US AWACS recapitalization for the 21st century

Scott Kenny said:
I really want an itemized list of what all the USAF required on their E-7s that the Aussies and NATO didn't.
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Doubt that’s ever public, but I suspect most of it is various communications formats not used by other countries.
 
MUOS SATCOM, defensive aids and 'cybersecurity hardening' were the public statements. The latter was reportedly the big cost item.
 
USAF-spec wiring harness - the same thing that raised cost & caused delays in the KC-46, and would have done the same to the KC-45 if it had been proceeded with.

And probably a lot of other USAF-spec stuff that functions pretty much like what is in the RAAF etc version, but is "OUR STANDARD, NOT THEIRS".
 
Scott Kenny said:
I really want an itemized list of what all the USAF required on their E-7s that the Aussies and NATO didn't.
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The USAF configuration builds on the UK configuration that modernized several aspects of the E-7 over and above what was exported to Australia, South Korea and Turkey originally. US has requirements for GPS/PNT, SATCOM (M-CODE and SATCOM mandates), OMS computing architecture (new mission computers), USAF specific software and cybersecurity compliance with US standards. Basic things that the US would expect a platform being delivered in 2028 to have especially with ABMS and CJADC2 capabilities in mind.

One can bet that on top of these, the USAF probably had some requirements for ensuring that the passive detection and self-protection suite onboard was up to modern standards. The entire scope of the HW and SW enhancements will probably never be disclosed because there's no need for it but suffice to say it would logically upgrade things to bring them to the mid 2020s standards and make it easier for the USAF to upgrade and enhance the platform once fielded (open mission system computing architectures etc). NATO will probably utilize several of these USAF enhancements as they will probably become standard offerings moving forward.
 

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JetBrain said:
www.airandspaceforces.com

Senate $852B Defense Budget Saves E-7, Keeps Space Force Flat

Senators advanced a $852 billion defense spending bill for 2026 that would give the Air Force nearly $5 billion more than it sought.
www.airandspaceforces.com www.airandspaceforces.com
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The bill also rounds out congressional support for the Air Force’s pursuit of the E-7 early-warning jet, which the Pentagon wants to ditch in favor of using Navy E-2D Hawkeye planes and satellites to track airborne threats instead. Senators are offering $847 million to continue that prototyping effort—a precursor to buying a 26-piece fleet to replace the Wedgetail’s decades-old predecessor.

Lawmakers and some military aviation experts have expressed skepticism that adding five Hawkeyes as a stopgap measure before surveillance satellites are ready to take on the Wedgetail’s mission would be enough to satisfy demand for its help.

“I can’t explain why the department wanted to wait on Navy fighters or Air Force early-warning programs … but we identified these issues and addressed them appropriately,” said Sen. Chris Coons, the top Democrat on the defense appropriations panel.
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Grey Havoc said:

Proposed E-7 Cut Reflects Budget Limit, Not Capability: USAF Official | Aviation Week Network

The “tough decision” to cut the U.S. Air Force’s planned E-7A Wedgetail fleet was simply a balancing act for funding, Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin says.
aviationweek.com aviationweek.com
(Subscription or registration may be required)
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This is a fairly standard tactic -- get down to your OMB-imposed budget topline by cutting the stuff you know Congress likes and will reinstate with plus-up.

The Navy keeps trying the same thing with the SCN budget, but hasn't quite realized that Congress doesn't have enough members who care about shipbuilding.
 
bring_it_on said:
Basic things that the US would expect a platform being delivered in 2028 to have especially with ABMS and CJADC2 capabilities in mind.
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But by pushing for those things they've now lost the entire capability, possibly to be replaced by the E-2D that also lacks them.

Perfect really is the enemy of adequate.

Yes it would have been more expensive long-term to introduce the E-7 in capability tranches, starting from what's available now ( though even that would have been leagues ahead of the E-3 ). But instead they've now got nothing except the E-3.
 
Kiltonge said:
But by pushing for those things they've now lost the entire capability, possibly to be replaced by the E-2D that also lacks them.
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They lost it because the OSD initiated a 8% 'cut' / 'redirection' of funds for each service and used its own analysis to basically nuke funding for the program and use that money elsewhere in the out years. From the looks of it, the decision to cancel the E-7 was not based on an Air Force led analysis, with the CSAF even going to great lengths to explain that he himself was not part of the analysis. The NRE portion of the contract (less the two test aircraft), was about $50 million a pop so its not like the entire 24 aircraft would have been preserved had the program cost $50 Million less per unit.

There was no magical 737 AEWC production line active churning out aircraft when the AF decided on its plans. The UK order led to a production re-start, and industry takes time to hire up, and get the supply chain back online. Not to mention identify suppliers and/or parts that need to be recertified or obsolescence mitigation measures etc. And then there was the pandemic related challenges. IN short, even if the AF had gone in for just half of the things it wanted we would still be in a place where Boeing would be producing the initial prototypes..given they still have not completed delivery on the UK order. The E-2D option was just a mitigation measure..by the looks of it, it wasn't even a direct replacement..but merely one order year worth of E-2Ds. Which is why there was a huge uproar after the decision. Congress has stepped in with both the HASC and SASC interested in restoring E-7s and funding FY26 at higher than requested level.
 
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snne said:
Turkey is looking to modernize its E-7T fleet using indigenous efforts.
https://twitter.com/x/status/1796201429939405246
View: https://x.com/T_Nblty/status/1796201429939405246?t=EzXqpHYOlkPvHgV7wbAVTA&s=19
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It went relatively under the radar after the IDEF 2025 fair, but Turkey is now indigenously replacing the consoles and modernizing the sensors (including the radar) of its E-7T aircraft.

13-004-turk-hava-kuvvetleri-turkish-air-force-boeing-e-7t-peace-eagle-737-7eser_PlanespottersNet_1744895_a8c9188f42_o.jpg


This is viewed by many as a critical interim step toward developing a fully indigenous AEW&C platform by the early 2030s. Based on the experience gained from this modernization effort and the earlier integration work of Turkish companies during the production of the E-7Ts, I suspect that the eventual design could be also based on the 737 airframe and bear a strong resemblance to the current platform.
 
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snne said:
It went relatively under the radar after the IDEF 2025 fair, but the Turkey is now indigenously replacing the consoles and modernizing the sensors (including the radar) of its E-7T aircraft.

13-004-turk-hava-kuvvetleri-turkish-air-force-boeing-e-7t-peace-eagle-737-7eser_PlanespottersNet_1744895_a8c9188f42_o.jpg


This is viewed by many as a critical interim step toward developing a fully indigenous AEW&C platform by the early 2030s. Based on the experience gained from this modernization effort and the earlier integration work of Turkish companies during the production of the E-7Ts, I suspect that the eventual design could be also based on the 737 airframe and bear a strong resemblance to the current platform.
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Some software and hardware modernisation(s) have already been completed.
 
[...] a dangerous misconception in parts of the Department of Defense is now equating Airborne Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) data, snapshots of moving targets from radar-based systems like space-based satellites, with the orchestration of air battle management.

This fallacy threatens US air superiority, especially against near-peer adversary China, whose advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities demand more than passive surveillance. AMTI informs, but only human-led air battle management, supported by platforms like the Boeing E-7 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, directs fighters, deconflicts lethal effects, and secures the skies.
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breakingdefense.com

AMTI is not air battle management: Why the US needs the E-7 now - Breaking Defense

Grant Georgulis in this op-ed lays out why the E-7 program should not be cancelled, but rather developed alongside space-based AMTI.
breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com
 
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Forest Green said:
I understood that space-based AMTI would eventually give full coverage not just snapshots.
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That's really missing the point of the article, which is that even continuous AMTI is not battle-management. There's no point putting an AMTI feed of the full theatre on an F-47's display, the pilot doesn't know what's critical and what's not. You need the feed from the AEW feed to go to people who are dedicated to integrating that with what's happening on the surface and able to assign missions across the available assets, and that's not adequately being addressed by the space-based AMTI advocates.
 
www.flightglobal.com

NATO re-evaluating E-7 acquisition amid uncertain US plans

With the Pentagon publicly seeking to end the US Air Force's nascent E-7 procurement programme, NATO headquarters is now reconsidering its plans the field the Boeing airborne early warning and control platform.
www.flightglobal.com www.flightglobal.com

TLDR: It's not just that the US pulling out of their 26 aircraft purchase will put up prices for NATO's 14 aircraft purchase, but that the US is also one of the partner nations in the NATO AEW force, and what if they pull their people and funding.
 
DWG said:
You need the feed from the AEW feed to go to people who are dedicated to integrating that with what's happening on the surface and able to assign missions across the available assets, and that's not adequately being addressed by the space-based AMTI advocates.
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It's already being done by the USAF, there is no reason the people need to be airborne to accomplish that task. All that is required is a feed, whether space based or airborne sensor, and sufficient comms to allow the respective airborne assets and ground based units such as the 728th to communicate.

When an E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft failed to launch during a key mission during a recent exercise, it could have meant the loss of real-time command and control for a multinational force conducting complex air operations.

Instead, the 728th Battle Management Control Squadron stepped in.

The unit, based out of Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, was participating in a Red Flag exercise, which is designed to give flying, command and control, maintenance and other support units valuable experience in realistic air-to-air combat scenarios.

However, for two days during the combat training event, the E-3 was unable to make it off of the ground. The 728th BMCS assumed full responsibility for the Air Battle Management mission, providing control and coordination for the entire Battle Management Area.

“For every mission in Red Flag we had two C2 agencies going,” said Maj. Walter Oliver, the 461st Air Control Wing deputy director of plans and programs and the 728th BMCS detachment commander for the exercise. “On two of those days, the E-3 was not able to get up in the air or take off for some reason. So the 728th covered down for the entire BMA … checking in aircraft, routing them to their hold points, and controlling the mission from start to finish.”
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Ozair said:
It's already being done by the USAF, there is no reason the people need to be airborne to accomplish that task. All that is required is a feed, whether space based or airborne sensor, and sufficient comms to allow the respective airborne assets and ground based units such as the 728th to communicate.
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No, they don't need to be airborne, but they do need to be deployable. Imagine trying to run the Desert Storm air campaign from the States.
 
Forest Green said:
Getting the correct number of assets up there is the only issue I know of.
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Fusing data from multiple satellites and sending it to C2 and tactical units is no minor affair. Even more so if it might be out of date/have time gaps, which one might expect with an incomplete system or a system under attack.
 
Josh_TN said:
Fusing data from multiple satellites and sending it to C2 and tactical units is no minor affair. Even more so if it might be out of date/have time gaps, which one might expect with an incomplete system or a system under attack.
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You would build redundancy into the system and how would it be any different to an AEW being jammed or even blown out of the sky by an LRAAM fired from a stealth aircraft, which it's trying to see the frontal RCS of? How do you manage a battlespace when you've been blown up? Then there's also the refuelling requirements for the AEWs, which puts the tanker in danger too. What's more deployable than permanently deployed?
 
DWG said:
No, they don't need to be airborne, but they do need to be deployable. Imagine trying to run the Desert Storm air campaign from the States.
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Other than enjoying the comfort of their own office chair I'm not sure what wouldn't be deployable about what the 728th does?

For Desert Storm as long as the sensor data and secure communications were available there is no reason that ABM for a conflict that size couldn't be run remotely today. The USAF have been flying remote assets communicating with forward deployed aircraft and ground units from the other side of the world for 20 years and are operating ABM remotely today. Ground based ABM has been deployed for years and was the primary method of airspace control over Afghanistan and Iraq.
 
Latency can also be a generic issue for some decisions today and might be a serious issue in an environment where we just don’t know what kind of capabilities a peer might bring in the EM spectrum but I a am skeptical, despite all the claims of resiliency and robustness, that the comms network needed to support the DoDs space based AMTI vision, won’t be seriously degraded. The value of hardened, LOS and LPI/J comms between platforms including especially a battle manager appears immense in my view. Is Wedgetail survival in the Pacific? Perhaps in some corners, but there six other continents to worry about. And besides, how does one design a survivable platform that can do what Wedgetail does? If you squint your eyes, perhaps CLAS allows a new shape of LO platform that can cruise at 50k w a B-2 like signature. But what happens when you begin emitting - could the technologies that define LPI for fire control radars be applied to the AESA AWACS (btw I know this term is outdated, what is the preferred nomenclature?) mission? Do people need to be on it?
 
Ozair said:
For Desert Storm as long as the sensor data and secure communications were available there is no reason that ABM for a conflict that size couldn't be run remotely today.
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Could it be done? Yes, probably. Could it be done optimally? No. There's no substitute for being in the same time-zone as the people you're working with. If you're trying to coordinate Georgia with Taiwan you're 12 hours out, you have to make a mental translation for everything you're assuming is going on. Same time zone, no issue.
 
DWG said:
Could it be done? Yes, probably. Could it be done optimally? No. There's no substitute for being in the same time-zone as the people you're working with. If you're trying to coordinate Georgia with Taiwan you're 12 hours out, you have to make a mental translation for everything you're assuming is going on. Same time zone, no issue.
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Disagree, this isn't a new issue and the US has been doing this for a while now.

www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1976249/command-and-control-of-afcent-from-shaw-not-caoc
 
Forest Green said:
You would build redundancy into the system and how would it be any different to an AEW being jammed or even blown out of the sky by an LRAAM fired from a stealth aircraft, which it's trying to see the frontal RCS of? How do you manage a battlespace when you've been blown up? Then there's also the refuelling requirements for the AEWs, which puts the tanker in danger too. What's more deployable than permanently deployed?
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I agree AEW has vulnerabilities; I was merely contesting your contention that it was just a question of orbiting enough satellites. Actually forming a complete air realtime air picture and having that disseminated to control nodes is no minor feat.
 
As for E-7, not every deployment is against a peer competitor in wartime. In fact none of them are since 1945. There are plenty of uses for AWACs short of war with China, probably the only opponent that could seriously threaten them. Even Russia would be rather hard pressed. And there are plenty of peacetime uses for E-7 as well.
 
Ozair said:
Disagree, this isn't a new issue and the US has been doing this for a while now.

www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1976249/command-and-control-of-afcent-from-shaw-not-caoc
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Like I said, "Could it be done? Yes, probably. Could it be done optimally? No." Note in your example that they're not proposing to shut down the CAOC at Al Udeid, they're simply demonstrating that they can run ops from Shaw for a few hours if they need to. Running it on an extended basis would be more of an issue.
 
Training_Dummy said:
Latency can also be a generic issue for some decisions today and might be a serious issue in an environment where we just don’t know what kind of capabilities a peer might bring in the EM spectrum but I a am skeptical, despite all the claims of resiliency and robustness, that the comms network needed to support the DoDs space based AMTI vision, won’t be seriously degraded.
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So I got curious and ran a quick search / shitty napkin math by going through SDA's own documents on the latency required for a satellite network and accounting for some integration between various sensors and what not. My math is probably wrong all over the place, but ..

Assuming a situation where we have AMTI satellites doing the sensing, doing the integration, then sending it down to AWACS or 6th gen fighters. I considered two scenarios - in unpermitting weather, all links going down to earth (or aircraft) are done in RF while communications between satellites remain using optical. The second scenario is in permitting weather where a reasonable number of downlinks to aircraft can use laser / optical datalinks.
Scenario 1 (non permissive weather, only rf used):
  1. Space only segment, where sensor sats use optical hops to communicate to fusion nodes, fuse the data, then send it over to whichever satellite is responsible for downlinking (all numbers are for the round trip time of 1 packet):
    • Hops: for N hops, roughly 2 * N * (13 to 33 ms). Assuming 5 hops, then you get 130-330 ms
    • Fusion algorithms: 10 - 200 ms
    • Total: 140 - 530 ms
  2. RF Downlink to AWACS / Fighters:
    • Total: 160 - 600 ms
Scenario 2 ( permissive weather, a reasonable number of downlinks are laser datalinks):
  1. Space only segment remains the same
  2. Optical Downlink first to ground then to fighters via Link-16:
    • 150 - 400 ms
  3. Optical Downlink directly to aircraft (HALE nodes):
    • 40ish ms
And that worst case doesn't account for jamming, EW and dazzling. I don't think China or the US intends on using anti-satellite weapons to a large extent either. So with sustained regional denial + best case denial mitigation strategies, you're still looking at outages of seconds to tens of seconds + severely degraded RTT times going into 1k ms. I have no concept of how workable delays of 1k + is for front line fighters needing SA. I think it should still be usable for SA but it'll preclude standoff targeting ability though and you'll have to have a stand in system in order to actually do targeting.
Training_Dummy said:
LPI for fire control radars be applied to the AESA AWACS (btw I know this term is outdated, what is the preferred nomenclature?)
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AESA already implies certain LPI features though.
Training_Dummy said:
Do people need to be on it?
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Depends. I'm increasingly starting to think that the true vulnerability isn't E-7 or satellite but rather having sufficiently attritable flying communication nodes.

From my very limited understanding, if you have a large fleet of high endurance and fairly replaceable UAVs (ideally HALE too so that downlinks go straight to aircraft that remain above most of the weather that precludes optical downlink usage) whose entire job is to be redundant relay links, that enables unmanned AWACS as well as more resilient space based AMTI as options as that way you have more network resilience and availability.
 

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