As of mid-April, a way to mount the weapons was still theoretical.
The AFSEO team along with the 53rd Test and Evaluation Group Det. 3 finally found what they needed not with future tech, but with legacy equipment, in the 1970s-era Triple Ejector Rack-9As and LAU-131 launchers. This equipment destined for the National Airpower Reservoir in Arizona was saved to serve a new warfighting purpose.
[...]
The 96th and 53rd team also created a connection and communication solution so the Strike Eagle’s systems and weapon could talk to one another. This communication system did not exist before and sprang from the team’s innovative change to the way the weapons connected to an F-16.
And now, tell me that the A-10 wouldn´t do a terrific drone hunter down low over Ukraine. Imagine all those rocket pods aligned under it´s large wings while it dangles low in the relief to scout for the ugly delta silhouette of Russian flying bombs against the bright stellar lights... (and through NVG).
A-10's would rejuvenate Ukraine drone defense around key points like large industrial suburbs and cities centers.
And now, tell me that the A-10 wouldn´t do a terrific drone hunter down low over Ukraine. Imagine all those rocket pods aligned under it´s large wings while it dangles low in the relief to scout for the ugly delta silhouette of Russian flying bombs against the bright stellar lights... (and through NVG).
They'd be great for that job and also hunting Russian cruise-missiles such as the AS-15 Kent and SS-N-27 Sizzler. Since the remaining A-10Cs are being retired this would be a good opportunity for Ukraine to get some combat proven drone-hunters.
They'd be great for that job and also hunting Russian cruise-missiles such as the AS-15 Kent and SS-N-27 Sizzler. Since the remaining A-10Cs are being retired this would be a good opportunity for Ukraine to get some combat proven drone-hunters.
It could work first by being directed to where the drones are flying by GCI and then locating them using IRST pods, the A-10 is equiped to carry the AN/AAQ-28(V)4 LITENING AT targeting pods or Sniper XR targeting pod IIRC.
It still needs to close intercept geometry and take firing position. Especially with APKWS, which isn't a modern A2A missile by design, and strongly implies rear aspect, chase intercept at close range(as it just doesn't have range for anything more).
Smallest GCI mistake in first(and only) attack, shortest delay in acquisition by the pilot - and target is gone.
I am very much an APKWS enthusiast, and honestly am fascinated by this weapon perspectives in a2a. But in active intercept role this is a fighter weapon.
It could work first by being directed to where the drones are flying by GCI and then locating them using IRST pods, the A-10 is equiped to carry the AN/AAQ-28(V)4 LITENING AT targeting pods or Sniper XR targeting pod IIRC.
Those maneuvers really, really require speed overmatch and quick search capability.
From that i understand, in LACM/drone defense even dated fighters are...wanting, as you only really want to work with ESA.
A-10 pilot will be just limited in number of effective interceptions he can hope to achieve.
The point of APKWS is you don't have to slow down. You only have to slow down to get a good shot with guns, which has caused several losses of aircraft during the war. With APKWs you use your radar to search for targets, slave your targeting pod to the radar so it's on the target, identify and gain optical track on the target, lase it, and fire.
Additionally the F-16 is far more survivable and adaptable to other roles, which given the size of the Ukrainian Air Force, they will have to be.
The point of APKWS is you don't have to slow down. You only have to slow down to get a good shot with guns, which has caused several losses of aircraft during the war. With APKWs you use your radar to search for targets, slave your targeting pod to the radar so it's on the target, identify and gain optical track on the target, lase it, and fire.
Additionally the F-16 is far more survivable and adaptable to other roles, which given the size of the Ukrainian Air Force, they will have to be.
most drones have props. An A-10 can certainly catch with that.
Similarly, the gun in front could be removed to improve significantly its performances. A radar set can even be substituted and a rocket magazine installed there (you don´t have to fire such rockets along the aircraft axis. you can fire them diagonally)
If a gun is wanted, Ukrainian can install their GSh-30.
And frankly, if the A-37 were still flying, I would have suggested that one.
most drones have props. An A-10 can certainly catch with that.
Similarly, the gun in front could be removed to improve significantly its performances. A radar set can even be substituted and a rocket magazine installed there (you don´t have to fire such rockets along the aircraft axis. you can fire them diagonally)
If a gun is wanted, Ukrainian can install their GSh-30.
And frankly, if the A-37 were still flying, I would have suggested that one.
1. The benefits are probably going to be more modest than you think. Speed is still a major issue against conventional CMs and a major point against in interception kinematics.
2. This is not exactly a cheap or easy modification to make.
The cruising speed of a Shaheed-136 for example is 100 knots and a fully loaded A-10 should be able to fly significantly faster than that, as for cruise-missiles such as the AS-15 Kent or the SS-N-27 Sizzler well that is a matter of intercept geometry. All the Ukrainian GCI operators need to do is position the A-10s ahead of the cruise-missiles so that they have a head on or near head-on intercept geometry.
Certainly removing the GAU-8/A cannon and its' magazine would definitely lighten the airframe although you'd need to add ballast to prevent the CoG moving too far aft.
The problem with using the F16 or Mig29 here is attrition. Generating massive sorties number next to every night is going to lower F-16 availability for other tasks where they could be more consequential. Think that we have now an average of several hundreds flying bombs targeting multiple sites several day of the week. Countering this is resource incentive and need to be tackled with an appropriate level of technology. Such as it is with cost.
All the Ukrainian GCI operators need to do is position the A-10s ahead of the cruise-missiles so that they have a head on or near head-on intercept geometry.
Ugh. First, it isn't "all have to do", collision intercept is the hardest thing to do - and note that in this case, pilot will be doing final search alone, through a pod, against a target which isn't really all that visible in wide angle modes, all while flying at low altitude.
And frankly it's very much up to debate if APKWS even can perform head on intercept. It's a lot to ask from missile without a proper seeker. It can be done from ground level, but air to air is a more complex story, which very easily may end up in a disaster.
There was recently a rather uninspiring anecdotal story from early 2022, when ukrainian GCI perfectly vectored flankers, almost point blank, on fullback package(multiple aircraft) at very low altitude, and russian escort somehow failed to engage them in time. But flanker pilots even in this situation just failed to locate targets - multiple large aircraft, - despite having an actual scanning IRST.
Night time engagement at very low altitude isn't something simple at all. Head on engagement of target with fronal area of ~1m2 and the only heat source masked by airframe, when the whole thing is visible only against the ground clutter - even more so.
I think it safe to assume APKWS is limited to prop driven drones/munitions for all practical purposes, even if there are limited possibilities of engaging faster objects.
While A-10 would be a good off the shelf anti Geran2 platform, you have to weigh that against the cost of absorbing an entire new aircraft type for exactly one mission and target set.
I think it safe to assume APKWS is limited to prop driven drones/munitions for all practical purposes, even if there are limited possibilities of engaging faster objects.
This is a bit too much - we know for sure it can do more(we saw engagements of Kh-59 missiles from boats guarding black sea route). Rear aspect engagement from a dogdight distance against a clueless missile* should be piece of cake. But it requires right geometries to achieve, and slow aircraft without radar isn't in position to give them against a high supersonic, low signature target.
*btw, note, that unlike cruise missiles, drones now have ways to see they're being attacked(rwr; optical/ir), and they do actively evade when pursued or shot upon. Lose it into the darkness - and good luck reengaging.
Well this the name of the game. That Russians would have to increase the sophistication of their weapons would be a victory by itself leading directly to less flying bombs, less deaths and more room for gaining the initiative in the air.
This is a bit too much - we know for sure it can do more(we saw engagements of Kh-59 missiles from boats guarding black sea route). Rear aspect engagement from a dogdight distance against a clueless missile* should be piece of cake. But it requires right geometries to achieve, and slow aircraft without radar isn't in position to give them against a high supersonic, low signature target.
*btw, note, that unlike cruise missiles, drones now have ways to see they're being attacked(rwr; optical/ir), and they do actively evade when pursued or shot upon. Lose it into the darkness - and good luck reengaging.
That might actually be a good thing---because aft firing munitions become more do-able. Low speed is an asset.
Heck, an (unmanned) Flying Fortress of sorts with guns all over it might be good at drone mitigation.
I wouldn't put a Specter gunship at hazard of course.
Yes, an F-16 can swoop in and out...but a drone programmer can code fish-like behavior to where that viper pilot's "prey items" part before him like the Red Sea ...a further exaggeration of something that can't be out climbed trying to deal with targets that can't be out-turned.
You have the F-16s on herd duty on the outside with A-10 mixing it up, or vice versa.
Networking's strength or weakness makes the difference here.
In addition to reading old dogfight reports, biology textbooks may need to be consulted as well--in that we see these scenarios play out everyday when bears and honey badgers tear at hives and soak up stings. That's the A-10.
It keeps its gun for ground targets...or if there are a lot of drones, fire into the swarm.
Here I want both A-10s and F-16s because they both have strengths and weaknesses. The discussion should be how best to use those two assets if there are only a few drones--or a sky full of them.
I can't wait to see what the "Attenborough Maneuver" looks like.
That can be corrected, relatively cheaply by the drone makers. Or rather, a total war economy produced drone would take a lot more damage than the current makers. Riveted aluminum construction instead of composite layups or blow-molded plastic.
That can be corrected, relatively cheaply by the drone makers. Or rather, a total war economy produced drone would take a lot more damage than the current makers. Riveted aluminum construction instead of composite layups or blow-molded plastic.
In my opinion, strictly for drone hunting (leaving the cruise missiles to the faster fighters) a light helicopter like the Airbus H145M would be a cost effective and also military efficient solutions.
Equiped with APKWS and a canon or heavy MG container, has night vision and you could also install a door gunner.
You can preposition them in front of probable targets exactly where you need because there is no need for airports. With cruise speed of around 250km/h it is capable of intercepting drones of the Geran type, which fly at under 200km/h.
In my opinion, strictly for drone hunting (leaving the cruise missiles to the faster fighters) a light helicopter like the Airbus H145M would be a cost effective (solution).
You can preposition them in front of probable targets exactly where you need because there is no need for airports.
An A-29 Super Tucano equipped with APKWS seven-round pods would be a good way of hunting drones and have it equipped with Browning M2 0.50" calibre heavy machine-girls as backup armament.
Price: The APKWS-II kit from BAE (which includes only the add-on guidance section and excludes the rocket motor and warhead) has historically cost significantly less.
lot 7: $22,025 per unit for 10,185 units in June 2018
lots 8-12: $21, 477 per unit? $2,684,650,000 awarded in September 2019. From the original presolicitation in 2017, the planned quantity was 125,000 units for lots 8-12. That's $21,477 per unit if actually ordered.
Lots 13-17: $31,691 per unit. $1,743,038,000 awarded for 55,000 units in August2025.
Also, lots 13-17 were originally only going to include 25,000 units. The 55,000 actual units is more than double that.
This is a significant jump in price, from $21k to $31k, that cannot be explained by inflation. Indeed, BAE has increased production rates which should bring economies of scale:
In December 2017 NAVAIR intended to fund BAE to increase production to 25,000 units per year
In March 2018 NAVAIR actually funded BAE to increase production to only 20,000 units per year
And yet, despite the fact that BAE had already increased production rates to at least 20,000 units per year, this latest order only procures 11,000 per year (55,000 total over 5 years). And each unit is significantly more expensive than the previous lots. This increase in cost and decrease in production rate can be explained by an addition of an IIR seeker, potentially a warhead included in the new APKWS kit, and the additional cost and complexity that entails.
For Lot 13-17, how many counter small UAS optimized variants do each of the customers intend on buying? Specifically, how many include the upgraded fuze vs the M423? What is the cost difference between the standard and the upgraded fuze?
Has the Navy, or another service awarded contracts to actually facilitize the 'additional IIR seeker' production like you would once you've finished developmental testing and deemed it cleared to enter production? If so, can you share those contract details?
Regarding the A-10 alleged slow speed, here is a hint of what speed the A-10 can achieve in the real world, countrary to other aircraft named here like Helo and Prop trainers:
The problem with converted Turbo prop trainers also is that they are not readily agile with a significant load under their wings and have similarly a low cruise speed in that configuration. Don't take me wrong, they would probably do better than the Yack Ukraine use today, but still.
Their great advantage however is that some are already integrated with rockets pods and NVG.
Regarding the A-10 alleged slow speed, here is a hint of what speed the A-10 can achieve in the real world, countrary to other aircraft named here like Helo and Prop trainers:
Never exceed speed* doesn't mean it can achieve that speed in the real world... it lists maximum speed as 381 kn (439 mph, 706 km/h) at sea level, clean. Armed it's slower, the cruise speed of 300 kn (340 mph, 560 km/h) is probably a good indicator...
* similarly the BAE Hawk comes to mind, it has a never exceed speed of M 1.2. But no one in their right mind would describe it as a supersonic aircraft.
The A-10 doesn't make sense imho. It's massive gun, the armor and paylod are not needed. On the other hand, it lacks a radar, which would be desperately needed.
If you want a cheaper solution to hunt lower end drones, something like an armed trainer is the better choice. PC-9 for example: top speed 593 km/h, cruise speed 556 km/h.
The A-10 doesn't make sense imho. It's massive gun, the armor and paylod are not needed. On the other hand, it lacks a radar, which would be desperately needed.
But it is also being retired so the A-10 is potentially available, what Ukraine needs now is a lot reasonably good performance aircraft to intercept these Russian drones and even fully loaded an A-10 is still significantly faster than a Shaheed drone. As for lack of radar aren't there podded radars that could be used? In regards to its' gun and associated ammunition storage if they aren't then they can be removed which would significantly lighten the aircraft.
For the radar a loitering Reaper with a radar pod could do great and bring the persistence that is needed with an overhead radar coverage, just like an AWAC.
@eagle : I knew obviously what I was quoting as VNE
Now, you have to compare with the VNE of your prop trainer with 4 rocket pods under the wings and the kind of constraints it imposes on the pilot that would have to fly low, at night, in the terrain with a sluggish, performance bracketed, aircraft.
The A-10 is a forgiving a/c, stable and agile with a consequent weapons load. It can loiter and reach its max speed with jet performances (Prop a/c accelerate generally considerably slower). If you dive down past the recommended speed, it would let you pull out without snapping a wing. It has the performance margin with a war load that is much required to be efficient hunting drones.
For the radar a loitering Reaper with a radar pod could do great and bring the persistence that is needed with an overhead radar coverage, just like an AWAC.
The A-10 is a forgiving a/c, stable and agile with a consequent weapons load. It can loiter and reach its max speed with jet performances (Prop a/c accelerate generally considerably slower). If you dive down past the recommended speed, it would let you pull out without snapping a wing. It has the performance margin with a war load that is much required to be efficient hunting drones.
Frankly speaking, I'd rather try a-10 in a type of mission fully present in Ukraine: loft CAS, but with APKWS and targeting pod.
Can potentially be effective enough, and while a-10 is slower than su-25, it's also an advantage, as ingress leg can be done lower.
The problem is of course VKS CAPs.
But overall, per Ukraine experience, I'd say that conceptually best battlefield aircraft in exiat is likely to be Av-8b+. Everything is just right where it should be. AESA and APKWS would be welcome, of course.
Tom Warner (ATM 04), B-1B pilot with the U.S. Air Force and meteorologist, flew the T-28 armored plane into hailstorms for the National Hail Research Experiment and is now helping archive data.
For Lot 13-17, how many counter small UAS optimized variants do each of the customers intend on buying? Specifically, how many include the upgraded fuze vs the M423? What is the cost difference between the standard and the upgraded fuze?
Has the Navy, or another service awarded contracts to actually facilitize the 'additional IIR seeker' production like you would once you've finished developmental testing and deemed it cleared to enter production? If so, can you share those contract details?
If lots 13-17 do include an EO/IIR seeker as I believe, with this new seeker placed at the tip of the missile, then the entire 55,000 unit run would be C-UAS optimized. It would use a small midbody warhead that wouldn't be good for much else. (By the way, Naval News did explicitly say in their reporting that the IIR seeker was on the nose). If I'm wrong about this, and lots 13-17 don't include the new EO/IIR seeker, then all bets are off, and very little of my analysis applies. Regardless, I don't know which customers will be receiving what quantities of this run.
As to your question about whether other contracts have been awarded to OKSI for the IIR seeker: no, not that I can find, however;
The SBIR opportunity stated that the contractor would likely need to subcontract with BAE to help them with their APKWS product. We wouldn't be able to find contracts between BAE and OKSI, only between the USG and BAE.
Assuming OKSI didn't just lie in their press release, we know that they made it past stage 2 into stage III, which is where prototyping and low-rate production (kind of an experimental LRIP) takes place. Phase II goes up to $1.8M funding, but Oksi stated they had received $6M in funding, putting them into Stage III.
As for the fuze, I believe that all C-UAS employments of APKWS-II use a more advanced fuze. The M423 fuze is a point detonation fuze, and I think this would have a very high failure rate in C-UAS. APKWS-II has not historically included a fuze or a warhead - it has only been the midbody guidance and control section.
Remember that APKWS-II is not primarily a C-UAS weapon, at the moment. It is primarily employed in an air-to-ground mode with an M151 blast frag anti-personnel warhead along with the M423 fuze. I'm not sure how much the M423 fuze costs. I also don't know of any reason why APKWS-II wouldn't be compatible with other warhead/fuze combinations. The bulk of purchased APKWS-II kits have been intended to be used in this way.
It's easy to miss it, but this FALCO mockup is not showing an M423 fuze.
In order to use APKWS-II as a C-UAS, a proximity fuze must be used. This was first mentioned publically in 2021, but may have even been in development in 2019. The proximity fuze in question is the VIPER fuze (designated FMU-178) made by L3Harris using a proximity sensor from TSC. This photo from TSC might be a pre-production prototype as it looks slightly different from what we saw at Sea Air Space 2025.
The baseline C-UAS version of APKWS-II is a USAF program called AGR-20F FALCO. It uses the VIPER fuze and improved software with an M151 blast frag warhead and the APKWS-II guidance kit. The VIPER fuze has a targeted marginal acquisition cost of $1,370 per, but the USAF is actually paying $4,038 per, including all labor and anciliaries. The USAF has a current inventory of 1,080 AGR-20F units and recently raised their inventory objective to 4,774 units. They also recently placed an order for 3,694 of what they are calling the "Warhead/Proximity Fuze Sensor Assemblies" from L3Harris, to be delivered by October 27, 2026. This assembly, when combined with the APKWS-II kit (WGU-59B) and 70mm rocket, creates the AGR-20F FALCO.
[EDIT: I made a mistake here. $1,370 is the cost of the M151 warhead with M423 fuze.]
The assembly is created by L3Harris, which manufacturs the proximity fuze (together with TSC), and then attaches it to a M151 warhead that they receive from the USG, after first removing an M423 fuze. They then send the new warhead with the proximity fuze, along with the old M423 fuze, back to the USG. Field assembly of the FALCO involves attaching the rocket to the APKWS-II kit, attaching the integrated warhead/fuze assembly to the APKWS, and setting the laser receiver on the APKWS to match the frequency of the designating laser.
We can see that the proximity sensors are the current bottleneck for FALCO, not the APKWS-II kit, with a production rate of a couple thosand per year for the former, and 20-25,000 per year for the latter. And with only 1k FALCO units in inventory, we can understand now why SECDEF declined to send any to Ukraine recently.
By the way, the USAF shows 340 FALCO units being procured in FY26 for $39,400 each, but this is just the J-book and could be off.
Side note: one issue that the nose-mounted IIR sensor will face is the backwash from the rocket motors of the rockets that launch first from the pod. You can see what that does to a standard fuze. APKWS-II was midbody to avoid this issue.
Anyway, I actually just found something new when going back and checking my notes and hard drive (everything is such a mess and I keep telling myself I will organize it but never do) and pulling up SAM. I think I know what's going on with this weird section between the noze and the APKWS. Why does it have slits?
The program has now completely transitioned to the Single Variant Block Upgrade (SVBU) that will enable the same guidance unit to be used for any platform, as well as increasing the overall employment envelope.
This refers to the FALCO software upgrade which allows the rocket to launch in an arced trajectory for better range and also improves the seeker algorithm for C-UAS. All future APKWS-II kits will be compatible with FALCO and all other uses. But that's just an aside. The interesting part is this:
To improve performance against UAS, certification of a suitable proximity fuse is in work for fielding to the fleet with current guidance and warhead combinations.
This can't refer to the L3Harris proximity fuze, which has been certified for a few years now. I assumed that there was no more information to be found on this new proximity fuze, but look at this contract from March that I just found, from NAVSEA, which owns APKWS:
The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head Division (NSWC IHD) is seeking potential sources for mechanical proximity fuzes. The following offers guidelines on specifics of the requirement:
REQUIREMENTS: The Contractor shall provide several proximity fuze variants to include mechanical proximity fuze variants to support the Navy/Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force. Mechanical proximity fuzes will be built for current 2.75 inch rockets.
Mechanical proximity fuzes! This is what I think we're seeing:
An small integrated warhead with a mechanical proximity sensor. The sensor deploys stiff wires in some fashion from the slits. Upon making contact with a drone mid-air, the wire is pushed to close a circuit and set off the warhead. We have seen this fuzing method used by FPV drones in Ukraine.
If this does is not a mechanical proximity sensor, then I don't know what the slits are for. I suppose they could be apertures for a traditional RF proximity sensor, but I have never seen anything like this. And if the proximity sensor is in the nose cone, and this section is only the warhead, then I don't see any need for slits or apertures of any kind.
“The next generation APKWS is dual mode. An infrared seeker and laser guidance kit with a mid-body warhead. The dual mode gives the ability to increase the rate of fire without holding the designation on the target. Lase, APWKS heads towards the target, and you can go to pseudo-fire and forget [with IR]. Lase, fire, next target, lase fire.”
Pulling it all together: it's possible that the integrated seeker and warhead could be contracted out to L3Harris directly, just as the current VIPER fuze and M151 warhead are. BAE would then sell the APKWS-II as-is to the USG, and L3Harris would sell the seeker/fuze/warhead assembly. The question then becomes: why did the APKWS kit go up by $10k and production drop by half? And how does the IIR seeker and the APKWS talk to each other?
But if the new BAE APKWS kit at $31k includes the IIR seeker, the warhead, and the fuze, why does it cost less than the current $35-39k AUR cost, when it has a new IIR seeker that should raise the cost? Perhaps the cheaper mechanical fuze is the answer. (Additionally, the AUR cost includes the rocket motor and packaging.)
I don't know how to reconcile all these facts.
By the way, BAE doesn't want you to know this, but here it is:
FALCO changes the way APK sees targets and makes sure you’re tracking a UAS versus a cloud. That was the first change to go air-to-air and that’s what’s being deployed in the Red Sea.”
Dave Smialek, Director of Business Development in Precision Guidance & Sensing Solutions at BAE Systems
I still want to see APKWS with the M255A1 (heavy) flechette warhead tried. Have it act like a giant AHEAD round, dumping 1200 60gr/3.9g kinetic darts at rocket velocity into the area.
Senciliary capilars as proximity fuse would be an interesting design. I don't see the required volume there for something rigid to extend.
Perhaps metal wires that are extracted by the rotating momentum of the rocket, extending out to cover a meters wide surface and detonate the rocket with a pressure detonator encased at the base upon sensing a contact.
Alternatively, there would be enough force upon contact to tear appart any significant chunk of many UAV.
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