Postwar British Aircraft Carriers

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I am not sure where to put this thread as it is both a rant and a question.

Only three countries in the Cold War era built and operated CTOL aircraft carriers. Of these, The United States and France deployed carrier forces which still operate CTOL ships today.

The saga of the Royal Navy's CTOL carrier force from 1945 to 1979 is examined to destruction in various threads on this site. In essence it could not match the ships and aircraft available to its requirements in the numbers needed. Since 1980 the RN has not been a carrier navy. Its anti submarine/commando helicopter carriers have operated a token force of VSTOL jets.

Comparison with France is more instructive than the RN's own love affair with the USN. The very name CVA 01 revealed the RN's yearning for its own Forrestal CVA. France meanwhile had built and was deploying two modern ships which operated from the 60s throughout the Cold War.

Why did the Royal Navy have such a hard time with its carrier force? Reading the accounts in Grove and Friedman you soon become dazed by the changes in RN thinking about what they want carriers to do. In "general war" as a nuclear war with the Soviet Union was gentilely called the RN was not sure how long its carriers would survive and whether they would hunt submarines, kill Swerdlow class cruisers or launch raids on Murmansk?
Meanwhile the few carriers that managed to hobble into service were kept busy in "limited war" from Korea to Singapore, Aden to Suez.
Could it have been different? I think the problem started in 1946 when the RN had to adjust to a postwar world in which Britain was ruined financially but still responsible for an Empire and for sharing the task of countering Stalin's Soviet Union.
Sorting out the aircraft carrier building programme between the heavy and light carriers was not easy. On the one hand the smaller ships were easier to get into service and could cope with the peacetime workload. Heavier ships were expensive, required difficult materials and used up scarce resources in the shipbuilding industry. Getting the Maltas built would have required a crystal ball.

The 1950s allowed the RN to run on its obsolescent ships as there was no serious naval threat. Sea Venoms, Scimitars and Wyverns faced no opposition from Migs at Port Said. Eagle's Sea Vixens nearly a decade later were not challenged in the Straights by Indonesian Migs.

Leaf through Jane's Fighting Ships in 1962 and most navies look little different from WW2. Only the US and Italian navies have cruisers and destroyers with anti aircraft missiles. Other navies have a handful of such ships under construction.

But the new decade was going to bring more missiles and faster bigger jets. The US Navy set the pace. Its super carriers of the Forrestal class were joined by four newer ships and the nuclear Enterprise. But perhaps a warning for the future the next nuclear carrier (Nimitz) was not to enter service until the second half of the 70s.

The Royal Navy was forced to choose between nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. The threat posed by Soviet submarines made this choice for the UK. Nimrod ASW and Seaking helos were vital as were the Hunter Killer subs (SSNs). Phantoms and Buccaneers were nice to have but not of much use in dealing with Soviet submarines.

So it was that the much talked about Escort Cruiser (killed off in 1962 to get CVA01) became 1966's Command Cruiser. Two decades after its demise in 1982 the Escort Cruiser had become an ASW carrier (CVS) and gained the Sea Harrier the RN had also scorned in 1962.

From 1982 to 1991 the Royal Navy fought its silent war with the Soviet Navy and the lack of a CTOL carrier had ceased to be an issue.

Far from being "the end of history" the 1990s saw the Balkans and Iraq remind the world that war had not taken a holiday. The ASW carriers and their Harriers impressed a new generation of UK politicians that aircraft carriers had their uses.

In 1997 the Blair Government decided that two new aircraft carriers were needed for the RN. The ships were not to enter service for many years and did not bring the CTOL carrier back into RN service.

The carrier programme proved the 1966 decision had been right. The UK could not have a significant nuclear submarine and ASW force and operate aircraft carriers. I cannot help but wonder whether twelve Astutes would not have worried Mr Putin more than the carriers?

I am sure the above will bring many of you to disagree but the subject seems as rich as ever.
 
I cannot help but wonder whether twelve Astutes would not have worried Mr Putin more than the carriers?
On paper yes. But unfortunately Astute is not a great model for anything given how badly the program has been botched (drawn-out construction, poor availability).
 
In 1997 the Blair Government decided that two new aircraft carriers were needed for the RN. The ships were not to enter service for many years and did not bring the CTOL carrier back into RN service.
IMO that was a serious error in judgement, as CATOBAR would have allowed the RN to use fixed-wing AEW and COD, regardless of whether they continued using SHAR then F-35B or went to F-35C (and -As for the RAF).


I cannot help but wonder whether twelve Astutes would not have worried Mr Putin more than the carriers?
I honestly don't think so. Mostly because it's hard finding people who don't lose their minds in a sub. I'm not sure that the UK has enough population to find 12 Astute crews plus the Vanguard crews.

Also, a carrier presents a different threat profile than "more subs", which requires different assets to counter. Same reasoning as the nuclear triad.
 
The rapid technological changes were impossible to predict. But where I could see a scenario with increased foresight is in the money, so the bean counter would say:

The major surface units from WW2 will last until ~1970 at the latest, the units started in but finished after WW2 until around 1980. So if you rely on those units there will be a huge block obsolescence problem in the 1970s and 1980s. That does not require hindsight.

Policy suggestion: No more finishing of ww2 units and no major rebuilds on from a deadline. That could be around 1957 with that year of maximum danger doctrine. So either finish the stuff until 1958/59 at the latest or build new. (A similar a policy was forced on France by the simple fact that it had almost no navy left from WW2).

Playing around with this idea: Ark, Eagle and Hermes are completed, Victorious rebuilt.
The three Centaurs would probably be completed until the deadline, too.

The numbers have been often played here for CVA01, this would be a bit different:

No completion of the Tiger class 1955-61. Saving 40 million £?
Only minimum refit for Eagle 1959-64: Saving 10 million £?

This could cover a version of the 1952 design.
But the carrier is not so urgent in the mid 50s, we have 3 or 4 fleet carriers. So 2-3 small "escort cruisers" like Jeanne D'Arc/Vittorio Veneto could be built, instead of the Tigers and later replacing the 3 Centaurs (main advantage: half the crew needed).

New fleet carriers would be needed from late 60s.

No refit for the Tiger class 1965-72. Saving 10 million £?
No refit for Ark Royal 1967-70. Saving 30 Million £?
No conversion of Hermes 1971-73. Saving 25 million £?
No Invincibles, RN has "escort cruisers" already.

The first carrier would be designed and laid down 2-3 years earlier than planned for CVA01, so decided by the Tory government and just in time to avoid cancellation by the Polaris squeeze and be unaffected by the EOS withdrawal. Building will be protracted though with the SSBN program, say 1965-73. Victorious, Ark and Eagle withdrawn. Hermes in some configuration as a less capable carrier.

Second one to modified design, instead of the Invincibles, replaces Hermes around 1980. No money or crew for a third one.

They serve until 2010 and 2017, get replaced by a catobar Queen Elisabeth Class in 2017 and 2019.

The only departure point would be a basic decision on how to recapitalize the major surface ships from the mid 50s on. It may be a bit too optimistic on crewing from the 1980s on.
 
I honestly don't think so. Mostly because it's hard finding people who don't lose their minds in a sub. I'm not sure that the UK has enough population to find 12 Astute crews plus the Vanguard crews.

Also, a carrier presents a different threat profile than "more subs", which requires different assets to counter. Same reasoning as the nuclear triad.
Given the historic numbers of SSNs the RN operated in the Cold War alongside the SSBNs and the SSKs I don’t really think that’s an issue. The S and T boats would combined been about that number of SSNs?
 
Given the historic numbers of SSNs the RN operated in the Cold War alongside the SSBNs and the SSKs I don’t really think that’s an issue. The S and T boats would combined been about that number of SSNs?

Double that.
 
Given the historic numbers of SSNs the RN operated in the Cold War alongside the SSBNs and the SSKs I don’t really think that’s an issue. The S and T boats would combined been about that number of SSNs?
There were 6x Swiftsures and 7x Trafalgars. 116 crew per S boat for ~700 crew, 130 crew per T boat for ~900 crew. Total of 1600 bodies on subs, call it that much more for submarine-qualified but not on subs at the moment for a total of 3200.

Astutes run with fewer crew, in theory operating with 100 and capacity for 110. So, ~800 crew at sea and ~800 more on shore for a total of 1600. 5 more Astutes for a total of 12 boats would bring the required manning to 2700.

The UK population in 1990 was 57mil. While the UK population in 2024 is 69mil, 11.8mil of that is migrants ineligible for military service on subs. The UK military age population is essentially unchanged from 1990.

With worse psychological problems and education, times drug and gang problems that tend to disqualify someone from Submarine service.

Yes, I stand by my claim.
 

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