Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining an independent strategic nuclear deterrent?

[NOMISYRRUC]

This thread exists in the same fictional universe as "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?" and my version of "UK Industry Rationalisation 1945" where the rationalisation begins in 1945 and is completed in 1948.

I think the answer to the question is yes. I have a rather controversial opinion on the first-generation V-Bomber (build the Sperrin instead of the Valiant) and think that a British SLBM at least as good as Polaris A-3 & possibly as good as Poseidon C-3 could have been developed with the money spent on Blue Streak, Blue Steel, Blue Water and Skybolt.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The ALT-Blue Streak SLBM

Greater Westland & Bristol Siddeley (both created in 1948 instead of 1960) receive contracts to built a small ballistic missile & its engines for research purposes instead of the Princess, Saro 53 & Saro 177 and the latter types rocket engines. This is effectively the Black Knight brought forward several years. It has the bonus that there's the chance of making an upgraded Black Knight or a Black Arrow type rocket in time to beat Sputnik. There wasn't an Avro 720 either. My original idea was to use the money to make an earlier start on Blue Steel (although the contract might have been given to a different firm) but as I've decided to use the money spent on that weapon to pay some of the R&D cost of ALT-Blue Streak, the money spent on Avro 720 & its rocket engine was instead spent on the Westland research rocket.

Development of Blue Streak still begins in 1955 except that it's an SLBM to replace the V-Force in 1965 instead of a MRBM. It wasn't cancelled in favour of Skybolt in 1960 which in turn was cancelled in 1962 by the USA leading to the purchase of Polaris. It entered service on the 4 Real-Resolution class submarines (of 5 planned) that entered service 1967-69 and relieved the RAF's V-Force at midnight on 30th June 1969 - four-and-a-half years late.

Some of the money for the R&D costs came from the £84 million spent on Real-Blue Streak 1955-60, the £32 million spent on Blue Water to 1962 and the £27 million spent on Skybolt to 1962. There would also been the money spent keeping Blue Streak "ticking over" between its cancellation as a MRBM & the start of the Europa project and the money spent on Europa itself. However, that's probably not enough so there's no Blue Steel in this "Version of History" and the money spent on the R&D and production of that stand-off bomb is instead spent on the development of ALT-Blue Streak.

The cost of 4 Resolution class submarines and their support facilities was the same. However, the ALT-Blue Streak missiles probably cost more than the Polaris missiles purchased from the USA. That's in part because the British Polaris missiles were at the end of a production run of 1,409 missiles. Production of the ALT-Blue Streak probably didn't exceed 200 including the missiles fired in the test programme, training rounds, backing rounds and the missiles installed on the submarines. The good news is that they'd be paid for in Pounds Sterling instead of US Dollars which would have helped the Balance of Payments.

ALT-Blue Streak had at least the same performance as Polaris A-3. I want it to be equal to Poseidon C-3. That may be possible on engineering grounds but I'm not sure about the extra cost. One way might be to make it an Anglo-French project to take the place of ELDO/Europa and Concorde. I also want something better than Chevaline which is preferably an equivalent to Trident C-4. However, that's another missile that may be possible on engineering grounds, but is too expensive. Similarly, I'd like a British equivalent to Trident D-5 to arm the Vanguard class.

Can a British equivalent to Polaris A-3 be developed in time to enter service in 1967 & reach full operational capability in 1969 with a start in 1955 and with the money spent on the "Real World's" nuclear armed missile projects? Could the UK have done better than that? Or would it have done worse? Could it have been followed up with equivalents to Poseidon and both versions of Trident without gutting expenditure on conventional forces like France has?

 

[zen]

More gratuitous linking to my threads. But very relevant to the concept of a UK solid rocket SLBM effort.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/rn-sea-based-ballistic-missile.34917/

 

[Archibald]

From memory - GB lagged behind in solid-fuel rocketry. Now of course, you could go the Soviet way (R-27, R-29 SLBMs) and adopt liquid propulsion. And there, GB excelled at H2O2-Kerosene.

More gratuitous linking to my threads. But very relevant to the concept of a UK solid rocket SLBM effort.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/rn-sea-based-ballistic-missile.34917/

What he said !

gratuitous linking to my thread.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/black-archer-the-keroxide-irbm-fictional-alternative-to-blue-streak.36149/

A H2O2-kerosene single stage missile of the correct size and weight could operate from a crapton of British air, land and sea platforms.
If done right, that propellant combo can get 330 seconds specific impulse and 0.95 propellant mass fraction.

Let's say it weights 30 000 pound, fully-fueled and armed.
9.81*330*ln((30000)/(1500)) = 9698 m/s (WDF, that thing almost makes it to orbit !)

With a 2000 pound warhead it still has a delta-v of 7164 m/s : plenty enough for ICBM rather than IRBM. For the sake of comparison, Atlas-F delta-v was aproximately 6000 m/s with a big H-bomb warhead: thrown 12 000 km away.

GROUND-BASED
-Blue Streak K-11 silo prototype
-Railroad (beware of tunnels however)
-TEL (truck mounted)

AIR-BASED
-Belfast, VC-10, Comet, Nimrod, Britannia, Concorde, Trident, One-Eleven, Vulcan, Valiant, Victor, HS.681...
(nota bene: launch from 50 000 ft, Mach 0.85 and 30 degree angle of attack provides a "free" 1100 m/s delta-v bonus. A Mach 2 Concorde would get 1600 m/s and the late Mach 3 Avro 730, 2000 m/s of "air launch delta-v bonus".)

9.81*330*ln((30000+2000)/(1500+2000))+1100 = 8264 m/s - ICBM, we still go. Almost FOBS !

SEA-BASED
-nuclear submarines, surface ships with HS.681 and helicopters, cruisers, carriers and battleships with missile tubes...

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

If Britain is willing to build a big enough Kerosene-H2O2 SLBM, then we could be looking at a situation similar to the Soviets when they introduced the R-29 into service, a missile with slightly greater than Trident C4 range which greatly increases the area for potential SSBN patrols, which in turn makes the Strategic ASW problem for the Soviets a much harder task. Not to mention it gives you plenty of reserve throw-weight for MRVs, MIRVs and/or decoy dispensers like Chevaline.

 

[Archibald]

Amen to that.
Now if only H2O2 wasn't such an unstable, explosive bastard stuff... HMS Exploder, HMS Excruciator... Blue Steel... no surprise UK ended hating H2O2 guts. A pity, because it is one of the few rocket oxidizer alternative to deep cryogen liquid oxygen... of Blue Streak fame.

Maybe keep it at lower purity - 75% or 80%. It is really from 85% and beyond that the thing become Wile E. Coyote explosive. Bad luck, it takes 90% or even 98% purity to get the best performance out of it.
Then again, maybe SLBM can live with 270 seconds specific impulse... solid-fuel performance.

Well the Soviets seemingly did well with R-27 and R-29 own very bastard propellants: N2O4 oxidizer and sister N2H4 fuel. Both Alien level of acidity and toxicity. Seems they encapsulated the whole thing before rolling it into the submarine tubes ? Maybe the same thing could be done for H2O2 (kerosene ain't a major issue, just ask aircraft carriers).

 

[uk 75]

The words "independent nuclear deterrent" mean different things in London and Paris.
France sees its deterrent as a shot across the advancing Russian armies to warn them not to enter France.
The UK on the other hand sees the job first of Bomber Command and then the Royal Navy Submarine Squadron to work so closely with their US counterparts that Washington will not leave Britain in the lurch when the time comes. Trident is especially useful as Russia has no way of telling whether a missile emerging from somewhere in the Atlantic has the Stars and Stripes or a Union Jack on it.
This might have changed after the 1956 Suez crisis. Many Conservative politicians became sceptical about the US willingness to defend Europe.
The 1957 White Paper under a different Prime Minister than Macmillan might have adopted a more Gaullist attitude.
Blue Streak unliked the planned Avro bomber relied on US technology from the Atlas rocket.
So in the new 1957 Paper the RAF gets its supersonic bomber.
Relations with the US deteriorate further when Kennedy replaces Eisenhower and crises in Berlin and Cuba see war threatened by Washington over the heads of London and Paris.
The Avro bomber proves too complicated and its first prototype fails to meet its performance targets. English Electric and Dassault of France propose a delta winged strike aircraft using the same Olympus jets as the Concord airliner.
France sees this plane as a better bet for striking Moscow than the Mirage IV. It agrees to join the UK in developing the SR.


Changing the rationale of the UK deterrent so that it does not rely on close relations with the US and becomes closer to the French model is not really possible before 1956 but from Suez to Cuba a much more Gaullist approach becomes feasible.

Merging the UK and French missile programmes yields gains for both sides.
But the UK no longer has the Mountbatten/Rickover partnership. Dreadnought enters service later with a British reactor.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The words "independent nuclear deterrent" mean different things in London and Paris.
France sees its deterrent as a shot across the advancing Russian armies to warn them not to enter France.
The UK on the other hand sees the job first of Bomber Command and then the Royal Navy Submarine Squadron to work so closely with their US counterparts that Washington will not leave Britain in the lurch when the time comes. Trident is especially useful as Russia has no way of telling whether a missile emerging from somewhere in the Atlantic has the Stars and Stripes or a Union Jack on it.
This might have changed after the 1956 Suez crisis. Many Conservative politicians became sceptical about the US willingness to defend Europe.
The 1957 White Paper under a different Prime Minister than Macmillan might have adopted a more Gaullist attitude.
Blue Streak unliked the planned Avro bomber relied on US technology from the Atlas rocket.
So in the new 1957 Paper the RAF gets its supersonic bomber.
Relations with the US deteriorate further when Kennedy replaces Eisenhower and crises in Berlin and Cuba see war threatened by Washington over the heads of London and Paris.
The Avro bomber proves too complicated and its first prototype fails to meet its performance targets. English Electric and Dassault of France propose a delta winged strike aircraft using the same Olympus jets as the Concord airliner.
France sees this plane as a better bet for striking Moscow than the Mirage IV. It agrees to join the UK in developing the SR.

According to Sir Humphrey it wasn't to deter the USSR. I was to deter France from attacking Britain.

And your missing the point of this part of the thread which is could a Polaris equivalent or better be developed from 1955 with the money spent of Blue Streak, Blue Steel, Blue Water & Skybolt?

 

[uk 75]

I am trying to give you a realistic point of divergence. Prime Minister Eden in 1955 is not going to wake up one morning and say to himself "Lets abandon all the money we have invested in aircraft for Bomber Command and develop a rocket instead".

The turning point for the UK is in 1957 when Sandys calls time on the Avro supersonic bomber in favour of Blue Streak and its mainly US technology plus "free" Thor missiles in East Anglia.

Your chemical booster wonderweapon (Moonraker) could have been selected instead but only if you first change the rationale for the UK deterrent.

As it stands no actual Air Marshals or Admirals much less Mountbatten would have given your plan the time of day.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I am trying to give you a realistic point of divergence.

It would have helped if you'd written "That won't work, but this might" before you went on your merry way.

Prime Minister Eden in 1955 is not going to wake up one morning and say to himself "Lets abandon all the money we have invested in aircraft for Bomber Command and develop a rocket instead".

I was under the impression that was what they decided to do in 1955 IOTL. Except I've got a submarine launched missile replacing aircraft in Bomber Command in 1965 instead of the a land based weapon to replace the aircraft in Bomber Command in 1965. Except the ALT-Blue Streak enters replaces the V-bombers nearly 5 years late.

The turning point for the UK is in 1957 when Sandys calls time on the Avro supersonic bomber in favour of Blue Streak and its mainly US technology plus "free" Thor missiles in East Anglia.

Blue Streak was started in 1955, not 1957. The RAF still has the Thor missiles. I haven't given the Avro 730 any thought yet.

Your chemical booster wonderweapon (Moonraker) could have been selected instead but only if you first change the rationale for the UK deterrent.

So what about it being a chemical booster? I was under the impression that all ballistic missiles were chemical boosters.

l take issue to you calling it a wonder weapon.

It's no more a wonder weapon than Real-Blue Streak. Having read the book the real Blue Streak was a lot closer to Moonraker than my Polaris clone. If I remember correctly the main difference was the range: Moonraker was 1,500 miles; and Blue Streak was 2,500 miles. They even launched it from an underground silo. Maybe Ian Flemming was privy to Blue Moon that preceded Blue Streak.

It's no more a wonder weapon than Polaris which was started around the same time.

As it stands no actual Air Marshals or Admirals much less Mountbatten would have given your plan the time of day.

The Air Marshals won't want it for obvious reasons. However, the Admirals would be a different story in part because of the work that Westland did with the earlier version of Black Knight developed with the resources put into the Princess & the rocket-plus-jet fighters and because some of them know about Polaris.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I think the answer to the question is yes. I have a rather controversial opinion on the first-generation V-Bomber (build the Sperrin instead of the Valiant) and think that a British SLBM at least as good as Polaris A-3 & possibly as good as Poseidon C-3 could have been developed with the money spent on Blue Streak, Blue Steel, Blue Water and Skybolt.

I strongly doubt that. Polaris development was a money sink beyond all money sinks. Look at what happened with the Force d'Frappe, eating the entire defense budget alive and demanding seconds!

 

[uk 75]

The problem is still the rationale for a solely home grown weapon.
Blue Streak, Skybolt and Polaris all relied on US technology transfer to be affordable.
Both politically and financially the UK depends on the US for its nuclear deterrent.
You need to read this book to see how unlikely your project is.

Cabinets and the Bomb: 11 (British Academy Occasional Papers): Amazon.co.uk: Hennessy, Peter: 9780197264225: Books

Buy Cabinets and the Bomb: 11 (British Academy Occasional Papers) Illustrated by Hennessy, Peter (ISBN: 9780197264225) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.

www.amazon.co.uk

 

[zen]

As trawling through this site will show the UK didn't lack rocket engine designs and did achieve several produced.

Nor did it lack chemistry or conceptual fabrication of fuels.

Nor did it lack the potential nuclear science to achieve lighter packages based on Granit series results.

In fact it had invested in a 42" press and a bespoke one off 54" motor.

The irony of '57 is the decisions could have been made in '56. Which is a crucial moment in the decision to attempt such lightweight packages.

 

[uk 75]

If you change the rationale for the Brirish Nuclear Deterrence away from co-operation with the US to a UK weapon of final warning (like France) then the missile development suggested here becomes realistic.

To allow the engineering what-if aspects of this thread (which are interesting) to develop let us assume that at some point in 1955 relations with the US become strained and Eden pursues a policy similar to De Gaulle.

 

[zen]

To allow the engineering what-if aspects of this thread (which are interesting) to develop let us assume that at some point in 1955 relations with the US become strained and Eden pursues a policy similar to De Gaulle.

Which is not impossible considering what did occure.
A potential unknown is what a healthy Eden might do, based on his experiences. Which include dealings with the US.
After all a number of sacrifices had been made in '51 to get NATO going and Eden would be fully aware of what had transpired from '45 onwards. Both he and Churchill agreed with Attle's decision to pursue a British Bomb....

Edited additional....
A healthy Eden might think he could potentially win election in '56 and '62.
So he might well back change in '56 having avoided the Suez Crisis but still needing defence reform
In that period the details might find relations with the US strained.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I strongly doubt that. Polaris development was a money sink beyond all money sinks. Look at what happened with the Force d'Frappe, eating the entire defense budget alive and demanding seconds!

That's because you may not realise how much was spent on Blue Steel, Blue Streak, Blue Water, Skybolt & then Chevaline IOTL.

 

[Dilandu]

I think the answer to the question is yes. I have a rather controversial opinion on the first-generation V-Bomber (build the Sperrin instead of the Valiant) and think that a British SLBM at least as good as Polaris A-3 & possibly as good as Poseidon C-3 could have been developed with the money spent on Blue Streak, Blue Steel, Blue Water and Skybolt.

There are a lot of problems here. Submarine launched ballistic missile must be:

* Storable - i.e. you can't use something as obvious as liquid oxygen for it, and therefore you need to use storable (less efficient) propellant. For 1950s it was actually a major problem - that's why both American and Soviet first ICBM used kerolox combination.

* Compact - otherwise it would be pretty hard to put into narrow hull of submarine.

* Require no pre-flight or regular maintenance - which was also very problematic for 1950s tech. It wasn't exactly very reliable, and inability to check the missile just before firing often led to... troubles.

* Have an autonomous guidance system, capable of handling the mobile platform. You could not just hardwire the trajectory into missile guidance computer. You need some way to rapidly calculate flight solution from current sub coordinates right to the target.

* Have either a very powerful warhead, or accuracy enough to hit target with avaliable warhead. With payloard severly limited by size of missile and available propellants, you would struggle to fit both.

 

[Dilandu]

Well the Soviets seemingly did well with R-27 and R-29 own very bastard propellants: N2O4 oxidizer and sister N2H4 fuel. Both Alien level of acidity and toxicity. Seems they encapsulated the whole thing before rolling it into the submarine tubes ? Maybe the same thing could be done for H2O2 (kerosene ain't a major issue, just ask aircraft carriers).

USSR started with adapting R-11 (Scud-A) to submarines as R-11F. It was a small kerosene-acid missile with 10-kt warhead and 150 km range, fielded in 1959.

Then there was R-13, specifically developed for submarines in 1955-1961. It have 600 km range with 1-megaton warhead. Fielded in 1961.

Then it was R-21, the first Soviet missile capable of underwater launch, on TG-02/melange. 1420 km range, 1-megaton warhead. Fielded in 1963.

And only then the R-27 was developed.

As you could see, it was a long road. Long even for high-tech industrial superpower with clear goals.

 

[Archibald]

This is the fascinating side of Soviet SLBMs, really. On the opposite side, USN / RN/ MN went straight for 3000 km range +, solid-fuel missiles: the Polaris template, let's call it that way.
But the Soviet Navy went through all those intermediate steps and with liquid propulsion.

 

[Dilandu]

This is the fascinating side of Soviet SLBMs, really. On the opposite side, USN / RN/ MN went straight for 3000 km range +, solid-fuel missiles: the Polaris template, let's call it that way.

Well, USN started with naval version of liquid-fueled Jupiter missile. And switch to the solid fuel became possible only after Teller persuaded military that it would be possible to design thermonuclear warhead small enough to be handlned by solid-fuel (i.e. less efficient) missile. This was a risky "jump into unknown" for USN - both the submarine-launched solid-fuel missile and compact warhead were very uncertain concepts - but more promising in terms of end results (if not fail, of course).

But the Soviet Navy went through all those intermediate steps and with liquid propulsion.

The main reason was, USSR have much less experience with solid fuel, and wasn't so sure about warhead miniaturization, so it continued to work with liquid-fuel missiles. The step-by-step approach was more reliable in terms of end results. It ensured, that USSR would get the workable missile, which could be relied on.

(considering how ridiculously unreliable were initial versions of Polaris and W47 warhead, I think you agree, that Soviet approach was safer )

 

[Dilandu]

Considering the alt-British SLBM. There are several problems with the whole concept:

* Britain did not have much experience with ballistic missiles in 1950s - or with rocket propulsion at all. Arguably they were at even worse starting position than French (who at least have some pre-war development, and were able to fire their first liquid-fuel rocket as soon as 1945). Both USA and USSR firstly gained experience with land-launched ballistic missiles, and only then started to think about integrating them on submarines. Britain in 1950s have nothing to start with, and would be forced to develope SLBM from near-zero.

* Royal Navy in early 1950s have next to zero interest in being part of nuclear deterrense. Under its "broken-back warfare" doctrine, Royal Navy essentially wanted to leave all nuclear warfare aspects to RAF - on the condition that RAF would not interfer with Navy's traditional role of communication protection (yeah, "Sverdlov" scare, a perfect example of RN inventing the problem that literally did not exist - USSR have no interest in surface raiding)

* Britain did not have much resources to put in high-risk programs. They could not afford for such program to fail and took much of their limited resources with it. The failure of "Blue Streak" and cancellation of "Skybolt" was a major blow exactly because it left Britain with virtually nothing except a small fleet of rapidly ageing bombers, that couldn't even be disperced well enough.

So to conclude; to develope its own Polaris-type SLBN by late 1960s, Britain must in mid-1950s start to pour enormous resources into high-risk program for generally uninterested Royal Navy, without no prior experience in rocketry. With all respect, but it's too... implausible.

The more realistic would be Soviet-like step-by step approach. For example; in early 1950s start a program of short-range liquid-fuel (kerosene & acid) ballistic missile for both Royal Army and Royal Navy - instead of buying US MGM-5 Corporal. Test it on surface ships, then try to integrate for surfaced submarine (R-11F analogue). In late 1950s start to push for something in 500 km range, surface-launched (R-13 analogue). Then by late 1960s, the R-27 analogue with 1500+ km range and megaton warhead may become possible.

 

[Scott Kenny]

There are a lot of problems here. Submarine launched ballistic missile must be:

* Storable - i.e. you can't use something as obvious as liquid oxygen for it, and therefore you need to use storable (less efficient) propellant. For 1950s it was actually a major problem - that's why both American and Soviet first ICBM used kerolox combination.

And good luck convincing the submariners to allow Red Fuming Nitric Acid or High Test Peroxide as the oxidizer...

 

[uk 75]

On top of which the ruling Conservative Party did not really want an "independent" nuclear deterrent.
British V Bombers and then Polaris and Trident submarines were there to work as closely as possible with the SAC and then the US Navy. Washington relied on the UK need to fire nukes first (British weapons played an important role in the SIOP and the British PM was a useful ally in stiffening a wavering President).
Kissinger realised this which led him to warn us off buying Poseidon because of the poor relationship between Heath and Nixon. Once Wilson took over the US helped with the development of Chevaline warheads and penetration aids for Polaris.
Heath was keen to work with Pompidou on nuclear weapons to the dismay of both the UK MOD and the Pentagon.

 

[Dilandu]

And good luck convincing the submariners to allow Red Fuming Nitric Acid or High Test Peroxide as the oxidizer...

Double the rum, reduce the lashes, and hire more cute cabin boys) Problem solved)

On serious note, this most likely wouldn't be unsurmountable problem. After all, Royal Navy HTP program was abandoned mainly not because of being dangerous, but because nuclear propulsion demonstrated itself to be more practical approach. And the Royal Navy surface-to-air missile program - "Sea Slug" - was initially viewed as liquid-fueled, before switching to solid fuel. So while there obviously would be some reservations and reluctance, the main problem to solve would be the general lack of interest from Navy side.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Double the rum, reduce the lashes, and hire more cute cabin boys) Problem solved)

On serious note, this most likely wouldn't be unsurmountable problem. After all, Royal Navy HTP program was abandoned mainly not because of being dangerous, but because nuclear propulsion demonstrated itself to be more practical approach. And the Royal Navy surface-to-air missile program - "Sea Slug" - was initially viewed as liquid-fueled, before switching to solid fuel. So while there obviously would be some reservations and reluctance, the main problem to solve would be the general lack of interest from Navy side.

As a submariner, you are greatly underestimating the reluctance for aggressive liquid oxidizers onboard a submarine.

 

[Dilandu]

As a submariner, you are greatly underestimating the reluctance for aggressive liquid oxidizers onboard a submarine.

Possible. On the other hand, Soviet navy worked with liquid oxidizers for a long time, and while they were troublesome and caused a fair number of rather grim accidents, they weren't exactly considered unreliable. I suppose, it's mainly a question of encapsulating the missile good enough in tube.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Possible. On the other hand, Soviet navy worked with liquid oxidizers for a long time, and while they were troublesome and caused a fair number of rather grim accidents, they weren't exactly considered unreliable. I suppose, it's mainly a question of encapsulating the missile good enough in tube.

The British value their highly trained submariners a lot more than the Soviets did.

Side note, I'm still pissed that the Russians didn't call the hotline when Kursk went down.

 

[Arjen]

I suppose, it's mainly a question of encapsulating the missile good enough in tube.

Eject a troublesome HTP-torpedo from a tube could possibly be done. When one of the reloads goes haywire, you're screwed.

 

[uk 75]

As I mentioned earlier there were still some in the Conservative Party who, like Chamberlain before the War, distrusted the USA and its traditional hostility to the British Empire.
Of course this did not include that great Imperialist Churchill who returned as Prime Minister in 1953. But suppose another Tory politician had replaced him after the crushing postwar defeat by the Labour Party. Sir Percy Ware-Armitage, MP for Ambridge was such a man.
This person goes on to win a narrow majority in the 1951 General Election. He is impressed by the advice he has received from one of Von Braun's Peenemunde team, Gerd Frobe, who suggests that work in the Soviet Union has already made the bomber obsolete. He also suggests that German experience with U boat launched weapons against the US should be adopted by the UK.
This could get you the independent deterrent.

 

[Dilandu]

Eject a troublesome HTP-torpedo from a tube could possibly be done. When one of the reloads goes haywire, you're screwed.

Well, the missile in the vertical tube did not exactly have onboard reload, so... just have the mechanism to eject the whole launch container from the silo in case of troubles.

 

[Dilandu]

Maybe the possible approach would be some non-standard idea; for example, the multi-stage SLBM with air-breathing (ramjet?) intermediate stage. I.e. start with solid booster - acceleration to Mach 3+ using ramjets - then fire the upper solid-fuel stage, already moving at around 1 km/s and having thinner atmosphere to dealt with?

Such approach would require much smaller and easier to design solid motors, doable for British industry. On the other hand, the guidance system would be more complicated. So it's possible that such missile would be useful only for surface launch (being tracked by submarine's radar and getting course correction from submarine fire control).

 

[Scott Kenny]

As I mentioned earlier there were still some in the Conservative Party who, like Chamberlain before the War, distrusted the USA and its traditional hostility to the British Empire.
Of course this did not include that great Imperialist Churchill who returned as Prime Minister in 1953. But suppose another Tory politician had replaced him after the crushing postwar defeat by the Labour Party. Sir Percy Ware-Armitage, MP for Ambridge was such a man.
This person goes on to win a narrow majority in the 1951 General Election. He is impressed by the advice he has received from one of Von Braun's Peenemunde team, Gerd Frobe, who suggests that work in the Soviet Union has already made the bomber obsolete. He also suggests that German experience with U boat launched weapons against the US should be adopted by the UK.
This could get you the independent deterrent.

That certainly gets you the desire for an independent deterrent.

But making and launching an SLBM is a whole set of wicked problems.

1. you need a short missile to fit into a submarine (compare Polaris to Minuteman). which also means:
2. you need a physically small and therefore lightweight warhead. and
3. you need a physically small and therefore lightweight guidance system that can adjust the flight path based on missile's starting position. and hopefully be able to be retargeted while in the tube of the sub.
4. Any WW2 veteran submariner will tell you very loudly that you need to be able to launch while submerged. which also means
5. you need a very accurate navigation system to tell the missile where it is starting from. and
6. your submarine needs a hovering system able to hold the ship as still as possible while suddenly losing the weight of the missile and gaining the weight of water that fills the tube.

just off the top of my head. There are almost certainly more problems that need to be solved.

 

[Archibald]

Least dangerous & most practical rocket oxidizer I can think of is nytrox: a blend of LOX & N2O. With plain old kerosene it should be fine.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Least dangerous & most practical rocket oxidizer I can think of is nytrox: a blend of LOX & N2O. With plain old kerosene it should be fine.

I dunno, that's a cryogenic...

 

[Archibald]

Very mild, and that's the beauty of it. LOX is -183°C, N2O is -88°C (from memory) but a blend of the two is a mild cryogen (-50°C).

Do you think mild cryogens could be handled in submarines ?

 

[zen]

Quoting myself based on readings on the subject. Right at the start of my thread on the subject.
I think JCF Fuller made a post in the naval section on this too.

"In 1955 it was envisioned that the RN could achieve a Sea Based Ballistic Missile for launch from submarines, launching from North of Russia or in the Black Sea by 1965."

As to certain political views expresse....I guess it falls to me to point out that while many might take such as a given, alternative and quite legitimate views which hold the US has been hostile to the UK as a power exist and explain most effectively certain interactions between the two states.

A truely Independent British perspective, concerned with the UK's independence and freedom, would not view US-UK relations through rose tinted glasses. As surely as a similar view is widely held by Americans.

 

[Dilandu]

Very mild, and that's the beauty of it. LOX is -183°C, N2O is -88°C (from memory) but a blend of the two is a mild cryogen (-50°C).

Do you think mild cryogens could be handled in submarines ?

Hm... It would require constant cooling of the missile propellant - i.e. you can't just seal missile in the tube & forgot about it till the launch, you would need coolant constantly circulating. And the tube must be well-isolated, otherwise cooling the missile may cause the outer hatch to be jammed by ice.

So essentially the problem is, that while nitrox is safer as itself, its usage would probably be less safe due to inability to completely seal the tube from the rest of submarine.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As I mentioned earlier there were still some in the Conservative Party who, like Chamberlain before the War, distrusted the USA and its traditional hostility to the British Empire.
Of course this did not include that great Imperialist Churchill who returned as Prime Minister in 1953. But suppose another Tory politician had replaced him after the crushing postwar defeat by the Labour Party. Sir Percy Ware-Armitage, MP for Ambridge was such a man.
This person goes on to win a narrow majority in the 1951 General Election. He is impressed by the advice he has received from one of Von Braun's Peenemunde team, Gerd Frobe, who suggests that work in the Soviet Union has already made the bomber obsolete. He also suggests that German experience with U boat launched weapons against the US should be adopted by the UK.
This could get you the independent deterrent.

Of course, if you want to follow the British sci-fi-comedy film route, I recommend the nuclear fuel developed by Professor Kokintz from radioactive wine. Another option is paint the missiles with a thick coat of cavorite.

Of course, the current cast of "The Archers" includes David Troughton son of the Second Doctor, Terry Molloy a former Davros and Timothy Bentinck (David Archer) is also Commissioner Simmonds in the Big Finish series of "Space: 1999" audio plays.

Of course the "The Archers" is an excellent place to find the actor to play Sir Percy Ware-Armitage, because Michael Cochrane the actor who played Sir Henry Simmerson is currently in it too. Though I still remember him best for being in "Wings" (the 1970s series about RFC pilots early in World War One, not Paul McCartney's other group) which also had David Troughton in it.

 

[Arjen]

Well, the missile in the vertical tube did not exactly have onboard reload, so... just have the mechanism to eject the whole launch container from the silo in case of troubles.

In the event, that did not succeed

 

[Dilandu]

In the event, that did not succeed

Well, you can't be prepared for everything. There is a potential risk of even solid-fuel missile self-combusting in silo (albeit as far as I know, it never happened), so it's impossible to make submarine absolutely safe. Reasonably safe - sure.