1935-1945 light fighters alternatives

[tomo pauk]

Doesn't mean he was wrong!

It certainly raises an eyebrow.

But I mentioned this because he was merely reminding the customers what they had been asking for ... no reason to assume any bias there, they would have known their demands as well as he did.

He was blowing his trumpet, IMO - I do assume bias.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

He was blowing his trumpet, IMO - I do assume bias.

Specifically in the bit I mentioned? If he'd reminded the recipients of his paper that they had demanded greater endurance from fighters when they really hadn't, that would have undermined the point he was trying to make.

And it's not that the veracity of his statement can't be cross-checked ... it's just that Messerschmitt's paper is well-known and convenient to refer to.

Just look at the Ta 152 ... it's not just an Fw 190 with more powerful engine and guns, it also has a significantly increased fuel capacity. That's what the customers wanted in 1944.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

Specifically in the bit I mentioned? If he'd reminded the recipients of his paper that they had demanded greater endurance from fighters when they really hadn't, that would have undermined the point he was trying to make.

And it's not that the veracity of his statement can't be cross-checked ... it's just that Messerschmitt's paper is well-known and convenient to refer to.

I see this, for a long time, as a vehicle to prop out his own product.

Customers also wanted the Me 210 to work. It didn't for a many months, and when it did, the world moved on. Customers also wanted the Me 309 - again a flop, even if we remove the engine problems from consideration. Common denominator here is Willy.

Just look at the Ta 152 ... it's not just an Fw 190 with more powerful engine and guns, it also has a significantly increased fuel capacity. That's what the customers wanted in 1944.

Customers didn't specified the long endurance on the Volksjaeger.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

Customers didn't specified the long endurance on the Volksjaeger.

That's why he was reminding them of their previous actions. They specified an ultra-short endurance fighter after previously having demanded endurance increases in fighters that had a longer endurance than the He 162 to begin with.

That's a totally valid point to make, independent of a possible conflict of interest.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[HoHun]

Hi again,

That's why he was reminding them of their previous actions.

A more detailed summary of the discussion in this post:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...einkel-he-162-by-dan-sharp.35770/#post-561407
Of particular interest:

Ganter of Heinkel responded to Ernst Heinkel, Francke and Frydag with a - to me - not entirely convincing letter based on the performance projections for the He 162 with 950 L internal fuel capacity compared to the Me 262 with 1970 L fuel capacity. The He 162 couldn't actually use all of that tankage initially, while the Me 262 had an additional 600 L tank, so the comparison correctly would have been more like 850 L @ 2805 kg take-off weight for the He 162 vs. 2570 L @ 6950 kg take-off weight for the Me 262A-1.

So even in Heinkel's projected He 162 of the story, they had less fuel per engine than the Me 262, and while the latter was upgraded, Heinkel in fact didn't manage to implement the full projected tankage in the production version of the He 162.

So Heinkel's view on the relative merits of light and heavy jet fighters respectively was based on inaccurate assumptions that favoured the light fighter ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

So even in Heinkel's projected He 162 of the story, they had less fuel per engine than the Me 262, and while the latter was upgraded, Heinkel in fact didn't manage to implement the full projected tankage in the production version of the He 162.

So Heinkel's view on the relative merits of light and heavy jet fighters respectively was based on inaccurate assumptions that favoured the light fighter ...

Thank you for the excerpt.
I still think that a light fighter is a good idea - and so is a heavy fighter - if people do their homework. Be these people at the establishments, airframe companies, and in the engine companies.
I'm okay if a light fighter is not better than a heavy fighter, or even than a '100% fighter'.

 

[HoHun]

Hi,

The real missed opportunity was the He-280, but that's another story.

It' actually directly connected to the fuel capacity question:

[*]Operationally, the Luftwaffe is continuously demanding range increases. The Me 262, selected over the He 280 partially because of it offered larger fuel capacity, has received tankage increases since then, and work on external tanks is going on to increase range even further.

(I'm summarizing a Messeschmitt paper there.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

Hi,
It' actually directly connected to the fuel capacity question:

[*]Operationally, the Luftwaffe is continuously demanding range increases. The Me 262, selected over the He 280 partially because of it offered larger fuel capacity, has received tankage increases since then, and work on external tanks is going on to increase range even further.

(I'm summarizing a Messeschmitt paper there.)
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)

Luckily, both Willy and RLM kept forgetting that the timing of a combat aircraft was something they should be concerned about.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

Luckily, both Willy and RLM kept forgetting that the timing of a combat aircraft was something they should be concerned about.

In that regard, Herbert Pohlmann's "Professor Junkers nannte es 'Die Fliege'" is quite interesting.

Pohlmann (of Stuka designer fame) describes the exponential growth of design complexity over the years, starting with the very simple F13 airliner and carrying through to the postwar concepts he was involved in.

This growth sort of invalidated everyone's experiences on how long programs took, and in combination with the RLM's expressed policy running flight testing and production setup in parallel (which didn't work) lead to a lot of planning failures. The Lusser-Lahs letter recently discussed on Calum Douglas' site covers this, and Eisenlohr's book adds the information that the development time required for new engines for systematically underestimated, too.

With regard to the He 162, Messerschmitt basically stated that the mass employment of the type in the spring of 1945 was an impossible goal, and history seems to have proven him right.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

In that regard, Herbert Pohlmann's "Professor Junkers nannte es 'Die Fliege'" is quite interesting.

Pohlmann (of Stuka designer fame) describes the exponential growth of design complexity over the years, starting with the very simple F13 airliner and carrying through to the postwar concepts he was involved in.

Everyone will agree there.

This growth sort of invalidated everyone's experiences on how long programs took, and in combination with the RLM's expressed policy running flight testing and production setup in parallel (which didn't work) lead to a lot of planning failures. The Lusser-Lahs letter recently discussed on Calum Douglas' site covers this, and Eisenlohr's book adds the information that the development time required for new engines for systematically underestimated, too.

The more modern and the more complicated design, the more the time it will require? Also, not every company was the same. We can compare how long it took for the P-38 to come around, as well as how much it took for the P-47 to became an actually useful combat aircraft that is not trying to kill it's pilot, vs. how fast were the P-51 or the F6F developed.
In the post-war time of 1950s, McDonnel was churning prototypes in an amazing pace, while some other companies did not.

As for the engine development, sometimes the favored engines get the resources, while other are starved for the resources. See the HeS engines. BMW was fiddling with the BMW 802, 803, 804, while the 801E was all but abandoned because there was supposedly no machine tools available. It also took the Germans eternity to come out with the more advanced superchargers for the existing engines.
Germany has the Jumo 004 to install in an 1-engined fighter if they wanted to do so.

With regard to the He 162, Messerschmitt basically stated that the mass employment of the type in the spring of 1945 was an impossible goal, and history seems to have proven him right.

Lack of success of the He 162 had a lot to do with the circumstances Germany found themselves in in 1944-45, rather than with the failings of the design.

When it is about own and other people's products, I've ceased to believe the statements of the people having the horse in the race years ago. That sleeve valves are oh so good. That other people are guilty that DB 605A does not work, but not DB, not us in Stuttgart. That Fw 190 was not a 'big engine on a small airframe', while Spitfire was; that Fw 190 was armed to the teeth from day one, but Spitfire was weak in that regard. That carburetors are oh so great (of cource they are, since you dont have any other fuel distribution system).

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

The more modern and the more complicated design, the more the time it will require?

With the more modern designs being more complicated inevitably, yes. He even plots that on a logarithmic scale, so "exponential" for once isn't just hyperbole.

BMW was fiddling with the BMW 802, 803, 804, while the 801E was all but abandoned because there was supposedly no machine tools available.

Well, fiddling with designs experimentally isn't the same as putting them into large-scale production. It uses an entirely different set of resources. Also, I think it's typical that for one production engine (or aircraft) there always is a number of different designs that don't make it.

Lack of success of the He 162 had a lot to do with the circumstances Germany found themselves in in 1944-45, rather than with the failings of the design.

Günter and Hohbach when interrogated by the Allies stated the following:

The start of quantity production was delayed from 1-2 months, more by the delay of production jigs than by structural changes. In May the first delivery of a large number of aircraft was to be made. In April 100 aircraft had been completed and parts for about 800 were ready for assembly

(From Dan Sharp's "The hated Volksjäger")

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

Well, fiddling with designs experimentally isn't the same as putting them into large-scale production. It uses an entirely different set of resources. Also, I think it's typical that for one production engine (or aircraft) there always is a number of different designs that don't make it.

Germany put the all-new Jumo 213, DB 603 and jet engines in series production. The DB 605 needed so many new parts vs. the 601 that it indeed warranted new name, and it was still manufactured. That they didn't do that with the BMW 801E was to their detriment.

Making engine prototypes and not being concerned with some kind of series production is wasteful, at best. BMW was trying to make more engine types than P&W or Wright in the same, despite the huge discrepancy of everything.

The start of quantity production was delayed from 1-2 months, more by the delay of production jigs than by structural changes. In May the first delivery of a large number of aircraft was to be made. In April 100 aircraft had been completed and parts for about 800 were ready for assembly

Thank you for the excerpt.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

Making engine prototypes and not being concerned with some kind of series production is wasteful, at best. BMW was trying to make more engine types than P&W or Wright in the same, despite the huge discrepancy of everything.

It would be highly interesting to know the ratio of engineer man years sunk into abortive research and development to the total number of engineer man years, but I habe never seen this quantified anywhere. Maybe a question for Calum - if anyone would be able to shed light on this, it would most likely be him

Not that everything was well with German engine developments, even by Eisenlohr's admission as one of the men in charge, but I really have no basis for a quantitative comparison.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

It would be highly interesting to know the ratio of engineer man years sunk into abortive research and development to the total number of engineer man years, but I habe never seen this quantified anywhere. Maybe a question for Calum - if anyone would be able to shed light on this, it would most likely be him

Not that everything was well with German engine developments, even by Eisenlohr's admission as one of the men in charge, but I really have no basis for a quantitative comparison.

Now that you've mentioned Calum and the state of the German engine developments - he is pretty scathing about that. A good deal is written about that in his book.

I don't think that we'll ever arrive at the real number of the lost man-years.