RAeS webinar: The Supply of Future Combat Aircraft. 29 July 2020

Always happy to engage in debate but this has raced away the last few days and other stuff has taken my attention.

Over this weekend I will try to post some summarised thoughts on some of the above.
 
F-4 production line was very cold at the time of the German and Japanese upgrades, both countries got rid of their F-104s by then. F-15s served alongside F-4s for decades in Israel, Japan and South Korea.
JASDF budget: you yourself quoted a near 1% of GDP defence budget for Japan. Given the size of the Japanese economy, you are stretching the meaning of poor.

So two countries with highly competent aviation industries, both of which built all or portions of the F-4 under licenses
(which included technical data) were able to perform typical avionics upgrades done on just about every other fighter.

Wow.

If you actually run the numbers, you'll find that the UK spends 40% more on the RAF than the Japanese spends on the JASDF.
And the UK's economy is 60% that of Japan's.
 
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I haven’t seen the presentation or know the person who gave it.
But given the nature and quality of the arguments being put by those that seem offended by it then on the question of who’s most correct my bet is on the presenter.

Feel free to post any data, analysis, sources or reasoning.

But given the nature of these vacuous observations my bet is that they form the basis for the theory that the brain merely exists to cool the blood.
 
And if you don't have more data than I do, how are you making a decision that JSDAF is a poor Air Force ? One man intuition ?
Indeed, your are merely guessing.

Their budgets are public. They can be compared to other Air Forces. See the analysis upthread.
In the absence of any data on their procurement, O&S, development/design thinking or analysis I can only guess.
But since you have no data to the contrary...

Again, Why would I check more data on JSDAF when we clearly don't have the same ways to measure things.

General lack of intellectual curiosity and/or the absence of a data driven mentality on your part?


And the Mirage.


But these combat records are mostly A/A. In A/G, F-4 could and did much better than both.

We were talking about Vietnam.

In Vietnam, The F-4's kill:loss ratio in non-A2A trim was less than unity and
worse than the F-105s which was better than unity. And the F-4 was inferior
in the strike role, hence the prevailing view in the AF expressed in "Sierra Hotel."

Many of the Israeli Mirage and F-4 kills were against strike-laden Arab aircraft.
That was not a feature of Vietnam.

And the F-4's in Israeli service typically carried *small* strike loads by Vietnam standards;
the goal was to disrupt Arab sortie generation with harassing attacks on airbases*
in an attempt to draw Arab aircraft into combat with the then A2A loaded F-4s.

If they failed to do that the F-4s were then allocated to CAP where GCI
vectored them against Arab strike or CAP aircraft.

* because they couldn't do anything against the hardened aircraft shelters


Ok. But for the F-104 service, European had their prod line and spares.

And a huge collaborative support (including two depots) and spares pooling program.

This was the heyday of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO).



No, you alone declare that here. What I say, is that it was in average good in any. Which is a reason it sold so well.
Tornado, the F-111, F-14 or F-15 were either too specialized or too expensive, or both.
And indeed it (F-4) was all that's left if one wanted a big twin with enough range to bomb farther and be able to fight correctly at the same time.
And improvement in missiles/avionics made that better over time, just like for the others.

See the analysis above. The choices for front-line fighters you wanted delivered in quantity
between the late 60's and the mid-to-late 70's that were <= ~$3 million amounted to Mirage or the F-4.

The actual flyway cost for the F-111 was terrifying and so were projected flyway costs for Tornado, F-14 and F-15.
And they wouldn't be available in quantity until the the late 70's/early 80's.


The way you judge again what is poor is the way a contemptuous multibillionaire would, with the US defense spending yardstick.
And a multibillionaire is not the average, it's off the charts, an anomaly.

The average country can get by on F/A variants of trainers. That's not the focus on this presentation or discussion.
We're talking about designing, developing, fielding and maintaining front-line combat aircraft in quantity.

Too poor to buy F-15 ? But that very JSDAF had F-15s flying alongside F-4s for quite some time.
By that statement, the RAF that neither had F-15/14/111s was a poor Air Force then ?

The JASDF bought the F-15 eight years after its first unit production in a period
where Japan's military spending had doubled.

Many of the RAF's development programs during this period collapsed.
And RAF was dumping money into Harrier and Tornado during this period.
And the F-111 buy had fallen apart.


Even if the F-4 wasn't much more expensive than a Mirage, which I strongly doubt,

Being allergic to data I guess you'll have to take my word for it.

it makes it even more obvious that at the time if one had the choice between the Mirage and the F-4 at about the same price, needing a Fighter-Bomber with longer range carrying and fighting capacity, one would go for the F-4. And the ones being able did.
Mirage was a good A/A plane, but was a comparatively light plane, in A/G it was an attack plane, not a longer range bomber like F-4 could do while still being able to fight correctly.

The number of Mirages or derivatives exported or built by export customers compares pretty favorably with the F-4 exports/local builds.

cause early [F-15] versions were mostly A/A.

As opposed to the early versions of the F-4?

But still the F-15 versions are more specialized.

Based on what metric?


This the thing, with all her flaws, the F-4 established a standard of what a correct ranged, correct carrying, and correct fighting abilities supersonic fighter-bomber of the future should pass. Not in USAF term, cause USAF could have the luxury to have specialized fleet ,
but in the average Air Force term who sees advantages in having a plane that give better capacity in longer range bombing and fighting than a single engined jet at the same time.

The vast majority of Phantom operators also operated other near-contemporary combat fast jets.
The average Air Forces of the world were being pitched things like the F-5 and Jaguar.

They'll now be pitched on things like the F/A-50 and F/A versions of the T-7.
These aircraft are not relevant to our discussion.
 
F-4 production line was very cold at the time of the German and Japanese upgrades, both countries got rid of their F-104s by then. F-15s served alongside F-4s for decades in Israel, Japan and South Korea.
JASDF budget: you yourself quoted a near 1% of GDP defence budget for Japan. Given the size of the Japanese economy, you are stretching the meaning of poor.

So two countries with highly competent aviation industries, both of which built all or portions of the F-4 under licenses
(which included technical data) were able to perform typical avionics upgrades done on just about every other fighter.

Wow.

If you actually run the numbers, you'll find that the UK spends 40% more on the RAF than the Japanese spends on the JASDF.
And the UK's economy is 60% that of Japan's.
The point is they saw merit in investing in the aircraft, then went on and did it. What is so difficult to accept?
It is adaptable.
Relative to GDP, Israel is one of the biggest spenders on defence. Its air force kept F-4s and F-15s flying alongide for decades, investing in upgrading them all the time.
 
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Their budgets are public. They can be compared to other Air Forces. See the analysis upthread.
In the absence of any data on their procurement, O&S, development/design thinking or analysis I can only guess.
But since you have no data to the contrary...
General lack of intellectual curiosity and/or the absence of a data driven mentality on your part?
Call it as you like.
The classic internet forum argument when something like "the sky is green" or "the JSDAF is a poor Air Force" is being refuted and the original poster persist , is for the original poster to ask "go get the data, see I'm right".
Sorry, I don't need to go get the data, i know the sky is blue, and i know the JSDAF is not a poor Air Force.

- you first said JSDAF was a second tier / poor AF, to which I said I was surprised of.
- You then responded that JSDAF doesn't even have the same number of fighters than the USMC.
- I then responded that there is no point in taking US services as reference for comparing others countries services because US services are so Ginormously rich , it can't be taken as a reference.
- You then switched your argument, this time trying to bring the RAF as a more acceptable comparison.
- I responded the point is not to compare with the RAF.
And that given what Japan has in his inventory, their professionalism, the wealth of the country, ect… JSDAF still isn't a poor Air Force.
- And then you ask for data to prove that JSDAF is a second tier / poor AF…

Note I can perfectly agree that JSDAF is not as rich as the RAF, and that any other Air Forces are absolutely not as rich as USAF/US Navy/USMC.
BUT , your measures as what are rich Air Forces seems to be only USAFs/RAF, and every others are poor AFs… Which is not my measures. Japan spends what it wants on his AF, and it's already enough not to make it a poor AF.
Getting datas that you'll read your own way because your measures are not mines , and because it satisfies your ego, is useless.

We were talking about Vietnam.
In Vietnam, The F-4's kill:loss ratio in non-A2A trim was less than unity and
worse than the F-105s which was better than unity. And the F-4 was inferior
in the strike role, hence the prevailing view in the AF expressed in "Sierra Hotel."

We ? Sorry I missed the mention Vietnam being the only conflict taken for reference here…
Why restrict to Vietnam ? Any conflicts in which the F-4 fought should be taken into account.

Many of the Israeli Mirage and F-4 kills were against strike-laden Arab aircraft.
That was not a feature of Vietnam.

And the F-4's in Israeli service typically carried *small* strike loads by Vietnam standards;
the goal was to disrupt Arab sortie generation with harassing attacks on airbases*
in an attempt to draw Arab aircraft into combat with the then A2A loaded F-4s.

If they failed to do that the F-4s were then allocated to CAP where GCI
vectored them against Arab strike or CAP aircraft.


* because they couldn't do anything against the hardened aircraft shelters

Many of the MiG-21s kills were strike-laden planes ? You contradict yourself here mentioning the attempt to draw Arab aircraft into combat (with strike-laden planes ?) , which amounted to a number of kills.

Here again, your definition of what's good is "being the best over everything", just like comparing Air Forces. Of course in these conflicts , the F-4 wasn't the best fighter, the best bomber, the best anything, that's not what I say. I say the F-4 have been on average good/adaptable for any of these mission. One type model being on average good enough in any mission is an excellent advantage, and makes it a good airplane.
No surprise 5000 were build, used by 14 operators.

The actual flyway cost for the F-111 was terrifying and so were projected flyway costs for Tornado, F-14 and F-15.
And they wouldn't be available in quantity until the the late 70's/early 80's.

Totally agree, the F-111 was extremely expensive, as were Tornado, F-14 and F-15.
F-15s bought by the poor JSDAF btw.

The average country can get by on F/A variants of trainers.

Ok… So the average country can go for F/A variants of trainers. Yet JSDAF going for F-35s, according to you is in the second tier / poor Air Force category.
I have more and more difficulty following your logic here.

That's not the focus on this presentation or discussion.
We're talking about designing, developing, fielding and maintaining front-line combat aircraft in quantity.

Yes thank you, I understood the point of the discussion.
But again, your reference in designing, developing, fielding and maintaining front-line combat aircraft in quantity seems only to be how the US should/could do it.

The JASDF bought the F-15 eight years after its first unit production in a period
where Japan's military spending had doubled.

Many of the RAF's development programs during this period collapsed.
And RAF was dumping money into Harrier and Tornado during this period.
And the F-111 buy had fallen apart.

And so that makes the JSDAF a poor AFs…
While they are now ordering 135 F-35, and committing to design a new domestic fighter.
And kept these bad/non-adaptable F-4s until last march...

Being allergic to data I guess you'll have to take my word for it.

Please see my first point in this post.
To think a big twin engine fighter (F-4) would not cost more than a much smaller single engined (Mirage) is flawed. in procurement cost, not to talk in service/maintenance.

The number of Mirages or derivatives exported or built by export customers compares pretty favorably with the F-4 exports/local builds.

Yes, you'll find though that many of the Mirage customers , had they wanted it, were forbidden from getting F-4s, or didn't had the money for it, or both.

As opposed to the early versions of the F-4?

True, but F-15 appearing after the F-4, about when the F-4E was there, itself being already a fighter-bomber by that time. I mentioned it, that's all…

Based on what metric?

F-15A/C are categorized as fighters, F-15E as strike aircrafts, when The F-4E would be as a fighter-bomber.
But a F-15 and even more the recent variants can certainly do better than a F-4E in any , that is why I say its like a perfect/better F-4.

The vast majority of Phantom operators also operated other near-contemporary combat fast jets.

Yes, because majority of F-4 operators had previous models in service, which were still useful.
Or added more recent models later, while keeping their F-4s.
Mostly like F-15s now.
Doesn't change the fact that at one time, they felt the need of procuring/operating F-4s , and that gave them more capacity.
Which clearly doesn't makes it a non-adaptable aircraft.

The average Air Forces of the world were being pitched things like the F-5 and Jaguar.

They'll now be pitched on things like the F/A-50 and F/A versions of the T-7.
These aircraft are not relevant to our discussion.

Is that so ?! Isn't the subject future combat aircrafts ?
F-5 and Jaguars were used in wars, they are combat aircrafts.
F/A-50 could be use in conflict, exported to iraq btw, not exactly the most peaceful place in the world. It is a combat aircraft.
At one point these will also have to be replaced by something else of their kind, thus they fit in a future combat aircrafts discussion.
Combat aircrafts are not only F-22/23/35/36 wonder machines that only very wealthy can build and procure.
 
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This is getting far off topic I think.

I thought that the primary thrust of the presentation was an argument for building new aircraft designs more often, not chasing perfection or over analysing, and that rather than spending lots of money maintaining old kit, use that money to buy new kit.

Doesn't the new "Digital Century Series" idea from the US has some overlap here?
 
That was the message I received from the presentation. Build experience by getting aircraft in the air in less than decades, reducing the risk of being overtaken by drastically changed circumstances. Design for maintenance, saving maintenance money for new kit.
 
What I understood of the idea the presenter expressed was that a way of lowering the raising price any new fighter (and thus the limited number one can buy), was to incorporate from the beginning more designs that would save money while the thing is in service.
Saving on future service cost would permit to build/buy in more number.

I've not checked a lot about that new "Digital Century Series" idea.
But just from the formulation, it seems to me a bit wishful thinking already.
Like , take the "good old days", add "digital", and we can have all we want again.
How would they lower prices by making more specialized types, like the Century Serie ?
But again, I don't know much about that new idea.
 
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Very interesting. Would something like the Low Support Vehicle fit the bill?

I have thought for a while that lower cost shorter life military equipment that gets replaced by better versions of itself before all new designs are introduced is the way ahead.

The UK has many painful to read stories about upgrading old equipment when it could have kept the production line open and brought the latest version a few years earlier.
 
That was the message I received from the presentation. Build experience by getting aircraft in the air in less than decades


F/A-18E/F EMD Contract Award: 1992, First Flight: 1995
F-22 EMD Contract Award: 1991: First Flight: 1997
F-35 EMD Contract award: 2001. First flight: 2006.

Typhoon, Rafale and Gripen were all under a decade as well.

Design for maintenance, saving maintenance money for new kit.

Aside from the F-14, there wasn't a single fighter produced since the F-4 that didn't have this as part of the design.
Based on actuals, O&S is 50% of fighter lifecycle. Of that 50%, maintenance accounts for 30% of the O&S breakdown
i.e 15% of overall lifecycle.

So even if through Herculean efforts you managed to cut maintenance in half you'd be saving single digits percentages
in overall lifecycle costs.
 
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You are being pretty selective with your dates there. Arguably F-35 development goes back to 1992's CALF program. EMD contract comes after the design is finalised and ready for production. Designs don't magically pop into existence ready to build. Typhoon took years in concept phase and was to some degree functionally obsolete in concept before EMD.
 
You are being pretty selective with your dates there. Arguably F-35 development goes back to 1992's CALF program.

You can play this game ad nauseam with internal company R&D efforts/studies and take us back to the 80's.
It's a pointless digression. Or you can stick with EMD.

If you really want CALF then then shouldn't the X-planes count?
If you really want ATF concepts then Dem/Val aircraft should count right?

All under a decade.

EMD contract comes after the design is finalised and ready for production.

Which completely mischaracterizes EMD.

Designs don't magically pop into existence ready to build.
Who said they did?

Typhoon took years in concept phase and was to some degree functionally obsolete in concept before EMD.
Concepts are cheap; EMD is not. I don't know what you mean by "was to some degree functionally obsolete in concept before EMD."

Last I checked, high speed weapons release coupled with a tight radius turn is an incredibly useful attribute.
 
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You are being pretty selective with your dates there. Arguably F-35 development goes back to 1992's CALF program.

You can play this game ad nauseam with internal company R&D efforts/studies and take us back to the 80's.
It's a pointless digression. Or you can stick with EMD.

In terms of the length of a program, it seems relevant to the arguments presented in the presentation. The argument was about building more often, which means cutting down the lengthy pre-EMD phase of development and building stuff.


EMD contract comes after the design is finalised and ready for production.

Which completely mischaracterizes EMD.

I'll admit that isn't correct - preliminary design is finalised and you move to detailed design and then actually building the aeroplane which is the costly part. However, I don't think that is really the part which is being criticised in the presentation - its the 10 years of analysis prior to EMD. At the the point you start the EMD phase, you are "building" already.

Typhoon took years in concept phase and was to some degree functionally obsolete in concept before EMD.
Concepts are cheap; EMD is not. I don't know what you mean by "was to some degree functionally obsolete in concept before EMD."

Last I checked, high speed weapons release coupled with a tight radius turn is an incredibly useful attribute.

Unstable canard deltas were de rigeur in 1979. Stealth wasn't really an option. By the early 1990s, if you were to start again, you'd probably end up with something different.

The point you make is a fair one. Part of the reason for the lengthy concept phase is simply that its much cheaper than actually going into EMD, and gives companies something to do without costing too much. It's make-work to keep people occupied. The problem with doing more building is that it will cost more. Its unlikely that you'll save enough in reduced operational support to offset the extra cost of building new designs.
 
In terms of the length of a program, it seems relevant to the arguments presented in the presentation. The argument was about building more often, which means cutting down the lengthy pre-EMD phase of development and building stuff.

The presentation failed, IMHO, to establish that modern pre-EMD* phases were especially lengthy or
a strong inhibitor on building more often.

The RDT&E even for something like the F-16 Block 60 was ~ $2.5 billion.
I'd like to know what the F-15SA/QA RDT&E amounts were but I'm guessing billions.

The "convincing-governments-to-spend-real-money" part of programs tends to be more on the critical path.

* The elapsed time from "Advanced Day Fighter" to YF-16 first flight was 9 years.
And it was another 8 years until the AF had a version of the F-16 they thought could survive in the ETO.


I'll admit that isn't correct - preliminary design is finalised and you move to detailed design and then actually building the aeroplane which is the costly part. However, I don't think that is really the part which is being criticised in the presentation - its the 10 years of analysis prior to EMD. At the the point you start the EMD phase, you are "building" already.

It's not clear that analysis is a strong inhibitor on building more since things like X-planes and demonstrators
happen during that period.

If you are talking about churning out more production representative aircraft @ quantity more
often you'd have to show that the you could hold down the fighter unit cost contributors enough
to make it worthwhile.


Unstable canard deltas were de rigeur in 1979.

I don't know; cranked arrows had and have some nice properties. And there was actual flight data.


Stealth wasn't really an option.

There was a good amount of RCS reduction work underway in Europe during this period.

And apologia by certain authors of picture books as to why stealth didn't become
the first-class citizen on European fighters then (as opposed to the current future European fighter designs)
still fails, in my judgement, to convince.

The point you make is a fair one. Part of the reason for the lengthy concept phase is simply that its much cheaper than actually going into EMD, and gives companies something to do without costing too much. It's make-work to keep people occupied. The problem with doing more building is that it will cost more. Its unlikely that you'll save enough in reduced operational support to offset the extra cost of building new designs.

Skilled teams that can devise concepts/designs that are convincing are hard to find.

There is certainly some element of make-work to it but since there's no non-governmental or commercial
demand for fighters, the home government is in essence the lender of first resort.

The F-20 and to a lesser extent the Textron Scorpion are cautionary tales in this regard.
 

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