Alternative RAF, 1936-41?

Does anyone know when the prototypes for the Fairey P.4/34 and Hawker Henley were ordered?

The British Aircraft Specifications File says "Two prototypes of each design were ordered in November 1934?"

That doesn't doesn't look right to me as Specification P.4/34 was issued to tender on 12.11.34

I think a few months would pass between issuing the specification and ordering the aircraft. The aircraft firms have to prepare their tenders that the Air Ministry has to examine before it decides which designs are the best before ordering any prototypes. E.g. 4 months passed between the issuing of Spec. F.36/34 to Hawker in August 1934 and the letting of Contract 357483/34 for the sole Hurricane prototype on 01.12.34.

Also the serial numbers were K5099 & K7555 for the for the Fairey P.4/34 and K5115 & K7554 for the Henley prototypes. That leads me to think that the K7554 and K7555 were ordered sometime after K5099 & K5115 because they'd have had consecutive serial numbers if they'd been ordered on the same date.
 
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More questions about the Hawker Henley.
  • When was Contract 540805/36 for 400 Hawker Henleys let to Gloster?
  • When was it reduced to 200 aircraft?
    • According to the Putnams on RAF aircraft the number on order was reduced to 200 aircraft in May 1937.
    • Can anyone corroborate that?
  • When did the first Gloster-built Henley fly?
    • I know when it was delivered (November 1938) but I want to know when it first flew too.
Two questions about the Hawker Hotspur.
  • When was Contract 527115/36 for 389 Hawker Hotspurs let to Avro?
    • I think it was 03.06.36 because.
      • The first 600 Hurricanes were ordered to Contract 527112/36 on 03.06.36.
        • And.
      • The first 310 Spitfires were ordered to Contract 527113/36 on 03.06.36.
    • Can anyone confirm that the contract was let on 03.06.36?
  • When was the contract cancelled?
    • They were to have been built to Specification 17/36 and The British Aircraft Specification File says "It was clear that all factories in the Hawker Siddeley Group were committed to production of aircraft already accepted, and the Hotspur project to abandoned".
    • So the Boulton Paul Defiant (the Hotsupr's rival to Specification F.9/35) was ordered into production.
      • The first 87 production aircraft were ordered to Contract 62289/37 on 28.04.37.
      • The first production aircraft flew on 30.07.39 and they were delivered from August 1939 to May 1940.
    • Therefore, I think it was sometime between June 1936 and April 1937.
 
I unfortunately don’t have Colin Sinnot’s book where fleshes out his arguments in more detail but I have read his thesis online. And IIRC there is what seems to me to be a possibility to have the Henley (or something close) replace the Battle entirely.

In the 20’s the RAF had two kinds of bombers. Light types that were intended to use their speed to get in and out of French airspace (in the 20’s and 30’s the RAF’s abilities were measured against a conflict with France) quickly, minimizing the amount of time the AdA would have to intercept them. They were thus lightly armed and as light and fast as possible. The other type were heavier and slower but better armed. They would depend on their armament for defence and fly at night to avoid most of the strongest fighter defence. Somewhat paralleling the later Heavy bomber/Mosquito split.

In the late 20’s the fast light type was represented by the Hawker Hart while the heavy night bomber was the BP Sidestrand. The Hart was obviously the better of the two in almost every way. And they could both carry about the same bomb load!

The CAS of the day thought that this may prove that single engine bombers were just inevitably superior to twin engine types. He conceded, however, that it was an unfair contest as the Sidestrand was older and more obsolete than the Hart. He thus thought to use the specs intended to replace the two aircraft as a comparative test to settle the issue.

The Sidestrand was up for replacement first, and the advancements in technology allowed this spec to call for a doubled bomb load of 1000 lbs. I can’t remember exactly which aircraft ending up coming out of this spec but it might have been the Wellesley? In any case, when it came time to replace the Hart, the bomb load was also doubled so that the two specs could be compared directly. Despite the objections of Fairey and most likely others involved, both this spec and the single engine requirements were held to. And the result was the Battle. This came just in time to be locked in as the aircraft built by the early shadow factory program and was built in large numbers.

However, part way through the process, perhaps due to the objections of Fairey and others, it was realized that the enlarged aircraft was going to be more of a single engined medium bomber than a Hart replacement. Thus a second spec was issued reducing the bomb load back to 500 lbs and allowing for better performance. The winner of this one was the Henley with the Fairey P.4/34 being the runner up. However, by that time the official competitor had finally switched to Germany, and light bombers were considered to have neither the range nor the bomb load for the task at hand. Thus interest in the Henley died and those that were purchased were generally used for target towing.

So, if you can convince the CAS and/or the specifications writers for the OTL Battle spec that the increase in bomb load will be detrimental and that a real Hart replacement is needed first (or perhaps only) then what you will probably get is an earlier Henley and Fairey P.4/34. Possibly with slightly earlier engines. The winner will likely still be chosen to be built to train up new workers in the shadow factories and be built in numbers. It would then be punted off into the Army Cooperation squadrons as the RAF interest turns to longer range interdiction and strategic bombing. While the Battle (if it exists at all) will be used in other roles as the niche for light bombers is eliminated.

And, voila! You have pilots facing AA and enemy controlled skies in Henley’s instead of Battles! They will still be lost in large numbers and probably not achieve the results asked for, but a few more of them may survive.

Do you have the link to that thesis, think I have his book somewhere......definatley read something by him pointing out as you say France was considered the target when ranges and capability were being considered.
 
Contracts for Hawker Hurricanes that were let to Hawker Aircraft Limited.
  • One prototype to Contract 357483/34 let on 01.12.34.
    • Flight was on 06.11.35.
    • It was delivered to the Aeroplane & Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE) in February 1936.
  • 600 ordered to Contract 527112/36 on 03.06.36 for delivery by 31.03.39.
    • First flight of L5147 on 12.10.37.
    • Delivered 15.12.37 to 06.10.39 according to the Putnams on Hawker Aircraft.
    • Delivered December 1937 to November 1939 according to the Air Britain book on L1000 to L9999.
  • 300 ordered to Contract 692230/37 and delivered from 29.09.39 to 01.05.40.
    • That is according to the the Air Britain book on N1000 to N9999.
    • According to the Putnams on Hawker aircraft it was Contract 751458/38.
    • Although the Air Britain book on R1000 to R9999 says that 4 replacement aircraft were ordered to Contract 751458/38, but they were cancelled.
    • Which is correct? It could be both. They could have originally been ordered to one contract and then re-ordered to the other due to some
    • When were these contracts let?
  • 500 ordered to Contract 962371/38 and delivered from 21.02.40 to 20.07.40.
    • When was this contract let?
    • Bowyer wrote on Page 43 of "Aircraft for the Few" that 1,000 Hurricanes were ordered in November 1938. They may be the 500 aircraft ordered to this contract and the first 500 aircraft ordered from Gloster.
  • 48 which the sources said were to replace operational attrition.
    • 24 to Contract 962371/38 and delivered in July 1940.
    • 20 to Contract 964753/38 and delivered from September 1940 to January 1941.
    • 4 to Contract 751458/38 that were cancelled.
    • When were these replacement aircraft ordered?
  • 8,703 ordered to Contract 62305/39 of which 203 were cancelled and 8,500 were built.
    • They were delivered from 02.07.40 to 24.05.44.
    • This was the last contract let to Hawker and brought the total (including the prototype and replacements) to 10,152 Hurricanes ordered of which 207 were cancelled and 9,945 were built.
    • The 8,703 aircraft weren't ordered at once as the contract was divided into 19 parts.
    • Does anyone know if any were ordered before September 1939?
    • And if so, how many were ordered and on what date(s) were they ordered?
 
Production of the Hurricane by other firms.
The Gloster Aircraft Company Limited

3,020 ordered of which 270 were cancelled and 2,750 were delivered from November 1939 to March 1942.
  • 500 to Contract 962371/38 that were delivered from November 1939 to June 1940.
  • 100 to Contract 19773/39 that were delivered from July 1940 to August 1940.
  • 2,420 to Contract 85730/40 of which:
    • 270 were cancelled.
      • And.
    • 2,150 were delivered from August 1940 to March 1942.
Does anyone know when these contracts were let?
  • I think 962371/38 was let in November 1938. See Post 284 for why I think so.
  • Contract 85730/40 was in five parts.
The Austin Motor Company Limited.
  • 400 were ordered to Contract 124304/40.
  • The first aircraft flew on 08.10.40.
  • 300 were delivered from February 1941 to October 1942.
  • 100 were cancelled.
Does anyone know when this contract was let?

The Canadian Car & Foundry Company, Limited

1,055 were ordered to British account of which 2 were cancelled and 1,053 were built.
  • The pilot production batch of 40 aircraft were built to Contract 964753/38 which was let in November 1938.
    • The first aircraft flew on 10.01.40
    • They were delivered from March 1940 to August 1940.
  • This was followed by 1,013 aircraft built in five series production batches.
    • 100 delivered from November 1940 to April 1941.
    • 340 delivered from March 1941 to May 1942.
    • 100 delivered from March 1942 to January 1943.
    • 225 aircraft delivered from November 1941 to April 1942.
    • 248 delivered from April 1942 to June 1943.
Does anyone know when the series production aircraft were ordered?

Another 400 Hurricanes were built to Canadian account of which 150 were delivered to the RAF between June 1943 and July 1943. That brought the total number of CC&F Hurricanes to 1,455 ordered of which 2 were cancelled and 1,453 were built.

Summary
  • 15,027 Hurricanes ordered.
    • Of which.
  • 14,627 were to British account and 400 to Canadian account.
    • Of which.
  • 579 were cancelled.
    • And.
  • 14,448 were built.
    • Of which.
  • 14,198 received a British military serial number.
 
Theses are to expand the tree of knowledge.. and to correct Conventional Wisdom. Sinnott's multiple corrections include trashing that:
- Sir Geo DH forced his idea of a Speed Bomber (Mosquito) through a hostile bunch of Airships (that's in Postan's Weapons Official History);
- (then S/L, later AM) Sorley invented and implemented 8x .303 for Hurricane/Spitfire;
- Hurricane and Spitfire were initiated PV by visionary contrarians despite those Airships (Very Senior Officers)..

He also displays that area bombing was not a desperate response to 1939/40 Day Bomber attrition, but was of 1923 origin.
-
 
Colin S. Sinnott, The RAF and Aircraft Design Air Staff Operational Requirements 1923-1939, Routledge, 2014, isbn 9780415761307.
It's not the most exciting read, but is a great example of looking at how requirements (at multiple levels) were developed and then progressed into real hardware which was used operationally to then look at whether the requirements were correct.
 
This is a stimulating thread, which must not be allowed to fade away.

We have explored Type B instead of Type A: do we care to discuss the Task first, which defines the Types? RAF did Big Bombers before Others did, and stayed there longer. RAF had an Army Co-operation Command, 12/40-5/43, career-destroying. Goering built his Luftwaffe as aerial artillery, close-up, mud-movers. Unlike UK, though, he would fight on Land, no Empire. RAF's CAS ACM Sir C.Newall 1937 saw Army Co-op as “gross misuse of air forces” G.Smith, Herts.&Beds.Airfields in (WW2),C’side,99,P195.

July,1934 RAF Expansion Scheme A was to run to 3/39, Ministers now willing to spend v Germany and Japan, so shall we start there? UK differed from, say, USSR, in wanting to spend money, not men: 9/39 Chiefs: “rely (on economic pressure to defeat) Germany ...continue (Sea/Air blockade. PM did) not believe (trench) holocausts are required (we) are bound to win in the end” P.Kennedy, Rise&Fall Br.Naval Mastery, 01, Peng,P306.

France had begun to construct the Maginot Line in 1930 and in 1933 had No1 Air Force by size(1,650 a/c); RAF was No5 (850 a/c). What would be a better Scheme A?
.
 
Hi,

RAF did Big Bombers before Others did, and stayed there longer. RAF had an Army Co-operation Command, 12/40-5/43, career-destroying. Goering built his Luftwaffe as aerial artillery, close-up, mud-movers. Unlike UK, though, he would fight on Land, no Empire.

I believe Colin Sinnott in "The Royal Air Force and Aircraft Design 1923 - 1939" points out that the RAF motivation for four-engined bombers was that they would give the most tonnage on target in relation to the monetary investment necessary to build such a fleet. It was the best design compromise under the restrictions applying to and identified by the RAF, not necessarily a superior solution to twin-engined bombers (which the RAF also acquired in great numbers).

With regard to the Luftwaffe, their doctrine was to achieve and hold air superiority and then use air power to destroy the sources of enemy power. They were not really preparing for ground support, and considered it a wasteful employment of air power. See "Spearhead for Blitzkrieg", edited by Alfred Price.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
France had begun to construct the Maginot Line in 1930 and in 1933 had No1 Air Force by size (1,650 a/c); RAF was No5 (850 a/c). What would be a better Scheme A?
At 1934, the OTL Scheme C, plus the overseas squadrons in Scheme F. There's no point in going "full Scheme F" because the war reserves of aircraft will be obsolete by 1939.

Out out interest, what were the second, third and fourth air forces by size in 1933? Plus are the 1,650 French and 850 RAF aircraft in 1933 first-line aircraft, i.e. not including reserves and non-combat aircraft like trainers.
 
This is a stimulating thread, which must not be allowed to fade away.

We have explored Type B instead of Type A: do we care to discuss the Task first, which defines the Types? RAF did Big Bombers before Others did, and stayed there longer. RAF had an Army Co-operation Command, 12/40-5/43, career-destroying. Goering built his Luftwaffe as aerial artillery, close-up, mud-movers. Unlike UK, though, he would fight on Land, no Empire. RAF's CAS ACM Sir C.Newall 1937 saw Army Co-op as “gross misuse of air forces” G.Smith, Herts.&Beds.Airfields in (WW2),C’side,99,P195.

I'm all for this thread to continue.

Best part of the LW bomber force were the long-range bombers, like the He 111s, and the Ju 86s and Do 17s. The short-range attack types, like the Hs 123 and Ju 87, were a minority. Henning has it right at the above post (as he often is).

France had begun to construct the Maginot Line in 1930 and in 1933 had No1 Air Force by size(1,650 a/c); RAF was No5 (850 a/c). What would be a better Scheme A?

If we remove the 'turret fighter' doctrine/role, we open Boulton-Paul to make some actually useful fighters, like the Spitfires, or at least Hurricanes.
If the job of a bomber is to bomb, and bomb well something 500 miles away, neither the Battle nor Blenheim are the money well spent.

The Army cooperation role, that was actually 3-4 roles bundled together - light transport/liaison/med evac (?), observation for artillery, light bomber - was a bad specification that led to the Lysander: can do all, but it is not good in either role. Better split the roles, with a separate aircraft for each of them. A very light 2-seater for artillery spotting and liaison (something like the Cub, Auster or Storch), a light transport (something like the Norseman, or a widebody Lysander), and a light bomber that does not afraid of the enemy fighters that much (the bombed-up Gladiator as a low bar, a Dagger-powered Hurricane or the MB.2 as a high bar?). If a war if likely to be against a major continental power, like France or Germany, the number of aircraft will be high anyway, thus making a case for the task-specific type rather for the Jack of all trades, master of none.
 
Nom #293: Ex-SoS/AirL Londonderry, Wings of Destiny, Mac,43,P.88: 1/33: France, 1,650 a/c; USSR, 1300-1500; US/Italy, ea.1,000; UK, 850. P.106: in 3/34 UK was 6th.World Air Power (might that have promoted Germany?) Front line or total? He says "we had only 850 machines".
I suggest neither he nor anyone knew.
 
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HH #292: "the imperative behind the dive-bomber," settled by Goering as Ju.87, 1/34, is P.279,R.Meredith,Phoenix/II, Helion,2017. The point here is that RAF read its Task(s) as not needing what Germany did, while RAF (felt it) did need Heavies, as Goering (felt he) did not. Later, Germany attempted Big (Ural/Amerika)Bombers, RAF received dive bombers - seen as worthless. Who would welcome the job of Director, Opnl.Reqts?
 
Nom #293: Ex-SoS/AirL Londonderry, Wings of Destiny, Mac,43,P.88: 1/33: France, 1,650 a/c; USSR, 1300-1500; US/Italy, ea.1,000; UK, 850. P.106: in 3/34 UK was 6th.World Air Power (might that have promoted Germany?) Front line or total? He says "we had only 850 machines".
I suggest neither he nor anyone knew.
He probably didn't knew within a dozen or two.
What we know today was that Committee of Imperial Defense suggested by the mid-1930s that RAF should be much expanded. A view that was opposed by many in UK, but that was supported by, for example, Nevile Chamberlain, the future prime minister.

HH #292: "the imperative behind the dive-bomber," settled by Goering as Ju.87, 1/34, is P.279,R.Meredith,Phoenix/II, Helion,2017. The point here is that RAF read its Task(s) as not needing what Germany did, while RAF (felt it) did need Heavies, as Goering (felt he) did not. Later, Germany attempted Big (Ural/Amerika)Bombers, RAF received dive bombers - seen as worthless.
When the RAF received the dive bombers (basically, the Vultee Vengeance), they used it in CBI, and it seems nobody complained there. But by then, a decent fighter was capable to carry the similar payload to the similar distances, unlike what was the case, say, in the 1930s; a fighter, once the bombs are gone, does not need to worry as much about the enemy fighters than it will be the case with an usual dive bomber of the day. A fighter, being faster, usually smaller and more nimble, will also be less of a rewarding target to the AAA.

RAF was probably looking at what they need, much more than at what Germany didn't need (or didn't felt they need).

Who would welcome the job of Director, Opnl.Reqts?

I have no firm candidates.
 
Nom #293: Ex-SoS/AirL Londonderry, Wings of Destiny, Mac,43,P.88: 1/33: France, 1,650 a/c; USSR, 1300-1500; US/Italy, ea.1,000; UK, 850. P.106: in 3/34 UK was 6th.World Air Power (might that have promoted Germany?) Front line or total? He says "we had only 850 machines".
I suggest neither he nor anyone knew.
It will be first-line aircraft, i.e. not including reserves and non-operational types such as trainers.

Some FWIWs.

At 31.03.34 the RAF proper (i.e. excluding the FAA) had a front-line strength of 788 aircraft in 72 squadrons. See below for the fine details.
Link to Message 61 - Comparison of RAF Expansion Schemes A, C, F, L and M
There were also 159-162 front-line FAA aircraft in the equivalent of 13½ squadrons. That would have made a total of 947-950 front-line aircraft in the equivalent of 85½ squadrons.

One of the last editions of the Putnams "Aircraft of the Royal Air Force since 1918" had an appendix which had a list of RAF aircraft on charge at February 1935. That said 2,513 for the RAF proper and 429 in the FAA for a total of 2,942 aircraft.

I've not got my copy of Green & Fricker handy, but the 1,650 aircraft for France looks about right if the aircraft in the overseas commands and Aeronavale are included and I think they wrote that the RA had a front-line strength of 1,200 aircraft in 1933.
 
The Opening Message, uploaded on Sunday 7th November 2021.
What changes should've been imparted to the RAF in order to make things easier in the 1st two years of the ww2 for the UK & Commonwealth? What do we axe/cancel, what to insist upon? Bar the suggestion for more Spitfires, this is too obvious. What on the BC bombers' force? Commitment to the continent once things go south?
Not a thread about what should France do better :)
Message 291 posted earlier today (Friday 9th January 2025).
This is a stimulating thread, which must not be allowed to fade away.

We have explored Type B instead of Type A: do we care to discuss the Task first, which defines the Types? RAF did Big Bombers before Others did, and stayed there longer. RAF had an Army Co-operation Command, 12/40-5/43, career-destroying. Goering built his Luftwaffe as aerial artillery, close-up, mud-movers. Unlike UK, though, he would fight on Land, no Empire. RAF's CAS ACM Sir C.Newall 1937 saw Army Co-op as “gross misuse of air forces” G.Smith, Herts.&Beds.Airfields in (WW2),C’side,99,P195.

July,1934 RAF Expansion Scheme A was to run to 3/39, Ministers now willing to spend v Germany and Japan, so shall we start there? UK differed from, say, USSR, in wanting to spend money, not men: 9/39 Chiefs: “rely (on economic pressure to defeat) Germany ...continue (Sea/Air blockade. PM did) not believe (trench) holocausts are required (we) are bound to win in the end” P.Kennedy, Rise&Fall Br.Naval Mastery, 01, Peng,P306.

France had begun to construct the Maginot Line in 1930 and in 1933 had No1 Air Force by size(1,650 a/c); RAF was No5 (850 a/c). What would be a better Scheme A?
We should certainly start in 1934 because that gives us time to develop the aircraft that the RAF actually needed in 1939 rather than the aircraft the RAF thought it needed. That is write the specifications and order the prototypes (in double the numbers of OTL) so large-scale production contracts can be placed in the TTL version of Scheme F.
 
"Build a better Merlin aero engine, and the airframe industry will beat a path to your door"

Part of Message 115.
It has been said that Rolls-Royce's preoccupation with the Merlin I for the Battle hampered its efforts to sort out the rocker-box problems that led to Hurricane production being delayed by six months. Then as the Merlin I proved a flop in the Battle, Merlin IIs were used, further hampering Hurricane production. But by March 1938 Merlin production was 50 per month and was over 100 per month by June.
If that's correct the Hurricane would enter service with the RAF 4 months after the Gladiator instead of 10 months. IOTL the former entered service with the RAF in December 1937 and the latter in February 1937.

If the early problems with the Merlin engine can be avoided, does it automatically follow, that more powerful versions of the engine will enter service at least 6 months earlier too?

As we know that the Peregrine and Vulture will be cancelled, can they not be developed in the first place, so Rolls Royce can concentrate on improving the Merlin and getting the Griffon in to service sooner? AFAIK the engine that became the Griffon was started around the same time as the Merlin, but development was suspended for several years so RR could concentrate on the Merlin.

Part of Message 225.
What Calum Douglas said.

Is expanding the RR factory at Derby sooner, along with building the RR Crewe, RR Hillington and the Ford aero engine factory at Trafford Park at least a year earlier than IOTL allowed?
 
The other part of Message 225.
The 4 x 20m Hispano armed Supermarine Type 312 is selected for F.37/35 and ultimately goes into production with all the modifications proposed for the IRL Spitfire Mk. III (retractable tailwheel, modified undercarriage, new windshield, armour changes etc.) including the Merlin XX with the RAE carburettor.
FWIW Hawker tendered a four-cannon Hurricane to the same specification.
http://www.k5083.mistral.co.uk/PROJECTS.HTMExcept, the above says it was four Oerlikon cannon.

In addition to installing the four Hispano cannon and the Merlin XX engine with the RAE carburettor on the Hurricane and Spitfire sooner, please can we have the quick-release canopy and self-sealing fuel tanks in service before the Battle of Britain instead of after it?
 
As we know that the Peregrine and Vulture will be cancelled, can they not be developed in the first place, so Rolls Royce can concentrate on improving the Merlin and getting the Griffon in to service sooner? AFAIK the engine that became the Griffon was started around the same time as the Merlin, but development was suspended for several years so RR could concentrate on the Merlin.
This is from Lumsden's "British Piston Aero-Engines and their Aircraft"

"Griffon I
This engine originated from the 1925 Buzzard, whose enormous potential was finally realized in the 1931 'R' racing engine. It was natural that the engine was in line for development into the upper bracket of military power units, even more potent than the P.V.12 (Merlin) already planned. A de-rated version of the 'R', to be called the Griffon, was first run in 1933. The Griffon I never flew. There was considerable pressure to get on with the smaller engine, already planned for the new Hawker and Supermarine fighters and so active development did not continue until 1939. It was then extensively changed and made far more compact, as the Griffon II.

The Griffon II was a major redesign of the original engine, first run in November, 1939. It was generally similar to the earlier Rolls-Royce engines and the Merlin in particular, although of considerably larger capacity. It was necessary to keep its size and weight within the limits already imposed by the size and shapes of existing fighter aircraft. In order to do so, much thought went into redesigning the components so as to keep the engine's dimensions, particularly the overall length, to a minimum. As a result the camshaft drives and the first part of the of the step-up of the supercharger drive were removed from the rear of the engine to the front. The crankshaft driving them via a pinion and shafts. The supercharger drive was a long shaft running to the rear, in bearings beneath the crankshaft; the second part of the step-up drive was completed at the rear of the engine through the usual moderate and full supercharger clutches. At first, it was thought that the small diameter of this drive was adequate for the spring drive."

And it continues with other comments like

"..... The original type of supercharger drive was not altogether satisfactory and in subsequent Griffons it was changed so that both step-up gears reverted to the rear. The real trouble, in its original form, was that it was expensive to make, hence the reversion to the drive at the back of the engine....."

"....These compact arrangements thus made it possible for the Griffon to be squeezed into the Spitfire, even with two-stage supercharging, aftercooling and ultimately a third supercharger drive. The Griffon turned in the opposite direction from that of earlier engines and at a rather lower speed, having a different firing order from that of the Merlin and producing a harsher exhaust note...."

The 'R' racing engine dimensions were (length x width x height) 100 x 32 x 42 inches.

The Griffon dimensions were 72-81 (depending on version) x 30.3 x 46 inches.

Merlin prototype engine first ran 15 Oct 1933 i.e the same year as Griffon I. It passed Type A test in July 1934 and first flew 21 Feb 1935.

RR was still developing the Kestrel through to 1938 for the likes of the Miles Master I trainer (Kestrel XXX at 720hp was the most powerful version) with the Peregrine being a development from that for use in the Whirlwind. First run of the latter was 1938.

Vulture built on that development line being described by Lumsden as

"Vulture I 1,800hp (1939), resembled two Kestrel sized Vee-12 units with a common crankshaft mounted on a common crankcase, with a two speed, single stage supercharger. A 24-cylinder, 90-degree X shaped engine. Virtually two Peregrines, one above the other on a single crankcase with all four banks of connecting rods operating on a single crankshaft."

First run was in May 1937.

RR was also working on the air-cooled 24 cylinder X layout Exe engine (also known as the Boreas) which first ran in Sept 1936. Intended for the Barracuda.

I suppose one question that needs to be answered is where was the general market in 1933 for an engine of the power of the 'R' engine (designed for 1,500 hp but developed to 2,350 hp in 1931 form). The early Merlins with about 1,000hp were adequate for the new fighters. It was the specs for new heavy / medium bombers arising in 1935/36 that drove the need for more powerful engines. By that time Griffon I development had been shelved. It seems to me that it was problems with Vulture development that saw Griffon once again become of interest but in the very much modified Griffon II form.
 
I suppose one question that needs to be answered is where was the general market in 1933 for an engine of the power of the 'R' engine (designed for 1,500 hp but developed to 2,350 hp in 1931 form). The early Merlins with about 1,000hp were adequate for the new fighters. It was the specs for new heavy / medium bombers arising in 1935/36 that drove the need for more powerful engines. By that time Griffon I development had been shelved. It seems to me that it was problems with Vulture development that saw Griffon once again become of interest but in the very much modified Griffon II form.
Note that, at least for the needs of this thread, the timeline starts in 1936. By that time, there is the Whitley in the works (it will fly in that year), an aircraft that the ~1500 HP engines would've fitted nicely, unlike the obsolete Tigers. The 1500 HP engine would've also been a better fit to the Battle, rather than the Merlin I/II/III. Same for the Wellington, much better than the 1000 HP Pegasus, and earlier available than the Hercules.
With 1937, and Germans installing the DB 601R of the similar power on the diminutive Bf 109, the 1500 HP engine will be wanted by the companies making the fighters and wanting not to be left behind. 1500 HP is not that much bigger power than what Britsol was expecting the Hercules to be doing.
 
Pardon me, binged the thread.
Cross-posting from the French thread... (cut short)

Boucing off this - I really appreciate the way you British optimized your fighter production around only THREE core elements
- Hurricane
- Spitfire
- Merlin engine
And that was it. 100% efficiency that saved your souls in September 1940.
Yes, a good focus would be a wonderful start.

Though I would argue that keeping a second engine type around just in case



Agreed all the way.
To me, engine is crucial; if an engine fails, a whole host of perspective aircraft designs are in shambles. It took about 4 years to come out with a workable engine in the 1930s-40s (even if the company was well versed in type of engines), while OTOH people were able to design an aircraft in matter of months.
Exactly.

See also the US T40 turboprop issues.



The thing that comes to mind is the prewar RAF leadership was institutionally delusional.
[...]
The biggest issue the RAF had was doctrine.

In truth many of its aircraft, while not perfect, were perfectly good enough. It was how they were used rather than their numbers or quality that was the problem. Only after the doctrine was shown to be so seriously flawed where the more intelligent, innovative and competent leaders able to rise to the challenge.
That problem persisted with the RAF in the Cold War. No Command-level organization for CAS or fighter bombers. Fighter Command was interceptors, Bomber Command was the V-bombers.



Burn the Botha. An aircraft named after South Africa apartheid-loving PM, can't be a good aircraft... and indeed it was a flying coffin; so why bothar ? :p:p:p
"Many Bothas burned to get us this information"? :p


Having recently been reminded the Boulton Paul P.92 was to have a 20mm cannon firing through the propellers of its Napier Sabres (in-between the crankshafts and through the centre of the blower), I wonder whether this might have been worth applying to single-engined Sabre fighters?
I'm not sure a single 20mm is adequate.

I'd want multiple guns.



The only other late 30s (perhaps more realistically early-40s) choice would be the 15mm BESA based on the ZB60, a hard hitting round but with a slow rate-of-fire to improve accuracy (15 x 104mm cartridge, 75 grams bullet, 818.3 m/s (2,685 ft/s) muzzle velocity and 450 rpm rate of fire).
Rate of fire could be improved.

I mean, the Browning .50cal goes from ~450rpm in the ground mount with the heavy barrel, to ~800rpm in the aircraft version with shorter and lighter barrels and lighter bolt.


Rimmed rounds work great even in 21st century in machine guns, semi-automatics and hand-operated bolt rifles.
No, they really don't.

Rim lock is a real thing, plus pull-out belts require a longer and heavier receiver than push-through belts do.

The only reason the Russians/former USSR are still using 7.62x54R is because they missed the time to replace their rifle ammunition: due to the Revolution and WW1 there was so much x54R in storage that it wasn't reasonable to surplus all of that. Even with creation of the 7.62x39 M43 round for most rifles and LMGs, you still need the medium/GPMGs in a heavier caliber.

Same problem the US Army had with .30-06 instead of .276 Pedersen, except that the US had a better way to deal with all the .30-06 than the Russians did.


Seeing this, i'll add just a small comment. Imo the air cooled inline was a dead end. Same as the whole sleeve valve thing, more trouble that's it worth. Merlin, Griffon, as well as major US, german, japanese etc engines did prefectly fine without. The time and efforts invested and spent to make the sleeve valve work would have better used to get more power earlier.
Thing is, back in the 1920s and 1930s people didn't think that you could make 1hp/cubic inch (61hp/liter) with poppet valves. But you could pretty easily do so with sleeve valves.
 
No, they really don't.

Rim lock is a real thing, plus pull-out belts require a longer and heavier receiver than push-through belts do.

The only reason the Russians/former USSR are still using 7.62x54R is because they missed the time to replace their rifle ammunition: due to the Revolution and WW1 there was so much x54R in storage that it wasn't reasonable to surplus all of that. Even with creation of the 7.62x39 M43 round for most rifles and LMGs, you still need the medium/GPMGs in a heavier caliber.
They really do.
Soviets did just fine not just with the 7.62x54R - from the pre-ww1 MGs to the post-ww2 PK, as well as with their rifles, but also with the 20mm for the Shvak and UB. British did more than fine with their .303 MGs, be these belt-fed or not. IIRC All of the Browning MGs were with pull-out mechanism, despite most of them using the rimless cartridges.

Guess it all comes down to just how your designers are good when they have the task to develop the automatic weapons.

Same problem the US Army had with .30-06 instead of .276 Pedersen, except that the US had a better way to deal with all the .30-06 than the Russians did.

(my bold)
US have had the perceived problem with the supposed vast quantities of .30-06s from the warehouses.
Care to elaborate on the bolded part?

Thing is, back in the 1920s and 1930s people didn't think that you could make 1hp/cubic inch (61hp/liter) with poppet valves. But you could pretty easily do so with sleeve valves.
The HP/cu in or HP/L metrics did not get anything to the table.
It does not propel an aircraft, it does not save the weight, it does not save on the size of the radiators/coolers/finning, while it does push the engine towards the reliability border, though.
 
They really do.
Soviets did just fine not just with the 7.62x54R - from the pre-ww1 MGs to the post-ww2 PK, as well as with their rifles, but also with the 20mm for the Shvak and UB. British did more than fine with their .303 MGs, be these belt-fed or not. IIRC All of the Browning MGs were with pull-out mechanism, despite most of them using the rimless cartridges.

Guess it all comes down to just how your designers are good when they have the task to develop the automatic weapons.
John Moses Browning is likely one of the greatest small arms designers to have ever lived.

But the various Browning MGs also really exemplify the "long and heavy receiver" issue.



US have had the perceived problem with the supposed vast quantities of .30-06s from the warehouses.
Care to elaborate on the bolded part?
The US could have belted all the .30-06 and ran it through MGs only, rifles chambered in .276 Pedersen. Rechambering the MGs once .30-06 had been used up would be pretty simple (barrels are a wear item, though you'd also need to replace the bolt).



The HP/cu in or HP/L metrics did not get anything to the table.
It does not propel an aircraft, it does not save the weight, it does not save on the size of the radiators/coolers/finning, while it does push the engine towards the reliability border, though.
If you can get 1500hp out of 1600-1800ci, that means you don't need 2700+ci and all the weight that includes.
 
John Moses Browning is likely one of the greatest small arms designers to have ever lived.

But the various Browning MGs also really exemplify the "long and heavy receiver" issue.

Agreed.
Unfortunately, there was no follow-up with the indigenous US automatic weapons between his death and the 1950s, that would've yielded the refined and successful weapons, from the small arms to the bigger guns. The M3 SMG notwithstanding.

The US could have belted all the .30-06 and ran it through MGs only, rifles chambered in .276 Pedersen. Rechambering the MGs once .30-06 had been used up would be pretty simple (barrels are a wear item, though you'd also need to replace the bolt).
Yes, they should've done that.

If you can get 1500hp out of 1600-1800ci, that means you don't need 2700+ci and all the weight that includes.

We can get 1500 HP from 1600-1800 cu in. Getting that from 1400 cu in is harder, and from 1230 cu in harder still. Weight will be still in the ballpark with either of these engines (assuming the same level of metallurgy, same fuel etc), ditto for the installed weight (ie. weight of the prop, coolers, liquids, pumps etc. added to the weight of the engine).

A 2700+ cu in engine gets us 2000 HP, though.
 
We can get 1500 HP from 1600-1800 cu in. Getting that from 1400 cu in is harder, and from 1230 cu in harder still. Weight will be still in the ballpark with either of these engines (assuming the same level of metallurgy, same fuel etc), ditto for the installed weight (ie. weight of the prop, coolers, liquids, pumps etc. added to the weight of the engine).

A 2700+ cu in engine gets us 2000 HP, though.
The DB603 only made 1500 sustained/1750 Takeoff/WEP.
 
The DB603 only made 1500 sustained/1750 Takeoff/WEP.
Note the fuel - 87 octane. It was also good for 1850 HP at 2.1 km, 5 min rating; the DB 605A did 1550 HP there, also on 87 oct.
The best figure on 87 oct fuel for the Merlin Mk.X engine that I can find - really a diminutive engine when compared with the DB 603A - was under 1200 HP down low.
 
Note the fuel - 87 octane. It was also good for 1850 HP at 2.1 km, 5 min rating; the DB 605A did 1550 HP there, also on 87 oct.
The best figure on 87 oct fuel for the Merlin Mk.X engine that I can find - really a diminutive engine when compared with the DB 603A - was under 1200 HP down low.
Yes, that was the major issue with the German war machine. Their regular gas vehicles ran on 60 octane, and planes on 87. While the Allies had 87 available for their ground vehicles and 100/130 or even 115/145 for aircraft.

But that octane difference meant that an Allied plane with a V1710 Allison was ~500lbs lighter for roughly the same horsepower.
 
Yes, that was the major issue with the German war machine. Their regular gas vehicles ran on 60 octane, and planes on 87. While the Allies had 87 available for their ground vehicles and 100/130 or even 115/145 for aircraft
German tank engines run on the 'normal' gasoline that have had the ethyl alcohol added, pushing the octane rating into the high 70s. Most of the aircraft engines indeed used the nominal 87 oct fuel, that went close to the 91 oct that Allied used for training. The C3 fuel was going from 120 grade for the early batches (in 1940/41) to 130-140 grade for the later part of the war; mostly used on the BMW 801D and some DB engines, like the 601N, as well as sometimes on the DB 605s with better S/C. German fuel used in their trainers was 80+ oct, called A2, and was about 30% ethyl alcohol + the 68 oct fuel (ethyl alcohol ups the octane rating by a great deal).

British tanks, and presumably trucks, used the so-called 'pool petrol', 65-68 octane (that was a great obstacle in turning the aero engines into tank engines - before Merlin -> Meteor, that still run on low RPM - that were designed to use higher octane fuel). They were the 1st people using 100 octane fuel en masse on combat aircraft, that went to 120 grade in rich mixture. Americans started strong with 91 oct, but were also in position to go with 100 oct fuel. By 1942, IIRC, the two agreed on the 100/130 grade fuel, that was used until the end of the war, and as a 'back up' fuel post war, after the 115/145 became standard. There was also the 100/150 grade fuel, used in 1944-45 in the West, that among other things helped in chasing down the V1s.
US tanks used the better fuel than the British tanks, eg. 80 oct for their supercharged radials.

But that octane difference meant that an Allied plane with a V1710 Allison was ~500lbs lighter for roughly the same horsepower.

What two aircraft do you have in mind?
 
It's a poor comparison, but something like Mosquito and Me410.
There is a lot to unpack there indeed. 1st - what Mosquito, and what Me 410? Then, we have one of the most efficient airframes of ww2, vs. a not so good German counterpart.
A 'gunned' Mosquito, the F Mk.II weighted 18530 lbs on this test. I don't have an access to the primary sources about the 'gunned' Me 410, German-language Wikipedia list it at 21277 lbs. That is some 15% more.
The F Mk.II will be propelled with some 1500 HP max, the 410 will have 1850 PS max. At 18500 ft, it is ~1150 HP for the Mossie, 1625 PS for the 410. (all vlues for no ram condition). The 410 will be faster by some 20 mph.

A more even comparison would've been the Me 210C, with the fully-rated DB 605A. The engine power is a bit better for the 210 at all altitudes, the weight is in the ballpark, and so is the speed.
The gun-less Mosquitoes - bomber and recon versions - were somewhat faster than the versions with guns.

The real advantage for the Mosquitoes vs. the German opposition came with the introduction of the 2-stage supercharged Merlins, that were mostly used in ww2 on the bomber versions. These went very fast (400+ mph) and very high, underscoring just how much an advantage can be gotten with the advanced supercharging, as it can be read here.
The 2-stage supercharged Merlins also found their way on the recons and night fighters.
 
Rim lock is a real thing
If you load your stripper clips/your magazines properly, it isn't. Never had enough clips to do the Mad Minute properly, but I've fired off full 10 round mags that were clip loaded (with modern commercial cases) with no issues. Again, IF you load properly.
 
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