Land attack is a well established and very conventional mission for any navy which fields anything the size of a Corvette and up. Which is what the Black Sea Fleet does, land attack against strategic assets. Denial of access to the Black Sea towards the adversary isn't really a mission that's even possible to achieve
Denial of access to sea refers to the nation, not to the navy. Navy is but an instrument of access. Access to the sea is nation's ability to leverage the ocean for
military,
economic,
political, and scientific purposes (paraphrasing Gorshkov, Maritime power of the State)
Ships and USVs going to and out from port of Odessa aren't stopped, i.e. Russia can't deny access to the sea to Ukraine. Despite its main port being within a few hours cruise from Crimean coast.
The fact that the weakest Russian fleet (excluding the Caspian Flotilla), a literal retirement fleet, can still conduct their land attack mission with relatively impunity against targets well inside Ukraine
It can, but only because it doesn't require anything. It's just inefficient. As soon as more efficient means of delivering warheads appeared - kalibr operations almost stopped (they're very rare in 2024-25, only sometimes they're adding some mass to the LACM salvos). Paying ¬1mil(missile) + portion of yearly operational costs of a ship(several dozen to couple hundred professional crew, maintenance, etc) isn't really sustainable when all it does is (with certain chance) delivers a single 500kg bomb. If it hits, of course: missiles miss, too.
Navy with LACMs can perform concentrated strikes (leveraging high number of cells per hull per moment of time), especially overseas.
Otherwise it's a waste of resources: airforce can do it better in attrition campaign(as Russia found out), since, at very least, it simplifies logistics and operations(deliver LACMs to a same safe airbase, when plane will deliver them to the launch point).
But even this isn't an optimum point, as it turned out(at least for major powers - Iran discovered this for well over a decade). Note that even VKS recently stopped launching LACMs. Why bother, when a slightly improved Geran gets you similar AD penetration rates, currently breaking Ukrainian attrition economics?
I.e. for current ops, T-75 is pointless: maybe it can launch Kh-69s cheaper than Su-57. It will never make up development costs this way; and this can be done even cheaper by, i don't know, MALE(
see Banderol) - there's no need for a big stealth plane. Rare special cases don't justify a separate platform.
But coming back to the VKS, the VKS in it's entire history was always more so geared towards defending Russian assets and air space against the NATO air forces than conducting deep strikes into NATO. The Russian army is a continental military first and foremost. As a consequence the VKS acts in a manner that supports the advancement of ground units. Something which is heavily emphasized by Su-34s raining down bombs against positions and fortifications, while Su-35 and MiG-31 sanitize the air space. They ensure that the Ukrainian Air Force has an incredible hard time to support their own ground forces from the air. Because they pose such a threat, especially due to significantly longer range missiles that their Ukrainian counterparts have to abort their mission, missing the window of opportunity, or catch an R-77-1 or R-37M with their face.
The question isn't what VKS was intended to do. Great end war with NATO didn't and still doesn't happen. United States Navy didn't get to send its navy to Philippines for one great battleship battle - battleships went out of action, and it became clear that something else should be done.
The question is how VKS adapts to a strategic shift of realities. They don't. They only adapted to the tactical one (UMPK), cutting their losses to sustainable level and beyond(as evidenced by plane exports).
But this essentially fixed the quality of VKS air support to a single level. Is it good at it?
Quality of air support (measured in advancement of ground units) is measured in single kilometers per month. Ukrainian Air Force
had such hard time before - right now it delivers more or less as much warheads as it can (video footage is frequent and stable).
I.e. VKS can't even defend its own ground troops.
Does it cost Ukraine extreme loss rate? Not really, around 1 fixed wing airframe per month.
Yes, Russia still outtrades, simply because it produces wastly more glide bombs, and because it simply has more bombers. But this isn't exactly an impressive result, which doesn't outweigh, say, effects of drone and artillery warfare.
And worth noting, that Russian ops are expensive - flankers are darn expensive airframes per flight hour.
Something the LTS could do even better, as it can push further with less risk and engage enemy aircraft more effectively. Stealth isn't about being a caveman and dropping a dumb bomb on a SAM battery. It's about decreasing the time of the adversary to react to the threat you pose, thus decreasing the risk of engagement for you. And an LTS armed with R-77s, R-37Ms or a Kh-69 can cause serious damage while pushing that threat envelope further into the enemy territory. Something that is only enabled by stealth or decisively superior stand-off capability.
All of this it doesn't do any better than, say, Ukrainian 9-13 (with two racks of SDBs and/or 2 JDAM-ERs) right now.
What's different about LTS(in theory, of course) - is that it's an affordable, more maintable, LO platform, capable of:
-better force generation(as for LO platform - it will
still take more effort and maintenance than a non-treated airframe);
-better attrition rates in more offensive scenarios(LO) on top of better force generation(which non-LO platforms can't achieve);
-integral offensive sensors and stand in precision weapons, allowing strike/reconnaissance sorties, clearing out air defences and ground warfare enablers as they're discovered - in numbers, if necessary.
Note, that I'm basically describing a F-35(or J-35). B/c it delivers all the checkboxes, which Su-57 does not. And S-70 does not. And tu-160m2 does not. Nor does the PAK-DA. I.e. all the big ticket RnD items of the airforce itself.
Yes, it's certainly just as capable of stand off, DEF-CA and other applications. But most importantly, it makes it capable of performing offensive counter air, DEAD and interdiction - it can create numbers over enemy, which are harder to get to unacceptable loss rates.
Tasks and situation that VKS failed to perform at all, despite the fact that conflict in Ukraine is over 10 years old at this point. They didn't notice new opponent(which Russia kindly created itself) before the 2022 war(for 8 years), they didn't really adjust their mission even after that. If VKS isn't interested in adjusting - there is no reason for it to procure T-75. Stand off lobbing, month after month, can be better done by other platforms. Infantry on both sides will be dying for that, but it is not their problem.
In a way, Sukhoi, for their own money, proposed VKS a plane they actually need for the last 10 years - a plane most suitable for offensive operations against a state power. VKS didn't bite. Which is ironic, because bulk of VKS combat strength now is other platforms born in the exact same way - Sukhoi pushed it on violently twitching and resisting air force back in late 2000s(which used its own money on projects such as su-27sm and su-34).
Until VKS do, expecting this plane to get operational is meaningless.