German Nuclear Weapons

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From time to time there has been speculation that postwar Germany might seek to obtain nuclear weapons.
This excellent article explains why such thoughts are a waste of space.
 
It's true that there isn't really much of a discourse here in Germany about nuclear proliferation. But that aside, it would make sense, in a vacuum.

Geopolitically speaking, there are no such things as allies or friends. Neither the US, which has been proven to be irrational, unpredictable and unreliable, nor the French (naturally concerned with their own national security first and foremost) can be relied upon. "Verlass dich auf andere und du bist verlassen" comes to mind, ultimately you can only rely on yourself, especially with regards to interests and safety. And Germany is the only historically great European power left to nuclearize, after the UK, France and Russia. Thus the development and deployment of SSBNs, weapons of pure deterrence with little means of conventional warfighting outside of WW3 scenarios, based on a type of vessel Germany has lots of familiarity with, would make sense.

But ultimately, as already established, the will isn't there. And yes, the rest of Europe would collectively shit their pants. But the fact that a strategically autonomous Germany makes these supposed allies nervous, shows that they are not to be relied upon.

In short, SSBNs would be perfectly suited for German national deterrence and ensuring strategic autonomy and safety. But yes, there is no genuine discourse going on and nobody in high places is interested in the prospect. And yes, in the short term relations to some countries would sour.
 
One possible option if the US continues to disengage from Europe would be a Franco German deterrent or even a Euro nuclear force along the lines of the early 60s ideas in NATO.
 
From time to time there has been speculation that postwar Germany might seek to obtain nuclear weapons.
This excellent article explains why such thoughts are a waste of space. ...

The debate has advanced from this since the Munich Security Conference commissioned and received a report (Mind the Deterrence Gap, Feb 2026) on European nuclear deterrence just recently.

On a very quick reading there's some overlap between the report and Philipp Rombach's article but some crucial differences also; indeed Rombach doesn't seem to be among the authors of the MSC report. I'm somewhat wondering whether the article (published mere months before the report) was written with the upcoming report in mind. I may come back to this.

Also, there is indeed renewed discussion about deterrent in Germany on the highest levels and widespread consensus that on an European level this issue needs to be addressed in a determined and timely way. France's change of doctrine was just the first major step in this process. Idle and uninformed speculation aside as a confounding factor (or indeed mostly external propaganda and corruption, of which there are ample amounts - for example inserting notions about purely nationalistic rationales to acquire a nuclear deterrent, societal polarization and ensuing decisional apathy, or transnational distrust) the semantics are important here. NPT will most likely be respected but the capability will be also be German in every aspect but name and sovereign launch authority.

There was a vocal anti-nuclear movement in Germany during the Cold War also and while I'm very sympathetic with non-proliferation arguments, that movement was also co-opted by then Soviet active measures. History does indeed rhyme. As Joschka Fischer's support for a European deterrent implies, necessity is the mother of persuasion; F. Scott Fitzgerald's notion about holding opposite ideas and still being able to function a very apt one indeed.

Here's the post linking to the report:

 

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