battlecruiser HMS Tiger survives til Second World War?

[Dilandu]

and the Tiger being considered a capital ship in the overall Royal navy quotas, t

Well, she was used mainly as training ship post-war. And technically, the transfer of the ship from RN to RAN jurisdiction would be considered internal transfer; i.e. it would not violate WNT, as long as Australian Navy is considered to be part of British total.

Saving her from London Treaty would be more tricky, but probably doable, if Australia would refuse to participate in such talks, arguing that such limitations would affect Royal Navy far more than Japanese, and thus represent a direct threat to Australian safety.

 

[zoeafr]

Well, she was used mainly as training ship post-war. And technically, the transfer of the ship from RN to RAN jurisdiction would be considered internal transfer; i.e. it would not violate WNT, as long as Australian Navy is considered to be part of British total.

Saving her from London Treaty would be more tricky, but probably doable, if Australia would refuse to participate in such talks, arguing that such limitations would affect Royal Navy far more than Japanese, and thus represent a direct threat to Australian safety.

Yes, I understand all that; but during the 20's, the Australian government put very little funds into modernization of the HMAS Australia; so, when arguing that it would be a priority for the pacific defense, the counter argument would be why then didn't the Australian government finance any funds to the navy? and to top that, if the Australian government didn't have funds available and it was a priority, Why then didn't the Royal navy finance the refits? So, the priority is hard to justify when there's no will from either party........

 

[Dilandu]

Yes, I understand all that; but during the 20's, the Australian government put very little funds into modernization of the HMAS Australia; so, when arguing that it would be a priority for the pacific defense, the counter argument would be why then didn't the Australian government finance any funds to the navy? and to top that, if the Australian government didn't have funds available and it was a priority, Why then didn't the Royal navy finance the refits? So, the priority is hard to justify when there's no will from either party........

Because HMAS Australia was outdated and spending money on her was considered impractical. HMS Tiger, on the other hand, is at least as good as Japanese Kongo-class battlecruisers, and have much greater standing value.

 

[zoeafr]

Because HMAS Australia was outdated and spending money on her was considered impractical. HMS Tiger, on the other hand, is at least as good as Japanese Kongo-class battlecruisers, and have much greater standing value.

Yes of course, but the HMS Australia wasn't in that bad of a shape in the early twenties; it is the government that let it rot to despair because of a lack of will.... Should the Tiger have been transfered during that period, the same thing would have happened to it.......

 

[Dilandu]

Yes of course, but the HMS Australia wasn't in that bad of a shape in the early twenties

She was not in a bad shape, but she lacked function to perform. She was both too slow to hunt enemy light cruisers, and too slow to evade Japanese battlecruisers. And she could not fight them either without a substantial refit - which was simply not practical for the single ship.

 

[zoeafr]

She was not in a bad shape, but she lacked function to perform. She was both too slow to hunt enemy light cruisers, and too slow to evade Japanese battlecruisers. And she could not fight them either without a substantial refit - which was simply not practical for the single ship.

Again, I understand; the point is there was no will to spend anything on it; I'm not aware whether the Australian government pleaded with the Royal navy to get a more updated ship, but again, it is hard to justify an argument of priority when neither the Australian government nor the Royal navy puts any effort to remedy the situation....
Also here we must not forget that it is the Royal navy and the U.S. navy who decided on the parameters of the London treaty, it wasn't imposed on the Royal navy.....

 

[Pirate Pete]

VERY LATE to this discussion, but it took me an age to locate the source of this attachment…
Oscar Parkes’s British Battleships…
Interesting statement about POTENTIAL speed for Tiger (and Queen Elizabeth class)…
So, perhaps a re-engineering could result in a speed increase….

 

[zoeafr]

VERY LATE to this discussion, but it took me an age to locate the source of this attachment…
Oscar Parkes’s British Battleships…
Interesting statement about POTENTIAL speed for Tiger (and Queen Elizabeth class)…
So, perhaps a re-engineering could result in a speed increase….

Hi Yes, I had read about those boilers and turbines; it would have been a first choice, but only if the Tiger would have had a full reconstruction. At that early time, this machinery was still in ''prototype development'' though it showed reliabity and performance. Two decisions came against it; the development was still at an early stage of reliability, so time was needed to achieve full production if the admiralty would put orders in. Though the QEs' were still at the design stage at that date, it was calculed that this machinery wouldn't be ready in time, and during that time, it was also argued that a mix coal/oil machinery was still the most reliable option since not all the far away colonies had access or the logistics for oil. This was the main reason the Tiger got what it had, with the QEs' taking the oil only machinery; they would more probably stay closer to the bigger bases which had the infrastructures for oil refills and repairs.
The other reason is that the admiralty, in my view and some of the authors of the books I read, was mostly composed of people with more conservative views; maybe they had more insight on the matter than we do now in the political and experience environment and that weighed in the balance.
The small boilers did achieve the reliability later, when the admiralty relented and decided on the option, but it was too late for the early ships until a full reconstruction would happen. The new type of machinery was not an interchageable unit, and though much smaller, all the surrounding accessories, needed to be re-adapted to the new set up, and sometimes new systems would have to be installed; result, a very expensive option, and time consuming installation made it imposssible to just alter the machinery quickly and cheaply.
In a scenario where the Tiger is the training ship and not the Iron Duke, nothing would have been possible until late 1936 and 37; that would mean no time, no large funding, and not much leeway to get the ship in dry dock. So the only possibility would have been a re-installation and modification of the main belt, conning tower, re-installation of ''Q'' barbette and turret, and the removal of what wuld hve been left of the 39 boilers ( apprx. 13 left for the 18 knot max speed dictated) and installation of the old and refurbished Warspite boiers (24) plus the installation of some Queen Elizabeth refurbished boilers which have been very recently taken out on her reconstruction (15) for the total of 39 put back in the pervious boiler places; no machinery change would have been necessary and the new ''oil only'' power would have been somewhere in the neighborhood of 125000 SHP. Next, a slightly thicker (10 in.) and longer ( spanning the length between ''A'' and ''X'' barbette) outer main belt, an upper and small lower 6 in. belt (an extension only for the top, and a 4 feet wide addition under the main belt) also extended to the same barbettes, the torpedo protection system, thicker deck plating ( ''slap on'' decking, no deep restructuring) and AA armament....Extra weight of the AAs' offset by the removal of the first two 6 in. guns on each side and the torpedo system.
Here is my last iteration of what I think is a logical re-arragement..... The first two are the original set up, the next two are what I came up with.
AA armament consists of :
Original 8 13.5/45 primaries
Original 8 6in. secondaries in casemates minus 4 ( two first ones on each side, previously 12 units)
New 10 QF 4/45 HA MKXIX in 5 twin turrets
new 24 2 pdr (40 mm) vickers QF MKVIII octuple in 3 units
new 12 2pdr (40mm) Bofor QF MKXI in 6 twin arrangement
new 32 1 pdr (20mm) Oerlikon QF MKXI in 16 twin arragement
new 4 1 pdr (20mm) Oerlikon QF MKXI in 4 singles on superstructure

A total of 72 AA armament, not counting the HA 4/45

Plating additions can be seen on th diagrams
This is not an absolute and comments and suggestions are more than welcome

 

[Owens Z]

VERY LATE to this discussion, but it took me an age to locate the source of this attachment…
Oscar Parkes’s British Battleships…
Interesting statement about POTENTIAL speed for Tiger (and Queen Elizabeth class)…
So, perhaps a re-engineering could result in a speed increase….

Good, Pirate Pete; this is interesting. I have read the Oscar Parkes classic but don't own a copy. HMS Tiger fresh from the builder briefly did a tad over 29 knots with engine forcing during her trials at normal displacement, and is credited with about 28 knots during WW1 service when the bridge ordered full speed ahead (assuming a calm or moderate sea). That's with her original coal-fired boilers and direct-drive turbines.

Reduction gears mean added weight, and as Scott Kenny pointed out, manufacturing such a transmission is an exacting and expensive process. And the second law of thermodynamics means that there will always be a bit of power wasted by friction in the gears. But with all that said, geared turbines put so much more of the engine's effort into the water that they immediately became the standard. Two Royal Navy destroyers launched in 1911 were the first to use reduction gears as an experiment, and the Courageous-class battlecruisers launched in 1916 were the first capital ships with this feature. So an alternate history where it instead was HMS Tiger (launched at the end of 1913) as the first capital ship with geared turbines, and small-tube boilers, is within the realm of possibility. I am not too enthused, because I think my different alternate history, which allows machinery a quarter-century more advanced, would result in a more formidable WW2 ship. But I'm glad to learn that my estimate of the revised maximum speed is roughly the same as what the famed naval architect Sir Eustace Tennyson D'Eyncourt believed (he was also the foresighted chairman of the "Landship Committee" that invented tanks).

 

[Owens Z]

Recently I was able to read the 1999 book The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922 by David K Brown at my local public library, and I found it to be well written and informative. Author Brown wrote in a footnote on p25, "There was discussion over the possibility of all oil fuel for Tiger but it was rejected". On p101 he stated that HMS Tiger endured fifteen 283mm AP shell hits, plus one 149mm hit, during the Battle of Jutland, mostly from SMS Moltke. (Wikipedia says eighteen shell hits, but doesn't cite a source.) Q turret had its armored roof blown in and was put out of action but her other three turrets kept shooting. And obviously Tiger didn't explode like battlecruisers HMS Invincible, Indefatigable, and Queen Mary (and Hood in 1941) did from much fewer hits, killing almost their entire crews. On pp155-56 is an annotated list of the sixteen hits on Tiger during Jutland; interesting.

During the earlier Battle of Dogger Bank Tiger took six hits by German shells, but she was promptly and fully repaired after both Dogger Bank and Jutland, and by all accounts the battlecruiser was in good condition when she was selected for scrapping after the 1930 London Naval Treaty. Seen in hindsight, an ill-advised decision by British authorities.

 

[zoeafr]

Recently I was able to read the 1999 book The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922 by David K Brown at my local public library, and I found it to be well written and informative. Author Brown wrote in a footnote on p25, "There was discussion over the possibility of all oil fuel for Tiger but it was rejected". On p101 he stated that HMS Tiger endured fifteen 283mm AP shell hits, plus one 149mm hit, during the Battle of Jutland, mostly from SMS Moltke. (Wikipedia says eighteen shell hits, but doesn't cite a source.) Q turret had its armored roof blown in and was put out of action but her other three turrets kept shooting. And obviously Tiger didn't explode like battlecruisers HMS Invincible, Indefatigable, and Queen Mary (and Hood in 1941) did from much fewer hits, killing almost their entire crews. On pp155-56 is an annotated list of the sixteen hits on Tiger during Jutland; interesting.

During the earlier Battle of Dogger Bank Tiger took six hits by German shells, but she was promptly and fully repaired after both Dogger Bank and Jutland, and by all accounts the battlecruiser was in good condition when she was selected for scrapping after the 1930 London Naval Treaty. Seen in hindsight, an ill-advised decision by British authorities.

Yes, I had read that too in one of my books, though from memory I don't remember where I saw the passage.
It is one one '' could have been, should have been''.....

 

[Archdude]

Recently I was able to read the 1999 book The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922 by David K Brown at my local public library, and I found it to be well written and informative. Author Brown wrote in a footnote on p25, "There was discussion over the possibility of all oil fuel for Tiger but it was rejected". On p101 he stated that HMS Tiger endured fifteen 283mm AP shell hits, plus one 149mm hit, during the Battle of Jutland, mostly from SMS Moltke. (Wikipedia says eighteen shell hits, but doesn't cite a source.) Q turret had its armored roof blown in and was put out of action but her other three turrets kept shooting. And obviously Tiger didn't explode like battlecruisers HMS Invincible, Indefatigable, and Queen Mary (and Hood in 1941) did from much fewer hits, killing almost their entire crews. On pp155-56 is an annotated list of the sixteen hits on Tiger during Jutland; interesting.

During the earlier Battle of Dogger Bank Tiger took six hits by German shells, but she was promptly and fully repaired after both Dogger Bank and Jutland, and by all accounts the battlecruiser was in good condition when she was selected for scrapping after the 1930 London Naval Treaty. Seen in hindsight, an ill-advised decision by British authorities.

Cool book and great comment

 

[Caravellarella]

On the latest Drachinifel Drydock podcast N°343 on youtube (22.41 to 27.15) there is a section on hypothetical modernising of HMS Tiger -

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FO9DpZQ0g7Y


Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[zoeafr]

On the latest Drachinifel Drydock podcast N°343 on youtube (22.41 to 27.15) there is a section on hypothetical modernising of HMS Tiger -

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FO9DpZQ0g7Y


Terry (Caravellarella)

Thank you for the link; I have watched many of his podcasts and they are very informative. As for the Tiger discussion, he talks about, or rather explains a scenario in which there is a full reconstruction, and an attempt to keep the weight of the ship as close as possible to the original weight and not going for more SHP to push the ship faster.
I appreciated his belt thickness analysis but the scenario of removing the Q turret, while not his idea, makes the ship a little weak, even upgraded to 14 in main battery. It is true that finding the ultimate combinaison of getting faster, better AA, better deck protection, bulges and remaining somewhere within a logical ship weight is much more complicated than one would think at first. I tried and got to a 32500 tons higher weight ship, ableit with 125000 SHP...
And I didn't go with a full reconstruction as it would probably have not been possible in a decent timeline...

 

[Archdude]

Interesting ideas!!!

 

[Owens Z]

On the latest Drachinifel Drydock podcast N°343 on youtube (22.41 to 27.15) there is a section on hypothetical modernising of HMS Tiger -

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FO9DpZQ0g7Y
Terry (Caravellarella)

Thank you for the link; I have watched many of his podcasts and they are very informative. As for the Tiger discussion, he talks about, or rather explains a scenario in which there is a full reconstruction, and an attempt to keep the weight of the ship as close as possible to the original weight and not going for more SHP to push the ship faster.
I appreciated his belt thickness analysis but the scenario of removing the Q turret, while not his idea, makes the ship a little weak, even upgraded to 14 in main battery. It is true that finding the ultimate combinaison of getting faster, better AA, better deck protection, bulges and remaining somewhere within a logical ship weight is much more complicated than one would think at first. I tried and got to a 32500 tons higher weight ship, ableit with 125000 SHP...
And I didn't go with a full reconstruction as it would probably have not been possible in a decent timeline...

Interesting ideas!!!

Thanks for the heads-up, Terry. Drachinifel tends to be verbose, and I don't want to sit through another three-hour video, but as you point out, the material relevant to battlecruiser HMS Tiger is only from 22:40 to 27:15, so manageable. Drachinifel refers back to an earlier video (Drydock Episode 332 from January 2025), which also discusses (57:50 to 64:30) a counterfactual survival of Tiger into the Second World War. His two questioners and/or Drachinifel himself might very well have read this present thread, which began in June 2024. Drachinifel makes some good points about a prospective 1930's rebuild increasing the coverage of Tiger's belt armor and thickening the deck armor, and about the rebuilt ship's usage against the Axis. I am indifferent to razing the battlecruiser's existing superstructure and erecting a 'Queen Anne's Mansion'-type instead. I vehemently object to removing one of her four turrets. The main battery is the raison d'etre of a capital ship, and such a suggestion shows a fundamental misunderstanding of what HMS Tiger is and is for.

 

[Archdude]

Thanks for the heads-up, Terry. Drachinifel tends to be verbose, and I don't want to sit through another three-hour video, but as you point out, the material relevant to battlecruiser HMS Tiger is only from 22:40 to 27:15, so manageable. Drachinifel refers back to an earlier video (Drydock Episode 332 from January 2025), which also discusses (57:50 to 64:30) a counterfactual survival of Tiger into the Second World War. His two questioners and/or Drachinifel himself might very well have read this present thread, which began in June 2024. Drachinifel makes some good points about a prospective 1930's rebuild increasing the coverage of Tiger's belt armor and thickening the deck armor, and about the rebuilt ship's usage against the Axis. I am indifferent to razing the battlecruiser's existing superstructure and erecting a 'Queen Anne's Mansion'-type instead. I vehemently object to removing one of her four turrets. The main battery is the raison d'etre of a capital ship, and such a suggestion shows a fundamental misunderstanding of what HMS Tiger is and is for.

Interesting thoughts.

 

[Owens Z]

HMS Tiger was the longest, heaviest, and fastest capital ship at the Battle of Jutland, on either side. In the authoritative book British Battlecruisers 1905-1920 rev ed, John Roberts judged that Tiger "was the last, and easily the best, of the pre-war British battlecruisers" (p40). After the outbreak of WW1, instead of wisely building additional Tigers a reversion to lighter, flimsier designs occurred, with the Renown class and Courageous class. Regrettable. The 'Mighty Hood' was meant to be the return to a battle-worthy balance of protection and firepower, but at the Denmark Strait action Hood proved too frail, exploding after a mere two hits from Bismarck (plus one from cruiser Prinz Eugen). By contrast, Tiger endured six German heavy shells at Dogger Bank, and fifteen at Jutland, and continued fighting.

In his book The Price of Admiralty, historian John Keegan wrote of Tiger that she was "certainly the most beautiful warship in the world then, and perhaps ever" (p132). Author Richard Hough also praised her graceful appearance, "especially in her early rig, before a stump mast was fitted [in 1918] just forward of the third of her evenly spaced, stately funnels. At her time, she was considered by many to be the most majestic and satisfactory-looking battle cruiser afloat. She was unquestionably the best battle cruiser in the Grand Fleet" (Dreadnought, p101).

Outer beauty and inner strength: what a lady! Tiger would be missed during Britain's time of trial in 1939-45.

 

[Archdude]

HMS Tiger was the longest, heaviest, and fastest capital ship at the Battle of Jutland, on either side. In the authoritative book British Battlecruisers 1905-1920 rev ed, John Roberts judged that Tiger "was the last, and easily the best, of the pre-war British battlecruisers" (p40). After the outbreak of WW1, instead of wisely building additional Tigers a reversion to lighter, flimsier designs occurred, with the Renown class and Courageous class. Regrettable. The 'Mighty Hood' was meant to be the return to a battle-worthy balance of protection and firepower, but at the Denmark Strait action Hood proved too frail, exploding after a mere two hits from Bismarck (plus one from cruiser Prinz Eugen). By contrast, Tiger endured six German heavy shells at Dogger Bank, and fifteen at Jutland, and continued fighting.

In his book The Price of Admiralty, historian John Keegan wrote of Tiger that she was "certainly the most beautiful warship in the world then, and perhaps ever" (p132). Author Richard Hough also praised her graceful appearance, "especially in her early rig, before a stump mast was fitted [in 1918] just forward of the third of her evenly spaced, stately funnels. At her time, she was considered by many to be the most majestic and satisfactory-looking battle cruiser afloat. She was unquestionably the best battle cruiser in the Grand Fleet" (Dreadnought, p101).

Outer beauty and inner strength: what a lady! Tiger would be missed during Britain's time of trial in 1939-45.

Agree with this!

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Hindsight is always 20/20 and you can't entirely blame the Royal Navy officers who believed a newer (slow) battleship with significantly more firepower and much better armor is of greater value than an older battlecruiser.

Yet I can't help but feel like they weren't accurately assessing the surface threat of potential enemies they might face in the Atlantic. They must have had some idea that France and Germany were working on small fast battleships and the Panzerschiffs. Were they under the impression that either nation (or Italy) was going to resume building slow battleships that at best might have a tactically irrelevant increase in speed?

I don't know how seriously they considered the USSR's intention of getting back into battleship construction. Imperial Japan in the far-east is its own concern of course, but they must have known details on the battlecruisers they had started prior to the Washington Naval Treaty. Those may have been cancelled, but they would seem to suggest that Japan greatly valued their new capital ships having greater speed than preceding classes of battleships.

By that date I don't know how seriously they considered the prospects of any potential war with the United States.

The biggest problem with keeping HMS Tiger I think would have been finding the time (and funds from Her Majesty's Treasury) to thoroughly modernize it before the war.

 

[Dilandu]

Courageous class.

"Courageous"-class was more an attempt to bridge the gap between light turbine cruiser and full-size battlecruiser. The light cruisers were... well, too light to fight anything heavier than they were. Even against old armored cruisers they weren't particularly effective. And the full-scale, "proper" battlecruisers were way too costly to build and too valuable for battleline to send them into patrols.

 

[Archdude]

Hindsight is always 20/20 and you can't entirely blame the Royal Navy officers who believed a newer (slow) battleship with significantly more firepower and much better armor is of greater value than an older battlecruiser.

Yet I can't help but feel like they weren't accurately assessing surface threat of potential enemies they might face in the Atlantic. They must have had some idea that France and Germany were working on small fast battleships and the Panzerschiffs. Were they under the impression that either nation (or Italy) was going to resume building slow battleships that at best might have a tactically irrelevant increase in speed?

I don't know how seriously they considered the USSR's intention of getting back into battleship construction. Imperial Japan in the far-east is its own concern of course, but they must have known of the battlecruisers they had started prior to the Washington Naval Treaty. Those may have been cancelled, but they would seem to suggest that Japan greatly valued having capital ships with higher speed than their than preceding classes of battleships.

By that date I don't know how seriously they considered the prospects of any potential war with the United States.

The biggest problem with keeping HMS Tiger I think would have been finding the time (and funds from Her Majesty's Treasury) to thoroughly modernize it before the war.

Agree!

 

[Derfel Cadarn]

Tiger had considerable value to the Royal Navy's WW2 fleet.

In 1939 they only had three battlecruisers - Hood, Renown and Repulse. These were the only ships capable of keeping up with the carriers, or catching and harming the German big-gun fleet, all of them capable of 28kt+ in 1939-41.

Italy had two 27kt Cavour class in service and three 30kt Littorio class under construction, while Japan was building the 27kt Yamato, rebuilding all four 30kt Kongo class and both 27kt Nagatos for 1940/41, by which time the RN could only expect three further KGV class.

So a comparative table of fast (<27kt) and big gun (<11") warships: Axis vs Allies

thirteen vs three in 1939:

Scharnhorst................. Hood
Gneisenau................... Renown
Deutschland................ Repulse
Scheer
Graf Spee
Conte di Cavour
Giulio Cesare
Nagato
Mutsu
Kongo
Hiei
Krishima
Haruna

fourteen vs four in 1940

Scharnhorst............... Hood
Gneisenau................. Renown
Lutzow....................... Repulse
Scheer....................... KGV
Littorio
Vittorio
Conte di Cavour
Giulio Cesare
Nagato
Mutsu
Kongo
Hiei
Krishima
Haruna

fifteen vs five in May 1941,

Bismarck.................. Hood
Tirpitz....................... Renown
Scharnhorst............. Repulse
Gneisenau............... KGV
Lutzow..................... PoW
Scheer
Littorio
Vittorio
Giulio Cesare
Nagato
Mutsu
Kongo
Hiei
Krishima
Haruna

fifteen vs five by December 1941.

Tirpitz......................... Renown
Scharnhorst............... KGV
Gneisenau................. DoY
Lutzow....................... North Carolina
Scheer....................... Washington
Littorio
Vittorio
Giulio Cesare
Yamato
Nagato
Mutsu
Kongo
Hiei
Krishima
Haruna

eighteen vs eleven in 1942

Tirpitz......................... Renown
Scharnhorst............... KGV
Gneisenau................. DoY
Lutzow...................... Anson
Scheer...................... Howe
Littorio...................... North Carolina
Vittorio...................... Washington
Roma........................ South Dakota
Conte di Cavour........ Indiana
Giulio Cesare............ Massachusetts
Yamato..................... Alabama
Musashi
Nagato
Mutsu
Kongo
Hiei
Krishima
Haruna

However capable the converted QEs and Nelson's they were not in the same speed range. The axis had a pretty safe speed margin over the RN in the early war. Having a fourth battlecruiser in 1939-1942 wouldn't have changed the odds much, but would be a welcome addition.

Hood was unable to receive the major refit she desperately needed in 1939-40 because she was too valuable to lay up for such a long time. With Tiger around, possibly coming out of a Renown type rebuild in the late 30s, Hood could have been spared.

Would this threat of 27kt+ battlewagons have been obvious in 1932 when Tiger was disposed of? The RN of this period considered Italy and Japan the biggest threats, Germany still a potential threat, even before declarations of war.

In 1932 the four Kongo's and two Nagato's were already a thing, the same vintage as Tiger and already undergoing rebuild. The Deutschland's were being laid down and making waves in European waters, the Cavours under rebuild and the Littorios only two years from being laid down. France were building their own response accordingly, the Dunkerque and Strasbourg in 1932.

So it can't be a stretch to imagine a threat picture where the RN's three ship battlecruiser squadron is greatly outnumbered. Even a four ship squadron with Tiger is going to be stretched.

Tiger had the hull shape and volume to fit a powerful modern steam plant, keeping her speed up to at least 30kts. Her 9" armour had proved pretty resistant to 11" gunfire in WW1. Space and weight savings in machinery could have translated to better underwater and deck protection like the rebuilt QEs.

There was plenty 13.5" ammunition and surplus barrels going and that weapon would have proved deadly to the Deutschland class, more than a bit upsetting to the Kongos and Cavours, admittedly the Scharnhorsts, Bismarcks, Littorios and Nagatos would have stood up to them unless improvements were developed or the KGV 14" was made to fit.

The hunt for German surface raiders in 1939-41 was constantly hampered by the lack of big-gun ships with the necessary speed and range. Tiger was the best option to expand that squadron.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I think it'd be possible to stretch the hull some without adding ridiculous amounts of weight, though it'd be "dashedly un-British": built the extensions out of 1/4" steel. Armor? What armor (there)?

Weight reserves and Treasury cheapness forcing a partial adoption of "all-or-nothing" armoring in the extensions.