Alternate Canadian Armed Forces procurement 1970s

Regarding the RCN's "mumbling, "there's always been an amazing amount of professional journal articles and academic papers done on the subject.
But thats usually as far as it goes.
 
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Were you of adult age in the 1970s? Because those of us who lived through that decade certainly felt the Canadian economy going into a tailspin.

After 1973, a period of hyperinflation had kicked in. By 1975, there was huge pressure on the GoC to limit rising consumer price while at the same time introducing wage controls. Despite those efforts, Canada's national debt more than quadrupled through the 1970s. Does a GoC spending spree on military kit sound likely under such economic conditions?

@GK. Dundas has mentioned some slightly surreptitious upgrades for the CAF Centurion fleet begun in the early '70s. That approach starts to make a lot of sense to me. For whatever reason, hard-pressed taxpayers are often less likely to notice upgrade programmes - regardless of their costs - than straight-out procurements of new kit.
Your suggestions follow RCAF practices where new purchases are rare, but they can always find the money for major overhauls. The Sea King helicopters - that I wrenched on 45 years ago - eventually served for 50 years.
The CF-18 fighter jets that I bent wrenches on 40 years ago - will still need to fly for another decade until their F-35 or Gripen replacements arrive.
 
The RCN always mumbled about sea lift capability, but never bought enough ships to do the job.
The mandarins of the DND and the Department of Finance had a lot to do with that, as well as some very dubious Canadian PMs, to be fair.

EDIT: The Department of Supply and Services (later to be merged in the 1990s into the ill-reputed Public Services and Procurement Canada, aka the Department of Public Works and Government Services) likely also played a detrimental role in this sad state of affairs.
 
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... Public Services and Procurement Canada, aka the Department of Public Works and Government Services) likely also played a detrimental role in this sad state of affairs.

Please do not bold major emotional-trigger names, words, or phrases! :eek:

In any discussion of DND procurement problems, you've also got to include the PMOs ... so CAF members go into the mix as well. Over the decades, uniformed personnel - most critically, those in procurement planning - have been conditioned to refuse any or all interim solutions (or perceived compromises) out of fear of getting nothing.

While history may reinforce such fears, 'hold out for the best' plays into the strengths of the larger bureaucracy. Why do anything risky when problems - all problems! - are best kicked into the long grass?

Those institutional attitudes are also a big reason for all of those 'mid-life' rebuilds of ancient equipment. At present, there is simply no alternative. To make any meaningful changes to such a procurement system, part of the AltHist needs to be about adopting policy changes.

One policy change might be putting time limits on procurement projects. Chances are, if a procurement has dragged out for more than 5 years, the premise(s) behind that planned procurement should at least be reviewed. Such reviews should start with the budget and work backwards. (To make budget analysis more realistic, maybe a Danish style All-of-Government agreement approach to defence plans and procurement?)

Another policy chance could be to introduce mandatory retirement dates for CAF equipment (especially vehicles). Not only would that get around those 'mid-life' temptations, it would mean that DSCO was selling off materiel which wasn't past its best-before date.

Then, make monies made from disposal of surplus CAF equipment (and maybe DND lands?) a revenue source restricted to future procurement - instead of plopping it back into the GoC General Revenue bucket or even into the wider DND operating budget. </policy>
 
Please do not bold major emotional-trigger names, words, or phrases! :eek:

In any discussion of DND procurement problems, you've also got to include the PMOs ... so CAF members go into the mix as well. Over the decades, uniformed personnel - most critically, those in procurement planning - have been conditioned to refuse any or all interim solutions (or perceived compromises) out of fear of getting nothing.

While history may reinforce such fears, 'hold out for the best' plays into the strengths of the larger bureaucracy. Why do anything risky when problems - all problems! - are best kicked into the long grass?

Those institutional attitudes are also a big reason for all of those 'mid-life' rebuilds of ancient equipment. At present, there is simply no alternative. To make any meaningful changes to such a procurement system, part of the AltHist needs to be about adopting policy changes.

One policy change might be putting time limits on procurement projects. Chances are, if a procurement has dragged out for more than 5 years, the premise(s) behind that planned procurement should at least be reviewed. Such reviews should start with the budget and work backwards. (To make budget analysis more realistic, maybe a Danish style All-of-Government agreement approach to defence plans and procurement?)

Another policy chance could be to introduce mandatory retirement dates for CAF equipment (especially vehicles). Not only would that get around those 'mid-life' temptations, it would mean that DSCO was selling off materiel which wasn't past its best-before date.

Then, make monies made from disposal of surplus CAF equipment (and maybe DND lands?) a revenue source restricted to future procurement - instead of plopping it back into the GoC General Revenue bucket or even into the wider DND operating budget. </policy>
This reminds me of a conversation at work today.
We were discussing bus overhauls at Coast Mountain Bus Company (Greater Vancouver, British Columbia).
Most of our rolling stock was only designed for a 13 year life as that is imbedded in several different state and federal regulations in the USA. But - since procurement dollars are tight in Canada - we tend to do major overhauls after 12-ish years of service.

At what point do overhauls become more expensive than new purchases?
 
Yes, that's a very interesting question riggerrob!

Regards
Pioneer

The issue is that overhauls come from a different budget line and are without significant political issues.

Australia's Super Hornet purchase was something like $3 billion and was stated to be an interim buy that would only last 10 years before being replaced by the mythical 4th F35 sqn. There was some chatter about the lack of a competitive process to get the best aircraft, but the then Government 'expended some political capital' and pushed it through.

In contrast Canada upgrading its old Classic Hornets merely requires a boost to the 'sustainment' budget for a couple of years and little to no 'expenditure of political capital'. The RCAF gets screwed, but nobody really cares about them, not enough for it to be a significant election issue anyway.
 
Yes, that's a very interesting question riggerrob!

It is indeed. And very much to the point. Not only does DND plan for excessively long life spans, they too tend to do 'mid-lifes' at the 4/5ths span. Since the base kit/vehicle/thingie is guaranteed to be completely beat, this is not just refurbishment and upgrade. You must also replace all worn-out parts - now quite necessary but adding no increase in capabilities.

Some of that can be anticipated (just based on age) but the so-called mid-life is also bound to uncover hidden wear and damage as well. As a result, the best starting point for planning a mid-life is a thorough tear-down of what you hope is your very worst example of the sample kit. Only then should you attempt to itemise and budget for mid-life parts and labour. Even then, expect surprises.

A good, current RW example of mishandled mid-life/upgrade project is the Polish Leopard 2PL programme. This all may sound like a argument for always-buy-new, but it isn't. Mid-lifes and rebuilds can represent good value with minimised fleet disruption ... but only if they are carefully and cautiously prepared for and executed.
 
How about Canada, appreciating that it can't continue 'go it alone' in terms of military aircraft, ships, combat vehicles, etc..., ops instead for leading/promoting joint military programs. The strategy being to share cost/risks of modern costly military programs and procurement.
This way Canadian aircraft/ship/vehicle design and technical expertise flourishes. While the R&D and manufacturing risks and costs are shared by other foreign companies/governments? A Panavia-like consortium approach, if you like. Where participating countries build given components of the aircraft/ship/vehicle in their respective country, which are brought together in each participating country for final assembly.....
An example of this approach could be that Canada closely negotiates with the likes of either Spain, and or Australia to become the joint launch customers/manufacturers of the Northrop F-18L Cobra, instead of the compromised heavier, more complicated (and more expensive?) carrier-based McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A/B Hornet. For by all accounts, the F-18L was seen to be the superior/favoured preference of Canada, Spain and Australia air forces. But neither countries wanted to take on the risk of being the launch customer........

I thinking such inter-government/industry/military programs could encourage/stimulate further joint manufacturing programs....

Just a thought.

Regards
Pioneer


Regards
Pioneer
 
In a sense, that approach had already been tried (through things like the US-Canada Defence Production Sharing Agreement). The tricky bit was finding appropriate partners.

A RW example is the P&WC PT6T Twin-Pac which was designed specifically for the US Bell Huey family. When NIH sentiments threatened the UH-1N Twin Huey programme, P&WC's parent firm just moved T400 production from Longueuil to West Virginia. [Edit: The GoC had heavily subsidised the PT6A and PT6T programmes but the] imbalance of power meant that there was nothing Ottawa could do to enforce the DPSA ... and DND still bought Twin Hueys from Bell.

On the "Panavia-like consortium", Canada was an original member of what becomes the MRCA programme leading to Panavia. The usual story is that, like the Netherlands, Canada pulled out of MRCA because of escalating costs. That is true ... in part. [1] Other factors were a new PM who wanted out of the nuclear strike role in Europe and industrial benefits concentrated with the European principles. Again, Canada had neither the political pull nor the industrial strength to ensure advantage.

As to your F-18L Cobra example, I can't speak to Spanish or Australian experience but, in Canada, Northrop had form. Most US corporations are quick to resort to legal action but few were as habitually litigious as the Northrop Corporation ... as Ottawa had come to find out to its expense.

All that said, I think that your suggestion is sound. What Canada lacked was focus. Trade policy had been subsumed into Foreign Affairs while more 'liberal' industrial policies meant that successful Canadian manufacturers would get gobbled up by larger foreign corporations. IOW, the Canada of the 1970s needed to get its own house in order.
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[1] Edit: The GoC called MRCA the Canadian Advanced Multi-Role Aircraft (CAMRA) project. Canadair gave it their own type number - CL-236 - suggesting that Cartierville was anticipating a good-sized portion of the work. But the GoC withdrew from the MRCA programme on 22 Oct 1968 - so, within 6 months of the beginning of Pierre Trudeau's premiership.
 
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How about Canada, appreciating that it can't continue 'go it alone' in terms of military aircraft, ships, combat vehicles, etc..., ops instead for leading/promoting joint military programs.
The problem is that those are more expensive than a single-country program. IIRC it usually works out to square root of the total number of partners. 2 partners means 1.41x more expensive, 3 partners means 1.7x more, etc.
 
The problem is that those are more expensive than a single-country program. IIRC it usually works out to square root of the total number of partners. 2 partners means 1.41x more expensive, 3 partners means 1.7x more, etc.

A 50-50 partnership makes a $1B project $1.4B, but each partner only pays $700m, and a 33-33-33 partnership drops the cost to $560m each.
 
The problem is that those are more expensive than a single-country program. IIRC it usually works out to square root of the total number of partners. 2 partners means 1.41x more expensive, 3 partners means 1.7x more, etc.
Thanks for your feedback Scott.
I appreciate and agree with your premises of added cost. But if such a scheme is adopted politically, socially and militaraly, the continuous work/employment/education/technology transfers, etc, would have a good and long-term benifit to Canada - if it is done right and consistently.......

I guess, in many ways, I see the Singaporean model, in it's holistic approach by government/military/society as a encouraging model, if that makes sense.

Regards
Pioneer
 
In a sense, that approach had already been tried (through things like the US-Canada Defence Production Sharing Agreement). The tricky bit was finding appropriate partners.
Thanks for your feedback Apophenia!
Nothing personally against my American colleagues, but I can't but help think there lays Canada's problem. Being so tied, so reliant, dare I say, so subordinate to U.S. political and military whims, seems to have slapped Canadian military industry in the face....

Maybe, just like my own country (Australia), Canada needs to be more mature and appreciate its own indigenous skills and capabilities....
A RW example is the P&WC PT6T Twin-Pac which was designed specifically for the US Bell Huey family. When NIH sentiments threatened the UH-1N Twin Huey programme, P&WC's parent firm just moved T400 production from Longueuil to West Virginia. The imbalance of power meant that there was nothing Ottawa could do to enforce the DPSA ... and DND still bought Twin Hueys from Bell.
Sorry Apophenia, can you elaborate what NIH is please?

On the "Panavia-like consortium", Canada was an original member of what becomes the MRCA programme leading to Panavia. The usual story is that, like the Netherlands, Canada pulled out of MRCA because of escalating costs. That is true ... in part. [1] Other factors were a new PM who wanted out of the nuclear strike role in Europe and industrial benefits concentrated with the European principles. Again, Canada had neither the political pull nor the industrial strength to ensure advantage.
Wow, thanks Apophenia, that the most I've ever seen/read about Canada's involvement in the MRCA program!
As to your F-18L Cobra example, I can't speak to Spanish or Australian views but, Canada, Northrop had form. Most US corporations are quick to resort to legal action but few were as habitually litigious as the Northrop Corporation ... as Ottawa had come to find out to its expense.

All that said, I think that your suggestion is sound. What Canada lacked was focus. Trade policy had been subsumed into Foreign Affairs while more 'liberal' industrial policies meant that successful Canadian manufacturers would get gobbled up by larger foreign corporations. IOW, the Canada of the 1970s needed to get its own house in order.
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[1] Edit: The GoC called MRCA the Canadian Advanced Multi-Role Aircraft (CAMRA) project. Canadair gave it their own type number - CL-236 - suggesting that Cartierville was anticipating a good-sized portion of the work. But the GoC withdrew from the MRCA programme on 22 Oct 1968 - so, within 6 months of the beginning of Pierre Trudeau's premiership.
Yeah, I can't help with Canadian shit-for-brains political thought process and shitfuckery, mate. I haven't been able to get my head around my own country's (Australia) for my lifetime, thus far......

Regards
Pioneer
 
Thanks for your feedback Apophenia!
Nothing personally against my American colleagues, but I can't but help think there lays Canada's problem. Being so tied, so reliant, dare I say, so subordinate to U.S. political and military whims, seems to have slapped Canadian military industry in the face....

Maybe, just like my own country (Australia), Canada needs to be more mature and appreciate its own indigenous skills and capabilities....
I'm sure that's a notable part of the problem.

But Canada has a very small population and correspondingly small economy, while being one of the geographically largest countries. Lots of land to patrol, not much dollars to patrol with.



Sorry Apophenia, can you elaborate what NIH is please?
Not
Invented
Here
 
I'm sure that's a notable part of the problem.

But Canada has a very small population and correspondingly small economy, while being one of the geographically largest countries. Lots of land to patrol, not much dollars to patrol with.




Not
Invented
Here
Ah!
Thanks Scott, you're a gentleman.

Regards
Pioneer
 
Canada has a very small population and correspondingly small economy, while being one of the geographically largest countries. Lots of land to patrol, not much dollars to patrol with.

I'd suggest a lack of targets to patrol for is more pertinent than a lack of resources with which to conduct the patrols. In 1968 when large area, low population, advanced economy Canada was slashing it's standing NATO deployment in favour of CAST similar large area, low population, advanced economy Australia was at the peak of it's Vietnam War commitment.

Canada could have committed more to defence if they had a serious threat, the issue isn't that they didn't put resources into defence its that they didn't match rhetoric and public utterances with the resources these required.
 
... Australia was at the peak of it's Vietnam War commitment.

Canada could have committed more to defence if they had a serious threat, the issue isn't that they didn't put resources into defence its that they didn't match rhetoric and public utterances with the resources these required.

Correct on the lack of any serious threat to Canadian territory. But "match[ing] rhetoric and public utterances with the resources these required" gets a bit more complicated.

On the politics, its important to remember just how popular that Liberal government was at the time - it won over 45% of the popular vote in the 1968 General Election. [1] Trudeau also had a cult-of-personality thing going which extended to Canadians too young to vote in April 1968.

The contemporary political rhetoric included the possibility of a complete Canadian withdrawal from NATO. That sprang out of internationalist notions popular at the time. But anti-military feelings in the Canadian populace in the late '60s had been spawned by that war in Vietnam.

Ultimately, it is Crown and Country which is served. Not allies, global affairs, or even reality, frankly. Both DND and CAF culture did its damnedest to separate itself from mainstream political attitudes. Then the military was puzzled by resulting public perceptions ... and how that damaged recruiting efforts and general public support.

It is easy to blame dumb politicians ... who are responsible for policy choices and decisions. But rarely do we castigate our militaries for attitudes which alienate the very citizens those armed forces are sworn to protect. And, yeah, I know that touches sore spots. But some degree of reality is essential. This isn't about redirecting blame ... it is about sharing it.

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[1] In the leadership race to replace Pearson, Pierre Trudeau had trounced both Robert Winters and the younger John Turner. Winters was closest but, since he would die in 1969, doesn't make for a useful what-if ... despite having military experience - WW2 LCol, Canadian Army - as well as extensive business exposure.
 
...
But Canada has a very small population and correspondingly small economy, while being one of the geographically largest countries. Lots of land to patrol, not much dollars to patrol with.
...

Bingo! In 1968, the population of Canada was just over 20M. The Canadian economy was completely dominated by resource extraction. Some 60% of exports went to the US - of which, 70% were relatively unprocessed resources. (In 1968, the remainder of export revenues could be evenly divided between the UK and all the rest of the world.)

US control of Canadian manufacturing industry had previously amounted to 46% with actual American ownership of said industry at 44% ... and both percentages were growing in 1968. Partially as a result of that linked/dependent economy, Canada was facing inflationary forces in 1968. But the effects were slightly less than in the US ... and that difference was attributed (by the OECD at the time) primarily to American involvement in the Vietnam.

Springing from the unpopularity of the Vietnam war in Canada, Trudeau thought the time was right for a complete withdrawal from NATO. (PET probably knew that, when enacted, the populace would object ... but he was just beginning his mandate.) What actually nixed PET's NATO withdrawal plans was the fear that Western Europe - especially the BRD - would then reject Ottawa's plans to diversify Canadian exports into Western Europe. [1]

Another economic aspect worth mentioning is that Canadian wages were always slightly higher than our trade partners. In part, that explains why so little of the economic output was in manufacturing. But, for our purposes, it also hints at a difficulty in going it alone on defence production. Instead, we usually ended up in a circular pattern. [2] That alone may explain why forays into building military kit remained/remains unfocused.

That kind of leads back to some potential alternative procurement concepts ... but I'll leave that for now.

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[1] That diversification was critical because Canadian exports to the UK were in freefall due to shifting trade policies at Whitehall.

[2] Eg: The US subsidises Lockheed but buys only minimal F-104s; Canada is then offered a deal to produce CF-104s for the RCAF and for export under the US MAP programme; the production contract is given to Canadair which is a wholely-owned subsidiary of US General Dynamics. For Ottawa, this looks like industrial investment and development. But, ultimately, control is entirely in foreign hands.
 
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I'm not knocking Canada's choices, just pointing out that to get national resilience and a comprehensive, capable military you really need a realistic threat to motivate the population and their political class. For example Australian PM Holt was reelected with a strong majority on the strength of an increased commitment to the shooting war in Vietnam.
 
It is easy to blame dumb politicians ... who are responsible for policy choices and decisions. But rarely do we castigate our militaries for attitudes which alienate the very citizens those armed forces are sworn to protect. And, yeah, I know that touches sore spots. But some degree of reality is essential. This isn't about redirecting blame ... it is about sharing it.

Yeah, I concur!

Regards
Pioneer
 
Back to procurement. OP @GK. Dundas has expressed a preference for modernised Centurion tanks with US diesel engines. That means that the ATL GoC needs to find ways other than a Leopard C1 purchase to ingratiate itself with Bonn (in the hope of expanding and diversifying Canada's trade relations in Europe).

Since both DND and the CAF had/have a habit of skewing towards US-made equipment, a good starting point is looking at what the West Germans had in 1970 but which the Yanks lacked. An obvious answer is an IFV. The SPz Marder 1 entered Bundeswehr service in May 1971 (the M2 Bradley would not see service for another decade). But, importantly, OTL production of the SPz Marder 1 was ended in 1975.

My suggestion is to follow the RW pattern but, instead of Leopard 1A3, substitute Marder 1. So, borrow a few Marder 1s from the Bundeswehr for CAF familiarisation purposes. Then place orders for production model C3 Marten MICVs [1] to come off the line after the last production SPz Marder 1 for the West Germans. As a result, Hanomag production of Marder extends beyond 1975 ... which should earn Ottawa a few trade points with Bonn.

As part of the agreement, Hanomag production of CAF C3 Martens would end in 1980. At that point, Hanomag tooling would be transferred to Cape Breton, NS, to facilitate continued, Canadian production of the vehicle. I am imagining a NS-built C3 Marten with thicker built-in armour (with equivalent blast and ballistic protection to Marder 1A3s with add-on plate). With domestic production in place, Canada could decide on potential expanded future roles (perhaps akin to Argentinian TAM variants).

Thoughts? Objections? Alternatives?

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[1] AFAIK, MICV was the preferred US Army term at the time. Almost inevitably, the CAF would choose to adopt such American terminology.
 
Me too ... but I'm a bit fickle (and the sly CV90 has since stolen my affections).

It is easy to forget just how early the West Germans were on to IFVs. Some argue that the Bundeswehr's SPz 12-3 was the first IFV - being a decade ahead of the Soviet BMP-1. And that makes sense.

The key thing about the Schützenpanzer was defining its role - carry PzGren dismounts while dealing with opposing light armour and recce units plus keeping ATGW operators' heads down, and even engaging low-flying helicopters. Sometimes IFVs get overloaded with the added roles and associated kit but, the main objective always had to be freeing MBT crews to focus on their strong suites.

In the end, it was revealed that both APCs and IFVs were needed. Still, that West German approach to PzGren-specific vehicles was quite a leap from the US 'battle taxi' approach of that time.

Changing topics ... I have a notion for how additional light infantry fit into 4CMBG after 1970. But this would be more about re-organisation than much actual procurement. Any appetite that subject?
 
Changing topics ... I have a notion for how additional light infantry fit into 4CMBG after 1970. But this would be more about re-organisation than much actual procurement. Any appetite that subject?

Lines on org charts are crucial in the military, if you can use a re-org to justify equipment acquisition then I'm interested.
 
I guess this means the Lynx does get upgunned to the RH 202 AND I guess the bird gunners get the twin mount as well.
I mean if the Marder/Marten comes with 20 MM . It just makes sense and we were looking to purchase the RH202 at one point.
 
The Short Belfast did have superior usable cargo dimensions to its fuselage.
Short did offer a few proposed variants - including a longer range variant and a variant that offered superior rough-field performance......

Regards
Pioneer
Couldn't the Belfast actually carry a single Centurion albeit not all that far ?
 
I guess this means the Lynx does get upgunned to the RH 202 AND I guess the bird gunners get the twin mount as well.
I mean if the Marder/Marten comes with 20 MM . It just makes sense and we were looking to purchase the RH202 at one point.

Yes, if the CAF takes on Marder without change, the RH 202 comes with it. [1] If that were the case, rearming the Lynx with a dual-feed RH 202 makes perfect sense. This would also be an opportunity to eliminate a Lynx weak point - the need to regularly reload the primary weapon through an open hatch. Done right, the Lynx upgrade would include ammo feeds that maintain NBC seals.

For the Lynx MLU, I was thinking of something like the one-man KUKA E6-II-A1 turret. AFAIK, that KUKA doesn't go into service until Wiesel 1 appeared in 1979 (just within our ATL). But, maybe KUKA could be encouraged to speed up turret development with the 'M113 1/2' refit market in mind? (Perhaps a joint purchase between CA and NL?)

Equipping bird gunners is always tricky. I'm going to post that in a separate response.

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[1] The alternative would be selecting an alternative turret to put on the German IFV. One possibility - although not my personal preference - would be Alvis' 2-seat aluminum turret from the Cougar ... except armed with a 30 mm Rarden.
 
On those bird gunners ...

Yes, with RH 202 in service, adopting the Zwillingsflak for local airfield air defence makes perfect sense. The limiting factor there is lack of radar control (might an M163 VADS mount be adapted for twin RH 202s?). VADS also makes wonder about a vehicle-mounted variant for that 'reinforce II. Korps' role?

RCA Airfield Air Defence Batteries at Baden-Soellingen & Lahr

At the start of our time period, 128 and 129 AADBs were armed with 40 mm 'Boffins' and Blowpipe MANPADS. 'Boffins' had a passable RoF and their hydraulically drives were surprisingly durable (considering they were 40 years old). The problem, again, was lack of radar control ... making 'Boffins' all but useless against low-flying jet attackers.

It seems to me that there were two SHORAD missile options in the early 1970s - the French Crotale or the British Rapier. The more compact (but much delayed) Franco-German Roland wouldn't arrive until the end of the decade. One bonus of waiting, though, would be access to a Marten AD variant based on the FlaRakPz 1 Marder (perhaps in a what-if contest against the losing M113 ADATS?).

Blowpipes would have seemed like Buck Rogers technology compared to the 'Boffins'. And, more to the point, the near-uselessness of the Blowpipe under operational conditions wouldn't be revealed until the Falklands conflict. In place of excessive foresight, might we introduce a bit of fortuitous 'gold-plating' here?

In OTL, DND ordered 100 x Blowpipe launchers from Short Bros & Harland in June 1973. These were an industrial offset for switching to PT6A engines on the Short 330. I'd like to expand a bit on that industrial cooperation theme. [1]

In June 1972, Northrop Corp. had announced that it was experimenting with a laser-guided Blowpipe variant. [2] RW, there were no takers. But what if Canada signed an agreement to co-develop the laser-guided Blowpipe - perhaps combining the NRC/DRDC, Northrops (with a hefty no-litigation clause included in the contract!) and Shorts?

So, for European-based GBAD, we have:

OTL early '70s: Blowpipe MANPADS + 40 mm 'Boffin' guns

With replacement/add-on options of:

ATL early '70s: Laser-Blowpipe + 20 mm Twin RH 202s + Crotale or Rapier SAMs; or

ATL early '70s: Laser-Blowpipe + 20 mm Twin RH 202s + 40 mm 'Boffins'

ATL late '70s: Laser-Blowpipe + 20 mm Twin RH 202s + Roland SAMs

Thoughts?

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[1] One obvious expansion might be to procure Short 330s for the CAF ... kind of anticipating the US C-23 Sherpa purchase. The Short may lack the CC-138s' rough field performance but no denying the 330's usefulness when fitted with a rear ramp ... I'm seeing both 'Twotters' and 'CC-330' in CAF service.

[2] Laser beam-riding wasn't something Shorts would get around to until their Javelin S15 of the late 1980s.
 
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Okay, no-one has actually objected to the notion of a more organisational what-if. So here goes ... which some procurement possibilities to follow.

The C3 Marten notion mentioned earlier would be a useful addition for Canadian Mechanised Infantry (just as the SPz Marders were for West German Panzergrenadiere). But, since 4CMBG would be reinforcing either VII Corps (US Army) or the German II. Korps on the Czechoslovak border, it is worth looking at how the Bundeswehr was (re)organising itself at the time.

Under the Heeresstruktur III re-organisation plan, some West German Panzergrenadierdivisionen were to be transformed into Jägerdivisionen. Relevant to II. Korps was 4. PzGrenDiv becoming 4. JgDiv. This change was a recognition that the terrain along the Czech frontier was less favorable for operations by more heavily-equipped Panzer grenadiers. Lighter Jägertruppen would also be more manoeuvrable when chasing down any breakthrough Czech/WarPac elements behind the main lines.

Adding In More Canadian Light Infantry

If such an organisational change made sense for II. Korps, it could equally have been applied to 4CMBG. Here it is assumed that existing MechInf - the bulk of Canadian ground forces - would be served by a mix of C3 Marten MICVs and M113 APCs. But Canada also had the equivalent of JgDiv - light infantry battalions mixed in among the MechInf battalions of Regular Force and Primary Reserve regiments. [1] And, if the CAF was modelling on Heeresstruktur III, there would be plenty of room for additional light infantry.

The light infantry role was cooked into the name Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and, IIRC, all 3 x Regular Force PPCLI battalions were light infantry in 1970. [1] The obvious solution was raising the Loyal Edmonton Regiment from Primary Reserve to Regular Force - becoming 4PPCLI (L Edmn R). Another unit to be raised would be 4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment. 4RCR could then join with 3RCR, the existing Regular Force light infantry battalion.

Bottes au Sol

So, that is a start at pumping up CAF light infantry units. But there was a further option which meshed better with a GoC priority of the day - that was establishing French Language Units. So, why not unités d'infanterie légère? The pattern of Anglophone units would be repeated - raising Force de réserve to Force régulière status.

My suggestion is Les Voltigeurs de Québec be raised to Force régulière and then be relocated 15 km NW to BFC Valcartier. There, they would join an existing Force régulière unit - 3e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment. (Here, I am not suggesting amalgamation ... more like 3eR22eR act as grands frères to the new kids.) Then, Le Régiment de Québec (amalgamated with Les Voltigeurs de Québec in 1954) is resurrected as a replacement unit for the Force de réserve. [2]

Procurement stuff to follow ...

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[1] Today, only 3PPCLI is a genuine light infantry battalion. The CAF's love affair with LAVs had skewed preferences towards MechInf. Whether that is a good thing or bad is probably a discussion for another time and place.

[2] In the OTL, starting FLUs just resulted in robbing French speakers from existing units. And that approach did nothing to improve CAF recruiting challenges among Francophone populations.

The goal of reviving Le Régiment de Québec as a reserve unit would be an attempt to ease such challenges in Québec. Eventually, similar efforts would be needed amongst Acadians, Franco-Manitobains, and other Canadian francophone populations.
 
Now the first procurement consequence (apologies in advance for its length).

As soon as light infantry is emphasised, a review of equipment weights would be due - including small arms and their ammunition. For the CAF, by the mid-'70s, the long and heavy 7.62 mm C1A1 rifle had been in Canadian service for over two decades. Light infantry would greatly benefit from more lighter and more compact small arms. Time for a replacement in 5.56 mm?

A move from 'battle rifle' to 'assault rifle' could be prompted by both the prior adoption of lighter M16 rifles by US forces in Vietnam as well as the 1974 service entry of the Red Army's new AK-74. So, let's move the RW Small Arms Replacement Project forward by a half decade. Introducing the totally imaginary SARP-75 programme. [1]

A Change of Scene?

To change the OTL arc of Canadian small arms, some institutional hand-wavium is required. RW, after all C1A1 production ended, the GoC shut down its Long Branch-based Crown Corporation, CAL Small Arms Division. That closure occurred in June 1976. In that same year, the GoC signed a new small arms maintenance contract with Diemaco Inc. - a privately-owned, Kitchener-based, subsidiary of Devtek.

At a glance the GoC actions seemed to make sense. Toronto-area real estate prices were booming and much of the CAL Small Arms Division plant was sub-leased to non-military producers anyway. But what if revenue from the sale of that old but more valuable Long Branch property had been used to just relocate to CAL Small Arms Division production to Kitchener instead? This would keep small arms production in GoC hands instead of drifting into foreign ownership (as Diemaco did - first with Colt, now under CZ).

What-If Small Arms Replacement Project - 1975 (SARP-75)

The most important part of SARP-75 would be the CAR (Canadian Automatic Rifle) project to replace the C1A1 with a new weapon chambered for 5.56x45mm M193 ammunition (later eclipsed by SS109 when that Belgian SS109 ammunition became NATO standard). A complete range of potential candidates was assembled after the CAF determined that a conventional rifle was preferred over any bullpup arrangements. [2] The final CAR programme candidates were:

1: Colt AR-15 = An 'Improved M16A1' variant (emerging as the M16A2 in 1983)

2: IMI Galil AR - Submitted by its NATO licensee, NWM De Kruithoorn N.V.
-- Galil AR ('Automatic Rifle'); 18-inch barrel; folding stock; 25-rd magazine

3: FN FNC 76 - Scaled-down FN FAL; later withdrawn from CAR competition*
-- * After performly poorly in NATO contests due to its rushed development

4: Heckler & Koch HK33 - 390 mm (15 inch) barrel; G3 wooden furniture
-- H&K roller-delayed blowback system modified to suit lower-power 5.56

5: Beretta AR70/SC70 - Assault rifle* and folding-stock carbine variant
-- * Fixed-stock AR70 saw limited Italian military service from 1972-73

6: SIG SG 540 - Swiss PV for export market and licensed production
-- SG 540 used AK-47 derived operating system; prod'n began 1973-74

CAR - The CAF C7/C8 Selection Process

A SARP-75/CAR selection committee would be tasked with assigning comparable values to each submitted design. A priority would be in getting new small arms into CAF service no later than 1980. After competitive trials, that committee would pare down the candidates and then select a winner.

I would imagine the selection committee acknowledging the SIG SG 540 as the superior type. But, working against quality, would be the high cost per weapon and justifiable concerns about Swiss export regulations (as already noted by @GK. Dundas).

The FNC 76 had its appeal in closely resembling the in-service FN C1A1 (which would provide 'muscle memory' benefits while simplifying small arms training procedure development). Alas, FN had already withdrawn its 'carbine' from the SARP-75/CAR competition.

Although favoured as a potential supplier, Colt's AR-15 - in its 'Improved M16A1' form - would, ultimately, have to be judged to be immature in its development.

That leaves the Italian Beretta AR70/SC70; the West German Heckler & Koch HK33; and the Israeli IMI Galil AR still in the running. If you were a member of that SARP-75/CAR selection committee, which weapon type would you choose to become Canada's next C7 rifle and C8 carbine? [3]

_____________________________________________

[1] In OTL, the Small Arms Replacement Project began in 1980 and resulted in the Diemaco C7 and C8 based on the Colt 'Improved M16A1' but with a distinct barrel.

[2] This decision eliminated the British L64 (aka Enfield Individual Weapon) and French FAMAS F1 from consideration for any future Canadian Automatic Rifle.

[3] I would imagine manufacturer-built sample/trial weapons - C7 rifles and C8 carbines - supplied to instructors at the Infantry School, CFB Gagetown, and to Weapons Techs of a trials det attached to 4CMBG in West Germany. After trial results were compiled, CAL SAD-Kitchener would start producing service weapons - designated C7A1 and C8A1 (following the earlier C1/C1A1 designation pattern).
 
More Canadian light infantry requires an equipment review beyond small arms.

Although it would represent a major cost, Mobility Command needed to address the flawed operational approach behind Canada's OG 107 Combats and WE64 webbing. Those designs were rooted in an inflexible dismount-from-APC-and-engage concept. Doubtless that sounded like the future in 1964 but it never represented reality. And that APC-dominated concept was doubly flawed for light infantry. At any rate, with the adoption of 5.56 mm rifles and carbines, Combats and webbing would need revising anyway.

For the Combats, the first improvement would be adopting flame- and stain-proof fabric(s). Coat GS breast pockets would need to be resized to fit the new 5.56 mm mags (or a radiation dosimeter). But re-sizing pockets does nothing to address the difficulty in accessing those fresh magazines while lying face-first in the mud. And that brings us to webbing ... since nothing about the thin WE64 rig worked for light infantry.

Our imaginary 'WE75' web should have a broader yoke and Y-strap as well as some form of shoulder padding (an irony of light infantry being the heavier loads often humped). Belt attachments for additional magazine pouches get around some of the access issues (with added weight moderated by the calibre change). Then, WE64 attachments' underlying flaws and redundancies must be addressed.

The redundancies are easy - ditch the now-useless entrenching tool carriers and FN 'mag bras'. Beyond magazine pouches, adopting SARP-75 pattern weapons also dictates a new bayonet frog and cleaning-kit pouch. Added improvements should be enlarged, properly-sized grenade pouches; a dedicated rain gear pouch; and a more flexible gas mask carrier (with sling or alternative belt attachments).

Slightly OT, I was also thinking about 4CMBG adopting Bundeswehr style helmet covers. I know that Amöbentarn was common in our timeframe. But, I'm guessing that Splittertarn would better suit the foliage patterns of the pine-dominated Bohemian Forest along the Czechoslovak frontier. Alternatively, just stick with OG 107 covers and add helmet netting over top. Thoughts?

Probably other improvements could have been made to Combats, WE64 carriers and attachments, etc. So, what have I missed?
 
As mentioned above, MechInf would be well-served by a mix of C3 Marten MICVs and M113 APCs. So what of the light infantry? It is not as simple as it sounds. Deploying light infantry to reinforce VII Corps and II. Korps close to the Czechoslovak border creates two distinct requirements for fighting vehicles.

Fighting Vehicles for Canadian Light Infantry


Those Canadian light infantry pushed close to the frontier require highly tractable vehicles for challenging terrain - again suggesting a mix of C3 Martens and M113A1s. In contrast, those troops detailed with containing and mopping up WP breakthrough elements behind the main lines would require more mobile, self-deploying vehicles for both transport and support (including direct-fire support).

I'm at something of a loss here. But (and I can hardly believe this) it has me wondering about toothier AVGP variants. In OTL, the 'boats' were rightly disparaged for their minimal armour protection and peculiar armaments choices. But bear with me here. In our ATL, can we tweak GM Canada's take on the Mowag original?

Let's say, with the re-organisation plan for CAF units in West Germany, other AVGP variants are factored in. A common feature of these Regular Force 'boats' would be somewhat thicker armour (including on the belly for mine protection) as well as enhanced NBC protection. But the 'General Purpose' in AVGP would also be played down, with each combat variant being more highly tailored for a specific role.

AVGP Derivatives with Teeth

Specifically, for that behind-the-lines role, I'm imagining two variants each for the Grizzly and the Cougar:

1: Grizzly IC (Infantry Carrier): Wheeled APC armed with a single, pintle-mounted C5A1 for self-defence;

2: Grizzly SC (Section Carrier): A specialist squad carrier armed with a For one-man KUKA E6-II-A1 turret (as per Lynx MLU);

3: Cougar 76: A direct-fire support vehicle, RO L23A1 (as per Reserve Force Cougars but with 'overseas' protection-level armour);

4: Cougar 30: As Cougar 76 but armed with 30 mm Rarden autocannon to act specifically as a 'BMP killer'.

A Lighter Vehicle for Light Infantry

Another vehicle useful for light infantry reinforcements would be Jeeps (albeit with 'Noddy suits' on standby!). In OTL, Canadian-made M38A1CAN fleet (Jeep CJ-5s) were supplemented in 1970-71 by US-made M38A1. But, in our ATL, perhaps the CAF gets to tailor its own Jeep for the Brampton Assembly Plant? How about a stretched Jeep CJ-6 variant powered by a 65 hp Mercedes OM616 2.4 L diesel (for fuel commonality with other CAF vehicles as well as a convenient parts supply in the BDR). [1]

_________________________________________

[1] As an option, RW Jeep CJ-5 and CJ-6 models were offered with similar output Perkins 3.15 L diesels for a time in the mid-'60s.
 
What-If Small Arms Replacement Project - 1975 (SARP-75)

The most important part of SARP-75 would be the CAR (Canadian Automatic Rifle) project to replace the C1A1 with a new weapon chambered for 5.56x45mm M193 ammunition (later eclipsed by SS109 when that Belgian SS109 ammunition became NATO standard). A complete range of potential candidates was assembled after the CAF determined that a conventional rifle was preferred over any bullpup arrangements.
That's a rather unfortunate view, considering that infantry transported anywhere are best served by bullpups.

Light Infantry in the US theories can make helicopter insertions, and I would suggest that the Canucks make sure that they have enough helicopters of whichever size they want to use to be able to insert a full battalion of infantry in a single lift for the Canadian Light Infantry Brigade(s). I think I prefer that the Army own their transport helicopters, but since it's Canada it'll probably be the RCAF flying them around in Chinooks.



That leaves the Italian Beretta AR70/SC70; the West German Heckler & Koch HK33; and the Israeli IMI Galil AR still in the running. If you were a member of that SARP-75/CAR selection committee, which weapon type would you choose to become Canada's next C7 rifle and C8 carbine?
Given those three, I'd vote for Galil, possibly modified to take STANAG magazines as in the modern Galil Ace versions.



More Canadian light infantry requires an equipment review beyond small arms.

Although it would represent a major cost, Mobility Command needed to address the flawed operational approach behind Canada's OG 107 Combats and WE64 webbing. Those designs were rooted in an inflexible dismount-from-APC-and-engage concept. Doubtless that sounded like the future in 1964 but it never represented reality. And that APC-dominated concept was doubly flawed for light infantry. At any rate, with the adoption of 5.56 mm rifles and carbines, Combats and webbing would need revising anyway.

For the Combats, the first improvement would be adopting flame- and stain-proof fabric(s). Coat GS breast pockets would need to be resized to fit the new 5.56 mm mags (or a radiation dosimeter). But re-sizing pockets does nothing to address the difficulty in accessing those fresh magazines while lying face-first in the mud. And that brings us to webbing ... since nothing about the thin WE64 rig worked for light infantry.

Our imaginary 'WE75' web should have a broader yoke and Y-strap as well as some form of shoulder padding (an irony of light infantry being the heavier loads often humped). Belt attachments for additional magazine pouches get around some of the access issues (with added weight moderated by the calibre change). Then, WE64 attachments' underlying flaws and redundancies must be addressed.

The redundancies are easy - ditch the now-useless entrenching tool carriers and FN 'mag bras'. Beyond magazine pouches, adopting SARP-75 pattern weapons also dictates a new bayonet frog and cleaning-kit pouch. Added improvements should be enlarged, properly-sized grenade pouches; a dedicated rain gear pouch; and a more flexible gas mask carrier (with sling or alternative belt attachments).
In this case, the US ALICE kit really is good and well worked out for light infantry work courtesy of the Vietnam war. (Reminds me, I need to chase down two sets of most of it, at least so I can have packs with and without frames for the Vietnam kit I have.)

Even now there are some folks who prefer ALICE over MOLLE. IMO, each one does some things better than the other one. I prefer ALICE magazine pouches to MOLLE, for example, because each ALICE mag pouch includes 2 grenade pouches. MOLLE gear you don't have built-in grenade pouches. I will admit that the MOLLE attachment system is better than the ALICE clips, though.



Slightly OT, I was also thinking about 4CMBG adopting Bundeswehr style helmet covers. I know that Amöbentarn was common in our timeframe. But, I'm guessing that Splittertarn would better suit the foliage patterns of the pine-dominated Bohemian Forest along the Czechoslovak frontier. Alternatively, just stick with OG 107 covers and add helmet netting over top. Thoughts?
That gets into what camouflage color/pattern the Canucks were wearing then. IIRC even the US is mostly "pickle suit" green or has just adopted Woodland Battle Dress Uniform. Funny enough, the Vietnam "Tiger Stripe" pattern works pretty well in pine forests.
 
That's a rather unfortunate view, considering that infantry transported anywhere are best served by bullpups.

Eliminating bullpups was a nod to conservative Canadian attitudes towards small arms. But it is also a recognition of the end days of a functioning Commonwealth. For over half a century, Canadian officialdom followed whatever the Brits did. By the '70s, aping y'all felt like a path towards independence (hence the strong pro-Colt AR-15 leanings).

Light Infantry in the US theories can make helicopter insertions, and I would suggest that the Canucks make sure that they have enough helicopters of whichever size they want to use to be able to insert a full battalion of infantry in a single lift for the Canadian Light Infantry Brigade(s). I think I prefer that the Army own their transport helicopters, but since it's Canada it'll probably be the RCAF flying them around in Chinooks.

Within Canadian light infantry units, there have long been specialist battalions - rotary-wing air assault, parachute deployment, etc. Tactical helicopters attached to 4CMBG were experimented with at one point (as part of 1 Canadian Air Group at CFB Baden-Sollingen - no 'RCAF' in the 1970s). AFAIK, by the time 444 THS was established, all deployed helicopters were recce spotters (with Bell CH-136 Kiowas replacing Hiller CH-112 Nomads).

The absence of TacHel for 4CMBG is one reason that I have emphasised procuring faster-moving APCs for the containment role behind the lines. The unspoken bit is that, with the distance from their bases, Canadian MechInf and light infantry would need road mobility to move up to operational areas at the first sign of any WarPac unpleasantness.

Given those three, I'd vote for Galil, possibly modified to take STANAG magazines as in the modern Galil Ace versions.

My preference would be the HK33 ... but not being adopted by the Bundeswehr argues against it. Ironically, the AR70/SC70 probably matured too early (with revision need by Beretta after SS109 was adopted).

So, yeah, the Galil would be a top contender (possibly in consultation with Valmet on the winter warfare features of the RK 62 series ... bringing the Galil back to its Finnish roots). On STANAG 4179, that comes a bit too late for our ATL C7A1/C8A1 (proposed Oct 1980). So, maybe standard 30-rd mags are adopted for a mid-'80s C7A2/C8A2 series?

NWM De Kruithoorn N.V. may have been working against itself (since it was focused on marketing the Stoner 63A1 system for its 'Post-70 Soldier' concept). Other than prototype/trials weapons, the Dutch firm would also need to exhale on series production at 's-Hertogenbosch.

In this case, the US ALICE kit really is good and well worked out for light infantry work courtesy of the Vietnam war. (Reminds me, I need to chase down two sets of most of it, at least so I can have packs with and without frames for the Vietnam kit I have.)

Even now there are some folks who prefer ALICE over MOLLE. IMO, each one does some things better than the other one. I prefer ALICE magazine pouches to MOLLE, for example, because each ALICE mag pouch includes 2 grenade pouches. MOLLE gear you don't have built-in grenade pouches. I will admit that the MOLLE attachment system is better than the ALICE clips, though.

ALICE would also be nicely timed for our ATL. The belt and yoke are ideal but I would modify any Canadian-made straps to incorporate shoulder padding (perhaps as removable sleeves with the dressing loop built in to the pads instead?). The plastic entrenching tool carrier could be dumped (CAF no longer used 'em). I'm guessing that the 1960 CA plastic canteen was based on a US Army original ... so ALICE canteen cover should work.

That gets into what camouflage color/pattern the Canucks were wearing then. IIRC even the US is mostly "pickle suit" green or has just adopted Woodland Battle Dress Uniform. Funny enough, the Vietnam "Tiger Stripe" pattern works pretty well in pine forests.

The standard CAF helmet covers of the day were OG 107 cloth with netting also seen (with or without 'rags'). On US options, 'Woodland' seems to have been optimised for broadleaf forests.

Interesting about 'Tiger Stripe'. That might be a starting point for a dedicated CAF camo pattern for 4CMBG. (After all, RW, it took the Germans 15 years to get from Truppenversuch 76 to full issue of Flecktarn!)
 
Eliminating bullpups was a nod to conservative Canadian attitudes towards small arms. But it is also a recognition of the end days of a functioning Commonwealth. For over half a century, Canadian officialdom followed whatever the Brits did. By the '70s, aping y'all felt like a path towards independence (hence the strong pro-Colt AR-15 leanings).
I was actually leaning more towards FAMAS than towards SA80 in this case.



Within Canadian light infantry units, there have long been specialist battalions - rotary-wing air assault, parachute deployment, etc. Tactical helicopters attached to 4CMBG were experimented with at one point (as part of 1 Canadian Air Group at CFB Baden-Sollingen - no 'RCAF' in the 1970s). AFAIK, by the time 444 THS was established, all deployed helicopters were recce spotters (with Bell CH-136 Kiowas replacing Hiller CH-112 Nomads).

The absence of TacHel for 4CMBG is one reason that I have emphasised procuring faster-moving APCs for the containment role behind the lines. The unspoken bit is that, with the distance from their bases, Canadian MechInf and light infantry would need road mobility to move up to operational areas at the first sign of any WarPac unpleasantness.
Gotcha. Still think that helicopters would be important, but idjits in charge gonna idjit.



So, yeah, the Galil would be a top contender (possibly in consultation with Valmet on the winter warfare features of the RK 62 series ... bringing the Galil back to its Finnish roots). On STANAG 4179, that comes a bit too late for our ATL C7A1/C8A1 (proposed Oct 1980). So, maybe standard 30-rd mags are adopted for a mid-'80s C7A2/C8A2 series?
Ah, I didn't realize that the STANAG magazines were that "recent".

So yes, Galils with the Israeli-standard 35rd magazine would be the likely winner. IIRC the "ACE" magazine well is a separate piece that can be added to existing Galils with some machine work to the receiver.



ALICE would also be nicely timed for our ATL. The belt and yoke are ideal but I would modify any Canadian-made straps to incorporate shoulder padding (perhaps as removable sleeves with the dressing loop built in to the pads instead?). The plastic entrenching tool carrier could be dumped (CAF no longer used 'em). I'm guessing that the 1960 CA plastic canteen was based on a US Army original ... so ALICE canteen cover should work.
Huh. Thought the ALICE yoke had shoulder pads. Must have been either commercial "improved ALICE" or some custom work.



The standard CAF helmet covers of the day were OG 107 cloth with netting also seen (with or without 'rags').
Huh. Okay, that will make things interesting for where to upgrade.

On US options, 'Woodland' seems to have been optimised for broadleaf forests.
IIRC that is what it was designed around. Since most of the world is broadleaf, not conifer.


Interesting about 'Tiger Stripe'. That might be a starting point for a dedicated CAF camo pattern for 4CMBG. (After all, RW, it took the Germans 15 years to get from Truppenversuch 76 to full issue of Flecktarn!)
For what it's worth, the stripes really need to run vertically, not horizonally as in the actual Tiger Stripe.
 
I was actually leaning more towards FAMAS than towards SA80 in this case.

FAMAS prompts a rhetorical question. Why were French language-obsessed Canadian governments so unmotivated in procuring military equipment made in France?

Most of what we did buy from France were missiles - SS.11 and ENTAC - but DND later also chose GIAT's LG1 towed howitzer (which proved a less than stellar performer). Then there was the meh Franco-Canadian Eryx SRAAW(H) ATGM (but we don't talk about that anymore!).

Gotcha. Still think that helicopters would be important, but idjits in charge gonna idjit.

I guess the big question is: When the balloon goes up, are TacHel going to survive the trip in. Already being on the ground in the vicinity of where you were supposed to be positioned just seems both safer and more useful than choppering in at the last mo'.

Ah, I didn't realize that the STANAG magazines were that "recent".

So yes, Galils with the Israeli-standard 35rd magazine would be the likely winner. IIRC the "ACE" magazine well is a separate piece that can be added to existing Galils with some machine work to the receiver.

Interesting. So, two options then:

- 1: When STANAG 4179 is available, replacement C7A2/C8A2 weapons are issued to 4CMBG (then to the rest of Regs) and the C7A1/C8A1s (and their Israeli 25-rd mags) are passed down to the Res); or

- 2: All C7A1/C8A1s go through depot-level MLUs - a quick check-over + refurb, minor receiver mod, and STANAG 4179 is a go. Israeli mags are then disposed of.

Huh. Thought the ALICE yoke had shoulder pads. Must have been either commercial "improved ALICE" or some custom work.

Had to look that one up. Apparently, optional shoulder pads go all the way back to LK-1 ALICE. Not sure if those pads were GI or just available for private purchase? (Although that is not strictly relevant to our ATL if the kit is to made in Canada anyway.)

For what it's worth, the stripes really need to run vertically, not horizonally as in the actual Tiger Stripe.

Yes, especially true for helmet covers. Vertical stripes should help break up the helmet's outline better (especially when prone, lying amongst ground cover).
 
FAMAS prompts a rhetorical question. Why were French language-obsessed Canadian governments so unmotivated in procuring military equipment made in France?
Because French engineers copy no one, and no one copies the French? :D

But I still insist that the FAMAS is one of the best small arms in the world in the late 1970s.



I guess the big question is: When the balloon goes up, are TacHel going to survive the trip in. Already being on the ground in the vicinity of where you were supposed to be positioned just seems both safer and more useful than choppering in at the last mo'.
It does, but 4CMBG was supposed to be a reserve unit, which means going to where they are needed in a hurry.

And helicopters are a lot faster than whatever trucks or APCs at hand.



Interesting. So, two options then:

- 1: When STANAG 4179 is available, replacement C7A2/C8A2 weapons are issued to 4CMBG (then to the rest of Regs) and the C7A1/C8A1s (and their Israeli 25-rd mags) are passed down to the Res); or

- 2: All C7A1/C8A1s go through depot-level MLUs - a quick check-over + refurb, minor receiver mod, and STANAG 4179 is a go. Israeli mags are then disposed of.
Doing both might be possible. 4CMBG gets a few new production guns to swap out immediately, then the rest of them go through depot refurb. I assume that even after full issue of C7A1s, there's going to be a few damaged in service. Usually run over by trucks or tracks. So you have a pause to retool the factory for the ACE magwell anyway, make a big run of new guns for 4CMBG to make sure the fix works, then do the MLU through the factory.

Though this may also require replacing the ALICE ammo pouches, I'm not sure that the Galil mags fit into the US standard size. disregard, 35rd magazines are a little bigger than STANAG 30rd. So having ALICE style pouches made to fit Galil magazines won't be an issue, as the smaller STANAG magazines will fit in just fine.
 
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