Mobilization of civilian ships, aircraft, and infrastructure beyond year 1 of a WWIII scenario

Not James Stockdale

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The basic scenario here is full-scale mobilization of war economies in a modern context over a period of 3+ years. The mobilization could start on Day 1 of a large, global war (the US and NATO vs Russia and China, for example) or continue through intermittent periods of high-intensity conflict. The first years of WWII probably demonstrate that those are not mutually exclusive. In terms of scale, the participating countries might be increasing defense spending to something on the order of 10-20% of GDP, so up to a 10x increase. There is no way all of that money can actually be spent within the existing military-industrial complexes, so a significant proportion of that money would have to go elsewhere in the economy.

My assumptions are that existing stockpiles and peacetime production rates of equipment will have to suffice for the first year, and that exquisite military equipment like large surface combatants or fighter jets would from new orders or new factories and shipyards would not be available any earlier than 3 - 5 years after mobilization begins. That interim period of months 12 - 36 is what I am looking at. Clear requirements will exist for more equipment as a result of expansion of forces and operational losses, but they cannot be replaced much above nominally peacetime rates (no more than advancing from 1 to 3 shifts per day at a factory, for example).

Therefore, how could civilian ships, aircraft, or land vehicles (either existing or in production) or the infrastructure to build these be repurposed in a mobilization scenario? This goes beyond the use of these vehicles for their design purpose in support of the military (civilian cargo aircraft or ships carrying military cargo), but to conversions of existing aircraft, ships, and vehicles and the production of equipment for military use by factories used to produce civilian equipment.

My first thoughts were about civilian aircraft. The USAF has about 55 KC-10s at Davis-Monthan, with roughly a dozen of those going to Omega ARS. A full-scale mobilization might see about 50 of those airframes returned to service, with parts support in the form of FedEx's 70 stored MD-10 airframes. These aircraft might be mobilized in Months 6 - 12, but a global conflict scenario would require more large airframes. There are roughly 60 MD-11s still in active service (at least up until the Nov 2025 crash) with FedEx, UPS, and Western Global. Although they do have different cockpits (KC-10s still have analog cockpits while MD-10s and MD-11s have glass cockpits), if those were taken up for military use and converted to tankers they could replace or supplement the KC-10 fleet while potentially relying on similar supply chains and a similar fleet of stored airframes used for spares.

This could also apply to large numbers of other widebody aircraft. There are roughly 300 to 400 777-200ERs still active or in storage, but the three engine types all include roughly 100 to 150 frames each. The holy grail of US heavy tanker conversion options are 350 ton 777-300ERs, 777-200LRs, and 777Fs. The 777F/777-200LR fleet is relatively small and might be better used in their current freighter role, while the potential impacts of a global conflict could have on the Gulf carriers could make a large number of 777-300ERs available for tanker conversions.

There are also about 400 A330-200s globally that could be converted to MRTTs, with more than half of them powered by Rolls-Royce Trent 700s, but that fleet is highly fragmented all over the world. There are a huge number of 767s in service as freighters in the US, but the KC-46 has a specific configuration that gives it better weights for tanker use. It would be possible to convert 767-300Fs to tankers, but they wouldn't have the same capacity as a KC-46 and that would remove their capacity from the civilian freighter fleet. There are also a lot of 747-400s in cargo service around the world, but the US-registered ones are used by airlines like Atlas Air, UPS, Western Global, and Kalitta that would have significant roles in moving military cargo.

Beyond tankers, airliner airframes are used by militaries for roles like AWACS, ELINT and EW, C2, and MPRAs. These are used in much smaller numbers than tankers, and conversion timelines would rely much more heavily on the production of new electronics. For example, I wouldn't see any reason to suddenly move radars from E-3Gs to 767 airframes during wartime, even though it might be technically feasible. The timeline for Wedgetail conversion from existing airframes has been very slow. The 767-400ER subfleets at United and Delta might be a good target if there is a need for the extra floor space (all US-based and US-registered) for something like the E-10, but the United and Delta 767-300s with PW4000 series engines might have better commonality with the current KC-46 fleet. MPRAs could be built with converted 737-800 or A321 airframes in the US or Europe, but the main bottleneck would probably be sensors and combat systems rather than airframes.

For civilian merchant ships, I would expect most involvement in military use would be carrying the same kind of cargo they do in peacetime (containers, vehicles, petroleum products, etc.). There are ships currently used by the US Navy or US government that were converted from civilian hulls into vehicle transports, ABM radar ships, hospital ships, and crane ships. I would expect yards like NASSCO to maximize production of new fleet oilers, but any requirements for additional hulls for underway replenishment would have to come from conversions. Civilian tankers and bulk carriers are not capable of 20+ knot speeds for use as fleet oilers or replenishment ships, but it might be possible to refit container ships as replenishment ships like the Canadian MV Asterix. Davie took a little over two years to execute the conversion, so I don't think 12 - 18 months would be unreasonable for a wartime project. One of the main constraints would probably be drydock space and shiprepair capacity during wartime, so this might be a better project for countries in Europe or Asia with more civilian capacity than the US.

A lot of the Offshore fleet (PSVs, AHTs) is very adaptable by design, so it would probably be relatively straightforward to convert these ships to all sorts of roles as fleet tugs, salvage and repair ships, tenders for combatants or USVs/UUVs, survey ships, etc. Military Sealift Command currently uses chartered offshore support vessels in its Submarine and Special Warfare Support Program. In the Month 12 - 36 timeframe, I think the more interesting angle is the use of the shipyards that build these ships, because shifting to MUSV/LUSV production seems very likely. My question here would be whether it would be better (faster) to build a standardized hull form (or a set of standard hulls) or try to design variants of hulls that these yards already produce. Most don't build very fast ships (12 - 15 kts is normal for an OSV). The other use of these small yards could be to build modules of larger ships for assembly elsewhere, like what Ingalls Pascagoula is already doing with some of their DDG and LPD production.

A significant number of LUSVs would require a significant number of missiles to arm them, although I think new factories for lower-cost missiles, most UAVs, small USVs, small UUVs, etc. could be built and in production within the 12 - 36 month window. Most small UxVs are shifting from becoming equipment to ammunition, so numerical requirements will probably skyrocket far beyond existing civilian capacity for all types. Beyond civilian UxV producers and existing military-focused production, the best place I see for expanding the industrial footprint of SUSV production is with civilian boat builders. Boat builders in the US produce roughly 200,000 boats under ~30 feet long per year, including aluminum hulls (the GARC is aluminum) and fiberglass (the Saronic Corsair is fiberglass). Even a tiny proportion of that production capacity could produce a huge number of USVs for military applications.

For ground forces, the main application is see is repurposing civilian truck production for militarized COTS trucks. There is essentially a spectrum from on-road trucks through off-road vocational trucks to actual military trucks, which are usually quite different, but modified COTS trucks could provide a substantial proportion of the capability of a real military truck with less cost and disruption to production. This could go from heavy trucks all the way down to pickup trucks for use a light, unprotected mobility vehicles with upgraded suspensions. Most civilian car production is too heavily automated and optimized to easily shift to production of militarized truck, although the supply chains would probably be more important than having a factory already standing. Looking even smaller, large UGVs might be able to repurpose components already used in small civilian cars like engines (especially small diesel engines that are more common in Europe) and suspensions.
 
How many civilian ships are ultimately owned by US, NATO and other US Allied country companies, or would transfer their flag of convenience to US, NATO and other US Allied countries in time of war? I also wonder how many ships could be seized in time of war, with their owners being powerless to stop it?
 
I must apologize in advance for my skepticism, but, after thirty years of creating credible scenarios for World War III, I have finally abandoned my efforts for a powerful reason: the absence of credible villains.

At present, considering what remains of the Soviet empire and China's military credibility to be potential enemies of the West is something that does not fit with my data.

Obviously, everyone can see it, but it cannot be said that the king is naked.
 
While there is no villain capable of or even desiring world domination the recent fracas in Iran (and even that ship that got stuck in the Suez canal) has shown how disruptive a war can be on non-participants. If the region had a wider global significance the impacts could be global and devastating. For example if China lashed out inside the 1st island chain the economies of Australia, Japan and South Korea would take massive hits and would require WW3 style mobilisation on their/our part to deal with it even if we/they were not combatants.
 
I must apologize in advance for my skepticism, but, after thirty years of creating credible scenarios for World War III, I have finally abandoned my efforts for a powerful reason: the absence of credible villains.

At present, considering what remains of the Soviet empire and China's military credibility to be potential enemies of the West is something that does not fit with my data.

Obviously, everyone can see it, but it cannot be said that the king is naked.
I agree that there is no realistic WWIII scenario today. If I wanted to talk about that, I would he over at AH.com. I mentioned US and NATO vs Russia and China because I wanted to include Europe and its defense industrial base in any discussion.

A conflict with China on one side and the US and its East Asian allies on the other would be essentially balanced in terms of PPP GDP, and neither side would have the ability to execute the most surefire form of war termination - marching infantry into the enemy capital - so the conflict (not necessarily active fighting) could last for years. The Pacific was lasted for almost four years with a 2:1 US advantage in production (accounting for Germany First).
How many civilian ships are ultimately owned by US, NATO and other US Allied country companies, or would transfer their flag of convenience to US, NATO and other US Allied countries in time of war? I also wonder how many ships could be seized in time of war, with their owners being powerless to stop it?
The big European container lines (Maersk, CMA CGM, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd) by themselves own or operate somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 ships. MSC alone is 20% of the global container fleet. Huge numbers of flag of convenience ships are owned by German or Greek shipowners, so the flagged and/or owned number is probably on the order of 5,000 container ships. Adding East Asian ships probably gives a few thousand more.

If the scenario is more along the lines of US vs China, then seized hulls might play a larger role on the US side. Chinese-owned ships sailing under puppet flags like Hong Kong would be fair game, and ships registered with flags of convenience like Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands probably wouldn't have any protection against US seizure. However, I think commercial purchases of European-owned ships, possibly with conversion work done in European yards, would still make up a larger proportion of a mobilization fleet than seizures. Market prices for a lot of container ships at the smaller sizes that would be useful for military conversions are on the order of $10 to $50 million, so small compared to the money that would probably be spent converting them for military use.
 
A broken backed global war between the West (Europe Australia Canada Japan S Korea) and Russia with or without China might resemble a hotter version of the 1950 to 1990 Cold War with brushfire wars flaring up anywhere. As I write this the role of a weakened US is less clear than at any time since 1975.
Large scale combat involving fleet or divisional action is the least likely scenario. Cyber war or proxy forces like sleeper agents or little green men has already begun.
 
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