Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining an independent strategic nuclear deterrent?

Good luck building an SLBM when the last rocket was.... Bloodhound?
For what it's worth (and as others have written) France developed a SLBM in 10 years and from scratch to boot. I'm giving the UK 12 years to do it and not from scratch.

With apologies to @Archibald "Anything the Frogs can do, le Roast Beef can do better or at least as well".
 
Don't forget that it doesn't necessarily have to have a 3-warhead MRV like the A-3 had. Could just be a 1MT warhead.
Which is in fact what the French M1 had. If we say a 1958 start, my guess is that an initial SLBM enters service circa 1970 with a 1 MT warhead, and is followed up by a Mark 2 with something very much like Chevaline from about 1982.
You are absolutely correct that the V-bombers were considered entirely adequate at the time. The time being the mid-1950s.

At said time it was thought that they'd be adequate until the mid-1960s. The reason why they did serve until mid-1969 wasn't because they were still considered to be adequate. It was because it took nearly half-a-decade longer than planned (in the mid-1950s) to produce a replacement.
With a 'late' program to replace them - i.e. a 1960 or later PoD - I'd suggest that the Interim Solution gets a bit more money spent on it than in OTL. That is, instead of the WE.177B strategic laydown bomb, a relatively simple standoff weapon. Nothing grandiose, effectively a British SRAM equivalent with something like a WE.177 in the nose. A few options were considered for this in OTL, but weren't considered worthwhile for just two years of expected service.
 
Which is in fact what the French M1 had. If we say a 1958 start, my guess is that an initial SLBM enters service circa 1970 with a 1 MT warhead
Fundamentally disagree.
From 1958 we're a World away from 1955 and the UK will be far more certain compact lightweight warheads are achievable.
First SLBM IOC is more like '65-67
followed up by a Mark 2 with something very much like Chevaline from about 1982.
Again flawed, mk2 and under 800lb is more like the early 70's.
Chevaline (penetration aids dispenser at the cost of one of three RVs) is late 70's early 80's.
 
If anything just adopting a pressure hull the same diameter as the Valiant for an all-UK-content Resolution would be cheaper and quicker than what actually happened, given the US Missile Compartment had a 3in narrower diameter pressure hull than the Valiant, hence some redesign was needed to repackage the contents into the narrower pressure hull of the Resolution.
That's interesting. Would it make the ALT-Resolution class submarines easier and therefore cheaper to build? And would it make it easier to fit things like larger missile tubes for larger missiles with longer ranges and/or heavier payloads?
 
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At least without defining what "better" means? Cheaper, more reliable, more numerous, more destructive, more terrifying, more Union Jack on it?
Cheaper is unlikely. Regrettably, the opposite is likely.

More numerous is possible as it will be harder to cancel the Ramillies (the fifth SSBN). More British jobs were at stake (because the missiles were built in the UK instead of the USA), the cancellation costs might have been higher, the marginal cost of the fifth SSBN might be small in the scheme of things as the fixed costs would have been spread over a 25% larger production run and cancelling 16 British-built SLBMs (plus backing rounds) doesn't save Dollars, cancelling 16 American-built SLBMs (plus backing rounds) does.

Having a fifth boat ensures that two boats are on patrol at at all times, which makes it twice as destructive, twice as terrifying and there are 32 things with Union Jacks on them pointing at the USSR at all times instead of 16.
 
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The following is an except from 'A Vertical Empire' by C.N.Hill and shows that solid propellants were being discussed in the mid 1950's:

This was during discussions concerning Blue Streak, but, I think anyway, it does show that it would not be beyond the capabilities of us Brits!

A Solid Fuel Design?

A report from Westcott dated December 1956 considered the ‘Application of Solid Propellant Motors to Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. Its summary states that

The studies are based chiefly on the studies of motors with plastic propellant charges of maximum length 25 ft and maximum diameter 3 ft 6 in. These maximum dimensions are considered feasible with radial burning plastic propellant charges ... and are within the pressing limits of facilities already planned and requested ... For a missile carrying a 4,000lb warhead, fitted with clustered motor units, the ranges calculated for single stage and two stage propulsion are respectively up to 1,300 miles and up to 2,500 miles.

Not surprisingly, given the lack of experience with solid fuel motors of such size, the report is somewhat lacking in precise detail, but instead takes various arrangements of mo tors and makes an estimate (or guess) at the range obtainable from each one.

The individual motors shown in the sketches are also very generic: other than being 3 ft 6 inches diameter and 29 ft 2 inches long, there is very little information about them. Quite why these particular dimensions have been chosen is not obvious.

It is clear that the option of using solid fuel motors was not taken very seriously – there is no mention of them at all in policy papers, and it is quite possible that the study was undertaken so as to be seen to have covered all possibilities. It does not appear from the report that there had been wide consultation with those who were actually producing solid fuel motors – the limits imposed on the dimensions seem to have been rather arbitrary. Certainly there is no discussion of the degree of practicality of building motors as large as these or larger.

The payload used in the calculations is given as 4,000 lb – given the later reduction in the weight of the payload it might have
been worth revisiting some of these ideas. Unfortunately the idea of a liquid fuel missile had become too firmly entrenched by then – which is, in many ways, a pity. For comparison, let us look at the American solid fuel Minuteman missile.

The US Air Force began looking at the possibility of solid fuel motors in August 1957, in response to the Navy’s Polaris missile. The task was given to Colonel Edward Hall, who calculated that ‘the ICBM version of Weapon System Q [i.e., Minuteman] would be a three-stage, solid-fuel missile approximately 65 feet long, weighing approximately 65,000 pounds, and developing approximately 100,000–120,000 pounds of thrust at launch’. The missile would be stored vertically in underground silos and ‘would accelerate so quickly that it could fly through its exhaust flames and not be significantly damaged’. The system was approved in February 1958 and the first successful launch was in February 1961, when the re-entry vehicle travelled a distance of 4,600 miles. Its design range was 5,500 miles. The first stage was 65 inches in diameter and 22 ft high; the whole missile was 55 ft tall – in other words, shorter than Blue Streak, almost half the diameter, a third of the weight, and it could deliver its payload near three times as far! The warhead yield was 1.2 MT and the re-entry vehicle plus warhead would have weighed in the order of 1,000 lb.

Even though the US was considerably ahead in the design of solid fuel motors, developing a British solid-fuelled missile would have been quite feasible, and probably no more expensive or time consuming than developing Blue Streak, but the idea was taken no further.
 

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The turning point for the UK is in 1957 when Sandys calls time on the Avro supersonic bomber in favour of Blue Streak and its mainly US technology plus "free" Thor missiles in East Anglia.
The ballistic missile research done by the Saunders Roe Division of Westland 1946-57 ITTL may make a British Thor substitute feasible. IOTL the 60 missiles were returned to the USA in 1963 and the USA used them as the first stages of satellite launch vehicles. ITTL the UK acquires 60-plus first stages of a Delta-class space launcher (because there will be backing & training rounds) free of charge in 1963.

If I remember correctly from one of Tony Butler's books the rainbow code Blue Moon was assigned to an undeveloped ballistic missile in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Perhaps this can be it.
 
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Quite why these particular dimensions have been chosen is not obvious.
Because the author likely knew of the 1950 studies that led to a 31ft diameter hull and was trying to get the maximum possible inside such.
 
The US Air Force began looking at the possibility of solid fuel motors in August 1957, in response to the Navy’s Polaris missile. The task was given to Colonel Edward Hall, who calculated that ‘the ICBM version of Weapon System Q [i.e., Minuteman] would be a three-stage, solid-fuel missile approximately 65 feet long, weighing approximately 65,000 pounds, and developing approximately 100,000–120,000 pounds of thrust at launch’.

Ed Hall, whose little brother Ted had been one of the Manhattan Project atomic spies besides Klaus Fuchs and a selected few others. To think Hoover's FBI missed THAT connection - almost unbelievable.
 
The US Air Force began looking at the possibility of solid fuel motors in August 1957, in response to the Navy’s Polaris missile. The task was given to Colonel Edward Hall, who calculated that ‘the ICBM version of Weapon System Q [i.e., Minuteman] would be a three-stage, solid-fuel missile approximately 65 feet long, weighing approximately 65,000 pounds, and developing approximately 100,000–120,000 pounds of thrust at launch’.
I thought he was the commanding officer of Fort Baxter, Kansas.

However, it was Col. John T. Hall, played by Paul Ford in the superior TV series and Dan Ackroyd in the inferior Steve Martin film. Fun fact, Jonathan Lynn who directed the film also co-wrote "Yes Minister" and "Yes Prime Minister".
 
At least without defining what "better" means? Cheaper, more reliable, more numerous, more destructive, more terrifying, more Union Jack on it?
Although the thread has so far been dominated by the discussion on the feasibility (or not) of developing a British Polaris substitute the thread is also about what happens before and afterwards.

For example it also means a better V-Force. And for that it does mean a cheaper (strictly speaking more aircraft for the same money), more reliable, more numerous, more destructive, more terrifying AND more Union Jack(s) on it!

And I'm doing that via the earlier rationalisation of the British aerospace industry.
 
In his book "Silent Deep" Peter Hennessy writes that the fifth boat was to be called Royal Sovereign and not Ramillies as mentioned first by Conways Allied Warships book.
A similar missnaming occured with CVA01 which various annual books like Weyers refered to as Furious (which I like). We now know it would have been Queen Elizabeth
 
Yes, but this warhead must be compact and durable enough to fit in. And the rocket must be powerful enough to carry such. In mid-1950s the first was far from certain (Teller claimed it was possible, but existing fusion devices were large and heavy), and the second wasn't associated with solid fuels at all.

For 1955 UK the "realistic" approximation of SLBM would most likely be "storable liquid-fuel missile, big enough for heavy boosted fusion warhead of Green Bamboo or Violet Club design". I.e. MUCH heavier than W47 for Polaris.
Green Bamboo or Green Grass seem unlikely in this scenario given their rather wasteful designs and it was acknowledged that a fusion warhead would be available sooner. So a new fusion warhead would have to be developed for any 1960s or 1970s device anyway.

I thought that was one of the British designed & built parts of Polaris. Therefore, it takes no more time to develop and doesn't cost more whether it's fitted to a Lockheed-built Polaris A-3 or the British analogue which is probably built by the Saunders Roe Division of Westland.
Depends, as in all things at this level its murky how much UK-US information exchange that there is. Certainly Britain had done a lot of RV research off its own bat, much of the info was of interest to the USA.

For what it's worth I think the stumbling block is the solid-fuel rocket engine.
Yes this is a major stumbling block.

As I've said, the really significant area the UK was lagging behind isn't rockets or warheads, it was guidance.
I don't think that Britain was that far behind in terms of inertial systems and star trackers and had already been working this this stuff since the late 1940s.

More Union Jack (and less Stars & Stripes) means the UK can sell more of the technology to third parties. E.g. to France as an incentive/bribe to France so it doesn't reject the UK's application to join the then Common Market.
Britain was generally against nuclear proliferation. I'm not even sure that they were really supportive of France's nuclear ambitions, they seem to have been hands off. Even Jaguar and AFVG were diplomatically problematic because they gave the (erroneous) impression that the UK was helping France to achieve its nuclear capability. Some of that would have been a sop to the US, but also that what you included in your post above about "terrifying" and that is if France started chucking nukes about for whatever reason, the USSR might not bother to make distinctions about De Gaulle's membership of but non-participation in NATO and just nuke the whole lot of Europe (and the US) just to be on the safe side. Likewise if the UK uses any nukes and we get "our hair mussed" then France as our (and FRG's) neighbour gets some nice glow too (unless the winds are lucky).

For example it also means a better V-Force. And for that it does mean a cheaper (strictly speaking more aircraft for the same money), more reliable, more numerous, more destructive, more terrifying AND more Union Jack(s) on it!
I took it for granted that you would be beefing up and keeping V-Force viable into the early 1970s until the SSBNs are ready.
 
There seems to be a division opening up between
A gradual evolution of a liquid missile force on diesel submarines in the 1950s
and
A nuclear submarine based missile system developed like France as an alternative to Polaris
Football is not my game but this is beginning to look like Luton FC playing Best, Beckham, Maradona and Pele in one of those fantasy football teams.
 
Green Bamboo or Green Grass seem unlikely in this scenario given their rather wasteful designs and it was acknowledged that a fusion warhead would be available sooner. So a new fusion warhead would have to be developed for any 1960s or 1970s device anyway.
I agree, but from 1955 point of view, Green Bamboo is one of the most realistic (although far from optimal solutions). I totally agree that actual wahread would be of a new type, developed in 1960s.
 
I'm rather sceptical about that and (unless you can produce a long list of lessons learned from those projects that were of financial benefit to Great Britain Ltd) the most important lesson from the above was how not to do it.

If you can, equally important lessons about structures, aerodynamics and avionics may have been learned from the projects that I propose to put in their place. With the bonus that there is more hardware to show for the expenditure.

For what it's worth I've not mentioned the Avro 730 or PT.428. However, if I remember correctly, they closed the factory when Blue Water was cancelled so all science/industry may have learned from that is how to write several thousand P.45s.

Also one saves money and reduces costs. A cost saving really means that more money was spent not less.
Ok, I don't want to derail your thread too much, but I think its worth me getting this off my chest, from a historian's point of view.

You have to be sceptical of the motives of why Flight published its list and why Wood later expanded it in his book.
All of those were cancelled projects - cancelled at some point of their development, some were barely more than sketches, some were semi-built prototypes and some were in production or production ready.

The gist of the price list is that the government/Services wasted millions by starting projects that they wanted and then decided that they didn't want or simply didn't work or were surpassed by newer technology. At no point does that list assign who was to blame for cancellation - was the Swift crap because the RAF/MoS failed to write proper specifications for it or because Supermarine couldn't actually design a decent handling fighter? There was a lot of white-washing that all the cancellations were due to politicians and the industry portrayed itself the victim. The truth is that the Ministries and Services did balls up a lot of stuff and the industry did genuinely design some clangers and failed to grasp everything the customer wanted and wasted time on dead-ends too. It was a 50/50 cock up.

The price list is of course a cost list, a sum of all the taxpayers money that was poured into these projects. I tot up (roughly) £473.5 million on your list. That is for £473.5 million quid's worth of designer's time, draughtsmens' ink, metal, machine shop work, prototypes, long-lead parts, metal bashing, experiments, wind tunnel time, testing etc. It's all for work done. All the money was spent by industry and the industry in Flight in totting up the list were not saying "the government shouldn't have given us £500 million-worth of work in a decade" but "you only gave us £500 million and didn't let us finish the job and we have nothing to show for it."
But all that work had some benefit, R&D effort was not entirely wasted as that fed into later designs. That experience was not always directly useful, of course waste is uneconomic and to be avoided, but not every cancelled project was a total loss.
I agree some projects ought never to have been begun and some should not have been cancelled, others should have been cancelled sooner. I agree that proper rationalisation and selection of requirements could increase efficiency and reduce a lot of waste. But I would not view it that cancelling one project automatically frees funds, or resources for something else and its not always a net gain, sometimes there are losses too.
 
Ok, I don't want to derail your thread too much, but I think its worth me getting this off my chest, from a historian's point of view.

You have to be sceptical of the motives of why Flight published its list and why Wood later expanded it in his book.
All of those were cancelled projects - cancelled at some point of their development, some were barely more than sketches, some were semi-built prototypes and some were in production or production ready.

The gist of the price list is that the government/Services wasted millions by starting projects that they wanted and then decided that they didn't want or simply didn't work or were surpassed by newer technology. At no point does that list assign who was to blame for cancellation - was the Swift crap because the RAF/MoS failed to write proper specifications for it or because Supermarine couldn't actually design a decent handling fighter? There was a lot of white-washing that all the cancellations were due to politicians and the industry portrayed itself the victim. The truth is that the Ministries and Services did balls up a lot of stuff and the industry did genuinely design some clangers and failed to grasp everything the customer wanted and wasted time on dead-ends too. It was a 50/50 cock up.

The price list is of course a cost list, a sum of all the taxpayers money that was poured into these projects. I tot up (roughly) £473.5 million on your list. That is for £473.5 million quid's worth of designer's time, draughtsmens' ink, metal, machine shop work, prototypes, long-lead parts, metal bashing, experiments, wind tunnel time, testing etc. It's all for work done. All the money was spent by industry and the industry in Flight in totting up the list were not saying "the government shouldn't have given us £500 million-worth of work in a decade" but "you only gave us £500 million and didn't let us finish the job and we have nothing to show for it."
But all that work had some benefit, R&D effort was not entirely wasted as that fed into later designs. That experience was not always directly useful, of course waste is uneconomic and to be avoided, but not every cancelled project was a total loss.
I agree some projects ought never to have been begun and some should not have been cancelled, others should have been cancelled sooner. I agree that proper rationalisation and selection of requirements could increase efficiency and reduce a lot of waste. But I would not view it that cancelling one project automatically frees funds, or resources for something else and its not always a net gain, sometimes there are losses too.
Fair enough and what I'm writing isn't a criticism of the people who made the decisions at the time. They weren't stupid people. Far from it.

Some of the cancellations were forced errors. That is some were overtaken by galloping technology and others had to be cancelled because of the poor performance of the British economy. Plus the defence ministries had to cover as many bases as possible, because nobody knows when & where the next war will be and what type of war it will be.

That being written No. 1. There is a thing in economics called opportunity cost, the potential forgone profit from a missed opportunity—the result of choosing one alternative over another. These threads examine what the opportunity cost may have been. If you think I'm using too much hindsight, I plead guilty as charged.

That being written No. 2. There are occasions when I think . . . "What were they on!" Blue Streak is one because it's obvious that the USSR would develop its own ballistic missiles sooner or later. In defence of the people that made the decisions it was sooner than expected. However, hundreds of millions of Pounds worth of Blue Streaks would still become obsolete by 1970 even if the USSR had developed ballistic missiles later rather than sooner. Therefore, on this occasion the middleman should have been cut out and the powers that be gone straight for a SLBM or Blue Steel Mk 2 or a British analogue to Skybolt.

That being written No. 3. It has been said that success breeds success. IOTL it was too often the opposite. Failure bread failure. I don't blame you for thinking some if it is too good to be true. I do sometimes. However, getting a few more things right first time in the period 1945-50 would have paid large dividends over the following decades.

I don't like all of your comments, but I pay attention to them and despite the tone of some of my replies I appreciate them. As I've said in our private messages I feel like a five-year-old child playing with the big boys in this forum. People such as yourself are published authors and I'm only a low-level enthusiast. For what its worth I thank you and all the other proper historians who contribute to this forum for tolerating me.
 
I think you're missing the point about the last half of Post 53. I was trying to give a scale of the British SLBM programme in comparison with the French SNF programme. In particular what I know about the latter's costs.

I think the extra costs are the R&D and production of the ALT-Blue Streak missile, because the UK built and paid for the SSBNs and the warheads anyway as part of the Polaris programme. Also the cost of the Polaris missiles can be deducted from the production cost of the ALT-Blue Streaks.

Though for the record.

While France had a front line of 36 Mirage IVs in 9 squadrons of 4, supported by 12 KC-135Fs the UK had a front line of 88 Victor & Vulcan Mk 2s (out of 123 that were built) in 11 squadrons of 8 aircraft which were supported by a front line of 16 Valiant tankers in 2 squadrons and then 24 Victor Mk 1 tankers (out of 31 that were converted) in 3 squadrons. Furthermore, 40 of the 88 third-generation V-Bombers were armed with Blue Steel Mk 1. Enough were built for 48 in 6 squadrons, but the third Victor Mk 2 squadron replaced the Valiant LRPR squadron instead of becoming the sixth Blue Steel squadron.

The RAF's V-Force wasn't disbanded when the RN's Polaris submarines relieved it in mid-1969. Instead 32 Vulcans (4 squadrons) were transferred to the SACEUR role where they belatedly relieved the 24 Valiants (3 squadrons) which were retired in 1965 and 16 Vulcans (2 squadrons) were transferred to Cyprus where they replaced 32 Canberra bombers (4 squadrons). The squadrons in Cyprus returned to the UK as part of the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75 and the 48 Vulcans (6 squadrons) remained in service until the early 1980s when they were replaced by the Tornado.

Meanwhile, a seventh Vulcan bomber squadron was converted to a LRPR squadron to replace the Victor SR.2 squadron and the 29 surviving Victor Mk 2s were to be converted to tankers to replace the 31 Victor K Mk 1s virtually one-to-one. But the number of tanker squadrons was cut from 3 to 2 as part of the Mason Defence review and the number of aircraft converted to Victor K.2s was cut to 24.
Up until their replacement with Tornado and then the conversion of any survivors to the tanker role, did V-Force bombers always have a nuclear role and an associated nuclear weapon?
 
Up until their replacement with Tornado and then the conversion of any survivors to the tanker role, did V-Force bombers always have a nuclear role and an associated nuclear weapon?
That was their day job. However, they did moonlight in the conventional bombing role on a regular basis.

My father was an electrician and he did his National Service maintaining the electrics of a Valiant in No. 138 Squadron at RAF Wittering. He said that officially some of the Valiants were in the air armed with Blue Danube atom bombs on a permanent basis.

However, the reality was that the only time he saw bombs being loaded onto a V-bomber was when one of the megaton-range atomic weapons destined for Christmas Island was put aboard a prototype Vulcan. (His squadron was attached to the Bomber Command Development Unit.) However, the bombs didn't fit because the bomb bays doors weren't wide enough and he & the rest of the maintenance staff stood at safe distance while the armourers (who were wearing heavy duty anti-radiation suits) tried to load the bomb. I don't remember the distance, so for the sake of argument I'll say half a mile.

He also said that the Valiants were suffering from metal fatigue even then and teams of aircraftsmen were going around fixing the cracks.

If I remember correctly 4 Valiant squadrons participated in the Suez War and from the late 1950s to the end of "East of Suez" detachments of V-bombers were sent to AFME & FEAF on a regular basis. The FEAF detachments participated in the Confrontation with Indonesia.

What I've seen of the Squadron Patterns produced in the 1960s was that 3 Victor B.2 squadrons were to have been retained after Polaris relieved the V-Force of the nuclear deterrent role. If I remember correctly from the Spottswood Report their job was to bomb China. However, he also wrote in that report that the existing V-bombers could carry a considerable load of H.E. bombs and the TSR.2s would only be able to carry a fraction of it. I suspect that the plan was to retain 3 squadrons of Victor B.2s rather than 3 squadrons of Vulcan B.2s in because the former could carry 35,000lb of bombs and the latter only carried 21,000lb of bombs.

And of course the Vulcans swansong was the Black Buck missions of the Falklands War.
 
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That's interesting. Would it make the ALT-Resolution class submarines easier and therefore cheaper to build? And would it make it easier to fit things like larger missile tubes for larger missiles with longer ranges and/or heavier payloads?
For the US, all the 41 for Freedom had 33ft diameter pressure hulls, despite going from Polaris (4'6"/1370mm diameter) to Trident 1 (71"/1800mm diameter).

Admittedly with a length limit of 33ft.


Having a fifth boat ensures that two boats are on patrol at at all times, which makes it twice as destructive, twice as terrifying and there are 32 things with Union Jacks on them pointing at the USSR at all times instead of 16.
Aren't the British using the US dual crew model? 3 months out under one crew, 1 month refit using both crews and the shipyard for labor, 3 months out with the other crew, 1 month refit, repeat ad nauseam. Under that system, 4 boats in existence puts 3 boats at sea 24/7. Adding a 5th boat doesn't add all that much.
 
I don't think that Britain was that far behind in terms of inertial systems and star trackers and had already been working this this stuff since the late 1940s.
How accurate were they? How heavy were the accurate ones?

Because you need one on the submarine accurate enough to tell the missile where it's starting, and a second one on the missile to check.
 
For the US, all the 41 for Freedom had 33ft diameter pressure hulls, despite going from Polaris (4'6"/1370mm diameter) to Trident 1 (71"/1800mm diameter).

Admittedly with a length limit of 33ft.
As I understand it the last 31 had bigger missile tubes than the first 10. That's why the George Washington & Ethan Allen classes weren't rearmed with Poseidon in the 1970s. Replacing the existing tubes with bigger ones was prohibitively expensive.
Aren't the British using the US dual crew model? 3 months out under one crew, 1 month refit using both crews and the shipyard for labour, 3 months out with the other crew, 1 month refit, repeat ad nauseam. Under that system, 4 boats in existence puts 3 boats at sea 24/7. Adding a 5th boat doesn't add all that much.
Yes they are and yes it did.

As I understood it the system was.
  • One in the patrol area.
  • One returning from patrol.
  • One in dock.
    • And.
  • One in transit to the patrol area.
Sometimes there was an overlap between the one in the patrol area & the returning boat or the one in the patrol area & the relieving boat.

Therefore, two were in the patrol area for some of the time. However, a fifth boat was needed to ensure that two were on patrol all the time.

However, I've had that disputed in other threads and been told that six are needed to keep two in the patrol area at all times and that's why France built its sixth SNLE.

I've also been told that as the number of boats increases the proportion of boats in the patrol area increases. We had a thread last year with a table demonstrating it and another table showing how the unit cost decreased as the total number of boats increased. Plus late 1960s editions of Janes say that about 20 out of 41 SSBNs were on patrol at all times.
 
As I understand it the last 31 had bigger missile tubes than the first 10. That's why the George Washington & Ethan Allen classes weren't rearmed with Poseidon in the 1970s. Replacing the existing tubes with bigger ones was prohibitively expensive.
True. The first 10 boats were Polaris only. Poseidon boats could be updated to Trident 1, but that wasn't done for most because the Ohios were coming.


As I understood it the system was.
  • One in the patrol area.
  • One returning from patrol.
  • One in dock.
    • And.
  • One in transit to the patrol area.
Sometimes there was an overlap between the one in the patrol area & the returning boat or the one in the patrol area & the relieving boat.

Therefore, two were in the patrol area for some of the time. However, a fifth boat was needed to ensure that two were on patrol all the time.

However, I've had that disputed in other threads and been told that six are needed to keep two in the patrol area at all times and that's why France built its sixth SNLE.
*facepalm* I keep forgetting the pathetic ranges on Polaris... Yes, 1 on patrol, 1 en route to, 1 en route from, and 1 in dock would be right for that much transit time from Holy Loch.

The difference between 5 and 6 boats needed to keep 2 on alert probably depends on just how far the patrol areas are from the home port. Baltic Sea, sure 5 boats is enough. But if you're going into the eastern Med or up to Murmansk/Arkhangelsk, you need 6 boats or more.





Plus late 1960s editions of Janes say that about 20 out of 41 SSBNs were on patrol at all times.
I don't know that I'm willing to believe that, but I was a Trident Sailor post 2000. I would believe 20 on alert in their patrol areas at all times.
 
True. The first 10 boats were Polaris only. Poseidon boats could be updated to Trident 1, but that wasn't done for most because the Ohios were coming.
If I remember correctly the plan in the 1970s was to complete 10 Ohios by 1981 to replace the 15 oldest first-generation boats which had been worked harder than the last 16 and therefore were wearing out faster and 12 out of 31 were rearmed with Trident 1.
*facepalm* I keep forgetting the pathetic ranges on Polaris... Yes, 1 on patrol, 1 en route to, 1 en route from, and 1 in dock would be right for that much transit time from Holy Loch.

The difference between 5 and 6 boats needed to keep 2 on alert probably depends on just how far the patrol areas are from the home port. Baltic Sea, sure 5 boats is enough. But if you're going into the eastern Med or up to Murmansk/Arkhangelsk, you need 6 boats or more.
For what it's worth I think I put longer range ahead of bigger payload in my criteria for a better British SLBM than Polaris A-3 because the 3 boats at sea would therefore be within range of their targets for longer. More "bang per buck" even if the total cost was larger.

That's also why I asked if a Valiant based Resolution class could have been fitted with larger missile tubes than the OTL version.
I don't know that I'm willing to believe that, but I was a Trident Sailor post 2000. I would believe 20 on alert in their patrol areas at all times.
For what it's worth 2 on patrol from a force of 5 is 40% of the total force. It only takes another 10% to achieve a 50:50 ratio.
 
IF...
If UK is developing it's own solid fuel SLBM.....
Why would they copy directly US design of Polaris?
Why 54" diameter, when they would have to build their own solid fuel press?
Their own silos
And fit with their RVs equipped with their warheads.
All not US design
All not US standard
Why 54" diameter?

Why the assumption of US standard?
 
As I understand it the last 31 had bigger missile tubes than the first 10. That's why the George Washington & Ethan Allen classes weren't rearmed with Poseidon in the 1970s. Replacing the existing tubes with bigger ones was prohibitively expensive.

Yes they are and yes it did.

As I understood it the system was.
  • One in the patrol area.
  • One returning from patrol.
  • One in dock.
    • And.
  • One in transit to the patrol area.
Sometimes there was an overlap between the one in the patrol area & the returning boat or the one in the patrol area & the relieving boat.

Therefore, two were in the patrol area for some of the time. However, a fifth boat was needed to ensure that two were on patrol all the time.

However, I've had that disputed in other threads and been told that six are needed to keep two in the patrol area at all times and that's why France built its sixth SNLE.

I've also been told that as the number of boats increases the proportion of boats in the patrol area increases. We had a thread last year with a table demonstrating it and another table showing how the unit cost decreased as the total number of boats increased. Plus late 1960s editions of Janes say that about 20 out of 41 SSBNs were on patrol at all times.
So is the current plan the RN uses? And does this mean that when it is said that one boat is on patrol, there are actually two more (for a total of 3) actually at sea? (usually) The number of missiles/warheads available in total and usually deployed reported in open sources seems to vary considerably.
 
IF...
If UK is developing it's own solid fuel SLBM.....
Why would they copy directly US design of Polaris?
Why 54" diameter, when they would have to build their own solid fuel press?
Their own silos.
And fit with their RVs equipped with their warheads.
All not US design
All not US standard
Why 54" diameter?

Why the assumption of US standard?
Are those questions addressed to me or someone that I have on ignore?

If they are addressed to me. No they don't. However, Polaris A-3 armed the Real-Resolution class. Therefore, how good ALT-Blue Streak would have been is how it compared to Polaris A-3.

That being written. The British SLBM programme isn't a crash effort like the US version. Therefore, the UK doesn't have to put the first practical design into production. They've got more thinking time, so they can fit the ALT-Resolution class with bigger launch tubes in order that bigger missiles than Polaris A-3 can be fitted in the first place, or as the boats were intended to have service lives of 25-30 years future proof them so bigger missiles can be installed later. Say every 8-10 years.
 
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So is [this] the current plan the RN uses?
I haven't the foggiest to be honest. My interest in military history stops at the end of the Cold War.
And does this mean that when it is said that one boat is on patrol, there are actually two more (for a total of 3) actually at sea? (usually)
Now or for the Polaris boats? See below.
The number of missiles/warheads available in total and usually deployed reported in open sources seems to vary considerably.
For the British Polaris boats it was 16 or 32 depending upon whether one or two boats were within range.

It may be different with the Trident 2 boats. Polaris A-3 had a range of 2,500nm and Trident 2 has a range of 6,500nm. Therefore, a larger proportion of the boats at sea will be within range of their targets.
 
Are those questions addressed to me or someone that I have on ignore?

If they are addressed to me. No they don't. However, Polaris A-3 armed the Real-Resolution class. Therefore, how good ALT-Blue Streak would have been is how it compared to Polaris A-3.

That being written. The British SLBM programme isn't a crash effort like the US version. Therefore, the UK doesn't have to put the first practical design into production. They've got more thinking time, so they can fit the ALT-Resolution class with bigger launch tubes in order that bigger missiles than Polaris A-3 can be fitted in the first place, or as the boats were intended to have service lives of 25-30 years future proof them so bigger missiles can be installed later. Say every 8-10 years.
Well a general to the audience question, but I'm happy with any reply.
Arguably a UK scientific view might ask what is the optimum for both submarine and land based silo....

Note the piece.
"The first stage was 65 inches in diameter and 22 ft high; the whole missile was 55 ft tall – in other words, shorter than Blue Streak, almost half the diameter, a third of the weight, and it could deliver its payload near three times as far! "
 
Well a general to the audience question, but I'm happy with any reply.
Arguably a UK scientific view might ask what is the optimum for both submarine and land based silo . . .
The ALT-Resolution class SSBN need not be a clone of the Lafayette class either, but in analogous to the missile that arms it, the Real-Resolution class SSBN is what it has to be measured against.

Therefore, it can be larger or smaller. It can have a different number of missile launch tubes. If it is larger it can have a pair of PWR-1 reactors and twin screws to maintain its speed.

However, it must cost the same as the Real-Resolution class without missiles (which if I remember correctly was an average of £40 million for the 4 boats that were built) and there must be at least 4 of them.
Note the piece.
"The first stage was 65 inches in diameter and 22 ft high; the whole missile was 55 ft tall – in other words, shorter than Blue Streak, almost half the diameter, a third of the weight, and it could deliver its payload near three times as far! "
I can't because I don't see it in the piece.
 
‘The first stage was 65 inches in diameter and 22 ft high; the whole missile was 55 ft tall – in other words, shorter than Blue Streak, almost half the diameter, a third of the weight, and it could deliver its payload near three times as far!‘
The quote comes from the last but one paragraph of my extract from Hills’ Vertical Empire…

HOWEVER….
and I HAVE TO RE-ITERATE THIS….
The design being discussed was a full-blown MRBM NOT a ‘Polaris’ size missile.
My point is that, whilst the quoted article (in it’s entirety) is regarding a land-based MRBM, it does demonstrate that there were thoughts regarding solid propellants which, in the case of THIS discussion, could be applied to a smaller weapon…i.e: one that MIGHT be developed for a submarine launched weapon…!
 
A lot of very interesting information is coming from everyone posting here.
As a blank canvas technical exercise to draw up a UK Force de Frappe (sorry Archibald I loved reading that name as a schoolboy) this is excellent value.
 
IF...
If UK is developing it's own solid fuel SLBM.....
Why would they copy directly US design of Polaris?
Why 54" diameter, when they would have to build their own solid fuel press?
Their own silos
And fit with their RVs equipped with their warheads.
All not US design
All not US standard
Why 54" diameter?

Why the assumption of US standard?
It's not building a clone.

That's the performance benchmark
we are competing against.
 
The ALT-Resolution class SSBN need not be a clone of the Lafayette class either, but in analogous to the missile that arms it, the Real-Resolution class SSBN is what it has to be measured against.

Therefore, it can be larger or smaller. It can have a different number of missile launch tubes.
My mental model was something closer to an Ohio in size (well, hull diameter of 42ish feet), because I was basing it around Jupiter sized launch tubes some 9 feet in outside diameter. It'd have a Delta-like tall turtleback behind the sail, because the missiles are 60ft long (note that Trident missiles are only 45ft long).

Assuming that the engineers started out planning on a liquid fueled missile with a very large diameter, and then got presented with a solid fueled missile down the road that wasn't as big around. Just stick a liner sleeve into the fat tubes like they did on the Trident 1 Ohios, or take advantage of the large diameter and get more range and/or throw weight.

An advantage of the larger hull is that it gives you more volume for machinery rafting, and lets you use a bigger reactor and steam plant. Having the volume to make a bigger steam plant makes it easier to design. You could basically swipe the steam plant from any surface ship with a beam of 42ft. Remember, the reactor is equivalent to an oil-fired boiler (well, the steam generators are), just without all the uptakes and downtakes.



If it is larger it can have a pair of PWR-1 reactors and twin screws to maintain its speed.

However, it must cost the same as the Real-Resolution class without missiles (which if I remember correctly was an average of £40 million for the 4 boats that were built) and there must be at least 4 of them.
Making the ships dual-reactor and meeting that cost target is going to be very difficult, I'd say stay with a single reactor despite the drag induced by the longer hull and tall turtleback. IIRC, the reactor and reduction gears are so expensive that they make up a good third of the cost of the sub.

Besides, it's not like an SSBN needs to be fast. You're not doing high speed transits to your patrol area like a fast-attack sub. You're doing an ultraquiet crawl into the area so nobody can hear you.
 
So is the current plan the RN uses? And does this mean that when it is said that one boat is on patrol, there are actually two more (for a total of 3) actually at sea? (usually)
I believe that "1 boat on alert and 2 more at sea" is specific to the Polaris boats, due to the short range of their missiles.

Trident 2s have such a long range that the boats could launch their birds from the pier and hit the assigned targets, so we're back to the 3 boats at sea and effectively on alert. Note that they may not actually be on alert, but it doesn't take long to prepare a Trident to fire, either.


The number of missiles/warheads available in total and usually deployed reported in open sources seems to vary considerably.
That's probably due to year in question, and whether or not they're only counting the boat(s) on alert or all the boats at sea.

Polaris A1 had single warheads, so one boat on alert would be 16 "deployed" or 48 "deployed" if they also counted the boats coming and going. Polaris A3 could take up to 3 warheads, but the UK went with 2 warheads plus decoys under Chevaline, for 32/96 deployed. Trident 2 can carry up to 14 warheads, so that's up to 224 per boat they're counting.
 
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