Replacing Polaris

[Archibald]

Problem: Mason review was 1974 and at the time french SLBMs were M1 (1971, Redoutable) and M2 / M20. M4 came by the early 80's afaik.

Two different Masons: Roy Mason was Minister of Defence in 1974, and published a defence review.

Sir Ronald Mason was the Chief Scientific Officer at the Ministry of Defence in 1979, and co-chaired a report into the future of the British nuclear deterrent.

O RLY ? Seems that I got my Mason wrong.

As we say in French "c'est au pied du mur, qu'on voit le maçon !"

https://forum.wordreference.com/threads/cest-au-pied-du-mur-quon-voit-le-maçon.3915172/
(I'll get my coat)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I've amended my SSN spreadsheet to include the Resolution class as well as the Vanguard class.
I'm assuming that the fifth Polaris would have been ordered in 1965.
The years for the Vanguard class are the years they were laid down not the years they were ordered.

​

 

[uk 75]

The condition of Britain in 1978 to 1982 was so dire that the decision by a Labour and then a Conservative government to build a new generation of SSBN and purchase a new missile from the US was as Sir Humphrey might have put it "courageous".
The independence of a national deterrent that was so dependent on the United States was not just questioned by politicians, military men thought money would be better spent on British forces in West Germany or on Royal Navy ASW.
What difference to NATO's nuclear force did a British force whether with Polaris, Trident or Cruise really make?
Washington blew hot and cold on the subject. Kissinger warned the British not to ask for Poseidon in the early 70s as he doubted Congress would approve.
By 1978 things were different, detente was not working and even the Carter administration had its doubts before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan really killed it off.
The US Navy were pro the idea of a British Trident submarine as it increased the uncertainty in Moscow about when and if NATO would use nuclear strategic weapons.
1979 to 1983 was a critical period in the history of the UK deterrent. As I argued in my opening paragraph politics rather than military rationale could have led to different options.
Four Trident submarines was probably more than the RN budget could stand. Nott's pruning of its surface fleet was only delayed by the Falklands and has continued to this day.
Noone has mentioned the Moscow criteria. This was at the core of the need to buy Trident. Cruise missiles could not be relied upon to get through and Polaris even with the Chevaline upgrade was vulnerable to the Soviet Galosh ABM (it wasn't actually but we had to wait until 1991 to find out).
Arguably the Moscow (or Beijing ) criteria still holds true and the Dreadnought boats will be built come hell or high water.

 

[alertken]

There are 2 constraints in building more SSBNs and one equally constrains more SSNs:
* shipyard capacity/competence. Hennessy/Jinks P.305 weaves to comply with Defamation Law but: by Revenge's acceptance, 12/69 Cammell's "and its workforce had, in the eyes of MoD, worked themselves out of (SSN/SSBN) business", so in '69 making Barrow monopoly (may we presume they thought that similar issues would have arisen on the Clyde?)
* (SSBN only) capacity/competence of AWRE/ROF to produce more warheads. Resolution's maiden patrol 15/6/68 had a half loadout.

We must also ask: why would we wish to bother with more SSBNs? How many Big Bangs deter? uk75's point #43 that Hitler could not be deterred: the theory of Deterrence rests on a rational actor, and that has worked...to now: Putin has not interdicted our supplies to Ukraine while they are still on NATO territory. If High Authority that we seek to deter is...irrational, no SSBN Force is enough. If rational, there is much to agree on with CDG's logic: I have (40Mn) French citizens: that is the number I will gird to kill in Bad Guy's country. We chose to call that the Moscow criterion. PRC for 2 decades kitted itself to delete any 2 Centres of High Authority. That is nearly sane and not MAD.

 

[Archibald]

If rational, there is much to agree on with CDG's logic: I have (40Mn) French citizens: that is the number I will gird to kill in Bad Guy's country.

« Dans dix ans, nous aurons de quoi tuer 80 millions de Russes. Eh bien je crois qu'on n'attaque pas volontiers des gens qui ont de quoi tuer 80 millions de Russes, même si on a soi-même de quoi tuer 800 millions de Français, à supposer qu'il y eût 800 millions de Français10. »

"Within ten years, we will be able to kill 80 million russians. Well, I think one doesn't attack a country able to kill 80 million russians; even if one can kill 800 millions french - provided there was 800 millions french in the first place."

The real deal was, whoever fired the first nuke, even low-yield tactical, triggered the end of the world.

 

[zen]

Hennessy/Jinks P.305 weaves to comply with Defamation Law but: by Revenge's acceptance, 12/69 Cammell's "and its workforce had, in the eyes of MoD, worked themselves out of (SSN/SSBN) business", so in '69 making Barrow monopoly (may we presume they thought that similar issues would have arisen on the Clyde?)

A good point and we can suspect the concerns over a Scottish Independence movement were, along with the issue of Unions/Labour a factor in choosing Barrow.

We must also ask: why would we wish to bother with more SSBNs?

Why should we not ask?
Why should we accept a bare minimum that at the time and under the threat of ABM efforts raised the requirements?

How many Big Bangs deter?

Good question, the answer is the mixture of their capacity to be used and their capacity wreak destruction.

uk75's point #43 that Hitler could not be deterred

Hitler needed a war to keep him in power and avoid the financial collapse Nazi basket case economic policy was producing. Only massive theft and the masking of total war could sustain the illusion.

 

[Hood]

I would recommend Peter Nailor's The Nassau Connection: The Organisation and Management of the British Polaris Project as a good read on the nitty gritty of the Polaris programme.

It seems that Cammell Laird had recruitment problems, for example in 1966 its quality control department was only 60% staffed, at that point they had around 90 people while Vickers, Barrow was approaching 2,400.

Laird seemed to be a slower builder, especially in the fitting out stages.
Work Months:
Resolution (Vickers) - 32 to launch, 13 to completion = 45
Renown (Laird) - 33 to launch, 22 to completion = 55 (some work normally done post-launch was actually shifted to the pre-launch phase to keep to schedule, an accidental flooding during fitting out didn't help either)
Repulse (Vickers) - 33 to launch, 10 to completion = 43
Revenge (Laird) - 35 to launch, 21 to completion = 56

And this is despite Laird losing 54,000 working days to industrial action 1963-68 compared to Barrow's 226,300!

The steel supply situation cannot be ignored when building additional subs in AU land. All four Resolutions had US-sourced HY80 which cost £1.15M extra.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The steel supply situation cannot be ignored when building additional subs in AU land. All four Resolutions had US-sourced HY80 which cost £1.15M extra.

I suspect that finding the HY80 steel for the 5th Resolution, 6 extra SSN and 4 extra Vanguard class would not be a problem as they were built after SSN & SSBN production for the US Navy was past it's peak.

​

 

[Hood]

Friedman's British Submarines In The Cold War Era provides some numbers for plans.

The 1962 LTC calculated a fleet of 20 SSN to ensure 8 at constant readiness in the Far East or alternatively 12 if 5 in the Far East could be reinforced by UK-based SSNs within a month. The target became 24 SSN to be built in 22 years.

The SSBN programme saw the fourth SSN deferred until after the first SSBN - the Admiralty assumed ordering 1 sub every 9 months until 1971 to make up the delay to cover SSN 05-12. The Treasury had wanted 1 per year...
It was thought that Cammell Laird becoming a second source would allow SSN orders every 6 months.

5 SSBNs would have allowed a continuous 1-submarine deployment to the Indian Ocean/Pacific to counter China using support facilities in theatre (Guam). With 4 subs there would be insufficient time on station to use Guam so additional facilities would have to be built. The on-station numbers have already been discussed above so I won't repeat those.

As to missiles, the USN had already advised the RN that Polaris A-3 would be replaced by the B-3 (which became Poseidon C-3). The government decided not to buy, and in 1967 the Labour Government said they would not buy it publicly. Within 6-8 years the UK dusted off the cancelled US-developed Antelope/ STAG decoy as Super Antelope then Super STAG which became Chevaline. The RN also looked again at Poseidon or a fifth SSBN. This was rejected in favour of the cheaper Chevaline option - which of course ballooned into anything but cheap.
Friedman also found evidence that the second Wilson government looked at a study converting the Resolutions to SSNs and ditching Polaris - what, if anything, was to replace the deterrent is unknown it seems.

The gap between Spartan and Splendid was due to the 1974-75 Review and capacity problems at Barrow.
By 1980 the order/completion interval was 15 months with an expected service life of 25 years. That would be sufficient for 16 SSNs and 4 SSBN. At this time improvements at Barrow saw Vickers offering 10/11-month intervals (at the expense of their surface ship construction) so 1 per year completing could raise the force to 21 SSN and 4 SSBN. The 1977 Fleet Requirements Committee wanted 24 SSN and 9 SSK. Of the SSN 5 would be north of GIUK Gap, 3 in the North Atlantic, 4 with the SSBNs and 7 with the RN surface task forces. 5 SSKs would be in the GIUK gap barrier and the other 4 supporting the SSBNs or doing shallow coastal work.
By 1983 direct support had been dropped but the desired numbers were now 27 active SSN and 13 active SSK with 7 SSN and 4 SSK in refit (total 34 SSN, 17 SSK). More SSNs were to be north of the GIUK gap (15) and 5 in it.
The 1985-90 Declared NATO Requirement was 20 SSN and 17 SSK. By 1985 the RN had 13 SSNs and estimated by 1991 it would have 18 but that would be the peak unless further construction was ordered. New SSKs would be needed too.

Torbay was ordered 11 months late due to financial issues (Nott - see below). As per the 1980 LTC:
SSN 15 (Tireless) - planned order April 1979, actual order July 1979
SSN 16 (Torbay) - planned order July 1980, actual June 1981
SSN 17 (Trenchant) - planned August 1981, actual March 1983
SSN 18 (Talent) - planned August 1982, actual September 1984
SSN 19 (Triumph) - planned August 1983, actual January 1986

At this time reopening Cammell Laird was not considered feasible given the level of investment required and lack of orders to keep it viable. Instead extending Valiant and Churchill and Swiftsure classes to 26 years and the Trafalgars to 30+ years was seen as more cost effective to cover the SSN build gap while the Vanguards were built.
SSN 20 was earmarked as the first of the SSN0Z design. SSN0Z was cancelled in autumn 1980 in favour of the SSBN class and it was clear that the SSN0Z design would not survive Nott anyway.
The 1981 LTC pushed the order for SSN 20 back to 1994. The Navy wanted a 1 per year order but this left Vickers with an 18-month gap. Decline in SSN numbers seemed inevitable during the mid-1990s (1 retirement per 18 months), falling from 19 in 1991 to 15 by 1999. The maximum building rate at Barrow was still 12-15 months. The Follow-On SSN (FOSSN) ideally had to be ordered in 1992. 5 FOSSN would serve until 2030. FOSSN was never ordered.
Work on the W Design studies began around 1985 and ended around 1989-90 but again nothing materialised (end of the Cold War). Batch 2 Trafalgar design work began in 1992. GEC got the contract as we know in 1996 before the shenanigans began and SSN 20 entered service as Astute in 2010 - some 25 years later than originally planned!!!!

When Trident came up the options were; an 80-cruise missile sub, Trident C-4, Trident D-5, or a modernised Polaris with new engines and Trident technology (A-4). In 1979 Repulse was thought to need replacing in 1991 due to a reactor vessel problem but the others could be refitted to serve well into the 1990s. The UK opted for C-4 in 1979 but in 1981 D-5 was on the scene which could not fit on a Polaris sub so that meant building a new class. In 1982 the UK opted for D-5 with some reduced R&D costs due to Reagan offering a deal but the rub was increased naval deployments outside of NATO in the Indian Ocean as a concession to the US for the deal. Friedman implies that the Nott cuts in 1981 were partly to pay for Trident. As part of this the US wanted the Friedman implies that the Nott cuts in 1981 were partly to pay for Trident. The US wanted the RN to retain Invincible instead of selling her to Australia (which Nott ignored) and to retain Intrepid and Fearless (which he did). The new SSBN fleet had a proviso that it might be a 3-sub fleet. Hopes to fit a (truncated) Ohio-class missile section were dashed as already a lot of the equipment was out of production. To ease the costs the initial deployment date was pushed back from December 1992 to December 1994. There was discussion of a fleet of 3x subs with 12x missiles each but no discussion of more than 4 submarines. Certainly the Trident SSBN programme pushed the SSN programme back too (see above).

 

[sopra4343]

The condition of Britain in 1978 to 1982 was so dire that the decision by a Labour and then a Conservative government to build a new generation of SSBN and purchase a new missile from the US was as Sir Humphrey might have put it "courageous".
The independence of a national deterrent that was so dependent on the United States was not just questioned by politicians, military men thought money would be better spent on British forces in West Germany or on Royal Navy ASW.
What difference to NATO's nuclear force did a British force whether with Polaris, Trident or Cruise really make?
Washington blew hot and cold on the subject. Kissinger warned the British not to ask for Poseidon in the early 70s as he doubted Congress would approve.
By 1978 things were different, detente was not working and even the Carter administration had its doubts before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan really killed it off.
The US Navy were pro the idea of a British Trident submarine as it increased the uncertainty in Moscow about when and if NATO would use nuclear strategic weapons.
1979 to 1983 was a critical period in the history of the UK deterrent. As I argued in my opening paragraph politics rather than military rationale could have led to different options.
Four Trident submarines was probably more than the RN budget could stand. Nott's pruning of its surface fleet was only delayed by the Falklands and has continued to this day.
Noone has mentioned the Moscow criteria. This was at the core of the need to buy Trident. Cruise missiles could not be relied upon to get through and Polaris even with the Chevaline upgrade local bookkeeping services san francisco was vulnerable to the Soviet Galosh ABM (it wasn't actually but we had to wait until 1991 to find out).
Arguably the Moscow (or Beijing ) criteria still holds true and the Dreadnought boats will be built come hell or high water.

Yes ,That assumption has largely held true so far. For example, Putin has not interdicted Western supplies to Ukraine while they remain on NATO territory. If the High Authority we seek to deter is irrational, then no SSBN force—however large—will ever be sufficient.

 

[zen]

Had A4 Polaris been chosen, how much of this would be UK made?

Is this the back door to domestic?

 

[Yellow Palace]

Had A4 Polaris been chosen, how much of this would be UK made?

Is this tje back door to domestic?

It was assumed to be a US developed missile with a UK developed 4-warhead MRV (not independent!) front end based on Chevaline, but no initial conceptual design had been carried out.

Frankly I'm not sure it was anything more than a stalking horse.

 

[Rule of cool]

I think an optimum path for the British would have been to choose Polaris over Skybolt in 1960, using A2 missiles with the RE.179 Skybolt/WE.177B warhead. When the A2 needs replacing in 1971 the British choose the Poseidon with either the ET.317 or Chevalie warhead. Given the Poseidon's double throw weight over the Polaris A3 a British Poseidon could carry 4 Chevaline warheads and still patrol outside the GIUK Gap. It might even tickle a few hundred extra km range from the missile given the limitations of UK nuclear warhead production capacity and likely inability or unwillingness to fully load up the MIRV bus.

The rest writes itself.