Alternate Australian Defence Force 1970s Procurements?

We used a mix of the two, APC regiment had US CAV structures but without tanks, and the Rec roled CAV had hybrid UK structures.
Weird...


The APC CAV, i.e. 3 and 4 CAV Regts, later the amalgamated 3/4CAV, was based on a troop with 14 M-113 and one ACV, with three four vehicle Sections and a HQ with two M-113 and one ACV.

The Rec CAV Troop was two LRV (M-113), two MRV (M-113 with a Scorpion Turret), and one APC (M-113 identical to the other two but with a section of assault Troops/ Cavalry Scouts).
Interesting.



In the 70s I would group most of the M-113 into the two CAV (APC) Regiments (maybe have them as integrated reg reserve units), providing sufficient life for two infantry brigades. Each with a Rec element with LRV/MRV M-113 variants. 2 CAV would get CVRTs as would the reserve CAV units, using Spartans in place of the M-113/LRV and Scorpion in place of the MRV. Each troop would have two APC-roled Spartans (as was down when the ASLAV was procured) to compensate for the smaller troop capacity.
That mix would probably make a good operational setup, but would be a PITA logistically. Maybe Oz could be one of the first to diesel-swap the CVRTs with Cummins 5.9L 6BTAs, though it's looking like that engine wasn't introduced until 1988ish.
 
Thing is, you don't have to adopt the US cavalry model.

That you did in one place but not in the other is what is weird.
One exercise I was on, we reroled from CAV to APC for the duration. Each Troop became a section, our Trp Commander (LT) and SGT stepped away and the CPL took over, we had sufficient extra personnel to cover the two vacant slots. Our rec sqn became an APC troop supporting Company Level operations for the exercise.

The next big exercise we did, we were primarily in our rec role, but did do a couple of days as APC to give the infantry experience.

Souport wise the CVRT would be easier, so long as there were sufficent spares available. The M-113 was basically still in its Vietnam spec and was a maintenance hog. Eventually, reserve units lost their armour and got Land Rovers instead, this was because the M-113 were upgraded and additional regular infantry Btns were mechanised.

We would have lost the flexibility to switch between rec and APC, but as mine-protected wheeled vehicles became more prevalent from the 70s it wouldn't really have mattered.
 
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At least Australia was able to deploy a light cavalry unit . During my research on the subject I was astounded to find we'd actually been working on doctrinal theory since 1946 with some false starts in the 50s,60s, 70s and 80s.
The only reason they currently exist at now is that we're so short of heavy armour that that the Army has no choice . And they're hoping the public doesn't notice.
Seems to working we currently seem to have a small squadron of Leo 2s in Latvia and a couple of troops scattered across the country.
 
I was having a thought about armour options for the Army in the 70s.

CVRT family for CAV instead of M-113, allowing them to be retained for the APC role exclusively. In particular, I'm imagining a Spartan with a Cadillac Gage T-50 Turret forming the mainstay of the CMF CAV regiments and squadrons.

Personally I think it was a mistake for the Army to go for an all-tracked AFV force in the 60s. Keeping a wheeled option available to the Army is one reason I keep banging on about keeping the British wheeled AFVs in service once the M113s started arriving, after all these vehicles were only 10 years old when they started to get retired.

One reason why Project Waler fell over was due to the dilemma over the strategic vs tactical mobility of wheeled vs tracked AFVs and the selection of the ASLAV in 1991 shows the Army fell on the side the wheeled AFV.

Saladins, Saracens and Ferret Mk2s could undertake in 1959 the sort or trials that the batch of 15 LAV-25s undertook 30 years later to demonstrate the value of wheeled AFVs in the Australian context.
 
Personally I think it was a mistake for the Army to go for an all-tracked AFV force in the 60s. Keeping a wheeled option available to the Army is one reason I keep banging on about keeping the British wheeled AFVs in service once the M113s started arriving, after all these vehicles were only 10 years old when they started to get retired.

One reason why Project Waler fell over was due to the dilemma over the strategic vs tactical mobility of wheeled vs tracked AFVs and the selection of the ASLAV in 1991 shows the Army fell on the side the wheeled AFV.

Saladins, Saracens and Ferret Mk2s could undertake in 1959 the sort or trials that the batch of 15 LAV-25s undertook 30 years later to demonstrate the value of wheeled AFVs in the Australian context.
It was a mistake, Australia has always needed wheeled vehicles and aviation for strategic mobility.

Look at the ANZAC Mounted Corps in WWI, they had horses, obviously, mostly mounted infantry, but swords were reissued following Beersheba. What most don't realise is they made extensive use of aviation and motor vehicles by WWI standards. Australia didn't operate them but there were also tanks in theatre. Chauvel was pushing for the motorisation of the army after the war; actually, he wanted the government to repatriate the vehicles we had paid for and been using in Europe and the Middle East.

They didn't need to be fancy; armour kits for trucks designed to fit them would have sufficed, and we could have built them locally.

We had Staghound Armoured Cars, Daimler and Ferret Scout Cars, in addition to the small number of Saladins and Saracens. We could have easily justified the local production of something perfectly adequate.

Motorising the CMF is easy; a transport, motor or mech troop provides company lift, and a squadron lifts a battalion. Each Brigade could literally have a Service Corps Regiment (possibly integrated or even reserve with a regular cadre) to do just that. The important thing is having the depots and the trained personnel, as well as something for them to work on, build and maintain their skills. The gear doesn't need to be the latest and greatest; it just needs to be usable.

CMF CAV would handle the tactical reconnaissance mission for their brigade; this is where the CVRT would excel, possibly each Regt could have a CAV Sqn with CVRT and an APC Sqn, maybe even a tank Sqn as well (this would fit the Infantry division scale of equipment, i.e. one tank Btn/Regt per Division).

An Armoured Cavalry Regiment (US type) is a Corps level capability; there logically would be one, and it would have at least one regular Squadron. This would be Wheeled for strategic mobility.

Now, if I had Visio, as I do at work, I could sketch a structure up.

Basically, mobility, including wheeled APCs are a Service Corps function.

Tactical rec is primarily and CAV function with tracked vehicles

Organic rec is a function of the unit, and is wheeled, Scout Car, Armoured Car, 4x4.

I need to think about it more. I did some work years ago, mostly in structures I set up in a buggy old game, that sucked as a game but was great for building force structures (I cannot remember the name of it). Basically, I built what I saw as the ultimate Australian Army of the early 90s, which, of course was based on what was in existence in the 70s and 80s.

Found it, Patriot. I will see if I can find it somewhere to download is it was great for building armies. It had a library with basically all the good Cold War gear from the 50s to the 80s.
 
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My thoughts on armour in the ADF.

Corps troops (predominantly CMF for mobilisation)
  • A tank brigade with several tank regiments to provide sufficient armour for one tank platoon/troop per infantry battalion.
  • An armoured cavalry regiment (predominantly wheeled) with multiple squadrons, each capable of independent operations, and an organic aviation squadron.
  • Corps Aviation Brigade
  • Corps artillery, including heavy guns, rockets, missiles and theatre air defence.
  • Corps engineering brigade, including construction, pioneer and assault regiments.
An armoured brigade with
  • two tank regiments
  • two armoured infantry battalions.
  • a cavalry regiment including tactical rec
  • one SPG Regiment
  • one composite aviation regiment
  • one armoured combat engineer regiment
  • brigade support elements.
A light infantry brigade that includes
  • mountain/jungle battalion
  • marine battalion
  • parachute battalion
  • light CAV Regiment
  • Amphibious Armoured Regiment
  • airmobile field regiment
  • airmobile engineer regiment
  • brigade support elements
CMF Brigades
  • CAV Regiment CVRT
  • Infantry Battalions
  • Field Artillery Regiment
  • Combat Engineer Regiment
  • Brigade support troops
 
That's a lot of AFVs @Volkodav .

During the Cold War Australia bought:
  • 51 Churchills
  • 143 Centurions (all variants)
  • 174 Ferret Mk1
  • 100 Ferret Mk2
  • 15 Saladin
  • 30 Saracen
  • 817 M113 (all variants)
  • 103 Leopard 1 (all variants)
I doubt even the best use of these numbers could equip your proposed force structure.
 
That's a lot of AFVs @Volkodav .

During the Cold War Australia bought:
  • 51 Churchills
  • 143 Centurions (all variants)
  • 174 Ferret Mk1
  • 100 Ferret Mk2
  • 15 Saladin
  • 30 Saracen
  • 817 M113 (all variants)
  • 103 Leopard 1 (all variants)
I doubt even the best use of these numbers could equip your proposed force structure.
8th/13th VMR operated Grants until 1957 when they converted to Centurions. They rerolled to Rec in 59 but retained a small number (one troop?) of Centurions until the early 70s.

4/19 PWLH operated Grants into the 50s, then was reequipped with Centurions before converting to Rec in the early 60s.

1st RNSWL Matildas then Centurions

15th NRL, also Matildas then Centurions

An armoured Regiment had 39 Centurions, and there were two CMF Armoured Brigade Headquarters.
 
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8th/13th VMR operated Grants until 1957 when they converted to Centurions. They rerolled to Rec in 59 but retained a small number (one troop?) of Centurions until the early 70s.

4/19 PWLH operated Grants into the 50s, then was reequipped with Centurions before converting to Rec in the early 60s.

1st RNSWL Matildas then Centurions

15th NRL, also Matildas then Centurions

An armoured Regiment had 39 Centurions, and there were two CMF Armoured Brigade Headquarters.

IIUC only 2 of those CMF units operated the Centurion into the 60s and even 70s, and I think in single digit numbers for tank-infantry familiarisation. There certainly wasn't squadron or regiment strength exercises, let alone enough tanks to equip a pair of 39 tank Armoured Regiments as well as 1st AR.

According to The Royal New South Wales Lancers they only got their 1st Centurion at Lancer Brracks in 1965, with 3 tanks by 1968, prior to this all training and instruction was conducted at the Armoured Centre, Puckapunyal.

I've attached the Army Journals from 1960 that show the structure of the Armoured Units for the Pentropic Division. These are aspirational as these weren't enough Recce vehicles for the Recce regiment and the APC regiment didn't get any vehicles until 1965, as the Pentropic Division was dropped.
 

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I wonder if this would have been a better use of the Armys AFV's in the Regular Army & CMF in the 60s
Each Brigade has an APC Regiment to provide lift and Each Division has a Armoured and Recce Regiment.
Probably would require more AFVS to be brought
 
I wonder if this would have been a better use of the Armys AFV's in the Regular Army & CMF in the 60s
Each Brigade has an APC Regiment to provide lift and Each Division has a Armoured and Recce Regiment.
Probably would require more AFVS to be brought
US ran their trucks like that in WW2, and IIRC has not done so since then. It does not work well.

Armour and Recce Regiments for each Division is likely doable. (IIRC the US Army did that in WW2)

I still think that 3 divisions; 1 airmobile, 1 motorized, and 1 armored is the better option. (if Oz has more than 3 divisions do it in multiples of 3)
 
US ran their trucks like that in WW2, and IIRC has not done so since then. It does not work well.

Armour and Recce Regiments for each Division is likely doable. (IIRC the US Army did that in WW2)

I still think that 3 divisions; 1 airmobile, 1 motorized, and 1 armored is the better option. (if Oz has more than 3 divisions do it in multiples of 3)
That was the plan for the army before project waler was cancelled, 1 airmobile/light/amphibious division, 1 motorised division and 1 mechanised division
 
I wouldn't be getting too excited by the Divisions, the last time Australia gathered formed Divisions was in March 1958 when 3rd Division arranged a parade of all its Victorian units and conducted a Brigade live fire exercise in 1959. With the winding down of 50s conscription into the CMF starting in 1957 the Brigade became the largest formation the ADF would deploy as a field formation. Sure, the 2nd and 3rd divisions existed on paper on and off during the Cold War, but mainly as administration for Reserve units rather than realistic field formations.

While Thailand deployed a Division to Vietnam and S.Korea a Corps of 2 Divisions and a Brigade compared to Australia's Brigade Group, neither of these countries supplied their own helicopters, transport or bombing aircraft, logistic or fighting ships. Adding these and other supporting arms/services to Australia's Vietnam commitment closes the gap a lot.
 
As a tangent, rather than aiming for divisions I think the aim would be to maximise 'jointness' and to use as many capabilities as possible for any particular deployment. There were some tentative steps toward joint operations in Vietnam with RAAF 9 Sqn helicopters assigned to 1ATF HQ and the RAAFie was 2IC of 1ATF. However, the 35sqn Caribou, 2 Sqn Canberra and RAN Destroyers did not operate primarily in support of 1ATF and were not commanded by it or Australian Forces Vietnam.

So instead of thinking we need to deploy a Division, instead a force could be a Brigade with a composite RAAF Wing of combat and support aircraft and a composite Navy Task Group of warships and supporting ships. The 'deployment' HQ would then command all these elements and how they could support each other.
 
IIUC only 2 of those CMF units operated the Centurion into the 60s and even 70s, and I think in single digit numbers for tank-infantry familiarisation. There certainly wasn't squadron or regiment strength exercises, let alone enough tanks to equip a pair of 39 tank Armoured Regiments as well as 1st AR.

According to The Royal New South Wales Lancers they only got their 1st Centurion at Lancer Brracks in 1965, with 3 tanks by 1968, prior to this all training and instruction was conducted at the Armoured Centre, Puckapunyal.

I've attached the Army Journals from 1960 that show the structure of the Armoured Units for the Pentropic Division. These are aspirational as these weren't enough Recce vehicles for the Recce regiment and the APC regiment didn't get any vehicles until 1965, as the Pentropic Division was dropped.
It is actually a viable model, small numbers at the unit for training, most vehicles located at the main training area. Ideally Australia would have procured additional vehicles, a great start would have been to have acquired the planned Comets and additional Centurions.

Even assuming they didn't, there is nothing stopping the expansion of armour in the 70s. The plans existed, the structures had existed, the only thing missing was the actual vehicles.
 
It is actually a viable model, small numbers at the unit for training, most vehicles located at the main training area. Ideally Australia would have procured additional vehicles, a great start would have been to have acquired the planned Comets and additional Centurions.

Even assuming they didn't, there is nothing stopping the expansion of armour in the 70s. The plans existed, the structures had existed, the only thing missing was the actual vehicles.

And the lack of a suitable Defence Policy and a realistic threat to drive the creation of one.

The only way the ADF is getting more AFVs for the Reserves is to use them, and the transition from the CMF as the centrepiece of the Army to the Regulars 1957-65 was way too messy and destructive for that to happen.

FWIW the Authorised strength of the CMF 1951-57 was 82,000, 1958-59 was 51,000 and 1960 onwards 30,000 but the combination of ending conscription and the pentropic 'reforms' meant that the CMF actual strength shrank to only 20,000 in 1960 but crept up to 27,000 by 1964. The Authorised strength of the Regular Army in 1960 was 21,000 and this crept up over the years to I think about 24,000 by about 1964, which was never met due to the booming civilian economy of the time.
 
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It is actually a viable model, small numbers at the unit for training, most vehicles located at the main training area. Ideally Australia would have procured additional vehicles, a great start would have been to have acquired the planned Comets and additional Centurions.

Even assuming they didn't, there is nothing stopping the expansion of armour in the 70s. The plans existed, the structures had existed, the only thing missing was the actual vehicles.
Have u got any more information on tge planned acquisition of the comet?
 
And the lack of a suitable Defence Policy and a realistic threat to drive the creation of one.

The only way the ADF is getting more AFVs for the Reserves is to use them, and the transition from the CMF as the centrepiece of the Army to the Regulars 1957-65 was way too messy and destructive for that to happen.

FWIW the Authorised strength of the CMF 1951-57 was 82,000, 1958-59 was 51,000 and 1960 onwards 30,000 but the combination of ending conscription and the pentropic 'reforms' meant that the CMF actual strength shrank to only 20,000 in 1960 but crept up to 27,000 by 1964. The Authorised strength of the Regular Army in 1960 was 21,000 and this crept up over the years to I think about 24,000 by about 1964, which was never met due to the booming civilian economy of the time.
Policy can and has changed very quickly and on multiple occasions, just look at plan Beersheba versus the current drive for long range fires and amphibosity.
 
Policy can and has changed very quickly and on multiple occasions, just look at plan Beersheba versus the current drive for long range fires and amphibosity.
Yep......
Initiative, is lacking due to our idelogical obsession of needing to be subordinate to a larger leading power, which we coin 'allied'/'alliance' :confused:

Regards
Pioneer
 
There is a pattern that many historians and strategists are well aware of, When there is fear of conflict, money becomes available, but long term planning falls by the way. Once the threat is over or reduces, there is planning based on experience, but the money gets turned off.

Peace-time strategies and policies in nations not planning on aggressive expansion prioritise things other than defence and tend to look at going as cheap as possible on defence, but often without any in depth strategy.

There have been exceptions, Beersheba was one of them, the late 80s white paper, in particular its naval strategy, come to mind.
 
There have been exceptions, Beersheba was one of them, the late 80s white paper, in particular its naval strategy, come to mind.
I'm not a fan of what plan Beersheba. It was rushed for Afghanistan deployments. The old and now current strategy of 1 mechanised brigade, 1 motorised brigade & 1 light/airbourne/amphibious brigade have and serves the army better than Beersheba Combat Brigades.
The ate 80s naval strategy was the plan to increase the Escort numbers to 17? also included the colins class subs?
 
There is a pattern that many historians and strategists are well aware of, When there is fear of conflict, money becomes available, but long term planning falls by the way. Once the threat is over or reduces, there is planning based on experience, but the money gets turned off.

Peace-time strategies and policies in nations not planning on aggressive expansion prioritise things other than defence and tend to look at going as cheap as possible on defence, but often without any in depth strategy.

There have been exceptions, Beersheba was one of them, the late 80s white paper, in particular its naval strategy, come to mind.
Yeah, ya not bloody wrong there!!


Regards
Pioneer
 
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Policy can and has changed very quickly and on multiple occasions, just look at plan Beersheba versus the current drive for long range fires and amphibosity.

The policy is needed in 1972 and 1976 white papers. If in these white papers a firm capability target was laid out then that could be procured against. As it was 'defence self reliance' was too vague to procure much against.

A few pages back I suggested a 1976 white paper strategy of self reliance in medium intensity conflict in our close region with our nieghbours. I don't know if that strategy gets the AFVs you want, but it certainly would provide a reasonable target to procure to from 1976.
 
The policy is needed in 1972 and 1976 white papers. If in these white papers a firm capability target was laid out then that could be procured against. As it was 'defence self reliance' was too vague to procure much against.

A few pages back I suggested a 1976 white paper strategy of self reliance in medium intensity conflict in our close region with our nieghbours. I don't know if that strategy gets the AFVs you want, but it certainly would provide a reasonable target to procure to from 1976.
Malcolm Frazer was Defmin from 69 to 71 and Army Minister before that, this wold have been an ideal time for a White Paper.

Frazer was quoted in defence, aviation, and maritime press on various plans during his tenure.
(I really wish the old flight magazine archives were still available, there were some real gems in there)
  • Two ocean navy (which did happen but took decades longer than planned)
  • 3 carriers and 23 destroyers and frigates to support this.
  • 10 DDLs (original plans were for a total of 10 FFGs so the planned number remained consistent for some time)
  • Cooperative program for Type 21 Amazon Class frigates (this may have been instead of the DDL, or maybe in addition to it once DDL became a destroyer replacement)
  • Supersonic Lead In Fighter Trainer to replace the Sabres used in the role, intended to be combat capable, 100 airframes
  • 100 Jaguars (possibly a LIFT alternative or maybe a separate addition to RAAF combat capability, it makes sense when
  • 36 F-4E, 6 -12 RF-4C/E and 6 KC-135 if the F-111 was cancelled
  • 6 options for RF-111 that were later converted to acquired 4 F-111A converted to Cs as attrition replacements
  • Consideration of USAF taking the F-111C fleet and converting them to F-111E or FB-111A configuration, allowing their replacement by another type, possibly F-111D, or the aforementioned Phantom option.
  • 12 AH-1G Gunships
  • Starlifter or Galaxy to supplement Hercules
  • Hawk
A white paper around this time would have been very interesting.
 
I was thinking on the seemingly contradictory aircraft number for the RAAF and realised that the Mirage was planned to start being replaced in the 70s and this was only averted by cutting one of the four squadrons and introducing a minimal life extension and upgrade program (DSTO developed structural patches etc. Matra Magic missiles and new 30mm ammunition stocks).

Anyway, there were many different options, including one for 50 F-15 and 50 AV-8B, with the AV-8B to serve in the FAA as a Skyhawk replacement. This would have left a shortfall in RAAF light attack, assuming the F-111 and not the Phantom buy went ahead.

This is where a supersonic, combat capable LIFT would fit, and or 100 Jaguars.

Potentially resulting in an ORBAT of
  • 2 Sqn and 1 OCU, or 3 Sqn of F-15
  • 2 Sqn of F-111
  • 3 or 4 Sqn of Jaguar
  • 3 FAA Sqn for AV-8B (even in the 70s it was planned to acquire either Sea Harrier or upgraded AV-8B+, which was already on the drawing board)
 
  • Two ocean navy (which did happen but took decades longer than planned)
  • 3 carriers and 23 destroyers and frigates to support this.
  • 10 DDLs (original plans were for a total of 10 FFGs so the planned number remained consistent for some time)
  • Cooperative program for Type 21 Amazon Class frigates (this may have been instead of the DDL, or maybe in addition to it once DDL became a destroyer replacement)
So the RAN in this white paper
  • 3 Carriers which I'm guessing would either the modified Iwo Jima class or modified invincible class with AV-8B+ replacing A-4s
  • 23 escorts (3-4x Perth Class, 6x River Class & 14-13x Australianised Type 21 & DDL Class
  • 8 Oberon Class Subs
  • Supersonic Lead In Fighter Trainer to replace the Sabres used in the role, intended to be combat capable, 100 airframes
  • 100 Jaguars (possibly a LIFT alternative or maybe a separate addition to RAAF combat capability, it makes sense when
  • 36 F-4E, 6 -12 RF-4C/E and 6 KC-135 if the F-111 was cancelled
  • 6 options for RF-111 that were later converted to acquired 4 F-111A converted to Cs as attrition replacements
  • Consideration of USAF taking the F-111C fleet and converting them to F-111E or FB-111A configuration, allowing their replacement by another type, possibly F-111D, or the aforementioned Phantom option.
  • 12 AH-1G Gunships
  • Starlifter or Galaxy to supplement Hercules
  • Hawk
RAAF
  • Possibly CAC CA-31 most likely Jaguar for supersonic LIFT & light attack role with 100 Airframes
  • AH-1G no brainer
  • How many Starlifter/Galaxy were proposed for the RAAF?
  • 75 F-15 to replace Mirage III (like the F-18 Buy)
  • Hawk replacing Aeromacchis
What were the Army's plans during this time period?
 
So the RAN in this white paper
  • 3 Carriers which I'm guessing would either the modified Iwo Jima class or modified invincible class with AV-8B+ replacing A-4s
  • 23 escorts (3-4x Perth Class, 6x River Class & 14-13x Australianised Type 21 & DDL Class
  • 8 Oberon Class Subs

RAAF
  • Possibly CAC CA-31 most likely Jaguar for supersonic LIFT & light attack role with 100 Airframes
  • AH-1G no brainer
  • How many Starlifter/Galaxy were proposed for the RAAF?
  • 75 F-15 to replace Mirage III (like the F-18 Buy)
  • Hawk replacing Aeromacchis
What were the Army's plans during this time period?
3 carriers, I have no idea, probably assumed to be surplus CTOL types (Hermes and Victorious?) to supplement Melbourne in the early 70s, then STOVL types from the mid 70s.

DDL was planned to supplement the 3 Darings, 3-4 Perths and 6 Rivers.

Remember, late 60s, although two additional Rivers had been ordered to replace Voyager, Duchess had been loaned for this purpose as well, and she was bought outright in 1972. Late 60s, and there was still a very real possibility that a fourth DDG would be ordered.

So when you add it up 3 Daring, 4 Perth, 6 River and 10 DDL or Amazon comes to 23.

The same applies for 4 Perth, 6 River, 3 DDL and 10 Amazon, assuming the later Tartar/Standard SM-1 DDL becomes a Daring replacement. 10 Amazons because that was the number originally assumed for the FFG total buy, and one of the reasons Zummwalt's low-end FFG was adopted, so we could afford more of them.

The plan was a single sqn for strategic lift. I believe the intent was 12 Starlifter, but as production was scheduled to end, this was swapped to 6 Galaxy.

The 50 Eagles was because it was a predominantly air superiority type and a strike types was desired to supplement it. This is why I wasn't sure about whether the Jag was a LIFT or a strike type. Retaining the leased Phantoms would have done as well, or perhaps a later buy of Hornets or F-16s. Had the Phantoms been retained, then the F-15E would have become an option to replace them in the 90s.

Whitlam was elected in 1972, and Australia's involvement in Vietnam was announced prior to that. This is when a lot of these plans changed, i.e. only three, DDLs, then they were cancelled, and an initial two FFGs were eventually ordered. The LIFT program went away, although that may have been linked to the earlier Mirage IIID order. The fighter replacement was delayed, as wetre other programs, but ironically the Tank replacement proceeded, it likely would have been better it it had been delayed as many vastly superior vehicles became available in the late 70s, early 80s.
 
Here is the 1972 Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, which was intended to be the first Defence White Paper but due to the looming election which the Coalition lost to Labor it was released a Parliamentary Paper instead. This paper was written by Sir Arthur Tange, Secretary of Deference who oversaw the amalgamation of the Departments of Defence, Army, Navy, Air Force and Supply in 1973 under Whitlam.

As for the various things mentioned by the likes of Malcolm Fraser, they can be considered ideas rather than concrete plans of action, like Air Marshal Murdoch mentioning Harriers in opposition to the idea of AH1G helicopter gunships. The 1972 Paper doesn't provide a shopping list, rather it mentioned capabilities that the ADF had at the time and when they could be expected to need replacement.

Ideally the 1976 White Paper could mention a specific capability that the ADF should prepare for.
 
Ive been thibking how useful would have it been to do a midlife rebuild on the river class like the dutch did with there type 12s.
Replace the 4.5inch gun with OTO Melara 76mm gun
Add harpoon missile launcher
Remove the limbo mortar for helo deck
Upgraded Ikara to the proposed Super Ikara version
Would it be possible to replace secat with seasparrow?
This would keep the river viable for longer meaning they can stay in service for longer till there replacements are built, not be decommissioned a few years before replacememts are built
 
Ive been thibking how useful would have it been to do a midlife rebuild on the river class like the dutch did with there type 12s.
Replace the 4.5inch gun with OTO Melara 76mm gun
Add harpoon missile launcher
Remove the limbo mortar for helo deck
Upgraded Ikara to the proposed Super Ikara version
Would it be possible to replace secat with seasparrow?
This would keep the river viable for longer meaning they can stay in service for longer till there replacements are built, not be decommissioned a few years before replacememts are built

I think you might be trying to do too much.

IIUC Limbo were generally replaced by triple lightweight torpedos, and you can't have a helicopter and Ikara due to weight. The 76mm and removing Sea Cat should free up weight for Sea Sparrow, but I don't know about Harpoon due to space if not weight.
 
I think you might be trying to do too much.

IIUC Limbo were generally replaced by triple lightweight torpedos, and you can't have a helicopter and Ikara due to weight. The 76mm and removing Sea Cat should free up weight for Sea Sparrow, but I don't know about Harpoon due to space if not weight.
So torpedo tubes to replace limbo. I know the dutch managed to get harpoons into there type 12s doing a similar rebuild, they also had 2 seacat launchers with there. So there should be weight for sea sparrow amd harpoons
 
So torpedo tubes to replace limbo. I know the dutch managed to get harpoons into there type 12s doing a similar rebuild, they also had 2 seacat launchers with there. So there should be weight for sea sparrow amd harpoons

Here's a question, if the ADF was on a higher trajectory in the 80s and replaced Melbourne with a 'Harrier Carrier' would the ADF still go 'Harpoon mad' in the 80s?
 
Here's a question, if the ADF was on a higher trajectory in the 80s and replaced Melbourne with a 'Harrier Carrier' would the ADF still go 'Harpoon mad' in the 80s?
I would say yes, cause the ddl was meant to have harpoon launches and this was before they started looking into melbournes replacement. Plus it gives the escort force a boast in standoff firepower when operating by themselves with out melbournes replacement
 
Here's a question, if the ADF was on a higher trajectory in the 80s and replaced Melbourne with a 'Harrier Carrier' would the ADF still go 'Harpoon mad' in the 80s?
Probably yes, it does make a certain sense .
As I recall AV8 B+ has a combat radius of roughly 400 NMI.add to that 60 NMI. range of the AGM 84 series.
What's not to like?
 
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Ships with Mk13 launchers, F18s and P3Cs are no brainers for Harpoon, but what about the significant effort that went into making F111 and Oberon-class subs Harpoon capable? Given the huge cost of a new carrier and CAG would it be worth it to convert those platforms?
 
Ships with Mk13 launchers, F18s and P3Cs are no brainers for Harpoon, but what about the significant effort that went into making F111 and Oberon-class subs Harpoon capable? Given the huge cost of a new carrier and CAG would it be worth it to convert those platforms?
Yes it would be as it give australia a long range and more flexible anti ship deterent. Think u could have the carrier attacking the enemy fleet from one angle while the obreons with therw stealth and f111s with there range can attack from different angles. Or they could interdict the enemies supply lines with harpoons aswell. In my opinion the ADF would go harpoon mad even with a harrier carrier
 
Here's a question, if the ADF was on a higher trajectory in the 80s and replaced Melbourne with a 'Harrier Carrier' would the ADF still go 'Harpoon mad' in the 80s?
I believe so. Ship-wise, the canister launchers can go just about anywhere there's open deck space and topweight allowance. Anything with a US Mk13 is physically compatible with Harpoon already, just install the appropriate fire control console.

P-3s are an obvious matchup, MPAs should carry a couple of AShMs as standard.
F-111s would be for long-range interdiction.
F-18s were natively compatible IIRC.
Harriers were not natively compatible, but the AV-8B+ version with a cut-down Hornet radar I believe were natively compatible.

This just leaves the subs, and at the time IIRC the US was happy to sell control logic to everyone. The RN had Harpoons, Japanese MSDF had Harpoons, I think all of NATO was approached to give their subs Harpoons.
 
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