Acquisitions, in hindsight..

[alertken]

More please, pretty please. So warming that UK has no monopoly in Procurement SNAFUs.

Aussie contribution?

 

[riggerrob]

… Greb Kodiaks: Stinkers among stinkers (no foot odour puns intended). The solution has been obvious for over a decade - instead of throwing money at Royer, ditch procurements altogether and standardize the boot allowance (highest rate for infanteers, lowest for Admin Clerks). …

During the 1970s and 1980s, Greb Kodiak boots (aka. combat boots) were issued to everyone in the Canadian Army.
They probably saved a few million dollars over purpose-built army boots, but the problem was that they were civilian-pattern construction boots. Deleting steel toes saved a few dollars and prevented a few frozen toes.

While the leather uppers proved plenty durable, so durable that they long out-lasted soles. The plastic (pseudo rubber) soles started with shallow treads that provide limited traction when walking on snow or mud. After a year, those soles wore down almost as smooth as a baby’s buttocks! Quite useless in a country where snow blankets the ground half of the year!

In the long run, the primary advantage was providing steady employment at the Royer Boot Factory in the small town of Lac-Drolet (near Megantic, Quebec.

 

[riggerrob]

….
Bobcat: Yup, perfect example of a design-by-committee disaster. Part of the difficulty was insistence upon the 'economy' of off-the-rack components. How could it be made worse? Add Canadian Car and Foundry into the mix?

One can't help but wonder if the mid-'50s back-up scheme to convert Sherman hulls into modernized Kangaroos mightn't have been better. Certainly couldn't have been worse. …

During the mid-1950s the Canadian Army did buy a batch of US army-surplus Stuart light tanks and a batch of M4A2E8 Shermans.

The Stuarts lost their turrets to serve as light recce vehicles ( the same roll as they served during WW2.
Some of the Shermans retained their turrets and served reserve regiments as lead-in trainers for Centurions. Circa 1964 I got a ride in the Sherbrooke Regiment’s last Sherman shortly before it was scrapped.

Meanwhile, a few dozen Shermans lost their turrets when they were converted to APCs. They were not much of an improvement over WW2 Kangaroo conversions since poor bloody infantry still had to climb up an down the sides to dis-mount.
A full-fledged - Israeli level - conversion to front engines and rear doors was too expensive for the Canadian Army’s budget.

 

[Lascaris]

It was more of a problem with Curtiss management who took a long time to work out all the design flaws with balance, tail flutter, etc.
All those engineering changes caused so many delays in CCF’s production that production engineer Elsie McGill was fired.
The RCN never operated Curtiss Helldivers.
Helldivers were unpopular with US Navy pilots. Immediately after WW2, the USN retired all of their Helldivers.
Only the Helldivers given to the French remained in service, mainly bombing Viet Minh. We have to wonder what the French did to offend the USN???

42 were delivered in the then Royal Hellenic Air force in 1949. Were used in the final battles of the civil war.

 

[riggerrob]

The Ross Rifle scandal was a problem entirely outside of Canada. Ross delivered many thousands of well-made rifles early during the First World War. Those rifles were precisely made to the high standards of competition marksmen. Those precise tolerances became a disadvantage as they clogged with mud in trenches.
The problem was largely with British-made .303 ammunition. Under pressure to produce millions of rounds, British munitions factories allowed tools to wear out and production tolerances were allowed to slide to the point that over-sized ammo jammed in precisely-made Ross Rifles. Canadian Army gun-smiths were eventually issued reamers to enlarge Ross chambers to accept sloppy British ammo, but confidence had been lost and Canadian troops were re-issued with Short Magazine Lee-Enfield rifles.

 

[Apophenia]

When talking about the Ross rifle, everyone forgets Sam Hughes' predecessor, Frederick Borden (after whom CFB Borden was named) As Minister of the Militia and Defence, Borden had overseen delivery to Canada of obsolete British Lee-Metford carbines. The next logic step was replacing all older black powder weapons with the new cordite .303 Lee-Enfield. Attempts were made to gain a licence to locally-produce MLE and LEC variants of the Lee-Enfield. But BSA was not willing to grant a licence or to establish its own Canadian production facility.

Sir Charles Ross was willing to pay for a Canadian plant for his straight-pull rifle. The puzzle is why anyone from the Department of Militia and Defence was willing to consider a Mannlicher-inspired target rifle as a service weapon. At this point, it is good to remember that the British Army's post-Boer War conclusion was that it must to re-arm with a new cartridge fired from a new rifle. In other words, the cordite .303-inch Lee-Enfield was seen as an interim solution pending what finally emerged as .276 Enfield (7x60 mm) and the Mauser-actioned Pattern 13 Enfield rifle. So, back in 1903, Canada's Department of Militia and Defence probably viewed the Ross rifle as an interim weapon as well.

Returning to Borden as Minister ... Sir Frederick suffered a personal tragedy when his only son - Lt H. L. Borden - and Lt. J. E. Burch were both KIA by Boer marksmen firing 7 mm Mauser M1895s. [1] The marked superiority of that German round would prompt the search for new British weapons. It should have better-informed decision-making at Militia and Defence as well. Instead, the Militia suffered through multiple Ross variants and the introduction of a non-standard .280 Ross round. In the UK, we see a spitzer bullet introduced for the .303 followed by the dragged out faffing about that produced the mediocre P13 Enfield.

But, since we're in the Alternative History section, we might consider possible Imperial alternatives in the post-Boer War period. For example, that Mauser 7 mm was already being produced in the UK as the rimless .275 Rigby sports round. Imagine, for a moment, that a batch of Lee-Enfield rifles was experimentally modified to fire the .275 Rigby/7x57mm Mauser round. Then, perform some 'Mad Minute' exercises comparing Lee–Enfields firing rimmed .303 with rimless .275 as well as with captured Mauser M1985s. My guess is that such comparison shoots might well have put paid to the development of the P13 Enfield and its .276 round. That could also have been the end of the slower-firing, straight-pull Ross rifles (.280 or .303).

If the British Army adopted a standard .275-inch Lee-Enfield, that would likely be the rifle that British Empire carried to war in 1914. Of course, in Canada's case, this would also require the War Office to pressure those corporate interests in Birmingham to 'release' the rights to this 'Imperial Standard' Lee-Enfield for Canadian production. But perhaps that is too much of a stretch ...

______________________________

[1] Lieutenants Borden and Burch had risen from cover at Witpoort ridge to lead a counter-attack by 1 Bn, Canadian Mounted Rifles - which later became riggerrob's Royal Canadian Dragoons. Some sources suggest that the same marksman killed both Canadian officers from 200 m away.

 

[riggerrob]

…. Attempts were made to gain a licence to locally-produce MLE and LEC variants of the Lee-Enfield. But BSA was not willing to grant a licence or to establish its own Canadian production facility.


be the rifle that British Empire carried to war in 1914. Of course, in Canada's case, this would also require the War Office to pressure those

When talking about the Ross rifle, everyone forgets Sam Hughes' predecessor, Frederick Borden (after whom CFB Borden was named) As Minister of the Militia and Defence, Borden had overseen delivery to Canada of obsolete British Lee-Metford carbines. The next logic step was replacing all older black powder weapons with the new cordite .303 Lee-Enfield. Attempts were made to gain a licence to locally-produce MLE and LEC variants of the Lee-Enfield. But BSA was not willing to grant a licence or to establish its own Canadian production facility.

Sir Charles Ross was willing to pay for a Canadian plant for his straight-pull rifle. The puzzle is why anyone from the Department of Militia and Defence was willing to consider a Mannlicher-inspired target rifle as a service weapon. At this point, it is good to remember that the British Army's post-Boer War conclusion was that it must to re-arm with a new cartridge fired from a new rifle. In other words, the cordite .303-inch Lee-Enfield was seen as an interim solution pending what finally emerged as .276 Enfield (7x60 mm) and the Mauser-actioned Pattern 13 Enfield rifle. So, back in 1903, Canada's Department of Militia and Defence probably viewed the Ross rifle as an interim weapon as well.

Returning to Borden as Minister ... Sir Frederick suffered a personal tragedy when his only son - Lt H. L. Borden - and Lt. J. E. Burch were both KIA by Boer marksmen firing 7 mm Mauser M1895s. [1] The marked superiority of that German round would prompt the search for new British weapons. It should have better-informed decision-making at Militia and Defence as well. Instead, the Militia suffered through multiple Ross variants and the introduction of a non-standard .280 Ross round. In the UK, we see a spitzer bullet introduced for the .303 followed by the dragged out faffing about that produced the mediocre P13 Enfield.

But, since we're in the Alternative History section, we might consider possible Imperial alternatives in the post-Boer War period. For example, that Mauser 7 mm was already being produced in the UK as the rimless .275 Rigby sports round. Imagine, for a moment, that a batch of Lee-Enfield rifles was experimentally modified to fire the .275 Rigby/7x57mm Mauser round. Then, perform some 'Mad Minute' exercises comparing Lee–Enfields firing rimmed .303 with rimless .275 as well as with captured Mauser M1985s. My guess is that such comparison shoots might well have put paid to the development of the P13 Enfield and its .276 round. That could also have been the end of the slower-firing, straight-pull Ross rifles (.280 or .303).

If the British Army adopted a standard .275-inch Lee-Enfield, that would likely be the rifle that British Empire carried to war in 1914. Of course, in Canada's case, this would also require the War Office to pressure those corporate interests in Birmingham to 'release' the rights to this 'Imperial Standard' Lee-Enfield for Canadian production. But perhaps that is too much of a stretch ...

______________________________

[1] Lieutenants Borden and Burch had risen from cover at Witpoort ridge to lead a counter-attack by 1 Bn, Canadian Mounted Rifles - which later became riggerrob's Royal Canadian Dragoons. Some sources suggest that the same marksman killed both Canadian officers from 200 m away.

When talking about the Ross rifle, everyone forgets Sam Hughes' predecessor, Frederick Borden (after whom CFB Borden was named) As Minister of the Militia and Defence, Borden had overseen delivery to Canada of obsolete British Lee-Metford carbines. The next logic step was replacing all older black powder weapons with the new cordite .303 Lee-Enfield. Attempts were made to gain a licence to locally-produce MLE and LEC variants of the Lee-Enfield. But BSA was not willing to grant a licence or to establish its own Canadian production facility. …. …..

If the British Army adopted a standard .275-inch Lee-Enfield, that would likely be the rifle that British Empire carried to war in 1914. Of course, in Canada's case, this would also require the War Office to pressure those corporate interests in Birmingham to 'release' the rights to this 'Imperial Standard' Lee-Enfield for Canadian production. But perhaps that is too much of a stretch. …

This was a recurring attitude within the British colonial empire where the economic model had the colonies supplying raw materials: cotton, silk, food, wood, iron, etc. and factories in the British Home Islands selling back finished high-tech products.
There were recurring complaints during the 1930s and 1940s - while establishing shadow factories - about corporate headquarters delaying deliveries of key drawings and tools.
See how Canadian Lysander production was delayed by the RCAF forgetting to order high-tech Rotol (UK) propellers.
Another example was the RAF engineer who complained that the first Canadian-built Lancaster was built incorrectly. Upon further review it was discovered to have been built exactly in accordance with old drawings.

 

[alertken]

I can (partly) defend the colonial business model point, by the 1938 reality that materials were overseas and large population was in UK. Oz had to wait longer than Canada for UK tech-assistance for Second Sourcing, in part that same point, in part tie-up of shipping to shift engines etc around the world. Ships, dodging U-Boats, were better employed bringing Diggers to UK kit already in a combat theatre.

I can (better) defend poor service by UK Design Parents to Second Sources by reassuring you it was not discriminatory . Vickers 10/38 was required by Ministers to fire the boss of Supermarine for delaying Spitfire output by slow/no drawings etc to UK sub-contractors imposed by Ministers to accelerate work. Bosses of HP (Halifax) and Avro (Manchester) took note and got on with helping their shadows.

As well as this clinging-to-business, a reason for hiccups in organising licensed manufacture of Br. kit in 1937-40 was that UK firms had sculpture quantity, produced by craftsmen who would progress from boy to retiree in the same firm - "guided", but not enslaved by drawings. Design Parents were slow over here in helping to de-skill their products to be made by UK newcomer firms, staffed by folk, such as females, who had no industrial expertise. Canada was not alone.

 

[Apophenia]

Some of this helps to explain why both Canada and Australia began favouring US suppliers even before the outbreak of WW2. Eg: Pratt & Whitney was willing to licence engine production to both countries. Britain, apparently, was not.

 

[riggerrob]

Some of this helps to explain why both Canada and Australia began favouring US suppliers even before the outbreak of WW2. Eg: Pratt & Whitney was willing to licence engine production to both countries. Britain, apparently, was not.

Part of the issue was that the USA already had a large and well-established machine-tools industry at the start of WW2. Furthermore, the Canadian automobile industry was already partly-integrated into the US economy, making it easier for Canadain firms to license-build American-pattern engines.
Note how Pratt & Whitney of Canada built many thousands of Wasp radial engines during WW2. Even British-pattern airplanes (Anson and Bolingbroke) built under license) in Canada got P&WC engines.

Similarly, most of the AFVs (Valentine, Ram and Grizzly tanks, Sexton SP guns and armored cars) built in Canada got American engines.

 

[riggerrob]

More on most them, really Rob
… Grumman Goblin fighter production: The Goblin purchase was foisted upon the RCAF in order to keep CC&F workers at Fort William active. Of course, in no sensible world would CC&F have been assembling obsolete Grumman carrier fighters without an honest market. CC&F had staff who were too smart for that - eg; GM Dave Boyd who quit in 1941 to help form Victory Aircraft and his brilliant wife, designer and engineer Elsie MacGill. But such people would always be over-ruled by CC&F top managers like President V. M. Drury (such was the sway of all Canadian establishment 'railway families' at the time).

But, before we start feeling sorry for the RCAF here, let's remember that our interfering lad, Drury, had been named honorary commander of 115 Squadron on 01 Sept 1938. (Obviously the RCAF kettle felt no need to call the colour of this CC&F tosspot ;p) In the end, CC&F was saved by local MP, C.D. Howe, ensuring that Fort William got the order (Dec 1938) to produce Hawker Hurricanes in Canada.
…. Helldiver production: Not really a Canadian procurement, since the SBWs ordered were all for the US Navy (including Lend-Lease). As for the choice of producing the truly dreadful Helldiver in the first place ... well, we're back to CC&F management interference again. ….

If we are still in alternative history …
In my RCAF ‘46 time line, CCF still builds Grumman Goblins, but never bids on the Hurricane or Helldiver contracts because they are too busy building Grummans under license.
Once CCF learns how to build Grumman Goblins, they shift to building Grumman Wildcats. Wildcats roughly equaled Hurricane performance and we’re “The best Allied carrier fighter of the early war.” according to RN FAA test-pilot Eric “Winkle” Brown.
CCF-built Wildcats soon become the most numerous airplanes in RN aircraft carriers.
To train RN and RCNVR FAA pilots, the RCN adapts an old Great Lakes bulk carrier ship, which only sails the Great Lakes. RCN pilots soon start to cheat by landing diagonally on her huge deck, inventing angled decks a few years before the RN.
Meanwhile, CCF lands a contract to build sub-components for TBM Avengers.
Then CCF lands another sub-contract to build sub-components for F6F Hellcats so that Grummans dominate British flight decks by late war.

Before Pearl Harbor, CCF and Grumman (Bethpage on Long Island, NY) struggle to maintain the illusion of American neutrality. For example, the US Navy “loses” a lot of airplanes that “ditched” in the Great Lakes during “training missions.” Funny how dozens of USN pilots “return from their. Niagara vacations” by train????
Meanwhile, the RCAF posts dozens of painters too obscure RCAF stations in Northern Ontario. Those few painters “overhaul” record numbers of Grummans.
OTL Fairchild of Canada were sub-contracting to built sub-components for Grumman Bearcats and Tigercats by the end of WW2. This continues in this alternate time line with three-way swaps of components between Bethpage, Montreal and Fort William.
Large numbers of C-47s cross the border during “navigation exercises,” but as the size and complexity of components increase, CCF remembers the shot-welding tools that they bought from Budd USA. Since both companies were originally in the business of building rolling stock for railroads, during the late 1930s CCF considered building stainless-steel rail cars and bought some shot-welding tools from Budd.
Those shot-welding tools end up being used to build Budd Conestoga cargo planes in Fort William.
Sure OTL Conestoga Mark I proved problematic, but Canadians soon develop enough “fixes” (e.g. exhaust pipes) that Conestoga Mark III prove reliable and are built by the hundreds. Half the solution was installing Wright R-1820 engines left over from a Wildcat contract. With the late-war versions pumping out 1400 hp. Conestoga Mark III proved “zippy!” Their cargo ramps prove especially valuable when delivering vehicles to beachheads in Normandy, Holland and across the Rhine.

 

[riggerrob]

More on most them, really Rob
… Grumman Goblin fighter production: The Goblin purchase was foisted upon the RCAF in order to keep CC&F workers at Fort William active. Of course, in no sensible world would CC&F have been assembling obsolete Grumman carrier fighters without an honest market. CC&F had staff who were too smart for that - eg; GM Dave Boyd who quit in 1941 to help form Victory Aircraft and his brilliant wife, designer and engineer Elsie MacGill. But such people would always be over-ruled by CC&F top managers like President V. M. Drury (such was the sway of all Canadian establishment 'railway families' at the time).

But, before we start feeling sorry for the RCAF here, let's remember that our interfering lad, Drury, had been named honorary commander of 115 Squadron on 01 Sept 1938. (Obviously the RCAF kettle felt no need to call the colour of this CC&F tosspot ;p) In the end, CC&F was saved by local MP, C.D. Howe, ensuring that Fort William got the order (Dec 1938) to produce Hawker Hurricanes in Canada.
…. Helldiver production: Not really a Canadian procurement, since the SBWs ordered were all for the US Navy (including Lend-Lease). As for the choice of producing the truly dreadful Helldiver in the first place ... well, we're back to CC&F management interference again. ….

If we are still in alternative history …
In my RCAF ‘46 time line, CCF still builds Grumman Goblins, but never bids on the Hurricane or Helldiver contracts because they are too busy building Grummans under license.
Once CCF learns how to build Grumman Goblins, they shift to building Grumman Wildcats. Wildcats roughly equaled Hurricane performance and we’re “The best Allied carrier fighter of the early war.” according to RN FAA test-pilot Eric “Winkle” Brown.
CCF-built Wildcats soon become the most numerous airplanes in RN aircraft carriers.
To train RN and RCNVR FAA pilots, the RCN adapts an old Great Lakes hull carrier ship, which only sails the Great Lakes. RCN pilots soon start to cheat by landing diagonally on her huge deck, inventing angled decks a few years before the RN.
Meanwhile, CCF lands a contract to build sub-components for TBM Avengers.
Then CCF lands another sub-contract to build sub-components for F6F Hellcats so that Grummans dominate British flight decks by late war.

Before Pearl Harbor, CCF and Grumman (Bethpage on Long Island, NY) struggle to maintain the illusion of American neutrality. For example, the US Navy “loses” a lot of airplanes that “ditched” in the Great Lakes during “training missions.” Meanwhile, the RCAF posts dozens of painters too obscure RCAF stations in Northern Ontario. Those few technicians produce record numbers of “freshly-overhauled” Grummans.
Large numbers of C-47s cross the border during “navigation exercises,” but as the size and complexity of components increase, CCF remembers the shot-welding tools that they bought from Budd USA. Since both companies were originally in the business of building rolling stock for railroads, during the late 1930s CCF considered building stainless-steel rail cars. Those tools end up being used to build Budd Conestoga cargo planes. Sure Conestoga Mark I proved problematic, but Canadians soon develop enough “fixes” (e.g. exhaust pipes) that Conestoga Mark III prove reliable.
Conestoga cargo ramps prove especially valuable when delivering light vehicles and anti-tank guns to bridgeheads in Sicily, France, Holland and Germany.

 

[Apophenia]

I like your idea of CanCar building Wildcats (and, especially, Marlets for the FAA) but, to be a spoilsport, it must be remembered that Fort William never actually 'built' Goblins. Those GE-23s were all assembled from US-made 'leftovers' - FF-1 fuselages from Grumman and wing panels from Brewster (not sure about their tailplanes).

 

[riggerrob]

I like your idea of CanCar building Wildcats (and, especially, Marlets for the FAA) but, to be a spoilsport, it must be remembered that Fort William never actually 'built' Goblins. Those GE-23s were all assembled from US-made 'leftovers' - FF-1 fuselages from Grumman and wing panels from Brewster (not sure about their tailplanes.

Granted, but CCF was learning the process of airplane-building from scratch and bolting together components made by Grumman was a good way to start the learning process.

 

[riggerrob]

Continuing with the RCAF ‘46 alternate time line, Michael Gregor is humbled by the RCAF’s refusal to but FDB-1 biplanes.
To keep him busy, CCF assigns Gregor to work on improvements to CCF-built Grumman Wildcats/Martlets.
Gregor’s first project is to install a 20mm motor cannon firing through the prop hub.

 

[tomo pauk]

Continuing with the RCAF ‘46 alternate time line, Michael Gregor is humbled by the RCAF’s refusal to but FDB-1 biplanes.
To keep him busy, CCF assigns Gregor to work on improvements to CCF-built Grumman Wildcats/Martlets.
Gregor’s first project is to install a 20mm motor cannon firing through the prop hub.

On a radial engine?

 

[BlackBat242]

I also would have opted for improved F-15E's over that of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet as an F-111 replacement. As readily proven by the evolution of the F-15I, F-15K, this fighter-bomber has not just remained relevant, but also in high demand.

Regards
Pioneer

And therefore given up having any Australian combat ECM aircraft.

Or did you forget that 12 of the 36 RAAF Super Hornets (1/3) are the EA-18G Growler (the other 24 are 2-seat -Fs)?

As there is no comparable F-15 version, the RAAF would have to either forgo the capability or still buy 12 EA-18Gs - thus adding another type - with its separate maintenance, training, and supply pipelines.



However, if the USAF did what I think they SHOULD have done - and replaced their EF-111A Ravens with an EF-15E (EF-15F?), then the RAAF could buy 24 F-15Es and 12 EF-15s.


Of course, going further back I'd have the RAAF create Canberra Mk.22 ECM aircraft in the late 1960s (using the EW systems of the EA-6A with some added EA-6B systems), with a 3-man crew (pilot, 2x EW operators).

There would still be enough airframes in decent condition (a dozen would be enough) because the Australian government would have followed the RAAF's choice and bought 24 A-5D Vigilantes (A-5Bs with a permanent fuel tank in the tunnel and conformal belly bomb stations) in 1963 instead of F-111s (and 6 RA-5Cs).

The A-5Bs would have been in service by 1965 or 66 (instead of 1973), and if necessary they could be replaced by the greatly improved F-111F (produced from 1971-Sept. 1976).

My preference would be for 30 F-111Js (F-111Fs with the FB-111 wing and stronger undercarriage) and 6 RF-111Js. They would be tacked onto the end of the USAF production run, thus being delivered in 1977-79, giving the Viggies a 12+ year service run.

By the time the USAF finished its EF-111A conversion program at the end of 1985 (first deliveries were in Nov. 1981) the RAAF would have ordered 8 Ravens to replace the Canberra jammers.

If the Canberra ECMs couldn't last that long, then we might see the EA-5C from the late 1970s:

 

[GTX]

If the Canberra ECMs couldn't last that long, then we might see the EA-5C from the late 1970s:

View attachment 713916

That was a fictional one I sketched up over a decade ago.

 

[Pioneer]

And therefore given up having any Australian combat ECM aircraft.

Or did you forget that 12 of the 36 RAAF Super Hornets (1/3) are the EA-18G Growler (the other 24 are 2-seat -Fs)?

As there is no comparable F-15 version, the RAAF would have to either forgo the capability or still buy 12 EA-18Gs - thus adding another type - with its separate maintenance, training, and supply pipelines.



However, if the USAF did what I think they SHOULD have done - and replaced their EF-111A Ravens with an EF-15E (EF-15F?), then the RAAF could buy 24 F-15Es and 12 EF-15s.


Of course, going further back I'd have the RAAF create Canberra Mk.22 ECM aircraft in the late 1960s (using the EW systems of the EA-6A with some added EA-6B systems), with a 3-man crew (pilot, 2x EW operators).

There would still be enough airframes in decent condition (a dozen would be enough) because the Australian government would have followed the RAAF's choice and bought 24 A-5D Vigilantes (A-5Bs with a permanent fuel tank in the tunnel and conformal belly bomb stations) in 1963 instead of F-111s (and 6 RA-5Cs).

The A-5Bs would have been in service by 1965 or 66 (instead of 1973), and if necessary they could be replaced by the greatly improved F-111F (produced from 1971-Sept. 1976).

My preference would be for 30 F-111Js (F-111Fs with the FB-111 wing and stronger undercarriage) and 6 RF-111Js. They would be tacked onto the end of the USAF production run, thus being delivered in 1977-79, giving the Viggies a 12+ year service run.

By the time the USAF finished its EF-111A conversion program at the end of 1985 (first deliveries were in Nov. 1981) the RAAF would have ordered 8 Ravens to replace the Canberra jammers.

If the Canberra ECMs couldn't last that long, then we might see the EA-5C from the late 1970s:

View attachment 713916

In truth, up until the purchase of the EF-18G purchase, the ADF/RAAF had systematically neglected ECM/EW - period.

I for one would have favoured the A-5B purchase over that of the immature TFX/F-111C - especially under the proviso of Menzies politically orchestrated 'that such a strike capability was supposedly needed immediately!'
Sadly, even with the purchase of the A-5B's, as much as the ADF/RAAF would have gained a decent reconn capability in the form of the RA-5B, the institutional neglect of ECM/EW cspability would undoubtedly persisted.

I do fully agree and support your notion of the RAAF A-5B's 'being replaced by greatly improved F-111F', as the F-111F was a mature design that had been formulated through operational service and experience of the F-111A, F-111D and F-111E. To say nothing of the precision and stand-off weapons the F-111F was designed and built to operate with...

Regards
Pioneer

 

[BlackBat242]

I do fully agree and support your notion of the RAAF A-5B's 'being replaced by greatly improved F-111F', as the F-111F was a mature design that had been formulated through operational service and experience of the F-111A, F-111D and F-111E. To say nothing of the precision and stand-off weapons the F-111F was designed and built to operate with...

Regards
Pioneer

As well as the ~25% more-powerful TF30-P-100 engines ( 15,000 lb thrust dry, 25,100 lb afterburning).

The F-111A/C models started with the TF30-P-3 (10,750 / 18,500 lb) then the -D/E models went to the TF-30-P-9 (12,000 lb / 19,600 lb ).
The FB-111A had the TF30-P-7 (12,500 lb / 20,350 lb) and the EF-111A got the TF30-P-109 (12,000 lb / 20,840 lb).

By 1985 the F-111F got the TF30-P-111 (17,895 lb / 25,111 lb).

 

[riggerrob]

The first CC-295 Kingfisher arrived at CFB Comox in September 2022, but they are still not fully operational.
Kingfishers are supposed to replace CC-115 Buffalos in the medium-range search and rescue role. The last RCAF Buffalo retired recently.
The gap is currently being filled by C-130 Hercules. Herks are good long-range SAR airplanes, but they are too big to make tight turns in the narrow mountain valleys that dominate Canada’s Wet … er … West Coast.

When I visited CFB Comox (July 2023) a Herc circled overhead during a search exercise, then about lunch time, ten CSAR Techs jumped out, deployed their parachutes and landed in the middle of Comox airport.

Para-dropping Canadian Search and Rescue Technicians - from Kingfishers - is proving challenging. The first problem is finding places to stow all of the specialized SAR equipment like cell phone receivers. Secondly, balancing the airplane with all of the equipment: medical equipment, parachutes, diving gear, etc. A third problem is that the Kingfisher cabin is too low for heavily-loaded CSAR techs to stand upright as they waddle towards the door.
If you have ever jumped with a heavy rucksack or tandem student strapped to your belly, then you understand the importance of straightening your spine when carrying heavy loads.
A fourth problem is airflow around the rear ramp. The first time they tossed out an anthropomorphic dummy, it hit the horizontal tail! Tail-strikes are exceeding rare - bordering on “never heard of” on the other tail ramp aircraft that I have jumped from: CH-47 Chinook, C-130 Hercules, DHC-4 Cariboo, DHC-5 Buffalo and Shorts Skyvan.
To date they have not dropped a human out the back of a Kingfisher.

 

[Apophenia]

... A third problem is that the Kingfisher cabin is too low for heavily-loaded CSAR techs to stand upright as they waddle towards the door...

Wow! This all sounds exceedingly grim Rob! I thought that a stand-up cabin and a 'jumpable' rear ramp were the non-negotiables of the FWSAR Project?

Mind you, NDHQ has only been working on FWSAR for a little over 20 years now. I suppose it would be unrealistic to expect them to work any faster