At this point, shouldn't the baseline assumption be every Boeing production line is flawed and needs review? As in, if it's a Boeing, it has a defect until proven otherwise?
Edit: Aboulafia has basically said either Boeing gets a new board and CEO or Boeing doesn't live to 2040. He has no confidence in Boeing being able to Clean-Sheet a new aircraft and, if Airbus gets something new in the 737-class produced rapidly enough, which is apparently their intention, that would be lights-out for Boeing.
Back when I worked at the other end of the airfield from Boing in the late 1900s, we had one guy who got laid off from Boeing show up for a bit since it was going to be a longer time than usual between contracts. His third or fourth day on the line he showed up just reeking of booze. "What's the big deal? I did this all the time at Boeing" "The FARs say that you're fired if you pull that shit at a Repair Station, that's why." I don't know if he was re-hired at Boeing or not.
Emirates Airlines boss says manufacturer ‘in last chance saloon’ as supplier Spirit AeroSystems finds new production glitch
www.theguardian.com
As of Friday, the incorrectly drilled holes had been found in 22 fuselages out of 47 inspected up to that point, spread between Boeing and Spirit, and may exist in some 737s in service, according to sources cited by Reuters.
An employee from Spirit AeroSystems, which is the sole supplier of the fuselage for the 737 Max, reportedly discovered that the holes were too close to the edge of the piece of metal in a window frame.
I was hoping they were simply in the wrong position laterally/circumferentially, not closer to the edge. That presumably means you have to re-run the stress calculations to work out if the window is still safe. We really don't want another Comet.
It's almost more worrying that some have the problem and some don't, you would hope a drilling task like this is being done on an appropriately set up jig. Whatever happened to "Measure twice, cut once"?
The chance of this not being in flying aircraft is minimal. It's going to be a nightmare for the airlines if they have to recheck every cabin window in every Max.
Tim Clark, the head of Emirates Airlines, has become the latest airline leader to call for significant change at Boeing. Speaking in an interview with the Financial Times, published on Sunday, he said Boeing was in the “last chance saloon” after a “progressive decline” in standards.
Oh they know how to fix it, just wanted to push the jets out the door to meet delivery/generate a positive short term result. That bit them before, and it will again if they keep making similar calls.
Well, typically a design issue not a manufacturing one. You can see that they have recursive occurrences also.
Once again, this is a minor and fairly common issue in aerospace. Not something that will push Boeing to a foreclosure.
I was hoping they were simply in the wrong position laterally/circumferentially, not closer to the edge. That presumably means you have to re-run the stress calculations to work out if the window is still safe. We really don't want another Comet.
It's almost more worrying that some have the problem and some don't, you would hope a drilling task like this is being done on an appropriately set up jig.
The window frames are pretty complex shapes, it would not be easy to set up a jig for them. You would be appalled at how many holes in an airframe have to be drilled freehand.
Having rivets too far apart is just as bad as too close to the edge of the metal. There's a reason that there is a specified rivet pitch.
The window frames are pretty complex shapes, it would not be easy to set up a jig for them. You would be appalled at how many holes in an airframe have to be drilled freehand.
I am sorry guys but a hole drilled out of specs is not a manufacturing issue but a design one.
I have seen 0.4mm as standards margin for manual drilling (not in aerospace). So, it's not an operator deviation but drilling/fitting instructions that are incorrect.
For example, often in aerospace you need 2D (D being the Diameter) from part edge when nominal standard is 1.5D. This is the kind of error you can get easily and across the whole industry.
I am confused. Holes were drilled that did not conform to specs. I would assume those specs, including allowed tolerances, to be part of the design. Design good, non-conformity to design bad. Thus: manufacturing issue.
In that case, I would expect those specs to be mentioned in the design.
If they are not, the design is deficient - which I consider to be A Bad Thing, as the flaw is likely to be repeated.
There are thousands drawings for each planes done by dozens of teams across various contractors working on many definitions. One team being faulty does not imply the lot is defficient.
It can be a wrong release, one individual replicating the same error, one wrong technical file that is not up to date...
You can't burn the airframe just for one or dozen of similar occurrences. You have to understand those come by the Hundreds in every airplane that is out there.
Boeing is on the wrong end of the attention. Tell me, how may Spirit be so unprofessional with the 737 but not on Airbus airframe? Sikorsky or Bell?
If I understand you correctly, you are saying the fault is in the design because the design is at odds with working practices at Spirit? Boeing unaware of Spirit's standards? I would expect Boeing and Spirit to reach agreement about standard manufacturing practices and tolerances before any work is done, but perhaps I'm being naive.
Exactly what components delivered by Spirit are to the extent that components are labeled as possibly unsafe for use.
From the article in The Guardian:
The aircraft maker will have to conduct work on about 50 undelivered planes after its supplier Spirit AeroSystems discovered two holes drilled incorrectly.
I am pretty sure you can bin thousands of airframe after a couple of out of tolerance holes.
I am not cautioning but this level is not enormous to make it a drama.
There is the possibility that these issues are also present in Airbus aircraft, but haven't been spotted since Airbus has not been under such close scrutiny recently.
So if the spec is an Xmm hole at point Y, and the hole is instead Amm drilled at point B, then that's a design error? Sorry, that's like saying if the control laws spec specifies X+Y and we implement X-Y then it's the fault of the control laws spec.
There is scope for manufacturing issues to be a design error, if the required operations aren't physically possible, or the combined tolerances make it impossible to meet the requirements in certain situations, but that doesn't seem to be the case here, and it certainly isn't the case in general.
Is this a safety of flight issue? Let's see what the FAA says. Boeing says not, but they were so fast with their answer, probably hoping to get on top of it within the news cycle, I'm not certain they had time for an in-depth review.
ETA: Boeing actually says the problem “is not an immediate flight-safety issue”. That 'immediate' is interesting wording, it could mean there is an issue but it will take time to develop (c.f. fatigue cracking problems in certain engines) and can temporarily be monitored,
I am pretty sure you can bin thousands of airframe after a couple of out of tolerance holes.
I am not cautioning but this level is not enormous to make it a drama.
Don't rule it out, that's precisely what happened with some of the RAF's Tornado F.3s. Airwork drilled holes out of tolerance (too large), the load paths were compromised, they had to scrap the entire F.2A fleet to use their centre-fuselages as donor replacements.
Michael Whitaker told Congress this morning that the Alaska Airlines door incident showed the agency needs to change how it oversees Boeing's manufacturing processes.
NTSB have published their interim report and it looks like the interest has brought their website down. Confirms the four bolts were missing when the plane was delivered and pretty damning of Boeings quality documentation or lack thereof.
Examination of the bolt holes shows no evidence of damage to the paint from the bolts being present for a prolonged period of time but there was evidence on the exterior of the hole of a washer having been present at some point. The door plug was manufactured in Malaysia and installed at Spirits Wichita plant, there is no documents to suggest any issues were experienced or corrective action taken at Wichita with the exception of an inspection noting the fuselage was 0.01 inches off being flush but no corrective action was required. The fuselage was delivered to Boeings Renton plant on 31st August where 5 defective fuselage rivets were detected during inspection in a vertical line running the height of the interior cabin just forward of the door plug which required the door plug to be removed to access. A non-conformance order for this rivet fix was created by Boeing on 1st September (NCR 145029253) and there is photos of the work being completed in various stages by Spirit personnel at Renton under work order 145-8987-RSHK-1296-002NC including with the door plug removed, the work order was closed out on the 19th September. There is no Boeing work order quality documentation however for the removal and reinstatement of the door plug or any subsequent quality inspection. Later that evening on the 19th September at 6:39pm after the rivet job was completed Boeing staff shared photos by text as they were discussing plans to fit the interior now the rivet job rework was completed including this photo which was taken one month before aircraft delivery. Examination by the NTSB shows that the plug had been reinstated but the bolts were missing. There was no work performed on the door plug or the vicinity by Alaska Airlines.
NTSB have published their interim report and it looks like the interest has brought their website down. Confirms the four bolts were missing when the plane was delivered and pretty damning of Boeings quality documentation or lack thereof.
Examination of the bolt holes shows no evidence of damage to the paint from the bolts being present for a prolonged period of time but there was evidence on the exterior of the hole of a washer having been present at some point. The door plug was manufactured in Malaysia and installed at Spirits Wichita plant, there is no documents to suggest any issues were experienced or corrective action taken at Wichita with the exception of an inspection noting the fuselage was 0.01 inches off being flush but no corrective action was required. The fuselage was delivered to Boeings Renton plant where 5 defective fuselage rivets were detected during inspection in a vertical line running the height of the interior cabin just forward of the door plug which required the door plug to be removed to access. A work order for this rivet fix was created and there is photos of the work being completed including with the door plug removed. There is no Boeing work order quality documentation however for the removal and reinstatement of the door plug and subsequent quality inspection. After the rivet job was completed and they were starting to fit the interior this photo was taken one month before aircraft delivery, examination by the NTSB shows that the plug had been reinstated but the bolts were missing. There was no work performed on the door plug or the vicinity by Alaska Airlines.
1) no bolts at Spirit? The imprint of a washer suggests that at least one bolt was there when it left Spirit for Boeing, but the skin being out of flush makes me question that.
I would want freaking photographs of those bolts being installed before I accepted those fuselages for shipment to Boeing.
Spirit issue. (Having photographs of the bolts covers Spirit from any claims on missing bolts. Bolts were present at this time/date, when we loaded the fuselages onto the train to Boeing.)
2) no documentation about the reinstallation of the plug, not even in passing for the rivet fix. (There is usually a line in there for "reinstalled whatever items removed for access in accordance with (procedure name/number)," signed by worker, cross-signed by QA if the documentation was part of the rivet fix. But sometimes, they do a separate work order to remove interfering parts for access to the bad rivets and then you'd sign the work off there.)
Undocumented maintenance?!? I just heard every single QA at Tramco spin up to go ensure that whoever was working in the area was never employed at the company again. And quite possibly never employed in the industry again.
Boeing issue. BAD Boeing issue. Tramco gave me one warning (I hadn't worked that particular spot and had maybe 3 months on the job), the next time it happened I would be fired.
3) That photo showing NO BOLTS INSTALLED.
How THE FUCK did that get past every single person who worked in that area for however long it was from "plug removed for access to bad rivets" to "Interior installed"?!?!?
Even worse Boeing issue. This is people not looking at the plane as a whole. Not the line scrubs, not the QA bubbas, not the leads, etc.
Pardon the profanity, this is an issue that requires the use of F-bombs. Lots of F-bombs. I removed most of them, assume that there's basically one f-bomb between every other word in that sentence to get my full thoughts on this.
And, yes, it's more complex than that. Beside manufacturers faulty culture, it falls down to inappropriate quality and safety culture in today massification of aviation, all along the chain.
According to the lawsuit, passengers from an earlier flight on the same airplane had reported the whistling sound to flight attendants, who then informed the first officer or pilot. The pilot took no action after checking the plane’s flight instruments, which indicated everything was normal, the lawsuit claims.
The pilot took no action after checking the plane’s flight instruments, which indicated everything was normal, the lawsuit claims.
www.adn.com
I still vividly remember the petite pilot of a northern bound flight making her preflight check, at night, in a snow storm, without proper winter clothes that would have allowed her to spend more time doing this, using only her smartphone light for visual inspection...
NTSB have published their interim report and it looks like the interest has brought their website down. Confirms the four bolts were missing when the plane was delivered and pretty damning of Boeings quality documentation or lack thereof.
Examination of the bolt holes shows no evidence of damage to the paint from the bolts being present for a prolonged period of time but there was evidence on the exterior of the hole of a washer having been present at some point. The door plug was manufactured in Malaysia and installed at Spirits Wichita plant, there is no documents to suggest any issues were experienced or corrective action taken at Wichita with the exception of an inspection noting the fuselage was 0.01 inches off being flush but no corrective action was required. The fuselage was delivered to Boeings Renton plant on 31st August where 5 defective fuselage rivets were detected during inspection in a vertical line running the height of the interior cabin just forward of the door plug which required the door plug to be removed to access. A non-conformance order for this rivet fix was created by Boeing on 1st September (NCR 145029253) and there is photos of the work being completed in various stages by Spirit personnel at Renton under work order 145-8987-RSHK-1296-002NC including with the door plug removed, the work order was closed out on the 19th September. There is no Boeing work order quality documentation however for the removal and reinstatement of the door plug or any subsequent quality inspection. Later that evening on the 19th September at 6:39pm after the rivet job was completed Boeing staff shared photos by text as they were discussing plans to fit the interior now the rivet job rework was completed including this photo which was taken one month before aircraft delivery. Examination by the NTSB shows that the plug had been reinstated but the bolts were missing. There was no work performed on the door plug or the vicinity by Alaska Airlines.
There are thousands drawings for each planes done by dozens of teams across various contractors working on many definitions. One team being faulty does not imply the lot is defficient.
It can be a wrong release, one individual replicating the same error, one wrong technical file that is not up to date...
You can't burn the airframe just for one or dozen of similar occurrences. You have to understand those come by the Hundreds in every airplane that is out there.
Boeing is on the wrong end of the attention. Tell me, how may Spirit be so unprofessional with the 737 but not on Airbus airframe? Sikorsky or Bell?
Because BOEING dictates what Spirit Aero does on BOEING programs, and they demand QUANTITY on their 737 bread and butter. Poorly trained burger flipping kids that think "tolerances" are how much they can drink and drug compared to their peers and the FACT they can also "buy off" too many of their in process inspection operations.
Greed got them to this point and will be their demise before they wake up.
NTSB have published their interim report and it looks like the interest has brought their website down. Confirms the four bolts were missing when the plane was delivered and pretty damning of Boeings quality documentation or lack thereof.
Examination of the bolt holes shows no evidence of damage to the paint from the bolts being present for a prolonged period of time but there was evidence on the exterior of the hole of a washer having been present at some point. The door plug was manufactured in Malaysia and installed at Spirits Wichita plant, there is no documents to suggest any issues were experienced or corrective action taken at Wichita with the exception of an inspection noting the fuselage was 0.01 inches off being flush but no corrective action was required. The fuselage was delivered to Boeings Renton plant on 31st August where 5 defective fuselage rivets were detected during inspection in a vertical line running the height of the interior cabin just forward of the door plug which required the door plug to be removed to access. A non-conformance order for this rivet fix was created by Boeing on 1st September (NCR 145029253) and there is photos of the work being completed in various stages by Spirit personnel at Renton under work order 145-8987-RSHK-1296-002NC including with the door plug removed, the work order was closed out on the 19th September. There is no Boeing work order quality documentation however for the removal and reinstatement of the door plug or any subsequent quality inspection. Later that evening on the 19th September at 6:39pm after the rivet job was completed Boeing staff shared photos by text as they were discussing plans to fit the interior now the rivet job rework was completed including this photo which was taken one month before aircraft delivery. Examination by the NTSB shows that the plug had been reinstated but the bolts were missing. There was no work performed on the door plug or the vicinity by Alaska Airlines.
I am sorry guys but a hole drilled out of specs is not a manufacturing issue but a design one.
I have seen 0.4mm as standards margin for manual drilling (not in aerospace). So, it's not an operator deviation but drilling/fitting instructions that are incorrect.
For example, often in aerospace you need 2D (D being the Diameter) from part edge when nominal standard is 1.5D. This is the kind of error you can get easily and across the whole industry.
Which industry besides aerospace is using rivets in aluminium structures? The only thing comming into my mind are aerstream mobile homes, which are largly aircraft inspired (The early wooden German Eriba as well, Erbiba stands for Erich Bachem...).
Drill to edge distance is a recurring concern all across the manufacturing universe. That is with metal, CFRP, plastics, woods, fabrics, living tissues etc...
Thanks for the pictures.
My line of thought was, what if the person whose job it was to fit the bolts wasn't sure of the difference between a door and plug, thought the plug was a door, and so didn't fit the bolts, but even I can see the difference . . .
Spirit AeroSystems intends to automate some aspects of its Boeing 737 Max fuselage production in a bid to improve quality, though the decades-old design of the narrowbody jet will limit the degree of modernisation available.
Thanks for the pictures.
My line of thought was, what if the person whose job it was to fit the bolts wasn't sure of the difference between a door and plug, thought the plug was a door, and so didn't fit the bolts, but even I can see the difference . . .
What if that were what happened? The person whose job it would have been to fit the bolts would have clearly been unfit for the job. Any other moronic hypothetical questions???
In aerospace, drill to edge distance and rivet spacing is a VERY exacting demand. Too close to edge or rivets too close together and you can get cracks propagating between holes or from hole to edge.
And then you get exciting things like convertible passenger planes...
What if that were what happened? The person whose job it would have been to fit the bolts would have clearly been unfit for the job. Any other moronic hypothetical questions???
After looking at the images of door and plug, yes, anyone capable of confusing one with the other should be doing something else than working on the assembly line.
On the other hand, as Einstein said...
"Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I'm not sure about the universe"
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