US 1960's procurement without McNamara?

[SSgtC]

Regarding F-4 vs. F-105 loss rates in the Vietnam War, "A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF USAF FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMBAT" includes those two, amongst others. One section, starting on page 63, directly compares the F-4 vs. F-105. Comparisions are used based on sortie rates, and losses to ground fire.

"Considering strike missions only, the F-105 loss rate in North Vietnam to ground fire was almost three times as high as the F-4. In Southern Laos, it was twice as high and in Northern Laos almost four times as high."

It's a document with a lot of detail, and I've only had a chance to skim it so far - but looks very interesting.

Thats where I saw those stats! I've read that book before so I knew the loss rates were significantly lower for the Phantom, but I just could not find the source. Thank you.

 

[starviking]

Thats where I saw those stats! I've read that book before so I knew the loss rates were significantly lower for the Phantom, but I just could not find the source. Thank you.

Happy to help.

 

[marauder2048]

Again, sticking up for the SLUF:

F-5 had 1,638 combat sorties in a more benign environment vs. 12, 298 for A-7D yet had 50% more total losses.

Which misses the point: the F-5 was there years earlier. The internal debates within OSD and the Air Force
are directly relevant to McNamara's influence thought SECAF Brown's role is equally important.

The A-7D ended up getting to the fight later and at a cost that was comparable or greater to a new build F-4.

A-1 wouldn't have been used by USAF if Navy hadn't already built it and was willing to share some of theirs (and the loss rate was terrible). A-37 was a modification of an existing aircraft.

How is this relevant? The A-7 was also a modification of an existing aircraft.
We were talking about the USAF's commitment to CAS. They committed several types to it and the losses reflect
that it wasn't some cynical lets-deflect-Cheyenne-ploy.

It should also be noted that A-7 wasn't actually designed as a pure CAS bird as much as strike with a secondary CAS capability (again thanks to USN). A-10 would have been a godsend in Vietnam

It was the interim A-X bird. It's never been argued by anyone that it was a pure CAS bird.

especially in the South as we didn't do much CAS in the North,

Duly noted above.

but the A-X just didn't seem to be that high a priority. It has been argued by many reputable sources, including the late, great, Jeff Ethell

A non-trivial number of the documents related to A-X weren't declassified until after Ethell killed himself.

Another discussion for another place since that had nothing to do with McNamara procurement.

It all happened under McNamara's watch so it's relevant.

 

[apparition13]

Again, sticking up for the SLUF:

F-5 had 1,638 combat sorties in a more benign environment vs. 12, 298 for A-7D yet had 50% more total losses.

The Navy lost 100, but I don't know what the loss rate was. The wiki article on US aircraft losses in Vietnam doesn't indicate how many sorties that involved.

A-1 wouldn't have been used by USAF if Navy hadn't already built it and was willing to share some of theirs (and the loss rate was terrible). A-37 was a modification of an existing aircraft. It should also be noted that A-7 wasn't actually designed as a pure CAS bird as much as strike with a secondary CAS capability (again thanks to USN). A-10 would have been a godsend in Vietnam, especially in the South as we didn't do much CAS in the North, but the A-X just didn't seem to be that high a priority. It has been argued by many reputable sources, including the late, great, Jeff Ethell that the main impetus for the A-X was to stop the AH-56 and when Army did that on their own, USAF wasn't sure what to do with the plane. Given their treatment of the aircraft (remember the "A-16"?) there's some credibility to that opinion .

Another discussion for another place since that had nothing to do with McNamara procurement.

I think of the A-7 as the jack of all trades and master of all attack aircraft. Second only to the A-10 as a CAS bird, and superior in some environments. Maybe the best interdictor of its time. Has the range and payload to do strike missions, if not the avionics of the A-6
or the F-111D and F. And the A-7F would have closed that gap as well.

A-7 source selection was 1965. Didn't show up in combat until 1970. That meets no definition of "rapid."
The A-7 needed a lot of work to turn it into something usable in the CAS role.

It's in line with 1950s aircraft, and faster than '60s and later aircraft.

 

[marauder2048]

A-7 source selection was 1965. Didn't show up in combat until 1970. That meets no definition of "rapid."
The A-7 needed a lot of work to turn it into something usable in the CAS role.

It's in line with 1950s aircraft, and faster than '60s and later aircraft.

F-111 contract award: Dec 1962. Combat debut; Mar 1968. That's for a radical clean sheet heavy fighter/attack aircraft
A-7D contract award: Oct 1966. Combat debut: May 1970. For a derivative of a light attack aircraft

 

[SSgtC]

A-7 source selection was 1965. Didn't show up in combat until 1970. That meets no definition of "rapid."
The A-7 needed a lot of work to turn it into something usable in the CAS role.

It's in line with 1950s aircraft, and faster than '60s and later aircraft.

F-111 contract award: Dec 1962. Combat debut; Mar 1968. That's for a radical clean sheet heavy fighter/attack aircraft
A-7D contract award: Oct 1966. Combat debut: May 1970. For a derivative of a light attack aircraft

That's more than just a little disingenuous. When the USAF first ordered the A-7, it was still only in the prototype stage with first flight of the type taking place less than 2 months earlier. And given the number of changes that the USAF required, the aircraft had to be almost totally redesigned internally. It was a new aircraft in an old skin.

 

[marauder2048]

A-7 source selection was 1965. Didn't show up in combat until 1970. That meets no definition of "rapid."
The A-7 needed a lot of work to turn it into something usable in the CAS role.

It's in line with 1950s aircraft, and faster than '60s and later aircraft.

F-111 contract award: Dec 1962. Combat debut; Mar 1968. That's for a radical clean sheet heavy fighter/attack aircraft
A-7D contract award: Oct 1966. Combat debut: May 1970. For a derivative of a light attack aircraft

That's more than just a little disingenuous. When the USAF first ordered the A-7, it was still only in the prototype stage with first flight of the type taking place less than 2 months earlier. And given the number of changes that the USAF required, the aircraft had to be almost totally redesigned internally. It was a new aircraft in an old skin.

As opposed to TFX...which was, vastly more capable, more complex and utterly non-existent?
The Navy had stood up its first A-7 squadron by the time the Air Force awarded the A-7D contract. The A-7 was
hardly a prototype by that point. Undeveloped, yes

 

[sferrin]

Yes, the plane would be expensive and maintenance intensive, although with a series production it would come down a bit. But then, dedicated interceptors were expensive and required special support, this was accepted for their very specific, unique mission. This may be one of the reasons why after the F-12B was blocked, USAF no longer pursued single purpose interceptor aircraft .

BTW, the F-111 interceptor, which is what McNamara wanted and killed the Blackbird line to try and force, would have only been able to carry two missiles, since external carriage would have reduced performance dramatically.

In that point of view, a F-111 interceptor would have be better choice
while F-12B dash at Mach 3 to enemies, fire it 3 missile (nuklear?) and return to base
Can F-111 fly with up to 8 missile and use it's Gatling cannon if needed, for a lower price

But USAF and NAVY not wanted F-111, in end that interceptor role got the F-14 and F-15

But if the F-111 can't get there before the other guy launches his missiles what good is it? The Blackbird could cover WAY more area than an F-111B. (Also, I seem to recall reading that the F-12B would have carried four AIM-47s with folding wings.)

 

[apparition13]

F-111 contract award: Dec 1962. Combat debut; Mar 1968. That's for a radical clean sheet heavy fighter/attack aircraft A-7D contract award: Oct 1966. Combat debut: May 1970. For a derivative of a light attack aircraft

And the F-111 was just as quickly withdrawn since 3 of 6 crashed in 55 missions. It eventually proved itself, but not until the 70s.

In that point of view, a F-111 interceptor would have be better choice
while F-12B dash at Mach 3 to enemies, fire it 3 missile (nuklear?) and return to base
Can F-111 fly with up to 8 missile and use it's Gatling cannon if needed, for a lower price

But USAF and NAVY not wanted F-111, in end that interceptor role got the F-14 and F-15

The only way the F-111 could carry 8 missiles is if two are on 4 of the 8 non-rotating wing pylons, which restricts speed to very subsonic. And the canon fits in the internal bay, so that would leave you with 4, which is the same number the production F-12 would have carried further and faster.

 

[marauder2048]

And the F-111 was just as quickly withdrawn since 3 of 6 crashed in 55 missions. It eventually proved itself, but not until the 70s.

Which is irrelevant since its doesn't alter the timeline. They threw the F-111 in because they *thought* it ready.
They didn't throw the A-7D in until later because they *knew* it wasn't ready.

 

[SSgtC]

So are we done shifting the goal posts yet or?

 

[marauder2048]

So are we done shifting the goal posts yet or?

Feel free to let us know when you think you've made a contribution to *attempting* a goal.

The dates are the dates. Sorry that doesn't comport with your wikipedia-deep knowledge of things.

 

[apparition13]

As opposed to TFX...which was, vastly more capable, more complex and utterly non-existent?

If you restrict the meaning of "vastly more capable" to longer ranged strike missions in the D (assuming its avionics work) or the F (phenomenal aircraft, should have bought several hundred more of them), sure. If you mean to include CAS and BAI, A-7 all day long. Especially the D and E.

Which is irrelevant since its doesn't alter the timeline. They threw the F-111 in because they *thought* it ready.
They didn't throw the A-7D in until later because they *knew* it wasn't ready.

Once the A-7 deployed, it stayed deployed. They didn't have to withdraw it to fix it.

And these dates are bugging me. So lets take a look: Vought A-7 Corsair II, Robert F. Dorr, Osprey Air Combat, 1985.

First flight, 27 Sept, 1965.

First A-7A delivery to the USN and USMC (which did not acquire them) for trials, 13 Sept. 1966.

First operational squadron, VA-86, then VA-147. No specific date listed, but VA-147 was doing carrier qualification on Ranger by July of 1967, which is 10 months after the first aircraft was accepted.

First combat mission, 4 Dec. 1967. From first flight to combat debut, 26 months. That's faster than WW2 development. Unless USN missions don't count.

 

[marauder2048]

As opposed to TFX...which was, vastly more capable, more complex and utterly non-existent?

If you restrict the meaning of "vastly more capable" to longer ranged strike missions in the D (assuming its avionics work) or the F (phenomenal aircraft, should have bought several hundred more of them), sure. If you mean to include CAS and BAI, A-7 all day long. Especially the D and E.

Supersonic penetrator vs. subsonic light attack. Yeah. The former is vastly more capable and complex.
And better loiter to boot. Naturally, they AF didn't throw the F-111 at the missions the "interim" A-X
was acquired to do.

Once the A-7 deployed, it stayed deployed. They didn't have to withdraw it to fix it.

The doesn't change the date of its first combat mission. Sorry this is an inconvenient fact for you.

USN missions don't count because they weren't flying the same aircraft.

Per SSgtC

given the number of changes that the USAF required, the aircraft had to be almost totally redesigned internally. It was a new aircraft in an old skin.

 

[apparition13]

As opposed to TFX...which was, vastly more capable, more complex and utterly non-existent?

If you restrict the meaning of "vastly more capable" to longer ranged strike missions in the D (assuming its avionics work) or the F (phenomenal aircraft, should have bought several hundred more of them), sure. If you mean to include CAS and BAI, A-7 all day long. Especially the D and E.

Supersonic penetrator vs. subsonic light attack. Yeah. The former is vastly more capable and complex.

Once the A-7 deployed, it stayed deployed. They didn't have to withdraw it to fix it.

The doesn't change the date of its first combat mission. Sorry this is an inconvenient fact for you.



USN missions don't count because they weren't flying the same aircraft.

You'd rather do CAS in an F-111 than an A-7? Or an A-10? Neither of which is as complex. Deep strike, sure, F-111F. Hunting mobile targets at night or bad weather? A-6. CAS? A-10 or A-7, depending on terrain and visibility. BAI? A-7, unless the weather is crap in which case A-6.

And seriously, Navy A-7s don't count because they weren't the same aircraft? You might as well say F-111s don't count until the F, when they got new engines and avionics that worked reliably, in which case you're looking at 1971 for the first F-111 flight. Or F-14s never existed, because USAF never flew them. Or MiG-21s never flew in combat, since the USAF only flew them in training.

A-7, first flight, 27 Sept, 1965, first combat mission, 4 Dec. 1967. The dates are the dates. Sorry that doesn't comport with your wikipedia-deep knowledge of things.

Since we're talking US aircraft, here's a US goal. With Adreas Cantor announcing, because who else?

 

[marauder2048]

You'd rather do CAS in an F-111 than an A-7? Or an A-10? Neither of which is as complex. Deep strike, sure, F-111F.

McNamara committed the AF to TFX (F-111) and a new CAS bird. The A-7D was the interim CAS bird.

And the A-7D was complex; it was every bit as expensive as the late model F-4s the AF was buying.
That's what ended up stunting the buy of the "interim" aircraft. The A-7D had by the standard of the day "cosmic" avionics.

And the CAS role in Vietnam was being handled by a combination of the A-1, the A-37 and the F-100.

Hunting mobile targets at night or bad weather? A-6.

McNamara's OSD had looked at the A-6 and rejected it for the AF on the dollars-per-payload-at-range argument.
It's the same analysis that resulted in OSD directing the AF to shed the F-105 on the premise that the AF
would buy the extended range tanks for the F-4. The latter never transpired.

CAS? A-10 or A-7, depending on terrain and visibility. BAI? A-7, unless the weather is crap in which case A-6.

You would use either interim CAS bird or A-X for CAS. You would use the F-111 for everything else.
Payload @ range, loiter whatever the F-111 was just so far ahead.

And seriously, Navy A-7s don't count because they weren't the same aircraft?

Either the A-7D was the practically new aircraft that SSgtC says in which case the Navy A-7s
were not relevant.

Or

The A-7D was just a straightforward derivative in which case the time from contract award to combat
debut cannot be characterized as rapid.

Contract Award date of 1966 and first combat mission was actually 1972. That's not rapid.

Getting the A-7D to a point where the AF thought it would be survivable and useful took time.

And it took great expense which stunted the total buy.

The alternative was an F-5 derivative. But OSD said no.

 

[kaiserd]

The F-12 appears to be one of those aircraft that benefits from never having to face the logistic nightmare it would have been to operate day-in-day-out as an interceptor; the inevitable high costs, high man-hour burden, low availability rates, limited ability to scramble etc. And this isn’t based on conjecture - we have the real world experience of operating A-12s and SR-71s to illustrate this.
In comparison almost anything (including an interceptor F-111 variant) would appear highly sensible. In any case what the US actually had/ got/ used instead proved good enough and the F-12 in particular represents a bullet dodged,

While I am not as much a fan/ advocate of the A-7 as some contributors above it was certainly incomparably superior to the F-5 in the air to ground role. I’m actually quite fond of the F-5 but even cursory consideration of its payload/ range performance demonstrates how absurd any claims to the contrary are.

 

[marauder2048]

While I am not as much a fan/ advocate of the A-7 as some contributors above it was certainly incomparably superior to the F-5 in the air to ground role. I’m actually quite fond of the F-5 but even cursory consideration of its payload/ range performance demonstrates how absurd any claims to the contrary are.

Ah..preternatural awareness of the specifications for the F-5 variant that would have been developed.
Please share the specs.

And of course, the central analytical premise was low-cost/high-payload. On that front, the A-7D failed miserably.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The F-12 appears to be one of those aircraft that benefits from never having to face the logistic nightmare it would have been to operate day-in-day-out as an interceptor; the inevitable high costs, high man-hour burden, low availability rates, limited ability to scramble etc. And this isn’t based on conjecture - we have the real world experience of operating A-12s and SR-71s to illustrate this.

Some of the issues you raise would have been blatantly obvious early on, and a solution must have been envisaged. I can only imagine that the F-12 must have had significant differences in equipment and operating concept from the other Blackbirds to make it a practical interceptor.

 

[zen]

On the F12...
The SR71 was a series of virtually hand built prototypes, not a large scale production run.
So not really comparable.
That said it's unlikely to be as easy to maintain, cheap or available as the F111

 

[Elan Vital]

Did the USAF have issues with the F-5 prior/unrelated to McNamara's nomination? And if it was likely to enter service en masse without him, how would it have evolved to better fit requirements?

 

[SSgtC]

Did the USAF have issues with the F-5 prior/unrelated to McNamara's nomination? And if it was likely to enter service en masse without him, how would it have evolved to better fit requirements?

IIRC, the F-5 was designed to be a simple, cheap export fighter for countries that lacked the ability to operate or maintain more advanced/complex fighters. The USAF bought a handful to use in Vietnam as essentially demonstration units to convince other countries to buy it (it wouldn't look good for the US to push the sale of aircraft they were unwilling to buy themselves). But IIRC, they never had any intention of buying large numbers for their own use. Though over 1,200 of the related T-38s were bought by the US.

 

[marauder2048]

IIRC, they never had any intention of buying large numbers for their own use. Though over 1,200 of the related T-38s were bought by the US.

Disingenuous since the AF was never going to buy large numbers of an interim CAS bird.

Did the USAF have issues with the F-5 prior/unrelated to McNamara's nomination? And if it was likely to enter service en masse without him, how would it have evolved to better fit requirements?

No issues with the F-5; it was the Air Force's initial selection for the interim aircraft. SECAF Zuckert made the official recommendation of the F-5
to McNamara and it was accepted...until a subsequent OSD study came to a different conclusion a few months later.

You could argue the initial USAF selection process was biased towards better A2A because early concept development of A-X was run out of the F-X office.

The role of LTV in getting the A-7 (re)selected over the F-5 is murky since it appears that most of OSD's analysis came from LTV.
At the same time, the parent OML, the F-8, was flying with distinction and the Navy was already buying the A-7.

 

[Cjc]

The F-12 appears to be one of those aircraft that benefits from never having to face the logistic nightmare it would have been to operate day-in-day-out as an interceptor; the inevitable high costs, high man-hour burden, low availability rates, limited ability to scramble etc. And this isn’t based on conjecture - we have the real world experience of operating A-12s and SR-71s to illustrate this.
In comparison almost anything (including an interceptor F-111 variant) would appear highly sensible. In any case what the US actually had/ got/ used instead proved good enough and the F-12 in particular represents a bullet dodged,

While I am not as much a fan/ advocate of the A-7 as some contributors above it was certainly incomparably superior to the F-5 in the air to ground role. I’m actually quite fond of the F-5 but even cursory consideration of its payload/ range performance demonstrates how absurd any claims to the contrary are.

Well like was already mentioned a lot of the matanince issues were going to be fixed on a proper production line (sense the a-12 and sr-71 were basically hand biult prototypes) but the big reson the airforce wanted the f-12 was because they felt they could get away with fewer of them, specifically 96 would be enough to take over the dutys of the 300 f-106 (wich would have been retired) now the us probably have bought more due to 300 f-106 being that absolutely bare minimum for the usaf and the orgonal requirements were for 1000 f-106, but that's were the usaf was seeing the money coming from. And aperintly congress agreed consdering they had already agreed to pay for it.

 

[kaiserd]

The F-12 appears to be one of those aircraft that benefits from never having to face the logistic nightmare it would have been to operate day-in-day-out as an interceptor; the inevitable high costs, high man-hour burden, low availability rates, limited ability to scramble etc. And this isn’t based on conjecture - we have the real world experience of operating A-12s and SR-71s to illustrate this.
In comparison almost anything (including an interceptor F-111 variant) would appear highly sensible. In any case what the US actually had/ got/ used instead proved good enough and the F-12 in particular represents a bullet dodged,

While I am not as much a fan/ advocate of the A-7 as some contributors above it was certainly incomparably superior to the F-5 in the air to ground role. I’m actually quite fond of the F-5 but even cursory consideration of its payload/ range performance demonstrates how absurd any claims to the contrary are.

Well like was already mentioned a lot of the matanince issues were going to be fixed on a proper production line (sense the a-12 and sr-71 were basically hand biult prototypes) but the big reson the airforce wanted the f-12 was because they felt they could get away with fewer of them, specifically 96 would be enough to take over the dutys of the 300 f-106 (wich would have been retired) now the us probably have bought more due to 300 f-106 being that absolutely bare minimum for the usaf and the orgonal requirements were for 1000 f-106, but that's were the usaf was seeing the money coming from. And aperintly congress agreed consdering they had already agreed to pay for it.

And yet objective reality (the US didn’t actually buy production F-12s, Congress didn’t actually pay for them) and common sense illuminates the likely folly of F-12s in service.

Non-specific hand-wavy “Production changes” won’t magically change the nature of the airframe, the engines etc.
It was inevitably going to have low availability rates, extremely high maintenance hour to flight hour ratios.
In that context claims that relatively low numbers of F-12s could replace larger numbers of more conventional aircraft with substantially higher availability rates comes across as bordering on the absurd.

The historic context is also very important.
The “bomber” threat to the continental US in this period was relatively weak (which the US had by this time realised) and was to essentially remain so until at least the late 70’s and the emergence of the Bear-H and its cruise missile armament (with the Blackjack to follow). Instead the Russian ICBMs were the clear primary (evolving) threat. There wasn’t a particular need for F-12s, particularly given the much higher priorities that needed to be funded at the same time as any theoretical F-12 buy.
The F-12 in service is a nice “top trumps” fantasy but a deeply unrealistic one.

 

[uk 75]

The nub of this thread is whether the methodology of McNamara would have happened under another Secretary of Defense.
Given that large corporations in the US had a great influence on how things were designed and built I auspect it would.
None of the examples quoted here such as Air Force control of Army aviation or the survival of programmes like the F12 or a CVAN66 seem to me to be likely to survive the way things were done in 1960s USA.
US Army officers would still have wanted Hueys and Cobras, Chinooks and Caribou under their control.
F12 had no Soviet B70 equivalent to justify its development.
The humungous cost and complexity of CVAN 65 would still have led the USN to go with CVA66.
F111 and the DX (later Spruance) programmes seem to me to be the ones where another SecDef might have made other choices.
FB111 in particular seems vulnerable on range and cost grounds.
Existing USN escort classes could have continued to be built instead of DX.

 

[BlackBat242]

CVA-66 was the choice of Congress, not Mac or whoever would be SecDef in his place... Congress was handed two different proposals by the USN/SecNav - one for CVAN-66 (using CVAN-65's 8-reactor design) and one for CVA-66, Congress chose the cheaper one, ordering her as CVA-66 in November 1960. Note that McNamara became SecDef in January 1961 - 2 months after CVA-66 was ordered.

Yes, I have seen two sites (https://www.ussamerica.org/history and Wiki) that claim (in virtually identical text) she had been ordered as CVAN-66, then cancelled and re-ordered as CVA-66 before construction began, but no USN source I can find supports this - instead I found a reference to the "choose one" scheme (which of course I can't find now).


CVA-67 was originally ordered in April 1964 as CVAN-67, the design had 4 A3W reactors. The decision to revert to oil-burning boilers was made AFTER she was laid down in October 1964... with the Forrestal/Kitty Hawk classes standard 8 Babcock & Wilcox boilers replacing the 4 A3W reactors. This was midway through McNam's time as SecDef (3 years ~10 months into his 7 year 1 month run).

 

[publiusr]

Blackbirds for everybody!

5000 Minutemans and the WS-120a heavy ICBM??

See Skynet? You should have sent the T-850 after him.

 

[Pioneer]

"It's the same analysis that resulted in OSD directing the AF to shed the F-105 on the premise that the AF
would buy the extended range tanks for the F-4. The latter never transpired."
(Post#56, Marauder2048)


What were these "extended range tanks for the F-4" you speak of Marauder2048? Do you know of their capacities?

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Scott Kenny]

The F-12 appears to be one of those aircraft that benefits from never having to face the logistic nightmare it would have been to operate day-in-day-out as an interceptor; the inevitable high costs, high man-hour burden, low availability rates, limited ability to scramble etc. And this isn’t based on conjecture - we have the real world experience of operating A-12s and SR-71s to illustrate this.
In comparison almost anything (including an interceptor F-111 variant) would appear highly sensible. In any case what the US actually had/ got/ used instead proved good enough and the F-12 in particular represents a bullet dodged,

The primary limit on a Blackbird's ability to scramble is the need to prebreathe oxygen due to the low pressure the suits operated at.

Sadly, it's not particularly healthy to breathe pure oxygen all day while you're on call for scramble duty. I believe I've read about using argon in the breathing mix instead of nitrogen, though that would be painfully expensive to set up for the pilots. Helium in the mix isn't a good option due to needing to talk on the radios.

So my expected fix for the time is a higher pressure suit or even a pressurized cockpit for the F-12s, plus an argon-oxygen breathing mix that the pilots stewed in while waiting to scramble. Pre-breathing inside an air conditioned trailer with air locks on the doors! Good news is that the Argon mix is physically heavier than the usual nitrogen mix, so you can open vents at the top of the airlock and flood the argon mix in from the bottom.

(I'd actually expect the planned F-12 buy to end up growing to nearly 350 birds, since ~100 Blackbirds could replace 300 F106 and the planned F106 buy was 1000. We know Congress approved the buy of 100 birds to start, and I suspect the the USAF would try to pry loose enough money to cover the full area intended for the F106s.)

 

[Yellow Palace]

So my expected fix for the time is a higher pressure suit or even a pressurized cockpit for the F-12s, plus an argon-oxygen breathing mix that the pilots stewed in while waiting to scramble.

The cabin actually was pressurised, though to a higher cabin altitude than on most aircraft - the pressure suits were needed for depressurisation and ejection. I'm guessing that the pure oxygen atmosphere was chosen for similar reasons as the space program, which shifted to a nitrogen/oxygen atmosphere at sea level pressure.

Operating at higher cabin pressures and near-natural atmosphere would eliminate the need to prebreathe, and the pressure suit would only be needed in an emergency .

 

[uk 75]

The B58 Hustler has its defenders and might have survived into the early 70s if F111 had not been bought.

 

[Michel Van]

The B58 Hustler has its defenders and might have survived into the early 70s if F111 had not been bought.

it could be that B-58 had survive in into 1980s
according some post about F-111 in this Forum
it seems the B-58 was extensiv in build, but was cheaper in operations, compare to B-52
and McNamara killed the B-58 in preference of his beloved F-111

Without McNamara the B-58 could remain in Operation on cost of B-52 feet, until B-1 is operational.
Maybe even order B-58C or D versions during 1960s
But that depend who become secretary of Defence under Kennedy or Nixon as President in 1960.

 

[Byeman]

The cabin actually was pressurised, though to a higher cabin altitude than on most aircraft - the pressure suits were needed for depressurisation and ejection. I'm guessing that the pure oxygen atmosphere was chosen for similar reasons as the space program, which shifted to a nitrogen/oxygen atmosphere at sea level pressure.

Operating at higher cabin pressures and near-natural atmosphere would eliminate the need to prebreathe, and the pressure suit would only be needed in an emergency .

The extra mass and the seal around the canopy would be unworkable.

 

[Byeman]

The B58 Hustler has its defenders and might have survived into the early 70s if F111 had not been bought.

Not really, too short of range, too vulnerable, too expensive and too many accidents.

 

[uk 75]

Not really, too short of range, too vulnerable, too expensive and too many accidents.

Its defenders claim not true on all counts.
B58s could hit many Soviet targets and were less reliant on tankers than B47s and FB111s.
B58s were better at low level than B47s and B52s and comparable with FB111s
Operational and maintenance costs compared favourably with B52s as only two bases used B58s.
Escape capsules ensured all three crew would survive unlike B47s and B52s.
Accident rates were lower than B47 or B52 squadrons.
Now as a Brit I am simply quoting one ex USAF B58 driver against other USAF. But it is worth examining

 

[1635yankee]

The primary limit on a Blackbird's ability to scramble is the need to prebreathe oxygen due to the low pressure the suits operated at.

Sadly, it's not particularly healthy to breathe pure oxygen all day while you're on call for scramble duty. I believe I've read about using argon in the breathing mix instead of nitrogen, though that would be painfully expensive to set up for the pilots. Helium in the mix isn't a good option due to needing to talk on the radios.

So my expected fix for the time is a higher pressure suit or even a pressurized cockpit for the F-12s, plus an argon-oxygen breathing mix that the pilots stewed in while waiting to scramble. Pre-breathing inside an air conditioned trailer with air locks on the doors! Good news is that the Argon mix is physically heavier than the usual nitrogen mix, so you can open vents at the top of the airlock and flood the argon mix in from the bottom.

(I'd actually expect the planned F-12 buy to end up growing to nearly 350 birds, since ~100 Blackbirds could replace 300 F106 and the planned F106 buy was 1000. We know Congress approved the buy of 100 birds to start, and I suspect the the USAF would try to pry loose enough money to cover the full area intended for the F106s.)

There would likely be little, if any, benefit to replacing argon (which, as inert gases go is quite cheap), as its solubility in bodily fluids is not far different from that of nitrogen. Only something with a markedly lower molecular mass would help -- nitrogen's (N2) is about 28, while argon's is 40. The only gases with lower molecular mass to nitrogen are hydrogen (H2 is about 2), neon (Ne is about 20). Historically neon is quite a bit more expensive than argon, which has, historically, been pretty cheap.

 

[Byeman]

Its defenders claim not true on all counts.
B58s could hit many Soviet targets and were less reliant on tankers than B47s and FB111s.
B58s were better at low level than B47s and B52s and comparable with FB111s
Operational and maintenance costs compared favourably with B52s as only two bases used B58s.
Escape capsules ensured all three crew would survive unlike B47s and B52s.
Accident rates were lower than B47 or B52 squadrons.
Now as a Brit I am simply quoting one ex USAF B58 driver against other USAF. But it is worth examining

all sourced from wiki

The B-58 was designed to fly at high altitudes and supersonic speeds to avoid Soviet interceptors, but with the Soviet introduction of high-altitude surface-to-air missiles, the B-58 was forced to adopt a low-level penetration role that severely limited its range and strategic value. It was never used to deliver conventional bombs. The B-58 was substantially more expensive to operate than other bombers, such as the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, and required more frequent aerial refueling. The B-58 also suffered from a high rate of accidental losses. These factors resulted in a relatively brief operational career of ten years.

Out of 116 B-58 Hustlers produced, 24 were lost in crashes. This represents a loss rate of approximately 21% of the total number produced.
Over its lifetime, 203 B-47 (about 10 percent of the total procured) were lost in crashes

A highly complex aircraft, it also required considerable maintenance, much of which required specialized equipment and ground personnel. For comparison, the average maintenance cost per flying hour for the B-47 was $361, for the B-52 it was $1,025, and for the B-58 it was $1,440.[44] The B-58 cost one-third more to operate than the B-52

The cost of maintaining and operating the two operational B-58 wings (39 aircraft per wing) equaled that of six wings of B-52s (only 15 aircraft per wing).

Wiki has B-47 combat radius longer than B-58

Escape pods are meaningless. just as dangerous to eject at mach 2 in a pod vs subsonic without one,

 

[RyanC]

Ok, let's go back in time to the lead up to Duncan Sandy's 1957 Defence Review and Robert McNamara's reign as Secretary of Defense.

Defense spending in 1955 was:

USA: 11.2% of GDP
UK: 9.3%...
France: 7.8%...
Canada: 7.7%...
Germany: 5.3%...
Italy: 4.7%...

In the UK conscription was becoming increasingly unpopular and would end soon with a phase-out in 1957 to 1960. This would cause the UK's personnel costs to increase, making it increasingly unaffordable to maintain the early 1950s UK military.

Meanwhile, the huge orders of military equipment during the Korean War were finally being completed -- the West was now being flooded with military equipment -- US Strategic Air Command now had 1,086 B-47s and 679 KC-97s by which it could wage nuclear warfare and the first B-52s were coming online. Elsewhere the US Army was nearly done with producing 12,000 M48 Pattons from 1952 to 1961 and 265 batteries of NIKE-AJAX SAMs from 1954 to 1958.

McNamara and Sandys both have received a large amount of hatred (most of it well deserved) over the years; but now that I've had time to think about it, a decent portion of their actions were counter-reactions to unreasonable military demands; and for that the Generals and Admirals never forgave them.

One of the best cases in the US was on 23 March 1962 when President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara visited Vandenberg AFB to watch an Atlas D launch. Afterwards, SAC chief Thomas Power chatted with both of them and referred to the Minuteman program:

"Mr. President after we get the ten thousand Minutemen..."

Kennedy interrupted with: "Bob [McNamara], we're not getting ten thousand Minutemen, are we?"

Later, after seeing a Bureau of Budget report that said 450 Minutemen could do the job, McNamara set the fleet at 1,000 missiles.

The late Stuart Slade over twenty years ago, pointed out that in the UK, of the Service Chiefs, only Mountbatten of the Royal Navy was astute enough to propose a realistic plan forwards for the RN (go for a small modern surface fleet of ASW ships backed up by amphibious ships for brushfire interventions and Polaris SSBNs for the strategic role). The other services (the RAF and British Army) didn't offer up anything equally realistic and they suffered the brunt of Sandy's defence cutbacks.

If no McNamara/Sandys to make brutal (painful) cuts, we'd be looking at a slightly hollow force for the 1970s for the US/UK (beyond the Vietnam era malaise in the USA).

We can see this played out somewhat closer to our time, as the Russians had a choice similar to McNamara and Sandys (somewhat) back in 2008, when Serdyukov proposed his reforms.

Serdyukov wanted to cut the number of ships in the Russian Navy from 240 to 123, while proceeding to purchase 100 warships (20 x submarines, 35 x corvettes and 15 frigates) by 2020.

If it had worked, it would have been nice. Instead, he was ousted and his reforms largely negated.

As a result of no Sandys/McNamara being able to make cuts, the Russian Armed Forces are a shibboleth of decrepit Soviet-era equipment kept around for show.

What use do the Slavas, Kirovs and Kuznetsov offer the Russian Navy, other than being decrepit mobile smoke screens? The only reason they're seriously considered "combatants" despite spending years in "overhaul" is because the Russians are desperate to believe that they're still the superpower of 1990 and having those ships lets them lie to themselves.

 

[Scott Kenny]

There would likely be little, if any, benefit to replacing argon (which, as inert gases go is quite cheap), as its solubility in bodily fluids is not far different from that of nitrogen. Only something with a markedly lower molecular mass would help -- nitrogen's (N2) is about 28, while argon's is 40. The only gases with lower molecular mass to nitrogen are hydrogen (H2 is about 2), neon (Ne is about 20). Historically neon is quite a bit more expensive than argon, which has, historically, been pretty cheap.

I mentioned that as I remember seeing something about replacing nitrogen in breathing mix with argon. That may have been for divers, as nitrogen under high pressures causes weird mental effects that aren't an issue in flight because the gas pressures stay low. The usual diver's mix for high pressure is helium-oxygen, which makes squeaky voices and would likely cause issues for pilot's communications.

In general, I'd want to pressurize either the suit or the cockpit to about 8-10psi (10kft equivalent pressure), and the cockpits are pure nitrogen like the X-15. Below that pressure and the bends turns into an issue.