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Missile Projects / Re: Patriot SAM replacement
« Last post by bring_it_on on Today at 02:33:51 am »
Any idea on AN/TPQ-53 array dimensions?

9.3 ft by 9.3 ft as per Kelvin Wong at Jane's IDR although I'm not sure since it does not appear to have equal sides..
https://www.scribd.com/document/357009253/Singapore-Acquires-ANTPQ-53-Counter-fire-Target-Acquisition-Radars?secret_password=bGSBnLQpbj0gdYWzUZtA
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It's really sad the NAVY not took the Convair Model 200 and end up with the Rockwell XFV-12 fiasco.

I wonder, What if: USAF and NAVY took Model 200 as F-16 and FV-12  ?
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Aerospace / Re: DARPA Long Range Anti-ship Missile (LRASM)
« Last post by bring_it_on on Today at 01:56:03 am »
What are the chances that we will see usn use lrasm used from mk41 vls by 2022 or so?

Looks unlikely. The OASuW Increment 2 will now address air launched requirements only. It is likely that the US Navy will continue to fund the Tomahawk seeker upgrade for the early 2020s and use it for anti-ship purposes until the Next Generation Land Attack Weapon is developed. 

https://news.usni.org/2017/08/16/navy-raytheon-close-finalizing-maritime-strike-tomahawk-missile-deal

A damn shame given LRASM would be much more likely to actually make it to the target.

...

Where they could have been by the early 2020s -

Quote
LRASM-B: THE SUPERSONIC SOLUTION THAT FAILED TO FLY:

Going back to the early days of the LRASM programme, DARPA's Tactical Technology Office originally received a total of nine proposals, with ATK, Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon all making submissions. Following an evaluation of the bids, it decided to place two separate Phase I contracts in mid-2009 with different businesses within Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control - Strike Weapons in Orlando, Florida, received USD10 million for an initial nine-month Phase I demonstration effort for what was originally known as LRASM-A; while Tactical Missiles in Grand Prairie, Texas, received a similar amount to pursue its LRASM-B concept.

In LRASM-A, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control - Strike Weapons conceptualised a subsonic, stealthy and survivable long-range cruise missile that married the AGM-158B JASSM-ER missile with a suite of additional sensors and systems. LRASM-A has subsequently become the basis for the LRASM follow-on development effort now being pursued by DARPA and Lockheed Martin.

Tactical Missiles' LRASM-B was a very different beast. It took the form of a high-speed weapon capitalising on a legacy hybrid rocket/ramjet engine (originally built for the Martin Marietta AQM-127 Supersonic Low-Altitude Target) to create a high-flying supersonic cruise missile that DARPA characterised as having "balanced speed and stealth for robust performance".

Phase 1 LRASM activities completed in March 2010. An evaluation by an independent government assessment team provided the necessary confidence in both weapon designs to justify further investment for flight testing, giving the green light for follow-on Phase 2 contract awards in late 2010 to continue the development and demonstration of both missiles. Strike Weapons received a USD60.3 million contract for LRASM-A, while Tactical Missiles was awarded USD157.7 million for LRASM-B. A third Phase 2 contract award, valued at USD34 million, was made to BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration for the design and development of a common sensor suite to support both LRASM variants.

The original plan was for LRASM-A to execute two air-launched demonstrations leveraging its JASSM-ER heritage and demonstrating applicability to USN and USAF tactical aircraft employment, while LRASM-B would complete four vertical launch system demonstrations proving applicability to surface combatant employment.

In November 2011 Marotta Controls announced that it had been contracted by Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control to develop a pressure regulator for the LRASM-B missile fuel pressurisation system. This would regulate pressure from a helium storage vessel, which is in turn used to pressurise the missile fuel system. The regulator design, based on an internal relief valve to prevent over-pressurisation due to downstream pressure within the regulator, borrowed substantially from Marotta's pedigree in providing pressure regulators to NASA and industry primes for satellite, launch vehicle, and manned space flight applications.

However, the LRASM programme took a new twist in January 2012 when the LRASM-B effort was terminated. Instead, DARPA, citing the pressing need for a near-term capability, said it was "consolidating investments to focus solely on advancing LRASM-A technologies ... to reduce risk and expedite delivery of cutting-edge capability to the fleet". And so LRASM-B died before it could fly. "Back into the blue: LRASM honed for extended reach, precision punch"~ IDR
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The Bar / Re: Nuclear Weapons - Discussion.
« Last post by marauder2048 on Yesterday at 08:35:48 pm »
According to the terms of the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty of 1961, the People's Republic of China would respond with military action and other aid to North

Where does the treaty oblige China to respond with military action?

Quote
'The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.'

The treaty says nothing about military action.

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Very Good
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Aerospace / Re: SNECMA C.450-01 Coléoptère VTOL research prototype......
« Last post by Motocar on Yesterday at 07:56:47 pm »
Very good...!
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The Bar / Re: Nuclear Weapons - Discussion.
« Last post by Triton on Yesterday at 07:44:24 pm »
According to the terms of the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty of 1961, the People's Republic of China would respond with military action and other aid to North

Where does the treaty oblige China to respond with military action?

Quote
'The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.'

Source:
http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/china-and-north-korea-have-a-mutual-defense-treaty-but-when-would-it-apply/

Plus statements by the People's Republic of China through state-owned newspapers that it will "intervene" if the United States launches a military strike on North Korea and that it will "prevent" regime change.
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The Bar / Re: Nuclear Weapons - Discussion.
« Last post by Triton on Yesterday at 07:13:12 pm »
Even the Korean War didn't result in a general war between the US and China.  I have difficulty believing China would go to war over a couple of precision air strikes.  Much like the hysteria when Russia came to Syria's aid, when it came right down to it, China would do little.

The following article from The Japan Times seems to support the idea that the People's Republic of China would not intervene in a limited war against North Korea. However, I am just not convinced that the war would remain limited to "a couple of precision airstrikes" and not escalate into a major regional war. You don't believe that Kim Jung-un and the North Korean regime are rational actors. So why should we believe that they will absorb the airstrikes without lashing out at neighbors within range of their weapons?

I believe that the response to the North Korea nuclear crisis will be anti-ballistic missile defense and "friendly" nuclear proliferation in South Korea, Japan, Australia etc. rather than military strikes.


"For North Korea and China, defense pact proves a complicated document"
by Jesse Johnson

Apr 18, 2017

Quote
In U.S. President Donald Trump’s calculus, a choice between Chinese cooperation or American military action loom large as part of any solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. But one often unspoken aspect of this outlook has been Beijing’s rarely mentioned mutual defense pact with Pyongyang — a treaty that would oblige China to defend North Korea in event of an attack.

The little-discussed pact, inked in 1961, legally requires Beijing to “immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal” in the event the North is attacked. Such assistance could simply mean providing better defensive weapons, but it could also include something dramatic, like deploying troops and conducting military actions against attacking countries.

For both countries, this alliance — sealed in blood by the Korean War — remains relevant and personal.

But much has changed, in terms of geopolitical realities, in the nearly 56 years since the treaty was concluded. China, now the world’s No. 2 economy, seeks prestige on the global stage and a larger say in world affairs. North Korea, meanwhile, is a nuclear-armed totalitarian regime, whose atomic weapons program and alleged human rights abuses have made the isolated nation a pariah state in the eyes of many.

For China, perhaps no other foreign policy issue has proved a greater challenge in the 21st century than North Korea. But would it respond to U.S. military action taken against North Korea?

Experts say the answer is as complicated as the pair’s troubled relationship.

“There is no love lost in the China-North Korean relationship,” Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington said. “The relationship is stressed.”

In the North, leader Kim Jong Un has scoffed at the vassal state relationship his country has with China, its sole patron. While Kim’s father, the late Kim Jong Il, enjoyed robust ties with Beijing, the young leader has distanced himself. He has executed his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, who had pushed for bolstered links with its neighbor, while also thumbing his nose at the leadership in Beijing. In the five-plus years since he assumed power, Kim has yet to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Despite repeated calls by China for the country to halt its nuclear weapons program, Kim has also overseen a huge uptick in missile and atomic tests that have threatened Beijing’s most cherished objective in the region: stability.

In an effort to protect this, Beijing may be willing to sacrifice its pact with Pyongyang, at least to an extent, experts say.

“While the mutual defense treaty obligates China to come to North Korea’s aid in times of war, no one believes that China will fulfill this obligation,” said Zhang Baohui, a professor of political science at Hong Kong’s Lingnan University. “The Chinese government has not mentioned this treaty for a long time.”

Zhang believes there are two explanations why Beijing would be unlikely to live up to the pact’s obligations: a fear of being ensnared in a devastatingly costly conflict and concerns of emboldening the North by giving it a carte blanche.

Instead, Beijing has chosen to take an approach that avoids highlighting the defense treaty while attempting to foster ties in other areas.

“Keeping mum on what they will actually do in a war scenario is a typical way for allies to discourage other members of an alliance from taking risky decisions,” said Zhang.

Still, he added, the first explanation also suggests that Beijing might turn a blind eye to a limited U.S. attack, one that does not seek to overthrow the Kim regime — and in turn put American troops on China’s doorstep.

But while a limited-war scenario may not trigger Chinese intervention, a full-scale war — one that would pit a superior U.S. military against North Korean forces — would be a different story.

China has long helped to prop up North Korea by providing it with aid and diplomatic cover as a means of maintaining a buffer zone between it and U.S.-allied South Korea. The founder of the People’s Republic, Mao Zedong, even had an aphorism for the North: “When the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold,” a reference to North Korea providing protection to an otherwise exposed China.

“China may worry that the U.S.-South Korea alliance will take over the entire Korean Peninsula,” Zhang said. In the event of a larger conflagration, it would intervene, he added, noting that this would not necessarily involve fighting, but possibly an attempt to maintain a kind of buffer zone near the Chinese border.

Experts say that with each provocation by the North, debate has grown in China over Pyongyang’s shifting role — “strategic asset” or a “strategic liability” — and whether the time has come for Beijing to cut its erstwhile ally loose.

“There is an intense debate in China over this question,” said Glaser. “There are deeply entrenched groups that view North Korea as a strategic asset.”

These groups argue that the U.S. is the greater threat and that the North helps to distract Washington’s attention from issues that involve Chinese core interests, such as the South China Sea, she noted.

But Glaser said “an increasingly vocal group of international scholars sees North Korea as a strategic liability. Xi Jinping has not yet taken a clear position, I’ve been told.”
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User Artwork / Re: Motocar's Cutaway drawings
« Last post by Motocar on Yesterday at 06:22:44 pm »
Just amazing work, Motocar!!! What program(s) did You use to make those great cut-outs?


I use modest paint and a lot of creativity ...!  Motocar
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