Type 4X/ Type 83 Destroyer

apparition13 said:
Point of clarification: Age of Sail frigates were cruisers. As were corvettes and even sloops. Cruiser was a mission description, not a ship type.
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Fair enough, but the role of "largest ship not of the battle line" went from Frigates in age of sail to Cruisers today.
 
TBH, it doesn't matter what you call the ship.
he French frégate is translated into English differently for AAW and ASW ships, even when those ships are the same size. The Soviet Union built 'Large Anti-Submarine Ships'.

The question is, what job does it perform? The rest is just politics.
 
Yellow Palace said:
TBH, it doesn't matter what you call the ship.
he French frégate is translated into English differently for AAW and ASW ships, even when those ships are the same size. The Soviet Union built 'Large Anti-Submarine Ships'.

The question is, what job does it perform? The rest is just politics.
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And the JMSDF built 4 classes of "Helicopter carrying ASW Destroyers" - 2 with a small flight deck and a hangar for 3 helos, and two with full-length flight decks.
;)
 
Scott Kenny said:
Fair enough, but the role of "largest ship not of the battle line" went from Frigates in age of sail to Cruisers today.
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The traditional definition of a cruiser was “the largest ship that can be built in numbers.”

In the age of sail that was 3rd/4th rates whuch were around by the dozen vs the relatively few 1st/2nd rates.

Frigates were always relatively small ships (5th/6th rates) by comparison.

So I think there was always space between capital ships (1st/2nd rates) and frigates (5th+).

Post WW2 I think the DLGs built around the world were by definition cruisers as they were biggest things built in relatively large numbers but weren’t the smaller hulls that also abounded. Hence frigates would be more akin to the US/European DDG/FFs with corvettes being OPVs*, FACs and the smallest FF types.

The destroyer term wouldnt exist. Which is a great shame as its a good name. Which is why it has persisted and mucked my nice neat naming conventions right up ;-)

*I’d rebrand all OPVs as corvettes. A much nicer name and historically much more illiterate in terms of what they do plus the command level assigned.
 
At risk of following myself, I think the USN called it right by classing DLGs as frigates iniitally but only because at the time it expected continued construction of larger ships in numbers to be cruisers (3rd/4th rate) in which case the DLGs constituted that smaller 5th rate (carriers being 1st/2nd) and hence frigate was appropriate - especially given the original US frigates had been closer to 4th rates anyway vs other frigate types. Only when it becomes apparant the DLG is the ship to be built in numbers and anything bigger was essentially a capital ship, do they become cruisers, which arguably was about the time they re-rated them as such anyway and the original cruisers have nearly all gone.

It then confused things by calling its smaller DLGs destroyers (eg ABs*) and reusing frigates for smaller, single role ships that had previously just been residual destroyers and patrol vessels in a corvette style “escort” role.

The RN calling the Type 42s destroyers is where the UK went wrong perhaps, cementing a ASW frigate and AAW destroyer split that is entirely ahistoric. It later would only ever refer to the Invincibles as carriers having early on obsessed about calling them cruisers - the newer position being the reality that they were capital ships although 2nd rate vs a CV/CVN 1st rate.

Types 45 & 26 are in every respect, cruisers. Although perhaps the RN’s convention keeps the two other names going. Type 83 may disrupt this…

Personally with the advent of shipborne helicopters, I’d argue they (the helicopters) have taken on the original “destroyer” mantle (which was a merger of the offensive torpedo boat and its counter the TBD vessel) as a thing that explictly exists to counter/attack other ships(subs) by firing torpedos(missiles).

*the RN had wanted “70 cruisers” to provide for its global role with fleets and stations. The USN has 70 odd active and globally deployed with task forces and independently/surface groups…
 
The Australian Institute reported that delays to starting Hunter build have mainly centred around the additional top weight of the CEAFAR AESA various radar band antennas, though significantly superior to the old gen Artisan S-band radar of the Type 26. The Australian developed CEAFAR was specified as the RAN wanted a much better anti-air warfare capability for its prime ASW ship, the additional topweight led to the beam having to be increased by 0.6m over the Type 26 plus a major increase in cooling capacity and crew numbers etc., even small changes to the dimensions of a ship involve significant recalculation and work for the naval architects which can see replicated with the Constellation where the hull dimensions were changed and the originally claimed 85% commonality to the parent Italian FREMM frigate now said to be under 15%, in effect a new ship, leading to a three year program delay, hopefully the max delay though as detail design still less than 80% complete time for some possible nasty surprises.
 
Cordy said:
The Australian Institute reported that delays to starting Hunter build have mainly centred around the additional top weight of the CEAFAR AESA various radar band antennas, though significantly superior to the old gen Artisan S-band radar of the Type 26. The Australian developed CEAFAR was specified as the RAN wanted a much better anti-air warfare capability for its prime ASW ship, the additional topweight led to the beam having to be increased by 0.6m over the Type 26 plus a major increase in cooling capacity and crew numbers etc., even small changes to the dimensions of a ship involve significant recalculation and work for the naval architects which can see replicated with the Constellation where the hull dimensions were changed and the originally claimed 85% commonality to the parent Italian FREMM frigate now said to be under 15%, in effect a new ship, leading to a three year program delay, hopefully the max delay though as detail design still less than 80% complete time for some possible nasty surprises.
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My understanding is that CEAFAR, while highly effective, is a particularly massive system. The Canadian implementation, using SPY-7 has been able to maintain the same beam as the baseline Type 26.
 
bobthemonkey said:
My understanding is that CEAFAR, while highly effective, is a particularly massive system. The Canadian implementation, using SPY-7 has been able to maintain the same beam as the baseline Type 26.
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The Australian government took majority ownership of CEA last year, effectively nationalizing the company. Generally speaking, nationalization is not a positive indicator for any business or sector. I do have to question why a modern active phased array radar isn’t scalable to fit any platform? Why pick a specialist ASW frigate if a supposedly high end AAW radar fitment was a primary consideration? It’s really difficult to judge the merits or success of CEAFAR, in any of its iterations. By all accounts, this company was relatively forward thinking when founded in the 1980s, so I’m not sure why CEA wasn’t acquired by a multinational prime contractor over the decades?

I can only hope that the ongoing Hunter class fiasco informs the decision making of the Royal Navy for the Type 83. For all I can know, maybe BAE could apply some of the Hunter engineering to a Type 26 based solution for the RN? More likely than not, it proves that an alternative concept is fully warranted, wether it is novel and innovative at 4,000 tons or essentially an AAW “Global Cruiser” inspired by the FSC studies of over 20 years ago?
 
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My limited understanding is that Northrop Grumman wanted the CEA radar tech and later bought a majority stake in the company and then the Australian Government took them over.
 
Examining the possible future interceptors of the Type 83 destroyer.
The future Type 83 destroyer will likely be expected to provide air defence across the short-range/point defence (up to 50km), medium-range (50km-150km) and long-range/anti-ballistic brackets (>150km). Currently, the Type 45 destroyers function firmly in the first of those three brackets, and are beginning to step partially into the third. Their mix of Aster-15, with a disclosed range of 30+km and Aster-30, with a disclosed range of 120+km and a proven short range anti-ballistic capability allows for proficient medium area defence - for example, providing a defensive screen for a carrier strike group out to (assuming that disclosed range is lower than maximum effective range) likely 150+km, the upper limit of medium range. The addition of CAMM means that these ships will have a shorter ranged point defence weapon, and the removal of Aster-15 from the A50 silos and its replacement with upgraded Block 1 Aster-30s will significantly improve the ballistic missile defence capability of the ship, although it will not increase its maximum engagement range significantly. The hypothetical movement to Aster-30 Block 1NT, underway in France and Italy, gives the missile as disclosed range of 150+km, and a 25km maximum altitude, would make small steps into the long-range defence bracket, but these have not been announced for the Royal Navy as of yet.

Assuming that the Type 83 will seek to improve upon its predecessor's defensive ability, as is likely, it will possess both a larger and longer-ranged arsenal of interceptors, facilitated by a large increase in VLS cell count. Today, I'd like to examine the possible options for each of the range brackets mentioned above, looking at what might be likely to be procured.

But before the missiles themselves can be examined, the choice of VLS used is crucial. Here, I see three main options: the currently used Sylver A-series (A35, A43, A50 and A70, of which the A50 and A70 are the most likely), the American Mk41, and a indigenous strike length system. Under current circumstances, the development of a British deep penetration VLS seems expensive and impratical, and therefore the most unlikely of the three choices (although the UK does have a history of spending large amounts of money developing indigenous systems when perfectly viable off-the-shelf alternatives are available - see Ajax). This leaves us with the Sylver system and the Mk41. Both have advantages - the Sylver system is already integrated with the Aster-30 series of missiles, and is familiar to the Royal Navy, having been the principal system of the Type 45 destroyers. On the other hand, Sylver struggles when it comes to the variety of systems that can be employed. Currently, the only interceptors capable of being fired from the Sylver VLS are the Aster family, the MICA-VL and the Crotale. Only one cruise missile, the MdCN, can be launched. Of these systems, the Royal Navy only uses the Aster-30 Block 1. Whilst the Anglo-French FC/ASW will almost certainly be Sylver capable, as will any future Italian-French interceptors, the relative dearth of available and integrated systems is problematic. Alternatively, the American Mk41 integrates a very wide range of missiles, although relatively few are in current Royal Navy service. The Mk41 is capable of firing all type of the American Standard Missile series (SM-2, SM-6, SM-3), the short-medium range ESSM, the Tomahawk cruise missile, the VL-ASROC and many more, including the British designed CAMM. As the chosen system of the USN, it will likely see many future integrations with coming missiles, eg LRASM. A further benefit to the Mk41 is that, whilst not yet integrated, it is theoretically capable of fitting and launching the Aster-30 family, and will likely be integrated with the FC/ASW when it arrives, what with the use of the Mk41 onboard the coming Type 26 and Type 31 frigates for the Royal Navy. Standardization is a further argument in favour of the Mk41 being chosen. As the UK integrates more closely with America and Australia through the AUKUS pact, it would make sense to join those nations in also using Mk41. As of the time of writing, the use of Mk41 cells, likely strike length cells, seems the most probable for the Type 83.

In the short-range bracket, it seems that the Royal Navy has a clear contender for its interceptor of choice: CAMM. The Common Anti-air Modular Missile, designed by MBDA-UK, offers a highly manoeuvrable interception capability at ranges of up to 25km (and likely further). Already in use on the Type 23 frigates of the Royal Navy and the SkySabre GBAD of the British Army, as well as using parts from the Royal Air Force's ASRAAM, and planned for integration on the Type 45 destroyers and Type 26 and Type 31 frigates, CAMM seems by far the most likely choice for the short-range and point defence option. One disadvantage, however, is that CAMM, even for a short-range missiles, has a short range. MBDA has disclosed a range of 25km, compared to 50km+ for the ESSM, which, like CAMM, is quad-packed into a single Mk41 VLS cell. However, whilst the CAMM on its own is short range, its siblings are not. Specifically, the CAMM-ER, or extended range, offers 45km range, bringing it to parity with the ESSM, and can still be quad-packed. Both of these weapons compare favourably against the Aster-15, which, along with having no quad-packing capability, has a shorter range to boot, and is not Mk41 capable. For these reasons, I would posit that the most likely short-range interceptor missile for the Type 83 is CAMM, and maybe CAMM-ER. Assuming that Mk41 would be used, and not the 'mushroom farm' silos of the Type 45 and Type 26, eight Mk41 cells could house 32 CAMMs or CAMM-ERs, giving the Type 83 a strong self-defence and local area defence capability.

Moving to medium range, there are a few more options. These are: the American SM-2 Block IIIC, used across many naval forces, the Aster-30 Block 1NT, in use by France and Italy, and the CAMM-MR, a missile in development jointly by Poland and Britain. SM-2, whilst likely the longest range of these systems, seems the least likely to me. In an effort to ensure a degree of strategic autonomy, I think that the UK will likely prefer a non-American missile. That leaves Aster-30 or CAMM-MR. Aster-30 comes with a proven record, and a clear anti-ballistic capability, and familiarity, but has yet to be integrated with Mk41 VLS cells, although is theoretically capable. Furthermore, with Aster-30 also in use by both France and Italy, it is likely to see continuous upgrades and improvements for its service life. On the other hand, there is CAMM-MR. With a range of around 100km, this system is in development for both Polish GBAD and naval employments, on board their variants of the Type 31, in conjunction with the UK. It promises a cheap missile with capability between ESSM and Aster-30, with part commonality with other CAMM variants. It might also be financially pleasing to share a common CAMM 'pool' with the British Army and other nations, reducing maintenance costs. The final advantage of CAMM-MR is perhaps its most appealing - concept imagery of the missile suggests that it may be able to be dual-packed in the Mk41 VLS cell, significantly boosting the amount of interceptors that can be carried by a vessel. However, it is my belief that the Aster-30, being both proven and anti-ballistic capable, is more likely to fill that medium range slot. CAMM-MR, being a less capable but more space-efficient missile, is more suited to the more constrained capacity of frigates like the Type 31, giving the model effective air defence when combined with CAMM and CAMM-ER. Aster-30, with its anti-ballistic properties, would seem to be the better fit for a larger destroyer with more space to dedicate to its missiles.

The final bracket is long-range and terminal ballistic missile defence, a category that really only has two systems that fulfil that bracket. These are both American, being the very long-range and purely anti-ballistic SM-3, enabling interceptions at ranges of 1200km and exoatmospheric altitude, and the long-range SM-6, with a disclosed range of 240km and an altitude of 34km, as well as terminal ballistic missile interception capability. Both missiles are extremely expensive, and are only capable of Mk41 launch. Of the two, SM-6 seems far and away more likely, purely on the basis that SM-3 is beyond what the Type 83 will likely need. In addition to this, SM-6 can also strike naval and land targets at long range. Coming back to the AUKUS angle mentioned above, it is also used by Australia, as well as Japan and South Korea. There are European systems aiming to produce missiles of a similar class. The HYDIS2 programme and the TWISTER initiative are two examples, and may become operational by the arrival of the Type 83 in the 2030s. Right now however, the SM-6 is the most obvious choice for long range air defence.

Obviously this is pretty surface level amateur analysis, but I'd love to know your opinions? Or if this is the wrong place to post this, recommendations of who else might want to see
 
As understand only Aster and the SM-6 have the necessary high Mach No. to intercept ballistic missiles and defeat hypersonic missiles in their terminal phase of flight as shown in the Red Sea countering the Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles, CAMM and SM-2 just too slow. USN will be trialing Patriot later this year fired from a Mk.41 VLS cell, did see one claim Patriot a Mach 8 missile.

MDA funding the hypersonic Glide Phase Interceptor with Japan for longer ranges, plan to choose either the Northrop Grumman or RTX design before year end with aim to reach operational capability in 2032/5, will need a satellite constellation to be able to track these high speed hypersonic missiles maneuvering targets flying at lower altitudes below the radar horizon at long range.
 
Cordy said:
As understand only Aster and the SM-6 have the necessary high Mach No. to intercept ballistic missiles and defeat hypersonic missiles in their terminal phase of flight as shown in the Red Sea countering the Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles, CAMM and SM-2 just too slow. USN will be trialing Patriot later this year fired from a Mk.41 VLS cell, did see one claim Patriot a Mach 8 missile.

MDA funding the hypersonic Glide Phase Interceptor with Japan for longer ranges, plan to choose either the Northrop Grumman or RTX design before year end with aim to reach operational capability in 2032/5, will need a satellite constellation to be able to track these high speed hypersonic missiles maneuvering targets flying at lower altitudes below the radar horizon at long range.
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Why does an intercepting missile need to be as fast as the one it's intercepting?
 
Ron5 said:
Why does an intercepting missile need to be as fast as the one it's intercepting?
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I don’t think Cordy said it had to match the speed of the interceptor target - but it does have to be fast.

Why? A few thoughts come to mind:

*To reach its target before terminal manouvers commence.

*If it is manouvering, the faster missile should have better delta-V to update its intercept flight path.

*To allow a good chance of a second shot if the first fails.

I’d also think that the built-up sensor picture could be outdated if a slower interceptor was used.
 
Reuben James said:
Examining the possible future interceptors of the Type 83 destroyer.
-snip-
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Personally, I see this going two ways - and it really depends on what aspect of air warfare and ballistic missile defense the RN sees itself getting involved in.

PAAMS:

Should the RN stick with the Aster family, then the obvious solution is to adopt the successor to the PAAMS WCS developed by the French and Italians - PAAMS-NG. This is being installed on the Horizon/Orizzonte-class destroyers and will also be used (likely in an evolved version) by the Italian DDX. This is designed to work with the Aster 30 B1NT interceptor as well as older versions of Aster 30 & 15, and the more capable Aquila down the line for endo-atmospheric work against ballistic missiles (presumably covering the full MRBM spectrum - I don't know if capability against IRBMs is intended) and hypersonic threats.

As far as air warfare system goes, this lends itself to easy integration with the CAMM family. CAMM largely re-used the software from PAAMS to begin with, and part of the development of PAAMS-NG has been to make it easier to integrate different missile types. It's land-based counterpart, SAMP/T NG, for example, is a system that is capable of managing a variety of short-ranged systems all at once (MICA NG, CAMM-ER, Mistral, VHSHORAD, and gun systems). For the Royal Navy, which at present appears to be leaving Aster 15 behind in favor of CAMM, both CAMM and CAMM-ER could make viable point defense and short-range interceptors, while leaving medium-range work and anti-ballistic work to Aster 30 B1NT and Aquila. CAMM-MR would be fairly redundant, however.

A difficulty in this context is launch systems. The RN is heavily in favor of strike-length Mk.41, as it is a universal VLS with many strike options. It also comes with benefits for CAMM integration given work done by Lockheed Martin on ExLS for foreign customers, and will be used on both its upcoming frigate classes. Sylver, on the other hand, is a far more limited VLS. Sylver A50 at present only fires Aster 15 (and eventually Aster 15 EC) and Aster 30 Block 0/1/1NT. Sylver A70, despite the advertising, only fired MdCN and does not have the ability to fire Aster SAMs. There has been some talk of an evolved (or outright new) A70 VLS that is actually universal like strike-length Mk.41, for launching Aquila, MdCN, and FC/ASW, but this has yet to manifest.

At present, the only confirmed payloads for the RN's Mk.41 cells are the Future Cruise Missile and Future Anti-Ship Missile from the FC/ASW program, though there is also interest in an anti-submarine weapon. It is not clear how much of a strike or ASW role the RN will want for Type 83 at present.

Opting to continue working with PAAMS and the Aster family would allow the RN to continue the relationships it already has with European defense companies within the air warfare realm. It is also suitable for the scale of sensor assets the RN has available to it (now and in the near future) and potential threats within the Euro-Atlantic area - essentially focusing on terminal and endo-atmospheric interceptions, for local defense against ballistic and hypersonic threats. At this point there are no European programs for a ship-launched glide-phase interceptor against HGVs, or exo-atmospheric interceptors for true area defense against ballistic missiles.

Aegis:

The other option is to abandon PAAMS and Aster entirely in favor of Aegis. Aegis benefits from constant investment by the USN, and from being a system meant to handle all aspects of naval warfare - though it can be scaled down to specific tasks. The RN could adopt Aegis as a whole CMS, or just the fire control loop and threat library, keeping it as an AAW WCS within their own national CMS. Aegis gives the RN access to the entire Standard Missile family, though they do not have to make use of it. For engagements against conventional air-breathing threats, it is entirely possible for the RN to rely only on CAMM, CAMM-ER, and CAMM-MR, in place of ESSM and SM-2MR. The only downside would be losing some engagement range versus SM-2MR, but truth be told this would mostly be impactful against low-performance threats like subsonic aircraft and drones, rather than missile threats.

For long-range work or more complex work, the RN could make use of SM-6, which is both an extended-range interceptor, and a terminal interceptor against SRBMs, MRBMs, and hypersonic threats. The RN would also be able to make use of true area defense against such threats, via procuring the SM-3 exo-atmospheric interceptor (for use against MRBMs, IRBMs, and even ICBMs) and, down the line, the under-development Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI).

All of these missiles could easily be accommodated in a single VLS type - the strike-length Mk.41 that is already in Type 26 and is planned for Type 31.

From a pure capability standpoint, other than potential caveats about the performance of SM-6 against ballistic missiles and hypersonics relative to Aster 30 B1NT and Aquila - Aegis and Mk.41 represent the superior choice. With that said... this is also a more expensive option that requires more capable sensor capabilities to take advantage of. SM-6, for example, is an extended-range missile that functions best when working as part of a full sensor network in the style of what the USN has with NIFC-CA and their AWACS - which the RN lacks. SM-3 and GPI are and will be very expensive interceptors, to boot. The RN will have a limited capability to take advantage of them independently without major investments in enabling systems (when operating alongside the USN is a different story).

As such, the merits of such a path would in large part come down to how much money the RN is able to argue for its needs - which seems like a difficult proposition in the current budget environment. There is also the somewhat thorny issue of British industrial content, depending on how much of Aegis is adopted and what sensors the RN might decide to pair Aegis with. What exactly the RN has in mind for next-generation sensors is less than clear at present, and opting for domestic solutions could complicate the uplink/downlink with Standard Missile (which has been an issue for APAR-using navies). Adopting SPY-6 or SPY-7 would be the simplest solution, but seems very dubious given the UK's strong radar industry.

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So there are arguments for going down either path. The RN is uniquely placed to make the call in either direction, just given its own SAM family - CAMM - can fit in either system, and though it is a PAAMS/Aster user, it does not actually have much industrial stake in it - it's mostly a Franco-Italian system. So the costs of leaving it aren't that severe, even relative to another system that it has no industrial stake in.
 
Lets just clarify.
CAMM-MR is intended as a cheaper supplement to Patriot and so in the naval context is more an alternative to the older Aster-30 or similar versions of Standard.

The essential core of CAMM family is the 'soft(cold) launch, thrust orientation prior to main motor ignition, datalink and PAAMS/FLAADS system.
As such the system is fully Digital and sensor agnostic. As long as the 'sensor' delivers target data in Digital format, the system will do the rest.

Arguably this suite of technologies is as applicable to a hypersonic cruise missile intercept or anti-ballistic missile intercept ,if the appropriate missile package is developed and the right sensor suite provides the data.

The real questions over any new AAW vessel or as it's now termed FADS is over the quantity/quality conundrum. This is where the effort has most risk.
 
starviking said:
I don’t think Cordy said it had to match the speed of the interceptor target - but it does have to be fast.

Why? A few thoughts come to mind:

*To reach its target before terminal manouvers commence.

*If it is manouvering, the faster missile should have better delta-V to update its intercept flight path.

*To allow a good chance of a second shot if the first fails.

I’d also think that the built-up sensor picture could be outdated if a slower interceptor was used.
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These are generic points (which are good, except for #2 which I don't understand) but why do they particularly apply to hypersonic and ballistic missile targets?
 
My understanding the physics say the short range AAM range limited against high Mach ballistic and hypersonic missiles decreases the faster the incoming missile target is due to very limited time, minutes to seconds, to intercept the attacking missile, why the high Mach No. of the AAM required

Wikipedia says the 40 km range Sprint 7,700 lbs missile was designed to counter the high Mach ICBM RV achieved by hitting Mach 10 and 100g , it cleared its silo at 0.6 seconds, first stage fired and the missile was tilted toward its target, first stage lasted only 1.2 seconds though with 650,000 pounds-force of thrust and. the second stage fired within 1 to 2 seconds of launch, interception was at an altitude of 1 to 19 miles took at most 15 seconds. The equivalent Russian A-235 anti-ballistic missile is said to be capable if intercepting ICBM RV travelling at Mach 17, also fired at 100g and reaches Mach 10 in 5 seconds.

Anti-ballistic missiles capability of defending usually defined by the speed by type of incoming ballistic missile i.e, TBM, MRBM and ICBM
 
On intercept of ICBM RV, it comes down to the sheer rate of closure.
Distance being covered at such speed, what is hard to resolve accurately at great distance imposes demands on the interceptor due to the limitations of sensor fidelity.

In short, as it closes the ability to be precise about it's course, and plot interception improves. But the slower the interceptor the closer the interceptor's impact with the RV to it's intended target and in turn the greater the exposure of risk, not just in failure but even in success.

So to keep the actual impact between interceptor and RV as far away as possible, the faster the interceptor must go.

Obviously if the sensors can provide that high fidelity data on the target when it's further away, the better chance of a slower interceptor hitting it further away.

This is why lateral maneuvering was so important in various ABM studies. As the quality of target data and thus predicted flightpath improves, so the interceptor must relocate, from where the target was expected to be based on lower quality but earlier data, to get into the trajectory of the target.

Also the longer you track the target, the greater the exclusion of errors.

Now the GPI effort includes space based sensors to give much earlier data and thanks to sensors improvements, better quality data.
 

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