So what if sometime shortly after ww2 after Britain relises that they are not getting the bomb tech from the United States, but dosnt think it has the resources to make the bomb on its own, so decides to create a joint project with the French, how would that effect both contrys nuclear and rocket programs going forward.
Franco-British nuclear program
- Thread starter Cjc
- Start date
- Joined
- 20 January 2007
- Messages
- 897
- Reaction score
- 922
No. So let's take POD as late-1949. NATO Treaty signed, France in, but not yet an operationally meaningful Org.
UK tried very hard not to move from creating the Art of AW, to production of the Article - a gravity fission bomb.
Near success, then Sov spies were uncovered in AWRE, sending UK/US talks on AW co-operation "into the deep freezer" where they stayed until 1958. Churchill tried again with Ike, 1953, failed, and only then committed to Production of (to be) Blue Danube and Red Beard.
There are no records of efforts then to collaborate with France. Korea, Vietnam. PCF strong domestically.
So, OP: If Churchill had reached out to France early-53, proposing cost-share on the lighter fission Bomb to be Red Beard...
well. the mind boggles. New PM CDG in 1958 would have no cause to perceive second-class status re the Anglos. Every subsequent AW step could have been a shared economic burden - Bombs, Bomber, SSBN. Great mutual benefit.
UK tried very hard not to move from creating the Art of AW, to production of the Article - a gravity fission bomb.
Near success, then Sov spies were uncovered in AWRE, sending UK/US talks on AW co-operation "into the deep freezer" where they stayed until 1958. Churchill tried again with Ike, 1953, failed, and only then committed to Production of (to be) Blue Danube and Red Beard.
There are no records of efforts then to collaborate with France. Korea, Vietnam. PCF strong domestically.
So, OP: If Churchill had reached out to France early-53, proposing cost-share on the lighter fission Bomb to be Red Beard...
well. the mind boggles. New PM CDG in 1958 would have no cause to perceive second-class status re the Anglos. Every subsequent AW step could have been a shared economic burden - Bombs, Bomber, SSBN. Great mutual benefit.
Hmmm French V-Bombers?
Vantour with Sapphires succeeds Canberra?
Anglo-French IRBM?
Granit series progresses?
Anglo-French Tactical Ballistic Missile ? Eau Blue?
Cooperation on SAMs....
France takes on Orange Nell or earlier Popsy?
Alternatively French Ramjet SAM benefits from Bristol's work on ramjets?
Standardisation of 105mm L60 naval gun?
Malafon/Ikara debate?
SSBN/SSN reactor effort?
Vantour with Sapphires succeeds Canberra?
Anglo-French IRBM?
Granit series progresses?
Anglo-French Tactical Ballistic Missile ? Eau Blue?
Cooperation on SAMs....
France takes on Orange Nell or earlier Popsy?
Alternatively French Ramjet SAM benefits from Bristol's work on ramjets?
Standardisation of 105mm L60 naval gun?
Malafon/Ikara debate?
SSBN/SSN reactor effort?
Last edited:
Close, but no cigar: eau bleue (can't be worse than Pluton)
The possibilities are endless - https://www.alternatehistory.com/wiki/doku.php?id=timelines:the_selene_project
The possibilities are endless - https://www.alternatehistory.com/wiki/doku.php?id=timelines:the_selene_project
- Joined
- 6 September 2006
- Messages
- 4,329
- Reaction score
- 7,529
Ignoring the sovereignty and independent deterrent concerns (Bevin: we want a bloody Tricolour on it!"), one technical problem might be the lack of access to US miniaturisation technology. That means physically bigger physics packages and larger bombs and re-entry vehicles. On the flip side, the UK had some interesting work on re-entry penaids and signature reduction that might improve French missile warheads in this regard.
The POD can be either 1946 or 1957 - both moments when the USA blocked GB access to their nuclear tech.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US–UK_Mutual_Defence_Agreement So July 3, 1958: GB, go screw yourself, the H-bomb and everything else is ours, not yours.
OTL Had Great Britain not played very smart with their 1957 H-bomb testings, bluffing included, the Americans may not have changed their attitude. And considering how hard afterwards did France tried to steal US nuclear secrets through the British (and they did tried every single trick they could think off - but the 1958 agreement had planned every single contingency in truly brutally efficient US fashion) I bet you that, indeed, France and Great Britain would end in (nuclear) bed.
Right from the very moment the US would told the UK, 1958 "hell no, we don't go, McMahon 1946 agreement is stronger than ever, go f***k yourself with your pathetic H-bombs bluff.
Between May 1958 (when De Gaulle returned) and 1964 (October 1, 1964: the day the first Mirage IVA squadron stood alert in my future birth town of Mont de Marsan) France was painfully aware how hard and expensive would the Force de Frappe be. Whatever trick that could cut into the bill or accelerate the schedule, was worth trying. And so they tried truly everything to snatch US-UK little nuclear secrets, all the way from reentry vehicles to Blue Streak via ELDO (the temptation was veeeeery strong to return Europa to its IRBM status for Force de Frappe !) H-bombs, and countless other stuff.
De Gaulle famously bargained EEC entry against UK nuclear stuff, to poor MacMillan utter dismay. That poor MacMillan truly ended between a rock (JFK and his NATO MLF) and De Gaulle (we will allow you british into the EEC... against some atomic secrets).
Everybody knows MacMillan went to Nassau in December 1962 to meet JFK - but only days before he met De Gaulle at Rambouillet castle near Paris. By the end of the month he was a bit baffled, to say the least - although he had salvaged Polaris for GB without NATO nor dual keys, and that was paramount.
The Americans made the same offer to De Gaulle, same month - but he was so enraged he told them to go to hell, and same for MacMillan dream of EEC membership.
Force de Frappe with Blue Streak, now that would have been something. Even if, TBH, Blue Streak LOX made it obsolete as a very unresponsive IRBM: took 15 minute to refill the damn thing.
Also Europa as a two-stage FOBS: get ride of that pesky and unworkable German Astris stage 3; tweak the french Coralie stage 2 as an orbital nuclear weapon carrier. Launch the thing from Hammaguir, Woomera or Kourou.
Last edited:
How would this Franco-british deal compare cost wise to the very good deal Britain got with the usa (aperintly smothed over quite a bit by lord Mountbattens personnel relationship with Admiral rickover and president Kennedy in case one wants another pod).
Also what would be more likely, raf mirage IV or force de frappe V bombers ? (maby both?)
Also what would be more likely, raf mirage IV or force de frappe V bombers ? (maby both?)
Yep, Redoutable IOC was late 1971 and its first patrol was March 1972. Unfortunately for the French, the British "suck" at solid-fuel rocketry: they never saw the need for the tech OTL, and then Polaris buried any need forever. Across Europe the ones obsessed with solid fuel rockets are the french and italians (the latter: Alfa and Scout).
The 1959 Mirage IVB could provide a French B-58 and thus a successor to the V-bombers. Crucially, British cooperation would bring better turbojets than Atar.
OTL the Mirage IVB went for Pratt J75, but Medway (RB.141) and Olympus (4 years before Concorde) were in the running, too.
How it could happen
1957-58 Mirage IV-01 and IV-A are on the drawing board. The British are denied US nuclear secrets, throwing MacMillan into De Gaulle's arms at Rambouillet.
Early 1959: the 30 tons MTOW Mirage IV-01 / IV-A have "ballooned" into the 60 tons Mirage IVB. SNECMA however can't get a Super Atar. The French turn toward the British and considered all the big powerful engines
- Gyron
- Olympus
- Conway
- Medway
There, are two bifurcating alt-histories with awesome potential.
A- The French picks Medway
This cascade massively into the Medway projects and the very rich Spey history (hello Viggen my old friend...)
B - The French picks Olympus
This de facto makes the Mirage IVB a subscale Concorde four years (1959 - 1963) before there was Concorde.
Now, OTL Concorde ended at 185 tons MTOW when the Mirage IVB is exactly 1/3rd of that: 60 tons. BUT before Concorde was "Super Caravelle" which was much smaller.
Bottom line: in the early 60's Mirage IVB and "Super Caravelle" could converge toward a 100 - 120 tons supersonic bomber. That would be totally awesome.
SNECMA & Rolls Royce
OTL SNECMA to get a J75 licence sold 15 - 20 % of its shares and stocks to the US company. Later this helped granting them a JTF10 / TF30 licence, too.
Now, if SNECMA do the same with RR, this could smoothen their relationship over the next two decades - and avoid such psycho-drama as the EJ200 vs M88.
Also, let's be clear about something.
The TSR-2 sad saga, if compared against the Mirage IV success, show a very important point.
In France, Mirage IVA development was essential to the Force de Frappe IOC in October 1964. AS SUCH, and RIGHT FROM 1958, one thing was made very clear to the Armée de l'Air, de Terre, and Marine Nationale.
Whatever expensive projects they had, no related to Force de Frappe or to the Mirage IVA, was dead or postponed.
One example: PA58 Verdun. But also the AdA massive interceptors plans, all the way from SMB-2 / Vautour orders to Trident and Griffon.
From 1958 it was Mirage III variants or nothing, for the next decade and beyond.
Right from 1958 the French fixed two FDF objectives and deadlines
- Mirage IVA, 1964 IOC
- Solid-fuel missiles (Plateau d'Albion or submarines) 1971 IOC
Once the two deadlines carved in stone, any other expensive military project that could stand in the way was canned. As simple as that.
We all know that on the British side, the TSR-2 development and cost was pestered by all kind of others expensive projects: CVA-01; P.1154; AW.681; Polaris; Skybolt; countless others.
Bottom line: a strong political power told the military they could NOT bickering and delay the Mirage IVA with any side expensive projects. That was clear from 1958 and De Gaulle return to power.
I can tell you that Mountbatten actitivism against the TSR-2 and in return, the RAF trying to screw CVA-01 by moving Australia on a map - this would not have happened with De Gaulle and his force de frappe drive. De Gaulle would have teared both sides a second... you know, the hole where the sun never shines.
That's paramount.
End result: Mirage IVB as a successor to the V-bombers from 1959 won't be delayed or stopped or canned, TSR-2 or CVA-01 style.
OTL the Mirage IVB went for Pratt J75, but Medway (RB.141) and Olympus (4 years before Concorde) were in the running, too.
How it could happen
1957-58 Mirage IV-01 and IV-A are on the drawing board. The British are denied US nuclear secrets, throwing MacMillan into De Gaulle's arms at Rambouillet.
Early 1959: the 30 tons MTOW Mirage IV-01 / IV-A have "ballooned" into the 60 tons Mirage IVB. SNECMA however can't get a Super Atar. The French turn toward the British and considered all the big powerful engines
- Gyron
- Olympus
- Conway
- Medway
There, are two bifurcating alt-histories with awesome potential.
A- The French picks Medway
This cascade massively into the Medway projects and the very rich Spey history (hello Viggen my old friend...)
B - The French picks Olympus
This de facto makes the Mirage IVB a subscale Concorde four years (1959 - 1963) before there was Concorde.
Now, OTL Concorde ended at 185 tons MTOW when the Mirage IVB is exactly 1/3rd of that: 60 tons. BUT before Concorde was "Super Caravelle" which was much smaller.
Bottom line: in the early 60's Mirage IVB and "Super Caravelle" could converge toward a 100 - 120 tons supersonic bomber. That would be totally awesome.
SNECMA & Rolls Royce
OTL SNECMA to get a J75 licence sold 15 - 20 % of its shares and stocks to the US company. Later this helped granting them a JTF10 / TF30 licence, too.
Now, if SNECMA do the same with RR, this could smoothen their relationship over the next two decades - and avoid such psycho-drama as the EJ200 vs M88.
Also, let's be clear about something.
The TSR-2 sad saga, if compared against the Mirage IV success, show a very important point.
In France, Mirage IVA development was essential to the Force de Frappe IOC in October 1964. AS SUCH, and RIGHT FROM 1958, one thing was made very clear to the Armée de l'Air, de Terre, and Marine Nationale.
Whatever expensive projects they had, no related to Force de Frappe or to the Mirage IVA, was dead or postponed.
One example: PA58 Verdun. But also the AdA massive interceptors plans, all the way from SMB-2 / Vautour orders to Trident and Griffon.
From 1958 it was Mirage III variants or nothing, for the next decade and beyond.
Right from 1958 the French fixed two FDF objectives and deadlines
- Mirage IVA, 1964 IOC
- Solid-fuel missiles (Plateau d'Albion or submarines) 1971 IOC
Once the two deadlines carved in stone, any other expensive military project that could stand in the way was canned. As simple as that.
We all know that on the British side, the TSR-2 development and cost was pestered by all kind of others expensive projects: CVA-01; P.1154; AW.681; Polaris; Skybolt; countless others.
Bottom line: a strong political power told the military they could NOT bickering and delay the Mirage IVA with any side expensive projects. That was clear from 1958 and De Gaulle return to power.
I can tell you that Mountbatten actitivism against the TSR-2 and in return, the RAF trying to screw CVA-01 by moving Australia on a map - this would not have happened with De Gaulle and his force de frappe drive. De Gaulle would have teared both sides a second... you know, the hole where the sun never shines.
That's paramount.
End result: Mirage IVB as a successor to the V-bombers from 1959 won't be delayed or stopped or canned, TSR-2 or CVA-01 style.
Last edited:
The above is for the bomber side of things.
Now, for the missiles... even flawed because LOX, the French would gladly grab Blue Streak as an interim IRBM. There is no doubt about that.
My readings of the MacMillan - De Gaulle - Ike-JFK triangular relationship 1957-1963 clearly show that, when ELDO and Europa happened in 1961, the French were trying to grab Blue Streak and bring it back to its IRBM status.
Have a look at this.
De Gaulle had one of his advisors (De Rose) secretely discussing with your Thorneycroft (of TSR-2 fame) to try and pass some Blue Streak and nuclear secret to France and accelerate the Force de Frappe missile deployment.
That guy, exactly
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/François_de_Tricornot_de_Rose
Thorneycroft was one heck of a colorfoul character. Had Nassau failed, he was ready to push MacMillan toward the french. Between 1960 and 1962 he was actively discussing with the french to look into possible nuclear cooperation with them. He was the one laying the groundwork just for that, as "Plan B" if a) Skybolt was canned (it was) and if b) Polaris could only procured via NATO / MLF / dual keys strings attached to them. And at Nassau the British had to bargain harsh to avoid the " b) " scenario.
But MacMillan was painfully aware the 1958 agreement expressedly forbade that: American repraisals would have been harsh. So MacMillan many times had to reign in on Thorneycroft activism and remind him not to cross red lines as fixed by the Americans in 1958. Of course the French loved that and tried to drag Thorneycroft BEYOND these lines, including with De Gaulle bait to MacMillan "nuclear secrets versus GB into the EEC". Poor MacMillan ended squeezed between a rock (the americans) and a hard place (De Gaulle).
It was against such background that (what a coincidence !) the British actually proposed Blue Streak to the French... (whaaaat ?) : as a CIVILIAN SATELLITE LAUNCHER. Within the frame of ELDO, hence with many other countries. By 1962 that was a go. But make no mistake, ELDO civilian nature and the 1958 agreement ensured the French could not move Blue Streak back to its earlier IRBM mission. There was a true "Berlin wall" between "Blue Streak as an IRBM" and "Blue Streak as Europa". The Americans were all aware of French shenanigans to get across that wall.
What the French exactly did between 1958 and 1963 was looking for some kind of "loophole" into the 1958 US-UK nuclear agreement. Once that loophole found, they could snatch US nuclear secrets through GB without the latter country being sandbagged by the Americans.
Unfortunately for the French the US were no idiots and that 1958 agreement was, quite simply, bullet proof. The French never found that loophole hence, had GB passed any nuclear secret to them they would have screwed the agreement, with the according punishment (think Suez crisis two years earlier, and the threats on the British pound... gasp ! - that kind of economic / monetary punishment).
One such example was the guidance system. Blue Streak inertial system was expressedly removed from Europa, to the french dismay as they badly needed it for FDF missiles. So they tried to get it back, but the british told them the 1958 agreement would not allowed such tech transfer. And on and on it went, the same way : reentry vehicles (NO !) engine technology (NO !) and on, and on. The French were driving Ike, then JFK, crazy.
Now, ITTL the masks have dropped and the French happily grab Blue Streak to provide the FDF with an off-the-shelf, unexpensive capability.
But that LOX oxidizer is really annoying. The Americans with Titan I and Atlas, the Soviets with Gagarin's and Sputnik R-7, had the same issue. So they are moving to storables (N2O4 oxi, N2H4 fuel - the latter Mark Watney beloved Hydrazine !) and toward solid-fuel ICBMs. So are the French with S-3 for Plateau'Albion and M1 - M20 for the subs.
BUT Blue Streak, just like Titan II, could be tweaked by removing that goddam LOX oxidizer for a better alternative. Blue Streak fuel is RP-1 that is kerosene like jet aircraft, and there is no problem with that. But LOX has to go.
And there, the British and the French each have a good option.
The British are the one and only using H2O2, not in Blue Streak but in every other british rockets: Black Knight, Black Arrow.
The French just like the Americans are moving toward hypergolic / storable, not for ICBMs but for Veronique and Diamant. There the oxidizer is N2O4.
Now, on the US side, Martin Marietta did such a move from Titan I (LOX / kerosene) to Titan II (N2O4 / N2H4). Aerojet had no problem with that: their LR-87 & LR-91 remained mostly unchanged.
Bottom line: the Blue Streak RZ-2 could be easily switched from kero/LOX to kero/H2O2 or kero/N2O4.
And once fitted with that new oxidizer, Blue Streak would regain its status as an efficient IRBM. The Soviets before moving to solid-fuel in the 1970's, did exactly that: they had IRBMs, ICBMs and even SLBM with liquid propellants.
Bottom line: 1964: a revamped Blue Streak with kerosene / N2O4 RZ-2 stands in alert as an early Force de Frappe missile...
Now, for the missiles... even flawed because LOX, the French would gladly grab Blue Streak as an interim IRBM. There is no doubt about that.
My readings of the MacMillan - De Gaulle - Ike-JFK triangular relationship 1957-1963 clearly show that, when ELDO and Europa happened in 1961, the French were trying to grab Blue Streak and bring it back to its IRBM status.
Have a look at this.
De Gaulle had one of his advisors (De Rose) secretely discussing with your Thorneycroft (of TSR-2 fame) to try and pass some Blue Streak and nuclear secret to France and accelerate the Force de Frappe missile deployment.
That guy, exactly
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/François_de_Tricornot_de_Rose
Thorneycroft was one heck of a colorfoul character. Had Nassau failed, he was ready to push MacMillan toward the french. Between 1960 and 1962 he was actively discussing with the french to look into possible nuclear cooperation with them. He was the one laying the groundwork just for that, as "Plan B" if a) Skybolt was canned (it was) and if b) Polaris could only procured via NATO / MLF / dual keys strings attached to them. And at Nassau the British had to bargain harsh to avoid the " b) " scenario.
But MacMillan was painfully aware the 1958 agreement expressedly forbade that: American repraisals would have been harsh. So MacMillan many times had to reign in on Thorneycroft activism and remind him not to cross red lines as fixed by the Americans in 1958. Of course the French loved that and tried to drag Thorneycroft BEYOND these lines, including with De Gaulle bait to MacMillan "nuclear secrets versus GB into the EEC". Poor MacMillan ended squeezed between a rock (the americans) and a hard place (De Gaulle).
It was against such background that (what a coincidence !) the British actually proposed Blue Streak to the French... (whaaaat ?) : as a CIVILIAN SATELLITE LAUNCHER. Within the frame of ELDO, hence with many other countries. By 1962 that was a go. But make no mistake, ELDO civilian nature and the 1958 agreement ensured the French could not move Blue Streak back to its earlier IRBM mission. There was a true "Berlin wall" between "Blue Streak as an IRBM" and "Blue Streak as Europa". The Americans were all aware of French shenanigans to get across that wall.
What the French exactly did between 1958 and 1963 was looking for some kind of "loophole" into the 1958 US-UK nuclear agreement. Once that loophole found, they could snatch US nuclear secrets through GB without the latter country being sandbagged by the Americans.
Unfortunately for the French the US were no idiots and that 1958 agreement was, quite simply, bullet proof. The French never found that loophole hence, had GB passed any nuclear secret to them they would have screwed the agreement, with the according punishment (think Suez crisis two years earlier, and the threats on the British pound... gasp ! - that kind of economic / monetary punishment).
One such example was the guidance system. Blue Streak inertial system was expressedly removed from Europa, to the french dismay as they badly needed it for FDF missiles. So they tried to get it back, but the british told them the 1958 agreement would not allowed such tech transfer. And on and on it went, the same way : reentry vehicles (NO !) engine technology (NO !) and on, and on. The French were driving Ike, then JFK, crazy.
Now, ITTL the masks have dropped and the French happily grab Blue Streak to provide the FDF with an off-the-shelf, unexpensive capability.
But that LOX oxidizer is really annoying. The Americans with Titan I and Atlas, the Soviets with Gagarin's and Sputnik R-7, had the same issue. So they are moving to storables (N2O4 oxi, N2H4 fuel - the latter Mark Watney beloved Hydrazine !) and toward solid-fuel ICBMs. So are the French with S-3 for Plateau'Albion and M1 - M20 for the subs.
BUT Blue Streak, just like Titan II, could be tweaked by removing that goddam LOX oxidizer for a better alternative. Blue Streak fuel is RP-1 that is kerosene like jet aircraft, and there is no problem with that. But LOX has to go.
And there, the British and the French each have a good option.
The British are the one and only using H2O2, not in Blue Streak but in every other british rockets: Black Knight, Black Arrow.
The French just like the Americans are moving toward hypergolic / storable, not for ICBMs but for Veronique and Diamant. There the oxidizer is N2O4.
Now, on the US side, Martin Marietta did such a move from Titan I (LOX / kerosene) to Titan II (N2O4 / N2H4). Aerojet had no problem with that: their LR-87 & LR-91 remained mostly unchanged.
Bottom line: the Blue Streak RZ-2 could be easily switched from kero/LOX to kero/H2O2 or kero/N2O4.
And once fitted with that new oxidizer, Blue Streak would regain its status as an efficient IRBM. The Soviets before moving to solid-fuel in the 1970's, did exactly that: they had IRBMs, ICBMs and even SLBM with liquid propellants.
Bottom line: 1964: a revamped Blue Streak with kerosene / N2O4 RZ-2 stands in alert as an early Force de Frappe missile...
Last edited:
Lascaris
ACCESS: Secret
- Joined
- 14 November 2008
- Messages
- 272
- Reaction score
- 313
What I see is the British providing the reactor PWR1 namely and the French the missiles in the SSBN projects. So M1/M2/M20 armed Resolutions and PWR1 powered Redoutables, somehow I doubt they'll convenge on a single SSBN class as well even though it would be making sense.
And I'm wondering about the Italians as a third potential partner in this...
More thoughts.
Granit effort would resolve down to 2,500lb warhead and objective of new miniaturised 1,000lb or less warhead .....call this Sandstone or maybe Agate?
Solid was in the pipeline. Tactical missile of 42" diameter pressed fuel. So short term Blue Streak, and mid-term Pershing clone. Longer term solid rocket press, either 54" or 60?
Cut in Victor numbers was an opening for a French order. IOC earlier than Mirage IV.
Mirage IV ports in V-Bomber EW?
Gyron or Olympus seems logical. If '58 potentially Armstrong Siddeley next generation supersonic engines.....also basis for supersonic transport.
New low level Mirage IV variant? RR Medway. Or BS?
Submarine reactor effort was well underway, delays meant opting for purchasing a US reactor for Dreadnought.
Possible silo build.
Granit effort would resolve down to 2,500lb warhead and objective of new miniaturised 1,000lb or less warhead .....call this Sandstone or maybe Agate?
Solid was in the pipeline. Tactical missile of 42" diameter pressed fuel. So short term Blue Streak, and mid-term Pershing clone. Longer term solid rocket press, either 54" or 60?
Cut in Victor numbers was an opening for a French order. IOC earlier than Mirage IV.
Mirage IV ports in V-Bomber EW?
Gyron or Olympus seems logical. If '58 potentially Armstrong Siddeley next generation supersonic engines.....also basis for supersonic transport.
New low level Mirage IV variant? RR Medway. Or BS?
Submarine reactor effort was well underway, delays meant opting for purchasing a US reactor for Dreadnought.
Possible silo build.
- Joined
- 6 September 2006
- Messages
- 4,329
- Reaction score
- 7,529
The only reservation I have is the hackneyed trope (but no smoke without fire); France wants lead position on everything they build. They never cooperated or ceded authority on any joint NATO development and even found it hard to do Franco-German industrial cooperation in areas where French technical know-how allowed them a bargaining position (helicopters for example).
We're looking at probably:
3-4 physics packages for:
Tactical freefall bomb (double as depth-bomb)
Air-launched stand-off missile to be succeeded by an ALBM
Tactical SRBM
IRBM
SLBM (plus subs plus reactors)
Possibly a SAM warhead
I don't see that the aerial platforms necessarily matter very much, there is little incentive to standardise.
Ultimately the RAF would want to extend V-Force life and would still probably prefer the 'Poffler' standing patrol solution. The Mirage IV element of Force de Frappe is short-ranged, perhaps Britain and France would cooperate on something like Minerve as a successor - but its highly expensive and the decision might well be to go down the ground/sea-launched ballistic missile route instead (remember the RAF gave up dreams of Mach 3 85,000ft bombers as obsolete in 1957...).
Silo IRBMs/ICBMs are probably fine for France but politically no-go in Britain so that makes tension already. On the basing issue alone it pushes Britain to seek air and sea launch as the only realistic options. Would Britain channel Blue Streak Mk.2 funds for a purely French-based missile? Probably not.
I see no issues with tactical packages and at a push both sides could build WE.177 and Blue Water AU analogues themselves with little problem.
An SSBN programme would demand some similarities, Polaris imposed a largely US midsection and the same would apply to an Anglo-French sub. Some snags; lack of access to US reactor technology, though by accounts HMS Dreadnought with a British reactor wouldn't have been that much different in terms of performance and indeed a lot of effort went into the Rolls-Royce effort. Does France give up its own reactor programme? Does the UK scrap its effort? Flip a coin!
Also means no access to US HY80 steel, might have some impact.
Maybe without Polaris the RN keeps its planned priority on SSNs and this pushes any SSBN fleet back to the mid-70s?
If they do go ahead, Kennedy is bound to dangle Polaris in an attempt to break up the friendship "hey guys we've already got a missile and missile tubes... buy now pay later and give us the keys."
So plenty of potential hitches, I can't see many cost savings unless both defence staffs can agree on priorities and narrow the field of platforms and weapons and unless the industrial heads can actually avoid squabbling and back-stabbing the other side by launching competing products.
We're looking at probably:
3-4 physics packages for:
Tactical freefall bomb (double as depth-bomb)
Air-launched stand-off missile to be succeeded by an ALBM
Tactical SRBM
IRBM
SLBM (plus subs plus reactors)
Possibly a SAM warhead
I don't see that the aerial platforms necessarily matter very much, there is little incentive to standardise.
Ultimately the RAF would want to extend V-Force life and would still probably prefer the 'Poffler' standing patrol solution. The Mirage IV element of Force de Frappe is short-ranged, perhaps Britain and France would cooperate on something like Minerve as a successor - but its highly expensive and the decision might well be to go down the ground/sea-launched ballistic missile route instead (remember the RAF gave up dreams of Mach 3 85,000ft bombers as obsolete in 1957...).
Silo IRBMs/ICBMs are probably fine for France but politically no-go in Britain so that makes tension already. On the basing issue alone it pushes Britain to seek air and sea launch as the only realistic options. Would Britain channel Blue Streak Mk.2 funds for a purely French-based missile? Probably not.
I see no issues with tactical packages and at a push both sides could build WE.177 and Blue Water AU analogues themselves with little problem.
An SSBN programme would demand some similarities, Polaris imposed a largely US midsection and the same would apply to an Anglo-French sub. Some snags; lack of access to US reactor technology, though by accounts HMS Dreadnought with a British reactor wouldn't have been that much different in terms of performance and indeed a lot of effort went into the Rolls-Royce effort. Does France give up its own reactor programme? Does the UK scrap its effort? Flip a coin!
Also means no access to US HY80 steel, might have some impact.
Maybe without Polaris the RN keeps its planned priority on SSNs and this pushes any SSBN fleet back to the mid-70s?
If they do go ahead, Kennedy is bound to dangle Polaris in an attempt to break up the friendship "hey guys we've already got a missile and missile tubes... buy now pay later and give us the keys."
So plenty of potential hitches, I can't see many cost savings unless both defence staffs can agree on priorities and narrow the field of platforms and weapons and unless the industrial heads can actually avoid squabbling and back-stabbing the other side by launching competing products.
Yup. Force de Frappe was 100% nationalistic pride and ego (De Gaulle included LMAO). A good case could be make cooperation would be anatema.
To be Brutally Honest,
the french would get the british onboard only to pillage four all important things
- Hurricane - to accelerate their Gerboise Bleue A-bomb (OTL: February 1960)
-
Operation Mosaic - Wikipedia
- Blue Streak to get into the IRBM / SLBM age ASAP, providing the FDF with an interim capability (
- Valiant SSNs to get into the SSN / boomer business ASAP, with "national" reactors (not Americans)
Whether the british would agree or not, De Gaulle would not care much... PILLAGING mode ON.
Five cardinal dates in the Force de Frappe existence
- February 13, 1960: first A-bomb (Gerboise bleue in the Sahara desert)
- October 1, 1964: Mirage IVA IOC (first squadron stands alert at Mont de Marsan military air base)
- August 24, 1968 : first H-bomb (Canopus, Moruroa)
- August 2, 1971: Plateau d'Albion IRBMs IOC
- March 1972: first Redoutable patrol with M1 SLBMs.
Now, getting the english onboard and pillaging their nuclear knowledge is essentially to accelerate all this - except perhaps "first A-bomb" well underway by 1957-58 when the US screws the UK.
But all four other dates can certainly be accelerated. British equivalent to the four dates left
- October 1, 1964: Mirage IVA IOC
- August 24, 1968 : first H-bomb (Canopus, Moruroa)
- August 2, 1971: Plateau d'Albion IRBMs
- March 1972: first Redoutable patrol with M1 SLBMs.
Are (give or take)
- V-bombers (1956) & TSR-2
- Hurricane (October 1952) ;
- Mosaic (1957) ;
- and Blue Streak
The british have an average 7 years advance over similar french "nuclear milestone". No doubt those 7 years will make the french salivating. Why bother reinventing the wheel at horrible expense when your neighbourgh has everything ready and free of service ?
The case of the Mirage IV, A or B, is indeed tricky. IF the French can grab solid-fuel missiles or IRBMs long before 1971-72 (such as a tweaked Blue Streak interim capability) - then its instantly squeeze the Mirage IV out of existence. Even more if V-bombers are available, second hand - or Buccaneers, or TSR-2.
I would say the French circa 1960-61 would hesitate between Vulcan B.2, Victor B.2, and Buccaneer S.2 as alternatives to the Mirage IV 01/A/B.
The whole thing as a interim system before rushing into the missile age ASAP - whether Blue Streak or early solid-fuel rockets.
France POV was clear right from 1958: nuclear bombers were expensive and doomed. Go missile ASAP. Only because missiles could not happen before 1971 did the FDF went for the Mirage IVA to bridge the gap ASAP - and October 1964, it was.
But as soon as missiles became available, number of Mirage IV squadrons dropped from 9 to 6 in the mid-1970's and rapidly shrunk afterwards. Had ASMP not been invented, the FDF air branch would have been shut down right from 1974 - the moment Albion's IRBMs and Redoutable's M1/M20 reached an early deployment plateau.
Out of 62 Mirage IVA build, only 18 were lucky enough to get the ASMP upgrade - and only because it was a) a cheap and b) more flexible - secondary alternative to SLBMs and IRBMs
Bottom line: France could never afford a V-force or a SAC. FDF had to go into the missile age ASAP.
OTL France did the solid-fuel missiles mostly alone (Boeing helped a little at the beginning in 1958, TBH) and could do no better than 1971.
ITTL, if somebody is willing to help and accelerate the schedule to any year before 1971, the French will instantly jump on that bandwagon. Even Blue Streak would be welcome, if only because, compared to any Mirage IVA, as ballistic missiles they are mostly invulnerable to Soviet defenses.
That's paramount.
- February 13, 1960: first A-bomb (Gerboise bleue in the Sahara desert)
- October 1, 1964: Mirage IVA IOC (first squadron stands alert at Mont de Marsan military air base)
- August 24, 1968 : first H-bomb (Canopus, Moruroa)
- August 2, 1971: Plateau d'Albion IRBMs IOC
- March 1972: first Redoutable patrol with M1 SLBMs.
Now, getting the english onboard and pillaging their nuclear knowledge is essentially to accelerate all this - except perhaps "first A-bomb" well underway by 1957-58 when the US screws the UK.
But all four other dates can certainly be accelerated. British equivalent to the four dates left
- October 1, 1964: Mirage IVA IOC
- August 24, 1968 : first H-bomb (Canopus, Moruroa)
- August 2, 1971: Plateau d'Albion IRBMs
- March 1972: first Redoutable patrol with M1 SLBMs.
Are (give or take)
- V-bombers (1956) & TSR-2
- Hurricane (October 1952) ;
- Mosaic (1957) ;
- and Blue Streak
The british have an average 7 years advance over similar french "nuclear milestone". No doubt those 7 years will make the french salivating. Why bother reinventing the wheel at horrible expense when your neighbourgh has everything ready and free of service ?
The case of the Mirage IV, A or B, is indeed tricky. IF the French can grab solid-fuel missiles or IRBMs long before 1971-72 (such as a tweaked Blue Streak interim capability) - then its instantly squeeze the Mirage IV out of existence. Even more if V-bombers are available, second hand - or Buccaneers, or TSR-2.
I would say the French circa 1960-61 would hesitate between Vulcan B.2, Victor B.2, and Buccaneer S.2 as alternatives to the Mirage IV 01/A/B.
The whole thing as a interim system before rushing into the missile age ASAP - whether Blue Streak or early solid-fuel rockets.
France POV was clear right from 1958: nuclear bombers were expensive and doomed. Go missile ASAP. Only because missiles could not happen before 1971 did the FDF went for the Mirage IVA to bridge the gap ASAP - and October 1964, it was.
But as soon as missiles became available, number of Mirage IV squadrons dropped from 9 to 6 in the mid-1970's and rapidly shrunk afterwards. Had ASMP not been invented, the FDF air branch would have been shut down right from 1974 - the moment Albion's IRBMs and Redoutable's M1/M20 reached an early deployment plateau.
Out of 62 Mirage IVA build, only 18 were lucky enough to get the ASMP upgrade - and only because it was a) a cheap and b) more flexible - secondary alternative to SLBMs and IRBMs
Bottom line: France could never afford a V-force or a SAC. FDF had to go into the missile age ASAP.
OTL France did the solid-fuel missiles mostly alone (Boeing helped a little at the beginning in 1958, TBH) and could do no better than 1971.
ITTL, if somebody is willing to help and accelerate the schedule to any year before 1971, the French will instantly jump on that bandwagon. Even Blue Streak would be welcome, if only because, compared to any Mirage IVA, as ballistic missiles they are mostly invulnerable to Soviet defenses.
That's paramount.
Last edited:
Buccaneer S.2 would be nice but came too late compared to Mirage IVA. This leaves the V-bombers B.2 variants - Vulcan or Victor ? Did the British had any to spare ? I think the French could accept some as an interim system.
The case of Blue Steel and Blue Steel Mk.2 are interesting because of Minerve and because of... ASMP. Imagine, FDF getting an ASMP-like standoff cruise missile capability nearly 25 years before ASMP OTL - 1986 on the Mirage IVP.
I often forget that when it was canned in April 1960 Blue Streak had not flown yet - it finally flew in June 1964 but as ELDO Europa F1.
So the question is: when was Blue Streak supposed to fly before April 1960 cancellation ?
A vertical empire (highly recommended book) tells me "later in 1960"
I can really see the French jumping on the Blue Streak program, at one condition (see above): change the oxidizer from LOX to either H2O2 or N2O4. They would probably go for the latter, considering their present experience with Veronique and Pierres Précieuses, all of them storable / hypergolic props. H2O2 was always an oddball among oxidizers, and the British, despite Black Knight / Black Arrow / Blue Steel, had negative experience with the stuff.
So, I would say: Victor B.2 and modified Blue Streak for the anglo-french. Mirage IV dropped, no point in developing it as Blue Streak even ELDO, even Europa, flew in June 1964 that is - some months before the Mirage IVA IOC at Mont de Marsan.
An interesting question would be: French Blue Streak, but WHERE ? Not sure they would fit into Plateau d'Albion, although (as we say in french) "les mêmes causes produisent les mêmes effets" (same causes = same results, in the sense that: there are not that many places in France where one can safely bury IRBMs into underground silos...)
Unfortunately, "Blue Streak" if translated in french sounds completely ackward or stupid - "la trainée bleue". Even more when "trainée" beside "streak" has a secondary, unrelated but extremely unfortunate slang meaning. "Une trainée" means "a whore".
And "raie" ( = ray) is even more unfortunate, as it is slang for pussy - just like "crack", actually.
The case of Blue Steel and Blue Steel Mk.2 are interesting because of Minerve and because of... ASMP. Imagine, FDF getting an ASMP-like standoff cruise missile capability nearly 25 years before ASMP OTL - 1986 on the Mirage IVP.
I often forget that when it was canned in April 1960 Blue Streak had not flown yet - it finally flew in June 1964 but as ELDO Europa F1.
So the question is: when was Blue Streak supposed to fly before April 1960 cancellation ?
A vertical empire (highly recommended book) tells me "later in 1960"
A Vertical Empire
A Vertical Empire provides a description of the British rocketry and space programme from the 1950s to 1970s, detailing the Medium Range Ballistic Missile Blue Streak and its conversion to a satellite launcher as part of the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO). This extensively...
books.google.fr
I can really see the French jumping on the Blue Streak program, at one condition (see above): change the oxidizer from LOX to either H2O2 or N2O4. They would probably go for the latter, considering their present experience with Veronique and Pierres Précieuses, all of them storable / hypergolic props. H2O2 was always an oddball among oxidizers, and the British, despite Black Knight / Black Arrow / Blue Steel, had negative experience with the stuff.
So, I would say: Victor B.2 and modified Blue Streak for the anglo-french. Mirage IV dropped, no point in developing it as Blue Streak even ELDO, even Europa, flew in June 1964 that is - some months before the Mirage IVA IOC at Mont de Marsan.
An interesting question would be: French Blue Streak, but WHERE ? Not sure they would fit into Plateau d'Albion, although (as we say in french) "les mêmes causes produisent les mêmes effets" (same causes = same results, in the sense that: there are not that many places in France where one can safely bury IRBMs into underground silos...)
Unfortunately, "Blue Streak" if translated in french sounds completely ackward or stupid - "la trainée bleue". Even more when "trainée" beside "streak" has a secondary, unrelated but extremely unfortunate slang meaning. "Une trainée" means "a whore".
And "raie" ( = ray) is even more unfortunate, as it is slang for pussy - just like "crack", actually.
Last edited:
Victor B.2 production was cut by 25 machines in the early 60's in favour of Skybolt equipped Vulcans.
I read they tried to flogg them to South Africa and Australia.
Arguably no Skybolt means no cut to Victor, but production line was open.
I read they tried to flogg them to South Africa and Australia.
Arguably no Skybolt means no cut to Victor, but production line was open.
Yes, I remember that. I can see those 25 airframes going to the French. I'm not sure they would want Blue Steel, it was a bit of a dog. The reason was that 1950's era H2O2 had a lot of impurities, which made it corrosive to the rocket engine and vehicle plumbing - and then the leaks led to big KABOOMS. The NF-104A had similar issues.
That's why I think the French would not want to hear about H2O2 oxidizer - on Blue Steel first, then if Blue Streak had to be tweaked.
The French would probably settle for a handful of Victor B.2 with gravity bomb nukes - perhaps the Mirage IVA AN-11 at the earliest possible date.
This also means the 12 C-135FR obviously never happen. If the French even wants aerial tanker, Victor K.2 is the way to go.
I also wonder if the French would take some Valiant SSNs ? Wow, twenty years before OTL Rubis.
That's why I think the French would not want to hear about H2O2 oxidizer - on Blue Steel first, then if Blue Streak had to be tweaked.
The French would probably settle for a handful of Victor B.2 with gravity bomb nukes - perhaps the Mirage IVA AN-11 at the earliest possible date.
This also means the 12 C-135FR obviously never happen. If the French even wants aerial tanker, Victor K.2 is the way to go.
I also wonder if the French would take some Valiant SSNs ? Wow, twenty years before OTL Rubis.
So the anglo-french 1959 nuclear package could be
Step 1 Victor B.2 with gravity nukes
Step 2 Black Streak with the different oxidizer, as an early, interim IRBM capability from 1963
Step 3 Valiant SSNs for the MN to gain experience for future boomers.
And then Step 4 : Redoutable vs Resolution boomers. (Resolutable, LMAO - or Redolution ? ROTFL)
en.wikipedia.org
en.wikipedia.org
Related to solid-fuel SLBMs: no idea how far along did the british went. The french took until 1972 to field M1 with 2500 km range only - very short to strike Moscow from the Barents sea or Mediterranean... M20 was a little better.
Now, look at the attached picture. I put Wikipedia tables side by side. And guess what ? Resolution and Redoutable development milestones are remarquably similar - until 1966 at least. For some unknown reasons it took the French four more years to finish their boat and shakedown-cruise it. Probably the lack of Valiant SSN experience beforehand, also the lack of Uncle Sam help.
Updated the picture to put Resolution and Redoutable milestones side by side. Well, all I can say is that their respective milestones were astonishingly close. It's almost unbelievable !
On both sides of the channel the Redoutable and Resolution shipyards builders were - unknowingly ! - racing each others. The French resisted until 1966 then completely dropped off behind.
I'm left wondering whether it wasn't a ploy by De Gaulle to (as usual) screw the anglo-americans he loathed.
Step 1 Victor B.2 with gravity nukes
Step 2 Black Streak with the different oxidizer, as an early, interim IRBM capability from 1963
Step 3 Valiant SSNs for the MN to gain experience for future boomers.
And then Step 4 : Redoutable vs Resolution boomers. (Resolutable, LMAO - or Redolution ? ROTFL)
Resolution-class submarine - Wikipedia
Redoutable-class submarine (1967) - Wikipedia
Related to solid-fuel SLBMs: no idea how far along did the british went. The french took until 1972 to field M1 with 2500 km range only - very short to strike Moscow from the Barents sea or Mediterranean... M20 was a little better.
Now, look at the attached picture. I put Wikipedia tables side by side. And guess what ? Resolution and Redoutable development milestones are remarquably similar - until 1966 at least. For some unknown reasons it took the French four more years to finish their boat and shakedown-cruise it. Probably the lack of Valiant SSN experience beforehand, also the lack of Uncle Sam help.
Updated the picture to put Resolution and Redoutable milestones side by side. Well, all I can say is that their respective milestones were astonishingly close. It's almost unbelievable !
On both sides of the channel the Redoutable and Resolution shipyards builders were - unknowingly ! - racing each others. The French resisted until 1966 then completely dropped off behind.
I'm left wondering whether it wasn't a ploy by De Gaulle to (as usual) screw the anglo-americans he loathed.
Attachments
Last edited:
- Joined
- 6 September 2006
- Messages
- 4,329
- Reaction score
- 7,529
As we've discussed on the Falklands thread, presumably Redoubtable was completed but awaiting her M1s and associated kit before being formally commissioned in 71?
And of course France was unique in building an SSBN before building an SSN, something which most other navies avoid, if you have fundamental tech problems better to sort them on an SSN rather than cocking up your deterrent.
As we know, the delayed Rubis-class required the AMÉlioration Tactique HYdrodynamique Silence Transmission Ecoute (Silent Acoustic Transmission Tactical Hydrodynamic Improvement) to solve their noise issues.
And of course France was unique in building an SSBN before building an SSN, something which most other navies avoid, if you have fundamental tech problems better to sort them on an SSN rather than cocking up your deterrent.
As we know, the delayed Rubis-class required the AMÉlioration Tactique HYdrodynamique Silence Transmission Ecoute (Silent Acoustic Transmission Tactical Hydrodynamic Improvement) to solve their noise issues.
Last edited:
Partial answers referenced in this thread
So if the pod was in say 1956, then there would not be any mirage IV? I thought the French really wanted that nucular triad for nationalistic proses?So the anglo-french 1959 nuclear package could be
Step 1 Victor B.2 with gravity nukes
Step 2 Black Streak with the different oxidizer, as an early, interim IRBM capability from 1963
Step 3 Valiant SSNs for the MN to gain experience for future boomers.
And then Step 4 : Redoutable vs Resolution boomers. (Resolutable, LMAO - or Redolution ? ROTFL)
Resolution-class submarine - Wikipedia
Redoutable-class submarine (1967) - Wikipedia
Related to solid-fuel SLBMs: no idea how far along did the british went. The french took until 1972 to field M1 with 2500 km range only - very short to strike Moscow from the Barents sea or Mediterranean... M20 was a little better.
Now, look at the attached picture. I put Wikipedia tables side by side. And guess what ? Resolution and Redoutable development milestones are remarquably similar - until 1966 at least. For some unknown reasons it took the French four more years to finish their boat and shakedown-cruise it. Probably the lack of Valiant SSN experience beforehand, also the lack of Uncle Sam help.
Updated the picture to put Resolution and Redoutable milestones side by side. Well, all I can say is that their respective milestones were astonishingly close. It's almost unbelievable !
On both sides of the channel the Redoutable and Resolution shipyards builders were - unknowingly ! - racing each others. The French resisted until 1966 then completely dropped off behind.
I'm left wondering whether it wasn't a ploy by De Gaulle to (as usual) screw the anglo-americans he loathed.
Also with a pod then there would also be not American reactors for subs wich could lead to some interesting changes, both countries started out with gas cooled reactors, but for some reason they weren't considered fit for subs (why is that i wonder) so the uk whint with us pwrs wile France uses there wird low inrechmint uranium case design, maby the UK uses that?
Lascaris
ACCESS: Secret
- Joined
- 14 November 2008
- Messages
- 272
- Reaction score
- 313
The obvious question is, what are the British getting out of the deal? French missiles for British reactors makes some sense. British reactors, bombers, bombs and missiles for no French contribution does not.So the anglo-french 1959 nuclear package could be
Step 1 Victor B.2 with gravity nukes
Step 2 Black Streak with the different oxidizer, as an early, interim IRBM capability from 1963
Step 3 Valiant SSNs for the MN to gain experience for future boomers.
And then Step 4 : Redoutable vs Resolution boomers. (Resolutable, LMAO - or Redolution ? ROTFL)
Resolution-class submarine - Wikipedia
Redoutable-class submarine (1967) - Wikipedia
Related to solid-fuel SLBMs: no idea how far along did the british went. The french took until 1972 to field M1 with 2500 km range only - very short to strike Moscow from the Barents sea or Mediterranean... M20 was a little better.
Now, look at the attached picture. I put Wikipedia tables side by side. And guess what ? Resolution and Redoutable development milestones are remarquably similar - until 1966 at least. For some unknown reasons it took the French four more years to finish their boat and shakedown-cruise it. Probably the lack of Valiant SSN experience beforehand, also the lack of Uncle Sam help.
Updated the picture to put Resolution and Redoutable milestones side by side. Well, all I can say is that their respective milestones were astonishingly close. It's almost unbelievable !
On both sides of the channel the Redoutable and Resolution shipyards builders were - unknowingly ! - racing each others. The French resisted until 1966 then completely dropped off behind.
I'm left wondering whether it wasn't a ploy by De Gaulle to (as usual) screw the anglo-americans he loathed.
NOMISYRRUC
ACCESS: Top Secret
- Joined
- 28 September 2008
- Messages
- 1,608
- Reaction score
- 2,380
Some questions for @Archibald, because you have access to the Second Edition of A Vertical Empire.
If I remember correctly from my copy of the First Edition of Mr Hill's book, the RAE/RPE in collaboration with Armstrong-Siddeley (later Bristol-Siddeley) developed the Alpha, Beta and Gamma family of rocket engines.
The next engine would have been the Delta, but it was decided to buy a licence on the Rocketdyne S-3D, which Rolls Royce used as the basis of its RZ.1 family of engines for Blue Streak and Europa. That (and De Havilland's licence on Atlas) was done to save time and money, but primarily time.
From memory it was estimated that 2 years was cut off the development programme. However, I'm sceptical that was the result in practice. The British had a habit of "fiddling" with imported American equipment and often to such an extent that it would have been just as quick and cheap to have developed an "All-British" system in the first place. For example the RZ.1 was the Rolls Royce designation of S-3D but the Firm redesigned as the RZ.2. Plus the cancellation of Blue Streak as a MRBM delayed the first test launch from late 1960 to June 1964 forfeiting the time saved by buying American.
So the questions to @Archibald are...
If I remember correctly from my copy of the First Edition of Mr Hill's book, the RAE/RPE in collaboration with Armstrong-Siddeley (later Bristol-Siddeley) developed the Alpha, Beta and Gamma family of rocket engines.
The next engine would have been the Delta, but it was decided to buy a licence on the Rocketdyne S-3D, which Rolls Royce used as the basis of its RZ.1 family of engines for Blue Streak and Europa. That (and De Havilland's licence on Atlas) was done to save time and money, but primarily time.
From memory it was estimated that 2 years was cut off the development programme. However, I'm sceptical that was the result in practice. The British had a habit of "fiddling" with imported American equipment and often to such an extent that it would have been just as quick and cheap to have developed an "All-British" system in the first place. For example the RZ.1 was the Rolls Royce designation of S-3D but the Firm redesigned as the RZ.2. Plus the cancellation of Blue Streak as a MRBM delayed the first test launch from late 1960 to June 1964 forfeiting the time saved by buying American.
So the questions to @Archibald are...
- Is the above about the Delta and S-3D true?
- Did Hill provide any technical data about the Delta engine?
- If he did, how did it compare to the RZ.2?
Last edited:
That's pertinent questioning, indeed.
- on the ballistic missile front:
a) the British have an early IRBM capability (Blue Streak)
b) the french have a long term solid-fuel SLBM program (M1 / M2 / M20)
I think a balanced cooperation could be made there.
Everything else is murkier.
- The British already have A-bombs and H-bombs - France has little to bargain there.
- The British have three options, if not four, for long range air-strike: Vulcan B.2, Victor B.2, Buccaneer and the coming TSR-2. The french only have the Mirage IV-01 from June 1959, so not much to bargain there either.
- submarines: the british are far ahead in SSN, the two countries are on equal basis for boomers (Redoutable vs Resolution)
I would say the french could bargain solid-fuel SLBM against Blue Streak IRBM, plus a tentative merging of the boomers program.
Otherwise, they would be indeed at a disadvantage: the British could provide interim bombers and SSNs to protect the boomers, plus H-bomb secrets. But at what cost ?
NOMISYRRUC
ACCESS: Top Secret
- Joined
- 28 September 2008
- Messages
- 1,608
- Reaction score
- 2,380
Please note that I'm a lot out of my depth on this subject. However, based on the little that I think that I know.
Point of Departure (POD) 1955
The British decide to develop a solid-fuel SLBM instead of Blue Streak. I've read that £84 million was spent on it as an MRBM and the British also spent another £27 million on Skybolt. This evolved into an Anglo-French programme, which the Italians might have joined too instead of developing their Alfa missile. It produced four weapons as follows:
- An equivalent to Polaris A-3 which entered service on the British Resolution class SSBN at the end of the 1960s. The British also planned to deploy a land-based version which would have replaced Thor around 1965, but in common with Blue Streak, the land-based version was cancelled in 1960.
- A Poseidon C-3 equivalent which is fitted to the French SNLE completed in the 1970s. Up to 50 land-based versions (in squadrons with 9 operational missiles and one undergoing maintenance) were deployed instead of the "real" SSBS.
- An equivalent to Trident C-4. This was fitted to the British Resolution class in place of the Chevaline upgrade to Polaris, was fitted to the French SNLE completed in the 1980s and refitted to the earlier French SNLEs.
- An equivalent to Trident D-5 which armed the British Vanguard class SSBNs and French Triomphant class SNLE-NG.
This might also be early enough to have Blue Steel Mk 1 redesigned to use this fuel. It doesn't enter service any sooner but it was a lot safer for the ground crews and may have been more reliable. The original Blue Steel Mk 2 was still cancelled, but the "This Time Line" version of Mk 1 was good enough to justify the development of a second-generation Blue Steel that entered service around 1970.
Not directly related to this was Blue Water. According to Wood in Project Cancelled it was cancelled in 1962 at a cost of £32 million because Thornycroft wanted to spend the money saved on TSR.2. Except that according to Gunston in The Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Rockets & Missiles (P. 31) the project was killed by the existence of the American Sergeant which did the same job in a system that weighing three times as much and costing five times as much.
Point of Departure (POD) 1945
The British don't develop the Saunders Roe Princess flying boat. They don't develop the rocket-plus jet aircraft (Avro 720, Saro SR.53 and Saro P.177) and their associated engines either. Instead they use the resources to accelerate the Avro Blue Steel, Saunder Roe's ballistic missile projects and that Company's helicopter programme.
As a result the small ballistic missiles developed by Saunders Roe are flying sooner.
- 36-inch Black Knight in the middle (or even early) 1950s instead of 1958.
- 54-inch Black Knight in the late 1950s instead of never. I believe that second-hand Redstone missiles were used instead.
- Black Arrow in the middle (or even early) 1960s instead of 1969.
It would also have been helpful had the British not become enamoured with HTP fuel at the end of World War II and instead started a solid-fuel rocket programme. Thus Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Stentor would have been solid-fuel instead of HTP engines and Black Knight (in both forms), Black Arrow and Blue Steel would have been solid-fuel instead of HTP fuel rockets and missiles.
However, I've no idea whether the "state of the art" in solid fuel propellants in the UK in 1945 would have allowed it and if it did the British might not have had the "brainpower" to develop it in the same length of time that they took to develop the HPT engines. "As I understand it" the lengthy development times of new technology projects in Post War Britain were as much due to a shortage of scientists and engineers as much as a shortage of money.
One of the side-effects would have been no British HTP powered submarine programme so no HM Submarines "Exploder" and "Excruciator". Instead the Admiralty gave the scientists and engineers that worked on that programme in the "real world" the task of developing a nuclear powered submarine. I want to say with the result was that HM S/M Dreadnought was built with a British rather than an American nuclear reactor, but that is probably wishful thinking.
If it wasn't wishful thinking the British would have sold a reactor to the French, who would have installed it in Q244, which would have been completed in 1964 as a 3,000 ton SSN called République.
Last edited:
- Joined
- 6 September 2006
- Messages
- 4,329
- Reaction score
- 7,529
The British were obsessed by HTP because of the Walter turbine and its submarine applications - a genuinely game changing fast underwater submarine that can outrun escorts and carve up convoys. The Russians too were very interested for the same reasons.
But Walter and his factory fell into British hands so we could make the turbines and the fuel producing equipment. That cost a lot of money, indeed there wasn't enough production capacity to run the fantasy submarine fleet envisioned and no doubt the RAF asking for stocks of HTP for fighter sorties would have annoyed the Navy no end. So I share the bemusement about why everyone jumped onto the bandwagon. It wasn't even as if the Me 163 was a sound tactical idea either!
The Russians made do very nicely on red fuming nitric acid and kerosense instead for example.
I wonder if anyone has done any analysis on the R&D money spent on HTP motors, ramjets and other rockets?
The Scorpion et al. had very little practical application either (Canberra stunt plane, Comet RATO but not used often (at all??)) but ramjets certainly did.
I think the only solid rocket propellant Britain had in 1945 was cordite.... so its a whole new ballgame and no Operation Paperclip bounty to kick-start efforts either. Most British missile programmes in 1945 were using LOX/Kerosene, bolting on dozens of cordite rockets or looking at ramjets - the fortyniners were all ramjets.
I don't think Saro was distracted by SR.53 and P.177, I don't think they would have got as far as they did with rockets had they not gained that experience. Mind you they spent as much time messing about with hovercraft and rotary wing too, Saro had an under-recognised Swiss army knife of capabilities.
Vickers was leading the HTP turbine designs at Barrow, Rolls-Royce was doing the nuclear stuff (I need to dig out why that was) so no real overlap in resources. Make no mistake if Admiral Rickover hadn't released Skipjack rear-ends we would still have had a reactor ready to go.
But Walter and his factory fell into British hands so we could make the turbines and the fuel producing equipment. That cost a lot of money, indeed there wasn't enough production capacity to run the fantasy submarine fleet envisioned and no doubt the RAF asking for stocks of HTP for fighter sorties would have annoyed the Navy no end. So I share the bemusement about why everyone jumped onto the bandwagon. It wasn't even as if the Me 163 was a sound tactical idea either!
The Russians made do very nicely on red fuming nitric acid and kerosense instead for example.
I wonder if anyone has done any analysis on the R&D money spent on HTP motors, ramjets and other rockets?
The Scorpion et al. had very little practical application either (Canberra stunt plane, Comet RATO but not used often (at all??)) but ramjets certainly did.
I think the only solid rocket propellant Britain had in 1945 was cordite.... so its a whole new ballgame and no Operation Paperclip bounty to kick-start efforts either. Most British missile programmes in 1945 were using LOX/Kerosene, bolting on dozens of cordite rockets or looking at ramjets - the fortyniners were all ramjets.
I don't think Saro was distracted by SR.53 and P.177, I don't think they would have got as far as they did with rockets had they not gained that experience. Mind you they spent as much time messing about with hovercraft and rotary wing too, Saro had an under-recognised Swiss army knife of capabilities.
Vickers was leading the HTP turbine designs at Barrow, Rolls-Royce was doing the nuclear stuff (I need to dig out why that was) so no real overlap in resources. Make no mistake if Admiral Rickover hadn't released Skipjack rear-ends we would still have had a reactor ready to go.
As I said elsewhere, among many PITAs related to rocketry, the lack of a decent oxidizer stands high.
- LOX: liquid oxygen
- H2O2: Hydrogen peroxide (= bleach)
- N2O: nitrous oxide (= laughing gas)
- N204: nitrogen tetraoxide, the storable / hypergolics oxidizer
- And everything else is an atrocious horror
And that's it.
Among these four
- LOX is a deep cryogen, -183°C - thus a PITA: it doomed Blue Streak, SS-6, Titan I and Atlas - all by itself.
- H2O2 only has decent performance if 98%, then any impurity including atmospheric water vapor: KABOOM, thus a PITA
- N2O is not too cryogen and not KABOOM (although Scaled 2007... boom), but its performance sucks with any fuel, thus a PITA
- N2O4 is a toxic, carcigenous, corrosive bitch that was invented only because ICBMs in silos needed it (with hydrazine fuel, N2H4),thus a PITA
- And everything else is an atrocious horror (fluorine !)
Guess why ICBMs went solid fuel ASAP... ? liquid fuels were giant PITAs and ticking bombs in silos (Titan II 1965 and 1980 accidents were truly horrible).
Among those few oxidizers, H2O2 / HTP is not the worse but its instability-impurity-explosivity was a major issue back in the 1950's when production and storage were not tightly controlled. As a result it gained an atrocious reputation that was only shaken by a) hybrid rockets (AMROC in the late 1980's) and later, Beal Aerospace (late 1990's).
@RanulfC ?
- LOX: liquid oxygen
- H2O2: Hydrogen peroxide (= bleach)
- N2O: nitrous oxide (= laughing gas)
- N204: nitrogen tetraoxide, the storable / hypergolics oxidizer
- And everything else is an atrocious horror
And that's it.
Among these four
- LOX is a deep cryogen, -183°C - thus a PITA: it doomed Blue Streak, SS-6, Titan I and Atlas - all by itself.
- H2O2 only has decent performance if 98%, then any impurity including atmospheric water vapor: KABOOM, thus a PITA
- N2O is not too cryogen and not KABOOM (although Scaled 2007... boom), but its performance sucks with any fuel, thus a PITA
- N2O4 is a toxic, carcigenous, corrosive bitch that was invented only because ICBMs in silos needed it (with hydrazine fuel, N2H4),thus a PITA
- And everything else is an atrocious horror (fluorine !)
Guess why ICBMs went solid fuel ASAP... ? liquid fuels were giant PITAs and ticking bombs in silos (Titan II 1965 and 1980 accidents were truly horrible).
Among those few oxidizers, H2O2 / HTP is not the worse but its instability-impurity-explosivity was a major issue back in the 1950's when production and storage were not tightly controlled. As a result it gained an atrocious reputation that was only shaken by a) hybrid rockets (AMROC in the late 1980's) and later, Beal Aerospace (late 1990's).
@RanulfC ?
Last edited:
NOMISYRRUC
ACCESS: Top Secret
- Joined
- 28 September 2008
- Messages
- 1,608
- Reaction score
- 2,380
This is the best that I can do.
Any similarity between this and Post 71 on Page 4 of the thread "British Cold War: Facts and Figures" on alternatehistory.com by someone with the username NOMISYRRUC is completely deliberate.
Source: The Flight Global Archive - Aviation History19671967 - 1672.PDF
https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1967/1967 - 1672.html
Notes:
- Square brackets contain the equivalent description from Appendix 5 of Project Cancelled by Derek Wood.
- There are some discrepancies between Wood's list and Flight's list, which are noted.
- Wood included the cancellation costs of the Vickers variable geometry projects (£1.5 million) and the cost of the Bristol 188 supersonic aircraft (£20.5 million), but the Flight article omits them.
- Wood said that £0.9 million was spent on the Vickers Red Dean, while the Flight article says £7.5 million. If he obtained the information from the Flight article he may have been reading the line above, which was an "Air-to-ship guided bomb" cancelled in March 1956 and is not in Wood's Appendix 5.
- The "Air-to-ship guided bomb" may be Green Cheese.
Last edited:
NOMISYRRUC
ACCESS: Top Secret
- Joined
- 28 September 2008
- Messages
- 1,608
- Reaction score
- 2,380
This is the table in Post 33 in date of cancellation order.
Any similarity between this and Post 73 on Page 4 of the thread "British Cold War: Facts and Figures" on alternatehistory.com by someone with the username NOMISYRRUC is completely deliberate.
Thats why I think the pod needs to be erlyer, so that France and Britain can share the cost of the A and/or H bomb development.
Main problem is France is ruined, the Indochina war ends in July 1954 only for the Algerian one to start in November of the same year, and finally, the 4th Republic is a quagmire without a backbone.
France was at war continuously from September 3, 1939 to March 19, 1962... from my grandfather 30 years to my uncle's 20, and it did no good to their mental healths, really. War is hell.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Indochina_War 20 000 soldiers KIA
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War 25 000 KIA
Drats, never realized that Algerian war had led to such losses on the French side. More than Indochina, damn it. Total 45 000 soldiers killed between 1945 and 1962 ! Never thought the toll had been so high, I was leaning toward 10 000 each.
Plus this before
That's near 250 000 killed between 1939 and 1962. Of course that's "peanuts" compared to the 1.3 million killed in 14-18.
Plus the goddam Algerian war proved expensive as frack. 11 billion dollars ??!!!!
Quick search brought a 1968 US intelligence report (NIE) assessing the Force de Frappe cost in billion of dollars: $17 billion. For the sake of comparison, Apollo cost north of $20 billion, perhaps as much as $25 billion.
Bottom line: no surprise De Gaulle wanted to shut down the dirty Algerian bush war and pour the military budget into the FDF instead. Plus NATO committments in conventional weapons... clearly something had to give. Algeria was shut down first, then a bit of NATO in 1966.
France was at war continuously from September 3, 1939 to March 19, 1962... from my grandfather 30 years to my uncle's 20, and it did no good to their mental healths, really. War is hell.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Indochina_War 20 000 soldiers KIA
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War 25 000 KIA
Drats, never realized that Algerian war had led to such losses on the French side. More than Indochina, damn it. Total 45 000 soldiers killed between 1945 and 1962 ! Never thought the toll had been so high, I was leaning toward 10 000 each.
Plus this before
That's near 250 000 killed between 1939 and 1962. Of course that's "peanuts" compared to the 1.3 million killed in 14-18.
Plus the goddam Algerian war proved expensive as frack. 11 billion dollars ??!!!!
Quick search brought a 1968 US intelligence report (NIE) assessing the Force de Frappe cost in billion of dollars: $17 billion. For the sake of comparison, Apollo cost north of $20 billion, perhaps as much as $25 billion.
Bottom line: no surprise De Gaulle wanted to shut down the dirty Algerian bush war and pour the military budget into the FDF instead. Plus NATO committments in conventional weapons... clearly something had to give. Algeria was shut down first, then a bit of NATO in 1966.
Attachments
Last edited:
NOMISYRRUC
ACCESS: Top Secret
- Joined
- 28 September 2008
- Messages
- 1,608
- Reaction score
- 2,380
Part of Post 30
Part of Post 31
If that's true I couldn't disagree with your statement more. How much of what one learns from a rocket-powered aircraft is transferrable to a small ballistic missile? As far as I know it's only the engine. Except that SR.53 & SR.177 used a DH. Spectre while Black Knight used an AS. Gamma. Different firms producing different engines.
It stands to reason that working on a small ballistic missile from 1951 to 1955 is a better way to learn about ballistic missiles than developing rocket-powered aircraft for 4 years and then starting work on a small ballistic missile. To use a phrase "It's not rocket science!" The irony is 100% intentional. Starting Black Knight 4 years earlier doesn't automatically mean the first launch would have been advanced from 1958 to 1954 but it would have helped.
Again I've resorted to Wikipedia to save time. Avro started work on the Type 720 in 1951 and it was cancelled in 1955. Work on Blue Steel began 1954-55. It stands to reason that working on a stand-off bomb 1951-54 would have been of more benefit to Blue Steel than the work done on the Avro 720. Starting Blue Steel 3-4 years earlier doesn't automatically mean the weapon would enter service 3-4 years earlier but it would help. On the other hand this was Avro's first missile project and the extra time would have allowed it to do some basic research before starting on the project proper. I also think that Avro and its subcontractors would have been better off not doing the Avro 730 and instead using the resources expended on that project to help to make Blue Steel Mk 1 to work.
Another Part of Post 31
The so-called "messing about" with helicopters included the production of a paltry 432 aircraft of the Scout, Skeeter and Wasp families.
If Saro had spent a bit less messing time about with huge flying boats that nobody wanted to buy & rocket powered fighters that the RAF & RN didn't have enough squadrons to equip and instead messed about with helicopters a bit more the Firm might have got the Scout and Wasp into service sooner. And if they did work on what became the Lynx might have begun sooner too.
Part of Post 31
I had to resort to Wikipedia to save time. According to that work on the SR.53 began in 1951 and Black Knight in 1955.
If that's true I couldn't disagree with your statement more. How much of what one learns from a rocket-powered aircraft is transferrable to a small ballistic missile? As far as I know it's only the engine. Except that SR.53 & SR.177 used a DH. Spectre while Black Knight used an AS. Gamma. Different firms producing different engines.
It stands to reason that working on a small ballistic missile from 1951 to 1955 is a better way to learn about ballistic missiles than developing rocket-powered aircraft for 4 years and then starting work on a small ballistic missile. To use a phrase "It's not rocket science!" The irony is 100% intentional. Starting Black Knight 4 years earlier doesn't automatically mean the first launch would have been advanced from 1958 to 1954 but it would have helped.
Again I've resorted to Wikipedia to save time. Avro started work on the Type 720 in 1951 and it was cancelled in 1955. Work on Blue Steel began 1954-55. It stands to reason that working on a stand-off bomb 1951-54 would have been of more benefit to Blue Steel than the work done on the Avro 720. Starting Blue Steel 3-4 years earlier doesn't automatically mean the weapon would enter service 3-4 years earlier but it would help. On the other hand this was Avro's first missile project and the extra time would have allowed it to do some basic research before starting on the project proper. I also think that Avro and its subcontractors would have been better off not doing the Avro 730 and instead using the resources expended on that project to help to make Blue Steel Mk 1 to work.
Another Part of Post 31
The so-called "messing about" with hovercraft did result in the sale of 6 SRN.4 and more than a few SRN.5 & 6. I haven't found exact figures for the SRN.5 & 6 family of hovercraft but the number appears to be at least several score. (Does anyone know how many were built?)
The so-called "messing about" with helicopters included the production of a paltry 432 aircraft of the Scout, Skeeter and Wasp families.
If Saro had spent a bit less messing time about with huge flying boats that nobody wanted to buy & rocket powered fighters that the RAF & RN didn't have enough squadrons to equip and instead messed about with helicopters a bit more the Firm might have got the Scout and Wasp into service sooner. And if they did work on what became the Lynx might have begun sooner too.
NOMISYRRUC
ACCESS: Top Secret
- Joined
- 28 September 2008
- Messages
- 1,608
- Reaction score
- 2,380
And I thought we had it tough with The Troubles in Northern Ireland.
I skimmed through the CIA report which was interesting.
This is a table I found looking for something else. It's a comparison of French and UK military personnel. The sources are the Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the year. There's a gap between 1955 and 1965 because they didn't have the information.
What I was looking for was a note from the same source saying that said France had an army of over 800,000 men in 1958 including 500,000 in Algeria.
Peak US troop strength in Vietnam was 543,482, on 30 April 1969 according to: https://www.vva310.org/vietnam-war-statistics#:~:text=Peak troop strength in Vietnam,country during the Vietnam War.
NOMISYRRUC
ACCESS: Top Secret
- Joined
- 28 September 2008
- Messages
- 1,608
- Reaction score
- 2,380
Part of Post 38
Events of 1955 says that 300,000 troops were in Algeria and Morocco.
Events of 1956 says that 400,000 troops were now in North Africa as 200,000 reservists had been called up. It also says that the last troops were withdrawn from Indo-China in April 1956.
Events of 1957 says that 400,000 troops were in Algeria after the 11th Division was moved there from Morocco which left 12,000 in that country.
Events of 1958 doesn't say how many troops were in Algeria, but it does say the garrison of Morocco was reduced from 40,000 to 30,000 and Tunisia from 28,000 to 7,000 with the balance 33,000 going to Algeria. Add that to the 400,000 troops there in 1957 and the total is 433,000.
Events of 1962 says that there were 440,000 French troops in Algeria at the start of 1962 which was to be reduced to 80,000 by mid-1963. It also says that National Service was being reduced from 27 months to 18 months and that the US had offered to sell Polaris to France on the same terms as the UK.
Events of 1964 says that French military personnel was now 636,000 and that nuclear expenditure amounted to 25% of the Defence Budget.
I was wrong. It was actually the Book of the Year 1961 - Events of 1960 and that the French Armed Forces had a total 1,026,000 including 810,000 in the Army and the defence budget was £1,182,500,000. It doesn't say how many troops were serving in Algeria.
Events of 1955 says that 300,000 troops were in Algeria and Morocco.
Events of 1956 says that 400,000 troops were now in North Africa as 200,000 reservists had been called up. It also says that the last troops were withdrawn from Indo-China in April 1956.
Events of 1957 says that 400,000 troops were in Algeria after the 11th Division was moved there from Morocco which left 12,000 in that country.
Events of 1958 doesn't say how many troops were in Algeria, but it does say the garrison of Morocco was reduced from 40,000 to 30,000 and Tunisia from 28,000 to 7,000 with the balance 33,000 going to Algeria. Add that to the 400,000 troops there in 1957 and the total is 433,000.
Events of 1962 says that there were 440,000 French troops in Algeria at the start of 1962 which was to be reduced to 80,000 by mid-1963. It also says that National Service was being reduced from 27 months to 18 months and that the US had offered to sell Polaris to France on the same terms as the UK.
Events of 1964 says that French military personnel was now 636,000 and that nuclear expenditure amounted to 25% of the Defence Budget.
I don't feel sure about Saro and solid rockets. EE however....
But strictly a more logical approach would have yielded solid fuel earlier and that logical route is likely keeping guided rockets in house.
In other words not hawking guided rockets to aviation firms but keeping it part of artillery at Royal Ordinance.
This might benefit LOPGAP to Seaslug and possibly Brakemine.
In turn implying new facilities on state owned land. EE's missile factory funded by government, would instead be RO factory.
But strictly a more logical approach would have yielded solid fuel earlier and that logical route is likely keeping guided rockets in house.
In other words not hawking guided rockets to aviation firms but keeping it part of artillery at Royal Ordinance.
This might benefit LOPGAP to Seaslug and possibly Brakemine.
In turn implying new facilities on state owned land. EE's missile factory funded by government, would instead be RO factory.
Similar threads
-
-
WAircraft of the 'Union of Franco-Albion' 1940.
- Started by Wingknut
- Replies: 2
-
Franco-British aircraft, from 1959
- Started by Archibald
- Replies: 35
-
France US Special Relationship- Started by uk 75
- Replies: 9
-
Britain without nuclear weapons
- Started by uk 75
- Replies: 3