British Anti-Ship Missiles

How would the Politburo react when WW3 in the late 60s the non-nuclear phase starts to drag into week 3 and the Red Navy is sitting in bastions doing nothing, the Red Army and Air Force are suffering severe attrition on the central front and NATO navies go on the offensive as they aren't busy protecting convoys?
I should also point out, that:

* Western advantage in electronic & high-tech weaponry wasn't exactly prominent in late 1960s. In Vietnam, USAF have a lot of troubles with basic S-75 "Dvina" - which, by USSR point of view, was already obsolete system, cleared for export exactly because it was mostly replaced by more capable S-75M "Volkhov" & S-125 "Neva";

* NATO military doctrine relied much heavier on tactical nuclear weapon, than Soviet one. USSR did not have as much tactical nukes as NATO before later 1960s, so Soviet doctrine relied more on conventional forces (like heavy tanks and rocket artillery). In case of non-nuclear conflict, USSR would not face as much troues as NATO would;

* Warsaw Pact have numbers. Both Soviet forward-deployed forces and Warsaw Pact allies have at least parity with NATO. But USSR have a massive second echelon (combat-ready troops on Soviet territory) and was fully prepared to move it forward immediately - while quickly preparing third and fourth for deployment. In non-nuclear scenario, NATO sinply did not have efficient way to impede Soviet logistic; USAF didn't even have any guided weapons in number besides Bullpup! And Vietnam clearly demonstrated, how its hard to impede logistic, using only dumb bombs;

* The 1960s Soviet naval strategy wasn't centered around "defending the bastions", the general idea was to hunt enemy boomers in North Atlantic and Med (since at this time SLBM range was still rather limited), and secure Soviet control over Baltic, Eastern Mediterranian and North. Hampering NATO logistic with submarine actions & maritime aviation strikes was also viewed as important;
 
FFS Tom Clancy was publishing that in the 1980s.
? The only non fiction Clancy book I know of is a biography of a us general (comander 7th corps during desert storm) , and even then why would anyone look at him as a sorse? Actual historians have been getting this wrong for decades by this point how would Clancy know anybeter?
 
I find the use of the haha-emoticon here lazy, disrespectful and most unhelpful.
 

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And Vietnam clearly demonstrated, how its hard to impede logistic, using only dumb bombs;

Yet in WW2 the Western allies did it masterfully from 1942, a situation far closer to what a Soviet advance into western Europe would look like than Vietnam.
 
Yet in WW2 the Western allies did it masterfully from 1942, a situation far closer to what a Soviet advance into western Europe would look like than Vietnam.
With all respect, but WW2 experience is not relevant for the situation 20+ years later, against the opponent that was much more industrially and technologically capable than Germany could even dream to be. Especially in such short timeframe as three weeks.
 
With all respect, but WW2 experience is not relevant for the situation 20+ years later, against the opponent that was much more industrially and technologically capable than Germany could even dream to be. Especially in such short timeframe as three weeks.

On the contrary, it is far more relevant than Vietnam. Like Germany in WW2 NATO and the Soviet were peer competitors more or less on par with each other and moving mass armies out in the open, in contrast Vietnam which was akin to a giant smuggling operation.

In any case while the end of the Cold War did provide access to Soviet plans and tactics, I believe Yugoslavia and East Germany were historical gold mines in this regard, I think the Soviet would act and react to the situation as they found it. Blanket statements about the Soviets going nuclear at the outset of any invasion of the west, or the Soviet Navy guarding bastions, or not and doing something else, likely have some truth but also would have to react to the enemy. It's not insightful to say NATO wasted it's time reacting to Soviet naval capabilities because they weren't going to use them as NATO thought they might. Such capabilities existed, NATO assessed how they were most dangerous and reacted to that, not plans on paper that they didn't have access to.
 
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