so poor. A modern monoplane torpedo bomber might have gotten close enough to take a shot but all six of the attacking Swordfish torpedo-bombers were downed by naval AA fire before they could get close enough. They lucked out against the Bismark but only because they were flown below the angle that the ship's smaller AA guns could be depressed to - and the ship's bigger guns lacked the ability to track even the slow Swordfish. As an airplane it was certainly successful, but as a warplane it was of somewhat limited use, however the British were the masters at re-purposing aircraft of marginal utility into roles where they were able to contribute.

A true might have been - had the British hung a torpedo off a Hurricane, as the Italians did off of several of their single engine/single seat fighters, how would the outcome have been different? The Swordfish's 18" torpedo weighed 1,548 lbs, the Hurricane IIC could carry 1000 lbs of bombs plus had the weight of 4 x 20mm cannon that could have been stripped out. With a light fuel load, it could have easily managed a torpedo attack in the Channel with the same weapon as the Swordfish, but I doubt it was on anyone's radar at the time. I am also not sure if the nose would have had to be lengthened slightly (probably no more than 6") to get the torpedo on the c of g properly, and a belly cradle stressed for the weight would need to have been added.

 

[tomo pauk]

Except against German Battlecruisers, or when there was aerial opposition, it wasn't so successful. They were ineffectual when the dash through the channel was being made, not least because its performance was so poor. A modern monoplane torpedo bomber might have gotten close enough to take a shot but all six of the attacking Swordfish torpedo-bombers were downed by naval AA fire before they could get close enough. They lucked out against the Bismark but only because they were flown below the angle that the ship's smaller AA guns could be depressed to - and the ship's bigger guns lacked the ability to track even the slow Swordfish. As an airplane it was certainly successful, but as a warplane it was of somewhat limited use, however the British were the masters at re-purposing aircraft of marginal utility into roles where they were able to contribute.

If only the Germans have had Battlecruisers back in ww2...
On a more serious note, the Swordfish was a dead meat where they were sent against a ship that had some fighter protection. No such luck for the Bismarck.

A true might have been - had the British hung a torpedo off a Hurricane, as the Italians did off of several of their single engine/single seat fighters, how would the outcome have been different? The Swordfish's 18" torpedo weighed 1,548 lbs, the Hurricane IIC could carry 1000 lbs of bombs plus had the weight of 4 x 20mm cannon that could have been stripped out. With a light fuel load, it could have easily managed a torpedo attack in the Channel with the same weapon as the Swordfish, but I doubt it was on anyone's radar at the time. I am also not sure if the nose would have had to be lengthened slightly (probably no more than 6") to get the torpedo on the c of g properly, and a belly cradle stressed for the weight would need to have been added.

Hurricane will need some nip & tuck so it can carry a torpedo. Relocation of the radiator bath from the belly to perhaps nose, and major rework of the undercarriage retraction so the torpedo does not go in the way when U/C is being retracted. Longer tailwheel leg also, as it was the case with Italian fighters adopted for the purpose, as well as for the Fw 190 tested as a torpedo-carrier.
How about the Spitfire? Belly is already clear, Spitfires were carrying 170 imp gal belly tank (170 x 7.2 = 1224 lbs of fuel + weight of empty tank) for ferrying purposes, and were testing the 200 gal 'torpedo-shaped' drop tanks.

 

[Hood]

I'm not so sure that was a fault of the Swordfish, the idea of flying your plane into floating fortresses bristling with multiple calibre AA guns and later with radar-guidance and VT fuses was suicide regardless of whatever torpedo bomber you were flying.
Even Avengers got hacked down at Midway, hundreds of Kamikazes were hacked out of the skies, even if their pilots' had not been of suicidal intent they would still have been hacked down in droves. The IJNAF's main torpedo successes later in the war came from night attacks.
Any successful day assault on major warships required mass attacks, splitting defences and coming in from high and low and using a variety of weapons. Air supremacy helped too to keep fighters off their backs.

But even the US either cancelled its remaining torpedo bomber projects or diverted them into the new 'Attack' classification or recasting them as ASW aircraft. Allied efforts on weapons went into trying to extend stand-off range (ZETA and other oddities) or switching to missiles and rockets (Highball would have been equally suicidal). The Spearfish if it had been produced it would have been a general-purpose attack aircraft and indeed before it had flown Fairey was already looking at developing it into the vastly different tandem-Merlin Strike Fighter.

 

[Pioneer]

We haven't done much talking about the land-based torpedo bombers here. That role was supposed to be fulfilled with Botha (we know ow that ended up) and Beaufort. Perhaps have Hampden and/or 'Hercules Beaufort' to do it together? An 1-engined monoplane torpedo bomber maybe?
How many torpedo bombers are needed actually?

Thanks tomo pauk, as I've never knew of, let alone seen the Blackburn B.26 Botha design until now!

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Pioneer]

So when Fairey wanted to stick a Merlin into the Battle it looked like a winner, the latest and best engine in a monoplane, what could go wrong? Plenty, by 1935 it wasn't' purely about horsepower anymore and even having the best engine didn't mean large speed increases could be obtained anymore over the fighters, in fact drag and weight became critical and the lighter and smaller fighter won out.

Agreed pretty much.
A note that Battle was not a fighter-bomber (just one fixed MG was installed, plus the F/B doctrine wasn't there), but a long-range 1-engined bomber, that flew with 200 imp gals + bombs. For comparison, Spitfire had 84 imp gals on board before mid-ww2.

Something pugnacious like the Henley might have worked out with better forward armament. But a single-seat Defiant with bombracks and wing guns would have sufficed I think for the early war. But probably it was much better that they made use of the Hurricane already set up for mass production. Typhoon got a new role to justify its production but even late-mark rocket-toting Hurris would have done a decent job over Normandy in conditions of total Allied aerial supremacy.

Hurricane looks indeed like a best pick here - it can lug a lot (those big & thick wings were good inn lifting stuff), and when bombs are gone it can ruin the day to any enemy flying. 8 .303s are excellent to trash soft-skinned targets - open-topped AFVs, trucks, guns and their crews, infantry etc.
Being faster and more maneuverable will also make work of the Flak gunners harder, though not impossible. Time to armor it a bit?

If the Hurricane is to be employed in a more centric fighter-bomber role, then at minimum, it needs those eight .303 machine guns replaced at minimum with 4-6x12.7mm Mgs or even better 4x20mm cannons IMO

Regards
Pioneer

 

[alertken]

Inferior RN a/c, superior USN derived from the political purpose of funding, 1933-39: what was Navy, so Navy Air, for?

USN had 4 advantages over USAAC in extracting funds: Pres FDR was a Former Naval Person; USMC holds a very special place in US National Identity; as does the moral stance of having no (actually few) colonies (so Naval bases); "our" China had been invaded by barbarians who must be ejected.

So USN was "for" Projecting Force far, against land opposition. FDR won funds for a 2 Ocean Navy before he did so for 20,000 a/c p.a.

The Board of Admiralty knew what RN was for: its Big Guns to sink Big Ships on waves ruled by Britannia from littoral bases, on which the sun never sets. So little land-based Air opposition...which would be seen off by ships' AAA. KGV battleships and lllustrious carriers were to operate together, Torpedo-Recce-Fighters (!?!) to find, damage, so slow, Big Ships to be sunk by the Fleet, as obviously Air could not. Illustrious armoured decks were protection against plunging Big Gun fire. A forward screen of scatterers, then AAA, would deal with IJN torpedo/dive a/c. Jousting dog-fighters were as improbable as high-payload bombers ranging far over the High Seas.

So the logic of biplane torpedo-launcher Swordfish was: short, even catapult t/o; slow, low and precise-angled release (UK torps were fragile). So Albacore as successor simply to raise crew effectiveness in cold and wet. Not the Buccaneer of the day, but the ASW chopper.

Air Ministry procured and RAF flew RN Air (till 1939): if RN had been responsible for those things...nothing would have changed, as RN Specified what it wanted in men and kit. UK industry Premier League would have been just as disinterested, because the low volume of RAF land-based business was better than the yet lower ship-borne. USN's business was greater than USAAC's for its few garrisons (Canal Zone, Philippines), so the best and brightest sought it. Ditto Japan. For OP's Alternative RAF 1936...there is no Naval angle.

 

[tomo pauk]

For OP's Alternative RAF 1936...there is no Naval angle.

I'm all okay with a dedicated thread for all the RN/FAA/CoastalCommand needs, say for the years of 1935-42?

 

[Pioneer]

Scrap any plans to build Stirling, Halifax, Whirlwind, dispose of the Typhoon/Tornado if/when they become too troublesome. Then reassign workers, resources and government funds to the Beaufort/Beaufighter, the DH98 and the Avro 679/683 (and the Hurricane and Spitfire, naturally) and the Sunderland/Seaford

Three heavy bombers was too many, but what would have happened if the Manchester had never become the Lancaster or the transformation had not been as easy and successful as it was? The Halifax needs to stay IMHO, at least until the Lancaster has proved itself.

The changeover from Beaufort to torpedo Beaufighter should probably have happened sooner.

Hurricane looks indeed like a best pick here - it can lug a lot (those big & thick wings were good inn lifting stuff), and when bombs are gone it can ruin the day to any enemy flying. 8 .303s are excellent to trash soft-skinned targets - open-topped AFVs, trucks, guns and their crews, infantry etc.

Who was it that said the best single-seat tactical ground-attack fighter is the last generation's best interceptor?

Agree with your analogy of "Three heavy bombers was too many", perhaps the Air Ministry sees past the pettiness of demanding that Specification B.12/36 be restricted to a wingspan of 100 feet, which would adversely affected the Stirling's performance, such as its relatively low operational ceiling [If anything, Short should have been allowed to retain the
the 112 ft 9.5 in (34.379 m) wing of its S.25 Sunderland design incorporated into it's original
S.29 Sterling submission from the get go.]
One should also appreciate that 'even before the Stirling went into production, Short had improved on the initial design with the S.34 in an effort to meet specification B.1/39. It would have been powered by four Bristol Hercules 17 SM engines, optimised for high-altitude flight. The new design featured longer span wings and a revised fuselage able to carry dorsal and ventral power-operated turrets each fitted with four 20 mm Hispano cannons; despite the obvious gains in performance and capability, but alas, the Air Ministry was not interested.'

In relation to the mentioned use of Canada and Australia to manufacture aircraft for the British war effort, 'in 1941, it was decided that the Stirling would be manufactured in Canada and an initial contract for 140 aircraft was placed. Designated as the Stirling Mk.II, the Hercules engines were to be replaced by 1,600 hp (1,193 kW) Wright Twin Cyclone engines; a pair of prototypes were converted from Mk.I aircraft. However, it was decided to cancel the contract in favour of manufacturing other aircraft; thus, no production Mk.IIs were ever completed.'

IMO either the Halifax or Lancaster should have been selected.

Finally, I concur with your analogy of "The changeover from Beaufort to torpedo Beaufighter should probably have happened sooner."
Perhaps a HS 129-like derivative of the Beaufighter, armed with a gondola-mounted Vickers 40 mm Class S cannon (as later used on the Mark IID and Mark IV Hurricanes), as a close support / anti-armour / anti-ship platform.....

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Volkodav]

RAF adopts the Gloster F.5/34 for tropical use and maybe even as a carrier fighter.

 

[Volkodav]

Inferior RN a/c, superior USN derived from the political purpose of funding, 1933-39: what was Navy, so Navy Air, for?

USN had 4 advantages over USAAC in extracting funds: Pres FDR was a Former Naval Person; USMC holds a very special place in US National Identity; as does the moral stance of having no (actually few) colonies (so Naval bases); "our" China had been invaded by barbarians who must be ejected.

So USN was "for" Projecting Force far, against land opposition. FDR won funds for a 2 Ocean Navy before he did so for 50,000 a/c p.a.

The Board of Admiralty knew what RN was for: its Big Guns to sink Big Ships on waves ruled by Britannia from littoral bases, on which the sun never sets. So little land-based Air opposition...which would be seen off by ships' AAA. KGV battleships and lllustrious carriers were to operate together, Torpedo-Recce-Fighters (!?!) to find, damage, so slow, Big Ships to be sunk by the Fleet, as obviously Air could not. Illustrious armoured decks were protection against plunging Big Gun fire. A forward screen of scatterers, then AAA, would deal with IJN torpedo/dive a/c. Jousting dog-fighters were as improbable as high-payload bombers ranging far over the High Seas.

So the logic of biplane torpedo-launcher Swordfish was: short, even catapult t/o; slow, low and precise-angled release (UK torps were fragile). So Albacore as successor simply to raise crew effectiveness in cold and wet. Not the Buccaneer of the day, but the ASW chopper.

Air Ministry procured and RAF flew RN Air (till 1939): if RN had been responsible for those things...nothing would have changed, as RN Specified what it wanted in men and kit. UK industry Premier League would have been just as disinterested, because the low volume of RAF land-based business was better than the yet lower ship-borne. USN's business was greater than USAAC's for its few garrisons (Canal Zone, Philippines), so the best and brightest sought it. Ditto Japan. For OP's Alternative RAF 1936...there is no Naval angle.

It could be argued that the RAF took the cream of the air minded officers from both the army and the RN leaving the two services with an over abundance of senior officers with little if any interest in aviation, let alone understanding of it. The problem is the RAF was ruled by politically savvy individuals who invented facts to support the survival and growth of their new service, i.e. bomber doctrine etc. meaning that the minority of officers in its ranks who believed in tactical air power and naval air power were side lined or silenced.

When you remove all the subject matter experts from an organisation its not surprising that the organisation ends up with a deficit of knowledge and understanding in the field.

 

[tomo pauk]

Agree with your analogy of "Three heavy bombers was too many", perhaps the Air Ministry sees past the pettiness of demanding that Specification B.12/36 be restricted to a wingspan of 100 feet, which would adversely affected the Stirling's performance, such as its relatively low operational ceiling [If anything, Short should have been allowed to retain the
the 112 ft 9.5 in (34.379 m) wing of its S.25 Sunderland design incorporated into it's original
S.29 Sterling submission from the get go.]

Stirling was already too big, with a huge wing, too draggy and too heavy. Air Ministry was not guilty of that.
Having an even bigger wing will result in even more drag and weight.
FWIW: discussion about the Stirling.

One should also appreciate that 'even before the Stirling went into production, Short had improved on the initial design with the S.34 in an effort to meet specification B.1/39. It would have been powered by four Bristol Hercules 17 SM engines, optimised for high-altitude flight. The new design featured longer span wings and a revised fuselage able to carry dorsal and ventral power-operated turrets each fitted with four 20 mm Hispano cannons; despite the obvious gains in performance and capability, but alas, the Air Ministry was not interested.'

The 'gains in performance and capability' are probably obvious only to the writer of the article? Stirling was already too big, heavy and under-performing. If anything can be seen with the RAF bombers, it is that lower weight, smaller size and less guns is the way forward.

 

[pathology_doc]

The 'gains in performance and capability' are probably obvious only to the writer of the article? Stirling was already too big, heavy and under-performing. If anything can be seen with the RAF bombers, it is that lower weight, smaller size and less guns is the way forward.

Until you run up against the need for an aircraft which can actually perform missions like the Dams raid and dropping earthquake bombs (including the ones that sank the Tirpitz). It's one thing to say "scrap the heavy bombers and build hordes of Mosquitoes" (to take that argument to its logical extreme), but sometimes you need the size, range and lift capability that a true heavy bomber provides.

 

[tomo pauk]

Until you run up against the need for an aircraft which can actually perform missions like the Dams raid and dropping earthquake bombs (including the ones that sank the Tirpitz). It's one thing to say "scrap the heavy bombers and build hordes of Mosquitoes" (to take that argument to its logical extreme), but sometimes you need the size, range and lift capability that a true heavy bomber provides.

Lancaster for me. It was smaller and lighter than Stirling, let alone the 'Super Stirling'. Size comparison:
picture

 

[alertken]

tks tomo for #169 discussion link. Enamoured as we are with kit, we can overlook the characters, who Procurers must deal with.

"(T)he incompetent drunk" (running Short: Oswald). (Halifax) "deplorable Product” “situation would not improve until ‘H.P and his gang are kicked out, lock, stock and barrel’”. AOC-in-C Bomber Cmnd, Harris, C.Messenger,Bomber Harris,A&A’mr,84,P92.

Stirling Prodn.Gp. “virtually collapsed (no) worthwhile contribution to our war effort in return for their overheads (need) wholesale sacking of the incompetents who have turned out (c)50% rogue a/c from (Harland/Austin) not forgetting {HP's} Supervisors" Harris Memo-SoS/Air, 30/12/42. C.Bryant, S.Cripps, Hodder,97,P330.

(HP was) “biggest hoarder of stocks (so denying them to MU/CRO for battle damage repair, or to accelerate shadow prodn. Avro’s {to be Sir}R.) Dobson was in the same mould. But when it came to argument (and toeing) the line, it was apt to be RD who emerged victorious" MAP’s A.Cairncross, Planning in Wartime,Macmillan,91,P64.

So much easier to requisition more B-24s.

Harris was new in post when he wrote those. So was MAP Cripps, whose 3/43 response was to Nationalise Shorts/Rochester, expel them from the S.Marston MAP Agency Factory and put in AWA to manage last Stirlings there, before assigning it to V-A/Spitfires. Dobson and Sir Fred H.P got the message, Aided their Production Groups and Civilian Repair Organisation contractors, so Lancasters and Halifaxes flowed.

But we are drifting to a thread to address what should we have done from say, May,43 when the Battle of the Atlantic was evidently won.​

 

[Pioneer]

Agree with your analogy of "Three heavy bombers was too many", perhaps the Air Ministry sees past the pettiness of demanding that Specification B.12/36 be restricted to a wingspan of 100 feet, which would adversely affected the Stirling's performance, such as its relatively low operational ceiling [If anything, Short should have been allowed to retain the
the 112 ft 9.5 in (34.379 m) wing of its S.25 Sunderland design incorporated into it's original
S.29 Sterling submission from the get go.]

Stirling was already too big, with a huge wing, too draggy and too heavy. Air Ministry was not guilty of that.
Having an even bigger wing will result in even more drag and weight.
FWIW: discussion about the Stirling.

One should also appreciate that 'even before the Stirling went into production, Short had improved on the initial design with the S.34 in an effort to meet specification B.1/39. It would have been powered by four Bristol Hercules 17 SM engines, optimised for high-altitude flight. The new design featured longer span wings and a revised fuselage able to carry dorsal and ventral power-operated turrets each fitted with four 20 mm Hispano cannons; despite the obvious gains in performance and capability, but alas, the Air Ministry was not interested.'

The 'gains in performance and capability' are probably obvious only to the writer of the article? Stirling was already too big, heavy and under-performing. If anything can be seen with the RAF bombers, it is that lower weight, smaller size and less guns is the way forward.

I hear and appreciate what you are implying tomo pauk, but the fact remains that the Stirling was the only true RAF heavy bomber up until the advent of the Halifax.
So as much as it has inherent design flaws, it still brought a heavy bombload to Germany, and hopefully one would think with a new longer wingspan, that little more altitude gained might contribute to a slight better survival rate.


Regards
Pioneer

 

[tomo pauk]

I hear and appreciate what you are implying tomo pauk, but the fact remains that the Stirling was the only true RAF heavy bomber up until the advent of the Halifax.
So as much as it has inherent design flaws, it still brought a heavy bombload to Germany, and hopefully one would think with a new longer wingspan, that little more altitude gained might contribute to a slight better survival rate.

The new longer wingspan is okay with me, with the rest of historical Stirling remaining, minus the gun turrets so the weight increase is countered a bit. That puts us a tad away from the time frame for this thread, that is 1936-41.

Some options that might've worked for the RAF before war erupts, wrt. heavier bomb load X over distance X redundancy:
- A-W designs the Ensign as a bomber (has 4 engines from get go; yes, swap the Tigers for Pegasus ASAP); high-wing A/C so the bomb bay is not restricted
- or: Whitley gets Hercules engines by late 1939 (it was rated for 8000 lb bomb load with two Merlin X engines, or almost double than Wellington or Hampden)
- or: Whitley is a 4-engined bomber from day one

 

[Pioneer]

I hear and appreciate what you are implying tomo pauk, but the fact remains that the Stirling was the only true RAF heavy bomber up until the advent of the Halifax.
So as much as it has inherent design flaws, it still brought a heavy bombload to Germany, and hopefully one would think with a new longer wingspan, that little more altitude gained might contribute to a slight better survival rate.

The new longer wingspan is okay with me, with the rest of historical Stirling remaining, minus the gun turrets so the weight increase is countered a bit. That puts us a tad away from the time frame for this thread, that is 1936-41.

Some options that might've worked for the RAF before war erupts, wrt. heavier bomb load X over distance X redundancy:
- A-W designs the Ensign as a bomber (has 4 engines from get go; yes, swap the Tigers for Pegasus ASAP); high-wing A/C so the bomb bay is not restricted
- or: Whitley gets Hercules engines by late 1939 (it was rated for 8000 lb bomb load with two Merlin X engines, or almost double than Wellington or Hampden)
- or: Whitley is a 4-engined bomber from day one

I don't know tomo pauk, so long as the improvised adoption of Armstrong Whitworth Ensign as a bomber doesn't have similar structural problems reminiscent to the Focke-Wulf Fw 200....

Regards
Pioneer

 

[tomo pauk]

I don't know tomo pauk, so long as the improvised adoption of Armstrong Whitworth Ensign as a bomber doesn't have similar structural problems reminiscent to the Focke-Wulf Fw 200....

A-W designs and produces a bomber. The transport never sees the light of the day.

 

[Hood]

B.12/36 that begat the Stirling (8,000lb over 3,000 miles or 14,000lb over 2,000, 230mph cruise at 15,000ft) had the following contenders:
A.W. 42 - 98ft span, 4x Merlin or Deerhound (very much a super-Whitley)
Boulton Paul P.90 - 100ft, 4x Kestrel or Dagger
Bristol - 110ft, 4x Hercules
Short S.29 - winner
Supermarine 316 - winner (albeit later tinkered with to become 317, delayed, then destroyed in 1940)
Vickers 293 - 93ft, 4x Merlin or Kestrel or Hercules or Pegasus or Dagger (very much a super-Warwick with every engine known to British engineers!)

Halifax and Lancaster emerged from the P.13/36 fiasco so could be considered pure accidents of fate to achieve what they did.

B.1/39 called for quad 20mm turrets, 280mph and 2,500 miles at 15,000ft with 9,000lb.
A.W.48 - 104ft span, 4x Griffon
Avro 680 - 120ft, 4x Hercules or Griffon or 2x Vulture & 2x Merlin
Blackburn B.30 - 104ft, 4x Hercules or Griffon
Bristol 159 - 114ft 6in, 4x Hercules or Griffon - joint winner but killed off in 1940
Fairey - 115ft, 4x Hercules or 124ft, 4x P.24
Gloster - 115ft 6in, 4x Hercules
H.P.60 - 115ft, 4x Hercules or Griffon (developed from Halifax but high wing layout) - joint winner but killed off in 1940
Short S.34 - 113ft 8in, 4x Hercules or Griffon (developed from Sterling)
Vickers 405 - 133ft, 4x Hercules or Griffon
What is striking is how many companies, many without any real bomber experience, attempted to scramble onto this spec.

B.8/41 Super Sterling S.36 - span 135ft 9in, 4x Centaurus
Developed during 1941, 2 ordered but cancelled in favour of Lancaster & Halifax continued production, Harris preferred a Sterling with Hercules VI
It could have been formidable (311mph at 20,000ft, 10x 0.5in & 2x 0.3in MGs, 23,500lb of bombs or 10,000lb over 2,300 miles) and better than the B.1/39 but the Centaurus was delayed and weight increase was an issue

Vickers at the same time was tinkering with Warwick III with Centaurus which morphed into the B.3/42 four-Merlin Windsor.
During 1942 the MAP began looking at the 100-ton and 75-ton monsters...

 

[alertken]

Whitley is core to any RAF AH>1936: Big Wings (not of flocks of fighters, but for Big Bombers - Paralysers).

The League's Disarmament Conference 7/32 had set* a Bomber weight limit of 6,600lb*. When Germany left it 14/10/33 capital markets fastened on Air as the dot-com of the day. New Company floats flourished. Armstrong Siddeley Devt. Co owned Avro (licensee, Fokker F.VIIB/3m wooden wing, basis of ragwing Avro's elevation on Avro 10, 18, 652) and ASM powering them. And AWA, who had a noisily-patented metalwing, basis of A.W.23 bomber-transport twin and £, 1/34 from Czechoslovakia to adapt it as A.W.30 Berlin-Bomber.

PM Macdonald had constrained Hampden and Wellingon 9/33 R&D ITPs to 6,600lb, but then freed Air Ministry, so they freed CZ of that expense by ITP 9/6/34, A.W.38 (to be Whitley). Imperial A/W ordered 4-motor A.W.27 Ensign/ASM Tiger, 22/9/34 at a fixed price, which by 3/35 threatened to destroy AWA. T.O.M.Sopwith (Hawker+Gloster) could not credibly bid a Big Wing. So he "merged" with ASDC 25/6/35, inc. ASM, soundly financing Whitley, so rewarded 23/8/35 with an order for 80 (and 174 (!) 652A Ansons, 7/35).

Bigger Twins were R&D funded 7/10/35 (A.W.39/Merlin or Deerhound, H.P.55/Hercules or Merlin (to lapse), V-A 284 Warwick/Hercules).
USAAC 17/1/36 funded 13 YB-17 (4xWright 1820), so Air Ministry had another think, and here could be our POD.

ASM piston engines had more snarl than bite. Pratt or Wright they were not. Ministers chose to put the Auto industry to producing Bristol radials, and were alert to R&D overload on scarce "draughtsmen" - their reason for confining new design work to the 1920 "Ring", which in engines was ASM, Bristol, Napier, RR: “practical considerations prevented” additions (8/4/43 Press article by (1935) A.M. Air Member,Supply & Research, AM Sir H.Dowding, M.M.Postan, A/c Prodn. Quality (1945 MAP Report),PoD Partizan Pr.).

One spurned licensor was Ld Nuffield, Pratt R.1830 at Wolseley Motors. Later, for hard cash and on Lend/Lease UK enjoyed:
R-1535 Twin Wasp Jr.: 603xMaster III;
R-1830 Twin Wasp: 220xWellington IV; 63xSunderland V; 165xBeaufort Mk.II;
R-2800 Double Wasp: (diverted from Avro Manchester: ) 499xWarwick Mks.I/III/VI.
Fairey took a Curtiss licence in 1924, was spurned on own-brands, but could have built the 1820 Cyclones that fixed AWA Ensigns.

Shall we list the a/c ruined by late, bad Brit also-ran engines: no. It was French+UK 1938/9 hard cash that expanded Pratt+Wright capacity (P&W $15Mn., Hartford/Br.Wing, Wright $20Mn) to power our hard cash US a/c purchases. We could not deploy 4-motor Heavies earlier than we did, as they would have been gliders. My whiff is: put Cyclones/Wasps on our own, delayed, despoiled types.

(*set...6,600lb: see #155, 3/1/22)

 

[tomo pauk]

Shall we list the a/c ruined by late, bad Brit also-ran engines: no. It was French+UK 1938/9 hard cash that expanded Pratt+Wright capacity (P&W $15Mn., Hartford/Br.Wing, Wright $20Mn) to power our hard cash US a/c purchases. We could not deploy 4-motor Heavies earlier than we did, as they would have been gliders. My whiff is: put Cyclones/Wasps on our own, delayed, despoiled types.

Your way with the words reminds me how my English is lacking.
How much better are, in 1936-41 = time frame for this thread), Cyclone vs. Pegasus, and Twin Wasp vs. Merlin?

 

[Pioneer]

The League's Disarmament Conference 7/32 had set a Bomber weight limit of 6,600lb.

Excuse my ignorance alertken, but is this fact or part of your backstory proposal?

Regards
Pioneer

 

[PMN1]

The League's Disarmament Conference 7/32 had set a Bomber weight limit of 6,600lb.

Excuse my ignorance alertken, but is this fact or part of your backstory proposal?

Regards
Pioneer

Real life, though I thought it was 6,300lb.

I have seen it said it was one of the reasons for the design that led to the Battle.

Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Pioneer]

The League's Disarmament Conference 7/32 had set a Bomber weight limit of 6,600lb.

Excuse my ignorance alertken, but is this fact or part of your backstory proposal?

Regards
Pioneer

Real life, though I thought it was 6,300lb.

I have seen it said it was one of the reasons for the design that led to the Battle.

Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Thank you for the clarification PMN1, I neither knew or appreciated this!

Regards
Pioneer

 

[alertken]

The mood of the times was that all bombers should be abolished. Conservative Baldwin took over 7/6/35 as PM from Labour Macdonald (it was a Coalition, National Govt to recover from the Recession), slapped Secrecy on 7/10/35 ITPs for Bigger Twins and was slow in Rearming until he had secured Election, 14/11/35: Churchill-the-Historian would heap blame on him for these delays. We here however would be glad he did not buy more Heyfords (last delivery 7/36); he did buy 58 more Hendons 7/35 but they were soon cancelled.

20/2/35-10/36: Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms and P.Noel-Baker,The Private Manufacture of Armaments were Best-sellers. The analogy is precise with 1960s CND and with the "woke" concept that profit from death is immoral.​

 

[Pioneer]

The mood of the times was that all bombers should be abolished. Conservative Baldwin took over 7/6/35 as PM from Labour Macdonald (it was a Coalition, National Govt to recover from the Recession), slapped Secrecy on 7/10/35 ITPs for Bigger Twins and was slow in Rearming until he had secured Election, 14/11/35: Churchill-the-Historian would heap blame on him for these delays. We here however would be glad he did not buy more Heyfords (last delivery 7/36); he did buy 58 more Hendons 7/35 but they were soon cancelled.

20/2/35-10/36: Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms and P.Noel-Baker,The Private Manufacture of Armaments were Best-sellers. The analogy is precise with 1960s CND and with the "woke" concept that profit from death is immoral.​

Thank you alertken, both fascinating and insightful.

I see some some historic irony here, in that just as 'heaped blame was laid on Baldwin for developing more advanced bomber's in secrecy' for political opportunism by Churchill; I've come to see and appreciate that the same political opportunism was exacted again Jimmy Carter by Reagan, when Carter cancelled the B-1A in favour of secretly endorsing the development of the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), which would lead to the Northrop B-2....

As much as it's popular to criticise and attack "revisionism", such facts when uncovered are harder to swallow when the narrator of the criticism has become a demigod in people's minds and ideology.....

Regards
Pioneer

 

[alertken]

Whitley amd Whiff, 1936 RAF. (Almost everything we might read on League/Dis-/Re-Armament/Appeasement is author-bias-centric).

UK, owning the 5th largest Air Force (by total a/c number) sat in Geneva, 2/32 with the larger 4 and 50-odd others to draft a Convention on (offensive) Armaments. Out on a political limb, Congress averse as ever to entangling Alliances, or Treaties constraining sovereignty, Pres Hoover proposed abolition of bombing. France proposed Bomber monopoly in a League Air Force to zap rogues. Weimar Germany /UK/US/USSR 22/9/33 proposed total abolition, failing that, tare weight limit of 3,000lb (so: Army Co-Op fighter-bomber: "defensive"). UK sought exemption for “policing” (aka Iraqi-"tribal pacification"): UK opt-outs have a long pedigree. France+Germany+UK+US+USSR agreed on no one package. Proposals for 16tons limit for tanks, 105mm for artillery, abolition of submarines, also lapsed.

In 7/32 UK PM Macdonald saw prospect of a weight agreement, so instructed SoS/Air Lord Londonderry to constrain tender Spec B.9/32 (dated 17/9/32 “must be <6,300lb” Meekcoms/Morgan, A-B Br Specs File,94, so, PMN1 #151). V-A T.271 tendered 10/32 compliant. “If as expected (30/10/32, League's) Disarmament Conference raised the tare weight limit for bombers to 6,500lb...”, so HP schemed HP.52 to (by Easter,'33) "the tare limit of 6,500lb then permitted by (the League) Barnes, Put. HP,P.351/2. No tare weight limit was Agreed, so "permitted" by the League. Proposals, not Intn'l Law. Disarmament Conference adjourned sine die, 6/11/34. The Biggest Whiff of C20th.

Conservative Londonderry drifted weight up for Whitley, maybe unknown to pacifist Labour Macdonald, before deletion of both 7/6/35. He has been traduced as pro-German: only a few starry-eyes were pro-the regime, but he and many were pro-encouraging Germany to fight the “foul baboonery of Bolshevism”. The 2nd. Biggest Whiff of C20th.: No UK/France Mutual Aid Agreements, 4-5/39 w. Poland et al.

So: if in 1932/33 we had ignored tare weight constraints (as 1st. post-1919 4-motor Force, USSR, did) could RAF have deployed something better, sooner than actual? My whiff is...yes, with the Dependable Engine(s) that made DC-3 what it was/is. Douglas' transport-derivative (DC-2) B-18, (DC-3) B-23 interested only RCAF (20, 1940, interim, while waiting for CAE Hampdens), but mate those engines with proper bombers...

 

[tomo pauk]

So: if in 1932/33 we had ignored tare weight constraints (as the first post-1919 4-motor Force, USSR, did) could RAF have deployed something better, sooner than actual? And my whiff is...yes, with the Dependable Engine(s) that made DC-3 what it was/is. Douglas' transport-derivative (DC-2) B-18, (DC-3) B-23 interested only RCAF (20, 1940, interim, while waiting for CAE Hampdens), but mate those engines with proper bombers...

Let's not over-rate the R-1830s.
DC-3 came about as a wider-body DC-2 (now that was a true revolution, along with DC-1 - a civilian aircraft with a cantilever monoplane wing, retractable U/C and variable speed prop, flying by the time Air Ministries of the world were still requesting biplane fighters with fixed U/C and fixed pitch prop), and was flying with a variety of 9 cyl radials, too.
Britain have had a good deal of very reliable engines, trick was connecting the dots in order to a make a good/great A/C - that sometimes didn't work.

 

[zen]

Insert time for political reality.
People knew what was happening in USSR.
Government knew what was happening.
When purchasing timber direct from USSR, UK Dept of Trade knew who had cut it and under what conditions. Gulags, slave labour, genocide of 'rich pesants' (people who owned something, a cow, a sowing machine etc..).
People had escaped to Finland, gotten out and sworn testimonials about what had happened to them.

Mass protests were held, but to our eyes they don't look like it because these were prayer meetings. Church led.
House of Lords took the brave stance to actually ask difficult questions. Pampered peers more concerned with Russisn poor than elected politicians.

While it took Attley until Warsaw to have rose tintedglasses ripped off and replaced with the real blood tinted ones. Others held no such illusions.
As anyone who read about France after the Revolution could've told them.

So R.Macdonald and Labour Government knew, and didn't want to admit it. Too many among them agreed with it, and wanted that here.

Better Germany rearm than the truth.

 

[uk 75]

Even Churchill believed that the French Army was the best means of taking on Germany with the Royal Navy imposing a blockade.
There was no serious thought given to an air campaign against Germany or Italy. Politicians were hapoy to just talk about numbers of aircraft being built. Noone seemed to give much thought about what they would do in a war.
Thus when war starts in 1939 the RAF is limited to ineffective raids on German naval forces. No question of bombing the Ruhr or Ludtwaffe bases.
Even if the RAF had had B17s and Baltimores instead of Whitleys and Blenheims it still had inept politicians in charge.

 

[Volkodav]

The mood of the times was that all bombers should be abolished. Conservative Baldwin took over 7/6/35 as PM from Labour Macdonald (it was a Coalition, National Govt to recover from the Recession), slapped Secrecy on 7/10/35 ITPs for Bigger Twins and was slow in Rearming until he had secured Election, 14/11/35: Churchill-the-Historian would heap blame on him for these delays. We here however would be glad he did not buy more Heyfords (last delivery 7/36); he did buy 58 more Hendons 7/35 but they were soon cancelled.

20/2/35-10/36: Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms and P.Noel-Baker,The Private Manufacture of Armaments were Best-sellers. The analogy is precise with 1960s CND and with the "woke" concept that profit from death is immoral.​

One of the factors leading to the Munich agreement was the advice to Chamberlin from the RAF that their bomber fleet was obsolete and that the Luftwaffe had a quantitive advantage in modern types that the RAF would not be able to defend against. The RAF were acknowledging that all the money spent on aircraft in the previous several years had done nothing more than train the workforce to build obsolete and obsolescent types that would (and were) slaughtered when the conflict began.

The irony is that while this was the case for the very expensive but ineffective bombers, the UK had ready for production and development more perfectly good enough fighters than they could build (especially considering the resources being put into bomber production). Some of these fighters would have made superb tactical fighters for CAS etc. far better than the Lysander the RAF decided the Army needed.

The RAF had large numbers of ineffectual operational types that were good for little other than training while the Luftwaffe used cheap civilian types for training before spending up big on modern operational types. Every Fairey Battle was a potential Spitfire, Hurricane or Henley the RAF didn't have, every Lysander was a Gladiator or Gauntlet. The Fairey Fulmar was fleet fighter that was also stressed and designed for use as a dive bomber, imagine if the RAF had them or similar in France instead of the Battles?

 

[tomo pauk]

The RAF had large numbers of ineffectual operational types that were good for little other than training while the Luftwaffe used cheap civilian types for training before spending up big on modern operational types. Every Fairey Battle was a potential Spitfire, Hurricane or Henley the RAF didn't have, every Lysander was a Gladiator or Gauntlet. The Fairey Fulmar was fleet fighter that was also stressed and designed for use as a dive bomber, imagine if the RAF had them or similar in France instead of the Battles?

Fulmar was still a slow aircraft (Mk.I was 80-120 mph slower than the Bf 109E, depending on altitude), will be made even slower with a bomb underslung. Going in with just a token escort will result in the similar results, ie. hacked aircraft and crew members, with questionable gains.
Battle was rated for dive-bombing up to 80 degrees.

UK was in position to make a Merlin-powered 330+ mph dive bomber (either with one or with 2 engines) by the time war broke out, unfortunately that never happened.