Dilandu
I'm dissatisfied, which means, I exist.
I should also point out, that:How would the Politburo react when WW3 in the late 60s the non-nuclear phase starts to drag into week 3 and the Red Navy is sitting in bastions doing nothing, the Red Army and Air Force are suffering severe attrition on the central front and NATO navies go on the offensive as they aren't busy protecting convoys?
* Western advantage in electronic & high-tech weaponry wasn't exactly prominent in late 1960s. In Vietnam, USAF have a lot of troubles with basic S-75 "Dvina" - which, by USSR point of view, was already obsolete system, cleared for export exactly because it was mostly replaced by more capable S-75M "Volkhov" & S-125 "Neva";
* NATO military doctrine relied much heavier on tactical nuclear weapon, than Soviet one. USSR did not have as much tactical nukes as NATO before later 1960s, so Soviet doctrine relied more on conventional forces (like heavy tanks and rocket artillery). In case of non-nuclear conflict, USSR would not face as much troues as NATO would;
* Warsaw Pact have numbers. Both Soviet forward-deployed forces and Warsaw Pact allies have at least parity with NATO. But USSR have a massive second echelon (combat-ready troops on Soviet territory) and was fully prepared to move it forward immediately - while quickly preparing third and fourth for deployment. In non-nuclear scenario, NATO sinply did not have efficient way to impede Soviet logistic; USAF didn't even have any guided weapons in number besides Bullpup! And Vietnam clearly demonstrated, how its hard to impede logistic, using only dumb bombs;
* The 1960s Soviet naval strategy wasn't centered around "defending the bastions", the general idea was to hunt enemy boomers in North Atlantic and Med (since at this time SLBM range was still rather limited), and secure Soviet control over Baltic, Eastern Mediterranian and North. Hampering NATO logistic with submarine actions & maritime aviation strikes was also viewed as important;