John21 said:
Frankly since the A-10 is going to be serving for almost 30 more years and the Air Force doesn't seem to give CAS the respect it deserves, they should be handed over to the Army. Heck along with the planes, have its pilots, maintainers and support equipment also rotate to Army service. Keep them in the same location and just give them a new paint job and scroll Army on the side.
Viewpoint Let the Army Fly Its Own Close Air Support
1033 words
9 February 1987
Aviation Week & Space Technology
AW
Pg. 11
Vol. 126, No. 6
English
Copyright 1987 McGraw-Hill, Inc.
(AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY military editor Brendan M. Greeley, Jr., flew close air support missions and served with a Marine infantry battalion during two tours in Vietnam. He later commanded a Marine Attack Squadron operating McDonnell Douglas A-4M Skyhawks. Following are his thoughts on assigning the close air support mission to the Army--Ed.)
The subject of close air support evokes strong emotions. Employment of all supporting arms--artillery, naval gunfire and air--to save the lives of Army and Marine Corps infantrymen has long been an article of faith in our ground forces. None of the arguments put forth concerning the value of interdiction or strategic bombing has altered the ground soldier's view that a timely air strike can often solve many of his problems.
The sheer magnitude of getting an air strike on target without endangering friendly troops is appreciated by few except those directly involved. Many things have to go right and it is very easy for one of them to go wrong, especially when executing single-pass attacks against small, hard-to-identify targets on a confused battlefield obscured by dust and smoke.
Coordination at all levels down to the forward air controller and aircrew is essential, and this coordination is easier to conduct if the soldier doesn't have to cross service boundaries. Air Force liaison officers serving with tactical Army units over the years have made things work as well as can be expected, but they are contending with an inherently unwieldy system.
The principle--and the value--of consolidating limited fixed-wing tactical assets under Air Force control is well established. But in the case of the close air support requirement where availability and response time are critical, it has merely created another layer between the Army infantryman and USAF aircraft.
There is no valid reason to prevent the Army from providing its own fixed-wing close air support.
Congress last examined the issue in 1971 during hearings to determine whether the services were buying different aircraft to fill the same close support mission--the Army/Lockheed AH-56A Cheyenne attack helicopter, an Air Force aircraft designated AX and the Marine Corps/Hawker Siddeley AV-8A Harrier. The hearings reexamined the long-standing question: which service should provide close air support? No Change
As it happened, the Army canceled the Cheyenne (but eventually got the Hughes Apache); the Air Force selected Fairchild to build the heavily armored A-10 for the sole mission of providing close air support for the Army, and the Marine Corps, rallying congressional support, got the Harrier.
In effect, nothing changed. Agreement between the Army and Air Force on a series of joint initiatives over the past two years included discussions of the issue but the subject was dropped (AW&ST June 17, 1985, p. 109).
The advent of the armed helicopter has clouded the roles and missions issue. Is an armed helicopter shooting at tanks 2,000 meters from friendly troops performing close air support? Yes, in the sense that the attack must be closely coordinated with ground units to prevent friendly casualties. But also no, in the traditional sense that close air support is a fixed-wing mission.
Concern over the possibility that critics of Marine aviation might try to replace its fixed-wing aircraft with helicopters prompted the Marine Corps to coin the term ''close-in fire support'' to establish a distinct armed helicopter mission that would not displace fixed-wing close air support. Target Requirements
Front-line targets dictate a requirement for both types of aircraft. The capabilities of the armed helicopter against point targets are insufficient to attack heavily fortified positions.
Marine Corps infantrymen supported by their own fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft have an ideal organization but even they have found that constant training is required to make the system work.
Despite evidence that it is the command and control structure and the training that make close air successful, rather than the equipment, Defense Dept. planners continue to waste time searching for the ideal support aircraft and Deputy Defense Secretary William H. Taft, 4th, has directed the Air Force to conduct yet another study--funded at $20 million--investigating more options for the close air mission (AW&ST Feb. 2, p. 19).
As far as equipment goes, simple VHF/FM aircraft radios that net with the ground forces are far more important to the success of close air missions than many of the exotic items that have been bought over the years.
Army and Air Force doctrine now emphasizes attack of the enemy's follow-on forces up to 90 mi. behind the front lines. As a result, the Air Force is looking for a high-speed multimission aircraft, capable of flying either close air or interdiction, to replace the A-10. Modified General Dynamics F-16s and LTV Aerospace A-7Ds are under consideration, along with other options as instructed in Taft's directive (see pp. 22, 23).
But the new aircraft may be off flying interdiction missions just when the Army wants it most, unlike the A-10, which was always available because it was dedicated to providing close air support.
The blurred dividing line of fixed-wing/rotary-wing capabilities should be replaced with a sharp, doctrinal line on the battlefield--namely the fire support coordination line. The Army should have primary responsibility for providing its own air support short of that boundary and if it decides some fixed-wing assets are needed . . . so be it. Army close air support aircraft will not threaten the existence of an Air Force proven in combat and now faced with missions in space and threats from cruise missiles that were barely perceived back in 1947.
As the Army defines the LHX as its next generation of light scout/attack helicopters and the Air Force looks for an A-10 successor, now is the time for the Defense Dept. to shift this mission to the Army. Strong support from Congress and the Defense Dept. is essential. The end result will be better support for someone who deserves it--the U. S. infantryman.