LBSM3 / Aegis ashore

Because it's big and heavy and would require substantial reengineering to convert to a system divisible into truckloads.
Just add another TEL to the THAAD system and put SM-3 Block IIA on that. (Or would it entail an entire revamp of the design for environmentals?)

How does the THAAD radar performance compare to SPY-6 (or even SPY-1)?
No idea. It's big AESA with 25,000+modules.

 
Because it's big and heavy and would require substantial reengineering to convert to a system divisible into truckloads.
Just add another TEL to the THAAD system and put SM-3 Block IIA on that. (Or would it entail an entire revamp of the design for environmentals?)

The launcher isn't a very large bottleneck as the Army is already doing it with the MK41 on a truck that it is fielding by 2023. The problem is that SM-3 requires a SPY-1/6 (S-band) uplink and radar to work. It is really an interceptor designed around AEGIS and the SPY-1/6 radar. A combination of SM-6, and THAAD-ER should suffice though for most of the threat. Sure it won't offer as early an intercept as a SM-3 might, but it will still allow a couple of shots with at least one well outside the atmosphere.
 
The system the Army is fielding by 2023 is called Typhon. It includes SM-6 and Tomahawk in a 4 MK-41 configuration mounted on an Army trailer. We should get images of what they are building over the next few months. They plan on begin fielding it over the next 18-20 months.

Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract last year.

 

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What's the latest on THAAD-ER? We saw models and video clips several years ago then nothing. :confused:
 
The MDA is doing some rapid prototyping and demonstrations pertaining to get to an upgraded THAAD interceptor but we don't know what they are currently targeting. I think the priority is to go through and upgrade the TPY-2 radars with the GaN TRIMMs and acheive THAAD - PATRIOT connectivity before they are able to fully focus on fielding a new interceptor.
 
In regards to the THAAD-ER haven't several ground-tests of the booster-motor been conducted? As far as I know no flight tests have been carried out.
 
Because it's big and heavy and would require substantial reengineering to convert to a system divisible into truckloads.
Yes, granted, but it will also be a sitting duck.
I think the additional irony of this fixed Aegis Ashore system will itself required a substantial layered sub-air defence network to protect, which I can't see that happening. The Soviet's/Russian's and Chinese have realistically realised and appreciated this for decades now, hence the stipulated mobility of their strategic air defence systems.
This is why as much as the notion of employing an existing known system like Aegis might seem sensible, in terms of cost, R&D and IOC, I think if the likes of the U.S. was serious, it would commit the time, money and resources into either a more modular variant of Aegis or create a new purpose design mobile strategic air defence system - even if it has to be a joint/shared project....But then again, we know how these usually end :(

Regards
Pioneer
 
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THAAD and PATRIOT already exist and cover/can-cover the threat. IAMD and C2BMC is available. With IAMD you can augment THAAD and PATRIOT with the SM-6 and SM-6 1B. What they have to determine is whether they need Mid-Course capability there. Is that option cost effective for Guam? When we haven't even done the basic defensive structure (HAS etc) in place? You basically need to evolve those and reintroduce plans to increase the Fov of the TPY-2. You don't need a completely new strategic system and waste billions on it when we have far more important priorities in offense and defense.
 
If interpreting correctly the Pentagon has selected Lockheed's SPY-7 in preference to Raytheon's SPY-6 for the Guam Aegis Ashore, a big feather in the cap for Lockheed, could imply they have the better radar, they use dual polarization for better discrimination, Japan also picked SPY-7 saying it was the better radar before they cancelled their planned two Aegis Ashore facilities due the threat of the SM-3 Blk IIA big boosters falling on land.
 
MDA has always liked LM's radar architecture, after all SPY-7 comes out of LRDR which was MDA picking LM. The leg work Japan and LM already did to integrate SPY-7 and Aegis Ashore likely didn't hurt. The Navy and Army still prefer Raytheon's architecture for their multi-role radars.
 
Regarding the planned Aegis ship replacements for Japan's abortive Aegis Ashore procurement:

The government decided in December 2020 to build two Aegis system-equipped ships as an alternative to deploying Aegis Ashore, a land-based interceptor system. The government gave up deploying Aegis Ashore due to factors including opposition from the public.

The plan is for the eight existing Aegis-equipped ships of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to operate in such waters as those around the Senkaku Islands of Okinawa Prefecture, while the new Aegis system-equipped ships are expected to be constantly deployed in the Sea of Japan to keep an eye out for ballistic missile launches by North Korea.

The SPY-7 radar for Aegis Ashore will be equipped on the new vessels. The government has already signed a contract to purchase the state-of-the-art radar from a U.S. firm. SM-6 missiles, which can intercept cruise missiles, have also been decided on as equipment for the two ships.

In addition to the advanced radar and missiles, the Aegis system-equipped ships are likely to carry cruise missiles that will be upgraded versions of the Type 12 surface-to-ship missile currently used by the Ground Self-Defense Force. After the upgrades, the missile’s range will extend to about 1,000 kilometers and it will be mounted on naval vessels.

Concerning the hull’s design, however, the government had originally considered constructing the ships with multiple hulls to make them less susceptible to the impact of waves.

Because few actual naval vessels have been developed with multiple hulls and the construction costs of such ships are likely to balloon, the government has decided on a single hull.
 
the land attack capability is for retaliatory strike I believe. The whole concept of the vessel is to deter and defend against north korea and free up their few destroyers to engage china in relevant waters.

However, now that the ship has ballooned into a 20,000 tons cruiser they will probably have theater of operation expanded. No doubt different communities in the military will try to shoehorn capabilities onto the ship. It will be interesting to see how the ministry will facilitate and control cost.
 

 
MDA requests $397.6 million in FY 2024 to continue the development of an integrated missile defense system for Guam defense against a range of missile threats. This Program supports the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. The final Defense of Guam architecture design includes integration efforts between MDA, U.S. Army, and U.S. Navy systems. The budget request includes critical requirements to support the architecture. These efforts include the development of the AN/TPY-6 radar to provide persistent long-range midcourse discrimination, precision tracking and hit assessment to support the Defense of Guam capability against long-range missile threats in the Pacific theater. AN/TPY-6 provides a 360 degree integrated sensor coverage, enables remote operations, and supports In-Flight Interceptor via the Aegis Guam System. The request also includes the Aegis Guam System development to interface with the dispersed the AN/TPY-6 radar, dispersed MK41 Vertical Launcher System (VLS) and the integration and control for a new U.S. Army missile launcher. The program continues Aegis Guam System architecture development and systems engineering activities necessary to provide an integrated air and missile defense system on Guam against ballistic and air-breathing missile threats.
 

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MDA studying anti-air warfare capabilities for Aegis Ashore sites
Uhm, it's Aegis? Assuming a 32-cell launcher, pack 4 cells with ESSMs and another 12-16 with SM2/SM6?

And if it's got a bigger launcher, or space for more cells, do that proportion of cells with ESSM and SM2/SM6.
 
In this day and age, why would you have such a strategically important defence system fixed and not mobile?
Because the below-deck weight of the radar is 60 metric tons and the small SPY-1 antennas are 6 metric tons per face, not counting supporting structures?

And it takes somewhere around 6 megawatts of power to run the beast, which is hard to generate in a mobile setting (~7800hp)
 
The system the Army is fielding by 2023 is called Typhon. It includes SM-6 and Tomahawk in a 4 MK-41 configuration mounted on an Army trailer. We should get images of what they are building over the next few months. They plan on begin fielding it over the next 18-20 months.

Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract last year.

I think that is specifically for the Long Range Precision Fires use, not for AA/BMD work.

Not that the Army couldn't buy more SM-6s to use for long range AA in addition to Patriot, but the Army was talking about SM-6 for land attack...
 
Uhm, it's Aegis? Assuming a 32-cell launcher, pack 4 cells with ESSMs and another 12-16 with SM2/SM6?

And if it's got a bigger launcher, or space for more cells, do that proportion of cells with ESSM and SM2/SM6.

It's actually 24 cells, which is just enough to hold the number of interceptors needed for the missile defense role. The version of AEGIS used in Ashore (Baseline 9.B2) was specifically intended just for BMD. And I believe AA does not include terminal illuminators, which means it can't guide SM-2 or ESSM Block I. This was in 2015, when SM-6 was very new and ESSM Block 2 wasn't even available.

There were also some geopolitical calculations at play here. Russia was hugely angry about AEGIS Ashore, and the allies went to some length to show that the system was primarily intended to counter Iranian rather than Russian missiles. One part of that was not turning the systems into air defense complexes (Iran obviously posed no air threat to the sites in Poland and Romania.) Clearly, this is no longer a factor.
 
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It's actually just 24 cells, which is just enough to hold the number of interceptors needed for the missile defense role. The version of AEGIS used in Ashore (Baseline 9.B2) was specifically intended just for BMD. And I believe AA does not include terminal illuminators, which means it can't guide SM-2 or ESSM Block I. This was in 2015, when SM-6 was very new and ESSM Block 2 wasn't even available.

There were also some geopolitical calculations at play here. Russia was hugely angry about AEGIS Ashore, and the allies went to some length to show that the system was primarily intended to counter Iranian rather than Russian missiles. One part of that was not turning the systems into air defense complexes (Iran obviously posed no air threat to the sites in Poland and Romania.) Clearly, this is no longer a factor.
Okay, lack of illuminator radars is an issue I hadn't thought about, but makes sense for a base intended for pure SM-3 loadout.

And having only 24 cells per AA base means that they'd definitely have to add more cells.

I'd be such a big jerk to Russia as to build a new pair of 64-cell sets, spaced enough that none of the construction work would block the existing cells, and then once at least one block of 64 was installed and loaded, go back and expand the 24-cell block to a 64-cell unit (since it's cheaper to have all the construction equipment there at one time). Total of 192 cells per site.

Makes for 24x SM-3 per set, 32x ESSM Block 2, and 32x SM-6, total of 72x SM-3, 96x ESSM, and 96x SM-6. SM2ER are significantly cheaper (not sure I trust the pricing sources, but it's looking like on the order of $1.5m per missile cheaper, roughly 25% cheaper), but would require the installation of illumination radars. Might even make that 32x SM-3 and 24x SM-6, if they don't add illuminator radars to the base, for a total of 96x SM-3, 96x ESSM, and 72x SM-6.

Once that's completed, you basically say "what are you going to do about it, Vlad?"
 
You'd only need illuminator radars for ESSMs and then only if they're block I variants (IIRC the block has an active seeker).
 
Don't SM2s need illuminators?

The poster I was replying only mentioned SM-3s, SM-6s and ESSMs, however if SM-2s are present then an illuminator radar is needed, however in this application I don't see SM-2s being deployed (I suspect they'll be phased out and replaced with SM-6s).
 
I think that is specifically for the Long Range Precision Fires use, not for AA/BMD work.

In Guam, it will be a part of the Air and Missile defense architecture, and will utilize Lockheed's TPY-6 (SPY-7 derived) radar and the same mobile launchers. I assume they will be using a combination of SM-3 and SM-6 missiles since Cruise Missile Defense will primarily be provided by the Army's IAMD (PATRIOT and IFPC capability).

View: https://twitter.com/AirPowerNEW1/status/1662176513943568389
 
I'd be such a big jerk to Russia

Today, sure. IN 2015, not so much.

Except that construction of the AEGIS Ashore sites has been such an absolute goat rope that I'd be reluctant to repeat it. Plus, it's way too easy to target a fixed site with things like drones/cruise missiles. Probably better to look at the new architecture they're planning in Guam, with mobile rather than fixed-site launchers.

But conversely, the current war in Ukraine makes me think that NATO has very little to fear from Russia in terms of deep air strikes. We don't need extensive long-range air defense, we need massively proliferated terminal defenses against cheap loitering/expendable munitions. Those don't need to be integrated directly into AEGIS Ashore, just fielded on mobile platforms and deployed widely enough to cover the AA sites as well as all the other vital infrastructure.
 
Today, sure. IN 2015, not so much.

Except that construction of the AEGIS Ashore sites has been such an absolute goat rope that I'd be reluctant to repeat it. Plus, it's way too easy to target a fixed site with things like drones/cruise missiles. Probably better to look at the new architecture they're planning in Guam, with mobile rather than fixed-site launchers.

But conversely, the current war in Ukraine makes me think that NATO has very little to fear from Russia in terms of deep air strikes. We don't need extensive long-range air defense, we need massively proliferated terminal defenses against cheap loitering/expendable munitions. Those don't need to be integrated directly into AEGIS Ashore, just fielded on mobile platforms and deployed widely enough to cover the AA sites as well as all the other vital infrastructure.
I've always felt they way the implemented Aegis ashore left a lot to be desired. If they were going to make it a fixed site they should have at least buried the cells in the ground.
 
I've always felt they way the implemented Aegis ashore left a lot to be desired. If they were going to make it a fixed site they should have at least buried the cells in the ground.
There's arguments either way with that. If the cells are buried, then you need buried electrical connections to them and that's a pain to maintain. Or you leave the electrical connections on the surface most of the way and have a drop next to the cells, which leaves the connections vulnerable to being run over or whatever.
 
I wonder if we'll see it eventually deployed in Ukraine? That would make life hell for Russian aviation assets there plus Russian ballistic and cruise missiles would have a hard time getting through.
 
I wonder if we'll see it eventually deployed in Ukraine? That would make life hell for Russian aviation assets there plus Russian ballistic and cruise missiles would have a hard time getting through.
Doubt it. THAAD radars and Patriot systems, sure.

Aegis Ashore takes a lot more infrastructure building.
 
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