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Negative, one AINS per missile. Look for the black disk (window) on the models.
However, the Hound Dog had the (Kerfott??) AINS in the B-52 pylon.
Rolling Thunder & Linebacker Cruise Missiles campaigns against North Vietnam??
- Thread starter Pioneer
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However, the Hound Dog had the (Kerfott??) AINS in the B-52 pylon.
Below is the conversation between Henry Kissinger and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore on 11th April 1973. Lee Kuan Yew suggested Kissinger to use surface-to-surface missiles against North Vietnam.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d294
Dr. Kissinger: We will do much to help his technological needs. Psychology is the real problem: we need to keep his confidence. If he goes on the offensive militarily and politically, he can win. He holds more cards than the enemy, but he has an inferiority complex. The Viet Cong need the support of the North Vietnamese Army, which is based 400 miles away. But we have to pick the time and the provocation. It has to be something great. If we do something prematurely we have to pay the domestic price. Is that wrong?
P.M. Lee: That is your domestic scene. There has to be a real buildup emotionally and psychologically here before you can give a real wallop. But you can’t afford to lose any more prisoners.
Dr. Kissinger: We can do almost anything without losing prisoners.
P.M. Lee: How?
Dr. Kissinger: By mining the ports.
P.M. Lee: There are still surface-to-surface missiles. I would like to take you two steps further. I am not a simplistic man, but the debunking of the domino theory is too simply put. If Thieu goes in the next two or three years and instability follows, the Thais are going to switch.
Dr. Kissinger: I agree.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d294
Dr. Kissinger: We will do much to help his technological needs. Psychology is the real problem: we need to keep his confidence. If he goes on the offensive militarily and politically, he can win. He holds more cards than the enemy, but he has an inferiority complex. The Viet Cong need the support of the North Vietnamese Army, which is based 400 miles away. But we have to pick the time and the provocation. It has to be something great. If we do something prematurely we have to pay the domestic price. Is that wrong?
P.M. Lee: That is your domestic scene. There has to be a real buildup emotionally and psychologically here before you can give a real wallop. But you can’t afford to lose any more prisoners.
Dr. Kissinger: We can do almost anything without losing prisoners.
P.M. Lee: How?
Dr. Kissinger: By mining the ports.
P.M. Lee: There are still surface-to-surface missiles. I would like to take you two steps further. I am not a simplistic man, but the debunking of the domino theory is too simply put. If Thieu goes in the next two or three years and instability follows, the Thais are going to switch.
Dr. Kissinger: I agree.
Apparently you didn't read the rest of the posting.
The Chinese did indeed supply arms and ammunition. It allowed them to access to both American and Soviet technology and the intelligence they gained by observing them in action.
They thought it was in their national interest to do so.
It is my contention that the Americans had no intention of invading North Vietnam much less China .
If they had been able to assure the Chinese that they absolutely no intention of doing more then taking Hanoi out of the war. I suspect the odds were roughly 60 /40 that China wouldn't shed a tear .
Except for the proforma diplomatic outrage and perhaps not much of that
You're presuming that China and North Vietnam were in lockstep with one another.
It's almost unbelievable the amount of bad blood between these two countries. And it goes back centuries.
Very interesting.
Scott Kenny
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Great way to get the Captain arrested and/or shot. And no, I'm not kidding.
You DO. NOT. F AROUND with PALs.
Scott Kenny
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Problem there is the terrible weather conditions over Vietnam most of the time.
Dilandu
I'm dissatisfied, which means, I exist.
Well, Walleye worked here relatively fine. There was an IR version of Walleye, don't forget)
Scott Kenny
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Without some kind of cluster warhead, I don't see Polaris having the accuracy to deliver conventional strikes.
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As a side note to the "There are still surface-to-surface missiles" aspect you've so kindly provided datafuser, that document's a really interesting insight to the sociopathic engineered (and hence turmoil) world of one Henry Kissinger - sustaining war for his and the administrations hubris.
Regards
Pioneer
Scott Kenny
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Assuming Polaris A1s with the ugly CEP of 1nmi at 1400nmi range, I'd want to do everything I could to reduce that. Much shorter range shots, none of this max range shots nonsense like with nukes. Not like either the Russians or Chinese had any decent number of ASW assets in the South China Sea or around the Philippines.
Max of about a 350nmi shot, if the A1 guidance is capable of depressed trajectory. If not, have to do a "high jump" type shot where you have the missile burn more energy in the climb up and quickly turn over. That short range/time of flight should get the CEP down to 500yards, which may be good enough for ~700lbs of tungsten darts inside a standard Mk1 RBA and a small bursting charge to break open the RBA at ~20kft. That is about like setting the normal Polaris to airburst, so could use the existing sensors.
It'd be a way of using up the Polaris A1s as A2s (half the CEP and slightly more range) or A3s (67% more range and 3x MRVs instead of unitary) came online.
Here is another conversation between Henry Kissinger and Lee Kuan Yew one week after South Vietnam collapsed.
Kissinger: Do you think the Chinese will work with Thailand to block Hanoi? Should we cooperate?
Lee: No. Because it would look like an American plot. You should delay it by stepping in and doling out aid until they say the insurgency can't be solved that way, but only by reforms. This government won't last and will be replaced by a government sympathetic with the Army. The number three Army man is being groomed for the top job.
I would be dishonest if I said Thailand would be a happy peaceful place. The thinking of the middle level in Thailand — they have seen Cambodia and Vietnam. They will try to stop it in the northeast, but if they can't they will come to terms with China. China is their insurance agent. The North Vietnamese Army and Chinese Army won't come down — they will pass arms and pamphlets and encourage subversion.
====================
Lee Kuan Yew: I must be careful so as not to scare the Malays and the Thais that the situation is hopeless.
The Secretary: You must get across to the American people that there's a price we will pay for Vietnam.
Lee Kuan Yew: They will leapfrog Thailand, fight 3 to 5 years and then come to terms.
The Secretary: What terms?
Lee Kuan Yew: Neutralism, pro-Communism.
The Secretary: What effect will that have in Malaysia?
Lee Kuan Yew: That's where we come in with contingency plans. I can't fight the same kind of war as the British. The Thais won't let the Malays cross borders to clean it up, but they might let us clean it up, if they also pay the price of concessions to the Chinese, etc.
The Secretary: How soon can you do it?
Lee Kuan Yew: Given the right kind of help from you?
The Secretary: What kind of help?
Lee Kuan Yew: Insurgency training.
The Secretary: Weapons, too?
Lee Kuan Yew: The right kind of intelligence and weapons.
The Secretary: [text not declassified]
Lee Kuan Yew: [text not declassified]
The Secretary: [text not declassified]
Lee Kuan Yew: [text not declassified]
The Secretary: [text not declassified]
Lee Kuan Yew: [text not declassified]
The Secretary: (reading paper) Have you talked to Schlesinger yet?
Lee Kuan Yew: I will talk to him tomorrow.
The Secretary: Rawling did not discuss it with us, but I think he is not unsympathetic. Can I keep this paper?
Lee Kuan Yew: Keep it [text not declassified] If you want secure links, it should be closely held, really discreet and secure. Habib said to me last night if we can start sending men here now, they will need technicians and technical equipment to meet the VC-type tactics, which the Thais and Malays will face.
The Secretary: This sort of thing we can do now. [text not declassified]
Lee Kuan Yew: Otherwise it will blow and I'll play it in the open. I have no motives here. I am trying to be helpful. I get nothing for saying it. I can't go beyond a certain point or the mass media goes after me.
The Secretary: You can go close to that point, though. We must wake up the American people to the dangers of the next five to ten years.
Lee Kuan Yew: Your Congress has to be prepared to lose all of Southeast Asia except Japan and to declare all the seas open. They will tell their constituents that.
The Secretary: In a fight between them and me with the constituents, I may win. History now accelerates very quickly. They won't like the consequences of the Vietnam loss. We were attacked at the Paris Accords for being too tough with them.
We intended to bomb in March or April 1973. It would have kept Hanoi quiet for two or three years.
Lee Kuan Yew: Well, it has happened, and we must deal with the consequences.
The Secretary: On counter-insurgency assistance, the training in Thailand is okay, what about Malaysia?
Lee Kuan Yew: [text not declassified]
The Secretary: Is this arranged?
Lee Kuan Yew: I discussed it with Schlesinger [text not declassified] You give them the idea that this is a good idea. [text not declassified] Their headquarters have been there for fifteen years. If they don't know what we are hoping to do, we can chip them down before it spreads but we need to drain the swamp too.
The Secretary: What do you think the Chinese think now?
Lee Kuan Yew: They are probably astounded that North Vietnam got away with it. They can't believe the Americans are so paralyzed and really fearful.
The Secretary: What will they do?
Lee Kuan Yew: They will try hard in Cambodia and will help the Thais a little.
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Thanks again for the extention of my learning curve datafuser
I guess after all that should have been learnt from the disaster that was the Vietnam War, nothings really changed. The geopolitical scheming and powerbroking has continued unabated.
Regards
Pioneer
I guess after all that should have been learnt from the disaster that was the Vietnam War, nothings really changed. The geopolitical scheming and powerbroking has continued unabated.
Regards
Pioneer
Below is from a discussion about a disarming strike against China in 1972.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972 - Office of the Historian
history.state.gov 3.0 shell
Mr. Kissinger: That may be true. What about our Minutemen over-flying the Soviet Union? Would we want to do that?
Adm. Moorer: It would make the Soviets happy if we were hitting China.
Mr. Kissinger: But the Soviets would see the missiles coming at them first.
Adm. Moorer: We could tell the Soviets that the missiles were going on to China. Anyway, the Soviets would see that we were in a tension-filled period with the Chinese.
Mr. Johnson: Quite frankly, I wouldn’t want to rely on doing that.
Mr. Tucker: We assume that the Minutemen would not overfly the Soviet Union. We would rely on Polaris and the B–52s. We will also have an overwhelming edge over the Chinese during the next decade. And, if need be, the number of warheads, particularly on the submarine-carried missiles, can be significantly increased.
Below is from the memorandum "Options to Counter North Vietnamese Violations", dated 11 April 1973.
" Destruction of the port of Haiphong would have very high psychological impact and could be accomplished using standoff weapons.
...
Standoff attacks against North Vietnam using naval gunfire and extended range guided weapons.
...
A standoff capability provides unique advantages in reducing POW losses. Even though Hanoi could not be reached by present weapons from the safe haven of coastal waters outside of SAM range, a large area of North Vietnam is within range of these 40–55 NM weapons. We should check on current inventories of these weapons and current constraints on their production. "
" Destruction of the port of Haiphong would have very high psychological impact and could be accomplished using standoff weapons.
...
Standoff attacks against North Vietnam using naval gunfire and extended range guided weapons.
...
A standoff capability provides unique advantages in reducing POW losses. Even though Hanoi could not be reached by present weapons from the safe haven of coastal waters outside of SAM range, a large area of North Vietnam is within range of these 40–55 NM weapons. We should check on current inventories of these weapons and current constraints on their production. "
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