US 1960's procurement without McNamara?

[Elan Vital]

Hi everyone,

Robert McNamara is infamously known on those forums for his particular handling of US military procurement. Selecting the losing contender instead of the one the military prefers, using the Total Procurement Package System that worked poorly with certain weapon programs, emphasizing standardization between different services regardless of their reasoning to have their own system...

Had he never been SecDef, how different would US procurement be? What designs would be selected by the military, and what programs could still suffer from industrial-political shenanigans in this period?

 

[Justo Miranda]

https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/13_sep2018-cancelled-f111b-1-180969916/

Was the Navy's F-111 Really That Bad? | Military Aviation | Air ...

airspacemag.com

 

[isayyo2]

Besides the plethora of confusing designation,

I expect that TAC would order the J79 F-101 instead of the F-110A/F-4C Specter/Phantom; I can also see an advanced intercepter being adopted, whether that's an F-12B or F-106E I'm not sure. The Navy would hopefully gets the F6D, maybe VFAX stays light and the F-14 is avoided all together? Now the Army would be actually be the worst off as McNamara was a proponent of the Airmobile doctrine with the OV-1 Mohawk and CV-2/7 cargo planes specifically being a point of contention with the Air Force. Had McNamara not run interference for the Army, the 11th test and 1st Cavalry would have either been severely hobbled by Air Force controlled helicopters or perhaps completely non-existed. There might be an alternative universe of the forum out there talking about "what could have been" of Airmobile operations

 

[SSgtC]

The Navy would hopefully gets the F6D, maybe VFAX stays light and the F-14 is avoided all together?

No, the Missileer would have been cancelled regardless. The Navy had serious questions about it's survivability after launching it's missiles. Without being forced into the F-111 program, VFAX probably never exists in the first place. We may not get exactly the OTL Tomcat, but we'd probably still get something close to it since that was what the Navy wanted in the first place.

 

[isayyo2]

The Navy would hopefully gets the F6D, maybe VFAX stays light and the F-14 is avoided all together?

No, the Missileer would have been cancelled regardless. The Navy had serious questions about it's survivability after launching it's missiles. Without being forced into the F-111 program, VFAX probably never exists in the first place. We may not get exactly the OTL Tomcat, but we'd probably still get something close to it since that was what the Navy wanted in the first place.

SSgtC, do you think a new airframe to carry the Eagle/Phoenix missile would be more likely than a modified Phantom?

 

[SSgtC]

The Navy would hopefully gets the F6D, maybe VFAX stays light and the F-14 is avoided all together?

No, the Missileer would have been cancelled regardless. The Navy had serious questions about it's survivability after launching it's missiles. Without being forced into the F-111 program, VFAX probably never exists in the first place. We may not get exactly the OTL Tomcat, but we'd probably still get something close to it since that was what the Navy wanted in the first place.

SSgtC, do you think a new airframe to carry the Eagle/Phoenix missile would be more likely than a modified Phantom?

Most definitely. Engine technology had passed the Phantom by. Without major airframe surgery, you couldn't fit a more modern turbofan into the Phantom. And by the time you actually do the surgery, it's probably not much more expensive to just go full clean sheet.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Mauler and Sea Mauler would have made it into service, in all probability.

 

[zen]

Mauler and Sea Mauler would have made it into service, in all probability.

That would have made things interesting.
UK was set to buy this.

 

[uk 75]

The F111 seems the only tangible example of the Mcnamara effect..Without him Boeing rather than GD might have won. Commonality between Navy, Marines and USAF not all bad. It worked with the Phantom. Would a USAF F18 been worse than F16.
The other projects mentioned above were doomed anyway.
On the airmobile div. Would it have made much difference if the USAF had operated the Hueys and Caribou.. They operated the C130s and the smaller Fairchild

 

[F-14D]

The F111 seems the only tangible example of the Mcnamara effect..Without him Boeing rather than GD might have won. Commonality between Navy, Marines and USAF not all bad. It worked with the Phantom. Would a USAF F18 been worse than F16.
The other projects mentioned above were doomed anyway.
On the airmobile div. Would it have made much difference if the USAF had operated the Hueys and Caribou.. They operated the C130s and the smaller Fairchild

There were lots more effects due to McNamara

While it's true that in the TFX case McNamara consistently ignored the recommendations of the military and the selection team, it's unlikely had he not been there the Boeing team would have won. That's because without him there would have been no TFX to begin with. USAF would have ended up with a separate program more attuned to their needs, maybe something similar to a VG TSR.2. The F-4 wasn't an example of a plane developed to perform wildly different roles for multiple services. It was a plane designed around and for one service's needs. It was so effective and so beyond what USAF had that they gritted their teeth and bought it. The A-7 was the same situation

On the concept of USAF F-18, USAF chose the F-16 before the F-18 was designed (the F-17 was substantially different). The F-18 also didn't match USAF's desire at the time for a low cost simple lightweight fighter. Regarding USAF operated Hueys (and by extension Chinooks) instead of teh Army, there would be problems. These crafts' missions were so out of USAF's wheelhouse it would be a continuing problem. Deployed forces would have much greater problems having to coordinate everything through two different Commands especially given that the services' priorities were so different. As far as the Caribou went, that was originally an Army aircraft. USAF took it away claiming that fixed wing supply was their exclusive role and mission regardless of who could do it the best .

 

[sferrin]

Blackbirds for everybody!

 

[F-14D]

Some other differnces had McNamara not been there:

There is a good chance the F-12B would have been built. At least four more SR-71s would have been built. They were planned. However once McNamara ordered the Blackbird line destroyed to insure the F-12 couldn't be built (he wanted to force USAF to buy the F-111 as its next interceptor) that no longer was possible.

We wouldn't have had the continued shortages of ordnance in the first years of the Vietnam War.

It's likely CVA-67 would have been nuclear powered ( no nuclear aircraft carriers was the only major policy decisis he made that he later conceded he was wrong).

There would have been fewer "Fixed Price Development" programs.

There are others. and of course he caused all kinds of other damage outside procurement. Look up "Project 100,000".

 

[marauder2048]

No McNamara means no joint-service F-4; he was behind the adoption and the reason
that all of the century series aircraft died.

You would have seen a lot more development of those types if they had had hot production lines.

No McNamara probably also means no FX/VFAX (F-15, F-14).

And the Navy was only able to weasel its way out of the F-111B after McNamara resigned.

It was a plane designed around and for one service's needs. It was so effective and so beyond what USAF had that they gritted their teeth and bought it.

Completely inaccurate. They were directed to buy it by the longest serving SECDEF in history.
In exchange, they got FX (F-X) and A-X.

The pre-war analysis was confirmed by wartime experience; the F-4 was no more effective and probably
less so than the F-105.

If no F-4, you would have seen derivatives of the F-106 over Vietnam for the A2A role.

 

[F-14D]

https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/13_sep2018-cancelled-f111b-1-180969916/

Was the Navy's F-111 Really That Bad? | Military Aviation | Air ...

airspacemag.com

Couple of details. The F-111B had already been canceled by the time they flew one out to the boat for a one-time only exercise. The craft used was the last of the prototypes (the next two were pre-production representative. It was specially lightened and I'm not sure it even had a normal fuel load. In an ironic footnote , the F-111B used was the asme one the article talked about that crash landed at Pt. Mugu a few months later.

It would be a surprise to many that the TF30's had all but eliminated compressor stalls

 

[F-14D]

No McNamara means no joint-service F-4; he was behind the adoption and the reason
that all of the century series aircraft died.

You would have seen a lot more development of those types if they had had hot production lines.

No McNamara probably also means no FX/VFAX (F-15, F-14).

And the Navy was only able to weasel its way out of the F-111B after McNamara resigned.

It was a plane designed around and for one service's needs. It was so effective and so beyond what USAF had that they gritted their teeth and bought it.

Completely inaccurate. They were directed to buy it by the longest serving SECDEF in history.
In exchange, they got FX (F-X) and A-X.

The pre-war analysis was confirmed by wartime experience; the F-4 was no more effective and probably
less so than the F-105.

If no F-4, you would have seen derivatives of the F-106 over Vietnam for the A2A role.

USAF was directed to look at the F-4 rather than start a whole new aircraft program. It was flown in the interceptor role against the F-106 and found to be at least as effective, and more so if you didn't have a whole radar net as we had in the US and Europe backing you up. Everything else it also did was gravy. Regarding the F-106 as an air superiority aircraft, given what it was designed for and its armament, who knows?

FX/VFAX came about as a reaction to the July 1967 Domodedovo air show. Something like them would have come along anyway, but not as soon.

The Navy "weaseled" out of the F-111B when both congressional Armed Services Committees voted in May of 1968 to not fund any further work on the program, although the writing had been on the wall since 1967. McNamara did not resign until Feb. 29, 1968.

 

[marauder2048]

No McNamara means no joint-service F-4; he was behind the adoption and the reason
that all of the century series aircraft died.

You would have seen a lot more development of those types if they had had hot production lines.

No McNamara probably also means no FX/VFAX (F-15, F-14).

And the Navy was only able to weasel its way out of the F-111B after McNamara resigned.

It was a plane designed around and for one service's needs. It was so effective and so beyond what USAF had that they gritted their teeth and bought it.

Completely inaccurate. They were directed to buy it by the longest serving SECDEF in history.
In exchange, they got FX (F-X) and A-X.

The pre-war analysis was confirmed by wartime experience; the F-4 was no more effective and probably
less so than the F-105.

If no F-4, you would have seen derivatives of the F-106 over Vietnam for the A2A role.

USAF was directed to look at the F-4 rather than start a whole new aircraft program. It was flown in the interceptor role against the F-106 and found to be at least as effective, and more so if you didn't have a whole radar net as we had in the US and Europe backing you up. Everything else it also did was gravy. Regarding the F-106 as an air superiority aircraft, given what it was designed for and its armament, who knows?

FX/VFAX came about as a reaction to the July 1967 Domodedovo air show. Something like them would have come along anyway, but not as soon.

The Navy "weaseled" out of the F-111B when both congressional Armed Services Committees voted in May of 1968 to not fund any further work on the program, although the writing had been on the wall since 1967. McNamara did not resign until Feb. 29, 1968.

Horrible history. The Air Force was instructed to buy the F-4 and the Century Series lines were canned.
The F-106 would regularly win DACT against just about anything until the F-15 showed up.

What the F-4 had was a radar large enough to employ Sparrow and that was nice.
Naturally, the F-4 was such a great interceptor that it never replaced the F-106...

F-X preceded 1967 since the MiG-25 flew before then. It's clear US intelligence was aware of it
(and the twin-engine Sukhoi) as early as 1964. Then there was the SA-4 to consider.
That's plain from all of the official histories.

McNamara announced his resignation in 1967; he was regarded as dead-man walking before that period.

 

[SSgtC]

The pre-war analysis was confirmed by wartime experience; the F-4 was no more effective and probably
less so than the F-105.

The same F-105 that was removed from combat because of its high loss rate? That F-105? The only American aircraft to ever be withdrawn from combat because of its loss rate? Yeah, I'm not seeing it

 

[bobbymike]

Blackbirds for everybody!

5000 Minutemans and the WS-120a heavy ICBM??

 

[marauder2048]

The pre-war analysis was confirmed by wartime experience; the F-4 was no more effective and probably
less so than the F-105.

The same F-105 that was removed from combat because of its high loss rate? That F-105? The only American aircraft to ever be withdrawn from combat because of its loss rate? Yeah, I'm not seeing it

As opposed to the F-4 loss rates as a bomber? Both were awful.
The difference was the F-4 still had a hot line and McAir was able to churn out the F-4
at rates that are really mind boggling.

 

[Michel Van]

I have to point out a important thing about the F-12

it's extreme expensive program and would have extrem operations and maintenance cost.
Something they accepted to the 32 build SR-71 because it's vital role for reconnaissance.

but to have fleet of 93 and more F-12 in another matter
because there Mach 3 interceptors that fire only 3 missiles and that's it !

Similar problems let B-58 to taken out of Service in 1970
The to high operations and maintenance cost for fleet of 116 B-58
Also the lack the option of conventional bombs runs let to this.

Even with out a Robert McNamara, the guy who take his job will come to similar conclusion on this matter.

 

[SSgtC]

The pre-war analysis was confirmed by wartime experience; the F-4 was no more effective and probably
less so than the F-105.

The same F-105 that was removed from combat because of its high loss rate? That F-105? The only American aircraft to ever be withdrawn from combat because of its loss rate? Yeah, I'm not seeing it

As opposed to the F-4 loss rates as bomber? Both were awful.

Not even close. The USAF lost 46% of all F-105s ever built over Vietnam. (833 total built, 382 lost to all causes). The Phantom lost 445 to all causes. That's a 13% loss rate out of over 3,400 Phantoms built for the USAF. The F-4 also flew a lot more sorties than the F-105 did. So yeah, your own claimed numbers are calling bullshit on you

 

[marauder2048]

The pre-war analysis was confirmed by wartime experience; the F-4 was no more effective and probably
less so than the F-105.

The same F-105 that was removed from combat because of its high loss rate? That F-105? The only American aircraft to ever be withdrawn from combat because of its loss rate? Yeah, I'm not seeing it

As opposed to the F-4 loss rates as bomber? Both were awful.

Not even close. The USAF lost 46% of all F-105s ever built over Vietnam. (833 total built, 382 lost to all causes). The Phantom lost 445 to all causes. That's a 13% loss rate out of over 3,400 Phantoms built for the USAF. The F-4 also flew a lot more sorties than the F-105 did. So yeah, your own claimed numbers are calling bullshit on you

Loss rates are aircraft lost relative to total production run? Since when? Gee I thought it would be something related to the number
of sorties flown, which configuration and the stat padding the F-4 did with all of its South Vietnam strike missions.

Yeah it really makes sense to include post-war production figures for the Air Force.

The real argument, in the Air Force view, came down to payload @ range.
McNamara's analytical argument, cost-per-tons delivered, for the F-4 in the strike role was premised on the long range tanks
...that the AF never bought.

Mac goes into the origins of the F-4 in AF and the "analysis" that motivated it.
http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2014/01/debunking-close-air-support-myths-2nd.html

The bibliography he provides is nice.
And the supplemental reading would be "Sierra Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietnam"

 

[isayyo2]

Marauder that was an extremely interesting blog post; I've never read anything that portrayed the Air Force's role in the AX program or the dedicated CAS role overall in a positive manner or from their perspective! Lot's of interesting tidbits; the A-4 almost got forced onto the Air Force, the A-7D had massive cost overruns, many in the Army viewed the Airmobile proponents as "insurgents", and of course, Congressional meddling. Can't we all just get along? HaHa

 

[apparition13]

The Navy would hopefully gets the F6D, maybe VFAX stays light and the F-14 is avoided all together?

No, the Missileer would have been cancelled regardless. The Navy had serious questions about it's survivability after launching it's missiles. Without being forced into the F-111 program, VFAX probably never exists in the first place. We may not get exactly the OTL Tomcat, but we'd probably still get something close to it since that was what the Navy wanted in the first place.

Whereas I suspect both would have gone forward. USAF would have gotten its FB-111H sized strike aircraft (it's really uncanny how closely the FB-111H fits the initial USAF requirements), and the Navy its long-duration loiter BARCAP missile platform to shoot down Soviet bombers attacking the fleet. MiGs didn't have the range to escort the bombers, and in a dogfight I'll take an F3D F6D over a Bear or Bison anyday.

There are others. and of course he caused all kinds of other damage outside procurement. Look up "Project 100,000".

Yeah, that's what I thought it was. "Let's reduce the standards to accept low IQ soldiers", because how could they possibly turn out to be liabilities in the chaos of combat?

Marauder than was an extremely interesting blog post; I've never read anything that portrayed the Air Force's role in the AX program or the dedicated CAS role overall in a positive manner or from their perspective! Lot's of interesting tidbits; the A-4 almost got forced onto the Air Force, the A-7D had massive cost overruns, many in the Army viewed the Airmobile proponents as "insurgents", and of course, Congressional meddling. Can't we all just get along? HaHa

I'm not sure the Israelis or Marines would agree with the assessment that the A-4 was terrible. And as far as I know, the stilt-legs that it didn't need in the first place weren't a tip-over risk despite looking like it. Spey4 should still have gone forward though.

Loss rates are aircraft lost relative to total production run? Since when? Gee I thought it would be something related to the number
of sorties flown, which configuration and the stat padding the F-4 did with all of its South Vietnam strike missions.

I know I've seen loss rate per sortie somewhere for the Vietnam War, but damned if I can find them now.

The real argument, in the Air Force view, came down to payload @ range.
McNamara's analytical argument, cost-per-tons delivered, for the F-4 in the strike role was premised on the long range tanks
...that the AF never bought.

I've never heard of these. Do we know what they looked like? Or their fuel capacity, or drag effects?

 

[SSgtC]

Whereas I suspect both would have gone forward. USAF would have gotten its FB-111H sized strike aircraft (it's really uncanny how closely the FB-111H fits the initial USAF requirements), and the Navy its long-duration loiter BARCAP missile platform to shoot down Soviet bombers attacking the fleet. MiGs didn't have the range to escort the bombers, and in a dogfight I'll take an F3D F6D over a Bear or Bison anyday.

Well, the Navy learned the hard way in Vietnam that fighters still needed to be fighters and had to be able to dogfight. So the Missileer was dead regardless. The rest, yeah. Had McNamara not tried to force two wildly different programs into one, both services would have gotten what they wanted much earlier and much cheaper.

I know I've seen loss rate per sortie somewhere for the Vietnam War, but damned if I can find them now.

Same. I could not find them anywhere and I know I've seen them before. That's why I used the stat i did

 

[apparition13]

Whereas I suspect both would have gone forward. USAF would have gotten its FB-111H sized strike aircraft (it's really uncanny how closely the FB-111H fits the initial USAF requirements), and the Navy its long-duration loiter BARCAP missile platform to shoot down Soviet bombers attacking the fleet. MiGs didn't have the range to escort the bombers, and in a dogfight I'll take an F3D F6D over a Bear or Bison anyday.

Well, the Navy learned the hard way in Vietnam that fighters still needed to be fighters and had to be able to dogfight. So the Missileer was dead regardless. The rest, yeah. Had McNamara not tried to force two wildly different programs into one, both services would have gotten what they wanted much earlier and much cheaper.

Here comes the yes, but: the F6D was cancelled in 1961 (Ginter puts it at April 25th), which is well before Vietnam air combat. So those lessons were yet to be learned, and the contract was there to be signed. It may be that the Eagle missile was a technological step too far, but development may have been far enough along when Vietnam lessons were being learned that the missileer system would have been deployed*. And the USN never really gave up on the concept. The A-12 was supposed to have the capability to act as a missileer in the outer air battle as well. Presumably flinging AIM-152s at Blackjacks and Backfires while F-14Ds/Super Tomcats/NATF/AFX went supersonic to chase the bombers down with their own AIM-152s.

Besides, the role was fleet screen against Soviet bombers in the Atlantic, the North Sea, and the Northern Pacific, not alpha strike escort. And since it was meant to operate from Essexes as well, it would have given them a squadron that could do the missileer role without F-14s that couldn't operate from them.

*What the resulting 4th gen fighters would have looked like would be up in the air at this point. There's no need for Phoenix with Eagle, and Eagle is too big for an F-14 to carry 4-6 and still be small enough to be a good dogfighter. I would lean toward something more like a classic "put the biggest engine you have in the smallest airframe (that can carry the necessary mission systems) you can" air superiority fighter, something more like an F-16 than an F-15 or F-14, but there's really no saying.

 

[F-14D]

I have to point out a important thing about the F-12

it's extreme expensive program and would have extrem operations and maintenance cost.
Something they accepted to the 32 build SR-71 because it's vital role for reconnaissance.

but to have fleet of 93 and more F-12 in another matter
because there Mach 3 interceptors that fire only 3 missiles and that's it !

Similar problems let B-58 to taken out of Service in 1970
The to high operations and maintenance cost for fleet of 116 B-58
Also the lack the option of conventional bombs runs let to this.

Even with out a Robert McNamara, the guy who take his job will come to similar conclusion on this matter.

Couple of things here, as I see it.

As I understand it, the YF-12A could only handle three missiles because given that the YFs were based on a modified A-12 design, with only three of them it was much simpler and cheaper to use one of the bays to house the avionics for the ASG-18 radar/fire control inherited from the F-108 program (which also could carry three missiles). With the proposed production version, it became practical to repackage the system into the fuselage and free up the fourth bay for an AIM-47. BTW, once they got rid of the Genie, F=106 was armed with four AIM-4s, which had to be fired two at a time, so you essentially only had two shots.

Yes, the plane would be expensive and maintenance intensive, although with a series production it would come down a bit. But then, dedicated interceptors were expensive and required special support, this was accepted for their very specific, unique mission. This may be one of the reasons why after the F-12B was blocked, USAF no longer pursued single purpose interceptor aircraft .

BTW, the F-111 interceptor, which is what McNamara wanted and killed the Blackbird line to try and force, would have only been able to carry two missiles, since external carriage would have reduced performance dramatically.

 

[F-14D]

Gotta stick up a bit for the SLUF, which seems to have been disparaged in a few posts. Yes, the A-7D had overruns, but given that USAF got rid of the crappy TF30 and updated the avionics an outstanding attack aircraft came out of it. It wasn't that agile, the A-7, "... is not very fast, but it sure is slow" . OTOH, it dropped more ordnance on Hanoi than any aircraft than the B-52 and dropped more bombs per sortie more accurately than any other tactical aircraft n the inventory. It may not have been a thrilling aircraft to fly, but it flew 12,928 combat sorties during the war with only four combat losses (out of a total of six).

USN liked the improvements USAF did to their A-7A that they changed the refueling method, put in some different radios and downsized the brakes and adopted it as the A-7E

 

[marauder2048]

Gotta stick up a bit for the SLUF, which seems to have been disparaged in a few posts. Yes, the A-7D had overruns, but given that USAF got rid of the crappy TF30 and updated the avionics an outstanding attack aircraft came out of it.

Which utterly destroyed its premise as cheap and readily available. The original recommendation of the F-5
would have been there earlier and better-er.

The 1961 mandated CAS aircraft was a good McNamara era development. The US did need something like that.
What A-X (and the interim CAS bird A-7D ) morphed into was meh. It's funny that nobody thinks of A-X
as an exemplar for concurrency-gone-wrong and gold plating but it really was.

 

[SSgtC]

Gotta stick up a bit for the SLUF, which seems to have been disparaged in a few posts. Yes, the A-7D had overruns, but given that USAF got rid of the crappy TF30 and updated the avionics an outstanding attack aircraft came out of it.

Which utterly destroyed its premise as cheap and readily available. The original recommendation of the F-5
would have been there earlier and better-er.

Considering that the F-5 wouldn't have even been able to reach most of the targets, I fail to see how it would be better.

 

[marauder2048]

Gotta stick up a bit for the SLUF, which seems to have been disparaged in a few posts. Yes, the A-7D had overruns, but given that USAF got rid of the crappy TF30 and updated the avionics an outstanding attack aircraft came out of it.

Which utterly destroyed its premise as cheap and readily available. The original recommendation of the F-5
would have been there earlier and better-er.

Considering that the F-5 wouldn't have even been able to reach most of the targets, I fail to see how it would be better.

The A-7D wasn't able to reach anything until the 1970s; that's a decade after the 1961 directive for a CAS-bird was issued.
And the A-7D was the "interim" CAS aircraft. And the performance over Hanoi is irrelevant since there was, by definition,
no CAS going on there.

For CSAR & misc sure.

 

[SSgtC]

The A-7D wasn't able to reach anything until the 1970s; that's a decade after the 1961 directive for a CAS-bird was issued.
And the performance over Hanoi is irrelevant since there was, by definition, no CAS going on there.

For CSAR & misc sure.

Except that delay had nothing to do with the A-7. Which was developed extremely rapidly. That delay was the Air Force doing everything in their power to not buy a dedicated attack plane. Had they bought the F-5, I'm 99% sure that it's pilots would have been almost solely trained in ACM with no more than lip service given to ground attack/CAS.

 

[marauder2048]

The A-7D wasn't able to reach anything until the 1970s; that's a decade after the 1961 directive for a CAS-bird was issued.
And the performance over Hanoi is irrelevant since there was, by definition, no CAS going on there.

For CSAR & misc sure.

Except that delay had nothing to do with the A-7. Which was developed extremely rapidly. That delay was the Air Force doing everything in their power to not buy a dedicated attack plane. Had they bought the F-5, I'm 99% sure that it's pilots would have been almost solely trained in ACM with no more than lip service given to ground attack/CAS.

A-7 source selection was 1965. Didn't show up in combat until 1970. That meets no definition of "rapid."
The A-7 needed a lot of work to turn it into something usable in the CAS role.

That delay was the Air Force doing everything in their power to not buy a dedicated attack plane.

I can see no evidence for that whatsoever. McConnell et al seem extraordinarily sincere in recognizing this
gap and trying to fill it. The USAF had committed the A-1 and the A-37 to Vietnam in quantity after all.

 

[SSgtC]

Ordered in November, 65. First flight in May, 68. 2.5 years from ordered to first flight is damn good. In fact, it lines up with the development time of the original Corsair. The A-7A was ordered in September, 63 and its first flight was almost two years to the day later. And given the number of changes the USAF demanded so that they wouldn't get stuck buying another Navy plane, I'd say that's more than reasonable.

 

[isayyo2]

I wonder what ripples an early 60s acquisition en masse of the F-5 would have caused? I’m sure the A-7D would have gone through, but the F-16 might’ve turned into a different animal down the line.

 

[marauder2048]

Ordered in November, 65. First flight in May, 68. 2.5 years from ordered to first flight is damn good. In fact, it lines up with the development time of the original Corsair. The A-7A was ordered in September, 63 and its first flight was almost two years to the day later. And given the number of changes the USAF demanded so that they wouldn't get stuck buying another Navy plane, I'd say that's more than reasonable.

The first flight is hardly relevant since it took 5 years to get it into a form that was survivable against the late-Vietnam era
threat environment. It's forgotten how many MANPADS and how much radar directed AAA was showing up in
*South* Vietnam.

 

[F-14D]

Again, sticking up for the SLUF:

F-5 had 1,638 combat sorties in a more benign environment vs. 12, 298 for A-7D yet had 50% more total losses.

A-1 wouldn't have been used by USAF if Navy hadn't already built it and was willing to share some of theirs (and the loss rate was terrible). A-37 was a modification of an existing aircraft. It should also be noted that A-7 wasn't actually designed as a pure CAS bird as much as strike with a secondary CAS capability (again thanks to USN). A-10 would have been a godsend in Vietnam, especially in the South as we didn't do much CAS in the North, but the A-X just didn't seem to be that high a priority. It has been argued by many reputable sources, including the late, great, Jeff Ethell that the main impetus for the A-X was to stop the AH-56 and when Army did that on their own, USAF wasn't sure what to do with the plane. Given their treatment of the aircraft (remember the "A-16"?) there's some credibility to that opinion .

Another discussion for another place since that had nothing to do with McNamara procurement.

 

[starviking]

Regarding F-4 vs. F-105 loss rates in the Vietnam War, "A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF USAF FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMBAT" includes those two, amongst others. One section, starting on page 63, directly compares the F-4 vs. F-105. Comparisions are used based on sortie rates, and losses to ground fire.

"Considering strike missions only, the F-105 loss rate in North Vietnam to ground fire was almost three times as high as the F-4. In Southern Laos, it was twice as high and in Northern Laos almost four times as high."

It's a document with a lot of detail, and I've only had a chance to skim it so far - but looks very interesting.

 

[Michel Van]

Yes, the plane would be expensive and maintenance intensive, although with a series production it would come down a bit. But then, dedicated interceptors were expensive and required special support, this was accepted for their very specific, unique mission. This may be one of the reasons why after the F-12B was blocked, USAF no longer pursued single purpose interceptor aircraft .

BTW, the F-111 interceptor, which is what McNamara wanted and killed the Blackbird line to try and force, would have only been able to carry two missiles, since external carriage would have reduced performance dramatically.

In that point of view, a F-111 interceptor would have be better choice
while F-12B dash at Mach 3 to enemies, fire it 3 missile (nuklear?) and return to base
Can F-111 fly with up to 8 missile and use it's Gatling cannon if needed, for a lower price

But USAF and NAVY not wanted F-111, in end that interceptor role got the F-14 and F-15

 

[Justo Miranda]

without McNamara?

Lockheed YF-12 in service