Are Airborne Armoured Vehicles worthwhile?

[uk 75]

I put this in the bar because I have always been fascinated by the amount of effort that was put in during the Cold War into developing airborne armour.
The Soviets had the most developed family with the ASU57and58 assault guns and the BMD family. Shots of Kabul airport in 1979 showed how they could be used in combat.
The US only had one Airborne Division and developed the M551 Sheridan which saw use in Panama and the 1991 Gulf War.
France had its AMX13 light tank which could be carried in the Nord Noratlas.
Britain was content to use its wheeled and tracked recce vehicles like Ferrets, Saladins and the Scorpion family.
Germany only used the collapsable KRAKA lightweight wheeled vehicle for its helicopter borne brigades. A lightweight armoured vehicle, the Weasel arrived just after the Cold War.
The War on Terror and the Balkans campaign upped the armour requirement for such vehicles. Fortunately the C17 and A400M like the IL76 can carry them.
A lot of effort and money has gone into developing airborne vehicles but have they been worth the effort?

 

[Pioneer]

I put this in the bar because I have always been fascinated by the amount of effort that was put in during the Cold War into developing airborne armour......

A lot of effort and money has gone into developing airborne vehicles but have they been worth the effort?

I've often thought along the same lines uk 75. The fact that the Cold War never went 'hot' means that the likes of the U.S. and Soviet airborne forces weren't ever deployed in their intended 'shock' roles againt a peer-adversary, let alone actually deployed as designed.....for example they weren't para dropped in mass in either Afghanistan by the Soviet's nor by the U.S. into Iraq. There seems to have been a reluctantly by both the Soviet's and U.S. (be it politically or militarily?)
Instead they have always seemingly been deployed as rapid reaction forces - more times than not either driven in or airlifted into a situation - but not parachuted as they were designed and equipped. What that reluctance is I can't put my finger on - cost?, casualties? or a fear that such a mass airborne drop would end up a cluster @$?*.....
I personally believe there is a valid need for such specialised airborne armoured vehicle as part of an effective cohesive airborne unit. I also believe that the Russian Army has far exceeded the U.S. in this notion by its non-stop research and development, and more importantly manufacturing and deployment of such specialised airborne armoured vehicles. In all intent and purposes IMO and view, the U.S. Army doesn't really know and hasn't known what it wants and needs in an effective airborne armoured vehicle since the 1960's - M551 Sheridan. The fact that the U.S. Army has know and appreciated that the principle failings of the Sheridan was its troublesome M81 152mm gun/launcher, and yet has failed to simply replace this weapon speaks load and clear of the U.S. Army's complacency.
I for one have been and continue to be impressed with the Soviet's/Russian's evolution of its airborne armoured vehicle range. The Soviet's/Russian's doctrine appears to have always appreciated the exceptence that their airborne armoured vehicles weren't and wouldn't be on a par with U.S./NATO MBT's and the likes, in terms of armour and firepower. instead they seemed to have excepted the lessons of massed airborne/para operations of WWII in which speed, mobility and support fire can supplement as opposed to fully neglect such force-multipliers. The Soviet's/Russian's also seems to have appriciated the volnrability of airborne/para units to quick and decisive counter attack by an opposing force - hence their adherence to organic firepower afforded the Soviet/Russian Airborne forces.......
Where as in the case of the U.S. Army's Airborne doctrine and their promising and yet cancelled 'airborne assault vehicle' projects...I'm truly confused and frustrated, to the point that I'm of the opinion they may as well disband the 82nd Airborne division, for in a peer to peer combat situation, you can't fight effectively with M998 Humvee as your principle assault platform.
Maybe in an attempt to emphasise what I'm trying to say - The U.S. Army out of desperation acquired additional firepower for its 82nd Airborne Division, took on a small number of LAV-25A2 wheeled armored vehicles from the U.S. Marine Corps to help provide that additional firepower. Not that I have a problem with this aquasition, it's just that the U.S. Army on its own doing quite it's involvement in the LAV-25 program early in its development in around 1983.....



Regards
Pioneer

 

[TomS]

The US did actually make a nearly brigade paradrop (~1000 troops) during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was only sort of a combat drop as Kurdish militia and 10th Group Special Forces were waiting for them on the ground. Then they airlanded armored support in the form of a mechanized company [-] with 5 M1s, 5 M2s, and 5 or so M113 variants. But the transports were so heavy that the runway they were using broke down over a few days.

So you could make a case for why the US might want airlandable armor light enough to not require multiple C-5s into unimproved airstrips. But then again, the capability that the SF guys really used most to hold Iraqi armor was a seemingly endless flow of Javelins.

 

[uk 75]

The Soviet Airborne Armour has never really been put to the test againt a well trained opponent with reasonable anti-tank weapons at their disposal.
In West Germany for example territorial units had Panzerfausts and tanks or tank destroyers with 90mm and later 105mm guns. British Infantry Brigades there and in Denmark had Wombats, later Milans, as well as LAWs and some 30mm Rarden. These would have been more than a match for BMDs and ASU85s.

 

[Pioneer]

The Soviet Airborne Armour has never really been put to the test againt a well trained opponent with reasonable anti-tank weapons at their disposal.
In West Germany for example territorial units had Panzerfausts and tanks or tank destroyers with 90mm and later 105mm guns. British Infantry Brigades there and in Denmark had Wombats, later Milans, as well as LAWs and some 30mm Rarden. These would have been more than a match for BMDs and ASU85s.

The US did actually make a nearly brigade paradrop (~1000 troops) during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was only sort of a combat drop as Kurdish militia and 10th Group Special Forces were waiting for them on the ground. Then they airlanded armored support in the form of a mechanized company [-] with 5 M1s, 5 M2s, and 5 or so M113 variants. But the transports were so heavy that the runway they were using broke down over a few days.

So you could make a case for why the US might want airlandable armor light enough to not require multiple C-5s into unimproved airstrips. But then again, the capability that the SF guys really used most to hold Iraqi armor was a seemingly endless flow of Javelins.

In all due respect TomS, I don't think the peer adversaries like China or Russia are going to accommodate a 'airlanding of armored support'.
The Soviet's/Russian's both know and appreciate this, hence their stipulation of parachute-delivery of its equipment - be it artillery, air defence or armour.
As much as low-altitude parachute-extraction system (LAPES) has a usefulness, I'd hate to imagine the risk of such a technique in a Divisional-sized operation against an adversary like China or Russia, with their adherence to layered air defence.

Again 'the U.S. Army's criticism that the M8 AGS was too light and vulnerable' only reiterates to me that they've forgotten or chosen to forget the fundimental principles of airborne/para operations - which is to cease and hold given ground for a given time, until either withdrawn or supported by larger and heavier elements. The notion that 'if it isn't a MBT parachuted out the back of a transport aircraft, then it isn't worth fielding' frustrates me to no end.

uk 75, in the same incident, I can't help but think that NATO forces might not be in for a shock where and when they came face-to-face with the speed and firepower of a Soviet Airborne Division - their organic artillery, mortars, air defence, to say nothing of their BMD's ATGM's, 73mm gun and the ASU85 SPG.




Regards
Pioneer

 

[uk 75]

I think that both the 82nd Airborne and the Russian Airborne forces are more intended for use against third countries (Panama, Afghanistan) who do not have sophisticated anti-air and anti-tank missiles. They are also useful to reinforce allies like Saudi Arabia and Syria at short notice. The USSR used an Airborne unit to secure Prague airport. Russia of course might need to police internally or its neighbours. I think the US has also used the 82nd in Chicago and Dominican Republic.(may be wrong on this one).
The memory of Arnhem and Crete still haunts airborne force use. Bundeswehr units with M48s and Milan would have made short work of ASU85s and BMDs (remember the fate of PT76s in Vietnam). Il76 drops through the NATO Nike and Hawk belt and in the face of F4,15 and16 patrols would have needed luck. Against Norway or Turkey/Greece or Denmark/Netherlands they might have been more capable. Ireland might also have been a target.
British air portable brigades were disbanded before they could re-equip with the Scorpion family and 105mm Light Gun and only 8 Field Force remained. But if the UK had kept an East of Suez role, Third Division's three Stategic Reserve brigades would have had Scorpion/Scimitar/Striker and Spartan which were close to the BMDs in capability.

 

[kaiserd]

Isn’t the brutal truth that large scale airborne assaults against peer opponents are likely to be extremely costly to the point of being impractical military or politically except for some very specific but unlikely scenarios; especially for the US “ground” forces who in the Cold War scenario, at least in Europe, didn’t have the same overwhelmingly offensive role and ethos as their equivalent Soviet Forces had (and which has been seeded as inheritance to their Russian-only successors).
This difference is seen in the equipment of these forces, including their “airborne” armoured vehicles.
Hence the focus has been towards airborne forces as elite “firefighting” troops for rapid deployment and use against non-direct peer opponents; hence the US lack of focus in developing new specialist niche armoured vehicles for this role/use.
Given the other competing priorities this was a sensible decision validated by events and given that there appears to be ample evidence that large scale airborne assaults are likely to be becoming increasing costly and potentially impractical even against non-peer opponents then appears the calculus is only going one way.

 

[riggerrob]

At Arnhem, British paratroopers were urprised to meet Panzers. They put their PIATs and AT guns to good use, but Really needed SP AT guns to rapidly respond to Panzer attacks.
I am not sure if light AFVs are needed or transportable by Hercules.

I can foresee a punt-hulled (think British Saracen 6-wheeled APC) semi-monocoque chassis to protect against road-side bombs and mines. The cab would be quick-fold canvas. Arm it like a “technical” with AT rockets or heavy mortars. Mortars need hydraulically-deployed base-plates for best accuracy.
If this light- wheeled semi-AFV survives the first day or two of Battle, then you strap or bolt on Kevlar cab covers to protect the crew against plunging shrapnel.

 

[yasotay]

Isn’t the brutal truth that large scale airborne assaults against peer opponents are likely to be extremely costly to the point of being impractical military or politically except for some very specific but unlikely scenarios; especially for the US “ground” forces who in the Cold War scenario, at least in Europe, didn’t have the same overwhelmingly offensive role and ethos as their equivalent Soviet Forces had (and which has been seeded as inheritance to their Russian-only successors).
This difference is seen in the equipment of these forces, including their “airborne” armoured vehicles.
Hence the focus has been towards airborne forces as elite “firefighting” troops for rapid deployment and use against non-direct peer opponents; hence the US lack of focus in developing new specialist niche armoured vehicles for this role/use.
Given the other competing priorities this was a sensible decision validated by events and given that there appears to be ample evidence that large scale airborne assaults are likely to be becoming increasing costly and potentially impractical even against non-peer opponents then appears the calculus is only going one way.

I think this a very accurate summation of the current thinking of the U.S. Army.

 

[apparition13]

I think that both the 82nd Airborne and the Russian Airborne forces are more intended for use against third countries (Panama, Afghanistan) who do not have sophisticated anti-air and anti-tank missiles. They are also useful to reinforce allies like Saudi Arabia and Syria at short notice. The USSR used an Airborne unit to secure Prague airport.

I don't really know about the US, but I thought the VDV's intended role in a European war was as a sort of - interdiction force, for want of a better term. Use air drops to bypass the battle area and get into the NATO rear areas and create chaos. In order to do so the troops needed mobility, fire support, NBC protection, and small arms protection. I think of the BMD/Sprut/BTR family more as Humvees than AFVs. Essentially NBC protected mobility; airdroppable and amphibious to get to and maneuver in the rear areas, firepower to destroy their targets, and enough armor to survive contact with rear echelon troops since they weren't as likely to encounter frontline heavy armor units. If they did they would probably try to run away and find somewhere else to create disruption.

Their use as "firefighters" comes from their mobility, not from design as third world intervention/counter-insurgency forces.

I have my doubts as to whether they could get to a drop area without being shot down given modern air defense systems, so the entire concept may be outdated. But if they could get into rear areas they would have the ability to take on infantry and Striker-type units. Not the heavies, but if you have to pull heavies to take them out that just makes the front weaker for the other guy's heavies.

 

[uk 75]

Apparition 13 The Warsaw Pact had lots of helicopter borne units for the interdiction role. The West Germans re-roled their three airborne brigades as helicopter borne forces to reinforce weak points or provide mobile anti-tank reserves.
The seven Soviet Airborne Divisions had plenty of options in rear and flank areas where air and ground defences were light or non existent (Austria and Ireland come to mind- controling Shannon airport). But their main value (as with the 82nd) was in limited early interventions like Panama and Afghanistan

 

[kaiserd]

Apparition 13 The Warsaw Pact had lots of helicopter borne units for the interdiction role. The West Germans re-roled their three airborne brigades as helicopter borne forces to reinforce weak points or provide mobile anti-tank reserves.
The seven Soviet Airborne Divisions had plenty of options in rear and flank areas where air and ground defences were light or non existent (Austria and Ireland come to mind- controling Shannon airport). But their main value (as with the 82nd) was in limited early interventions like Panama and Afghanistan

As an Irish person I’d love to know the source for the supposed interest of Soviet Airborne forces in neutral backwaters like the Republic of Ireland. Sounds like a complete waste of their time and resources in the context of a wider European war likely rapidly escalating to a wider nuclear exchange. Also don’t know how such an airborne force would survive the long flight (distance and flight time) past or through multiple NATO nations (especially the UKs) air defences, and what they would be expected to achieve if they did.

 

[uk 75]

No source. I like the idea of the USSR respecting neutrality though. I merely shifted Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising from Iceland to Ireland. Borrowing from what the Sovs did in Prague in 1968. Using Aeroflot markinged transports to capture and hold Shannon Airport at the beginning of hostilities and disrupt air travel across the Atlantic. Ireland had virtually no Armed Forces and I think we can guess whose side the IRA would have been on. Most UK units in Ulster would have reinforced BAOR leaving a few infantry formations. Bears and Backfires staging through Shannon would have been worth the risk of transiting relatively undefended Scottish and Ulster airspace, RAF Lightnings being focussed on the East Coast, so only a sqn of Phantoms at Leuchars. And given Mrs T's attitude to Ireland we would have left you to deal with the problem.

 

[JFC Fuller]

There is a distinct difference between airportable and airdroppable, both in terms of role and in terms of the impact on vehicle design and doctrine. The former allows flexible rapid deployment and remains a frequent AFV design driver to this day, see the US Army MPF and OMFV programmes, the Stryker was designed to be air transportable in volume though has grown in weight significantly since.

The Soviets in the Cold War, and the Russian's in reduced form today, have an airborne doctrine that is evolutionary of Soviet thinking from the 1930s and in many respects comparable to the use of airborne forces by the Western Allies in offensive operations in WW2. As such they created, and maintain, an elaborate suite of air-droppable vehicles that could be deployed from their large fleet of large transport aircraft. such operations in a general war would require air superiority though, that seems challenging in the early stages of any peer conflict.

The Western approach on the other hand has tended to emphasise air-droppable units as niche light infantry forces but with a large element of air-portability built into wider force structures. To take the British example, 3 Division existed as a UK based strategic reserve from 1951 through to the mid 1970s under various guises and with various unit combinations. Airportability was always a feature (see exercise STARLIGHT in 1960) but this was formalised in 1968 with the creation of Army Strategic Command at which point 5th, 19th and 24th Infantry Brigades were classified as airportable within 3 Division and 16 Parachute regiment was attached to the new command. The emphasis here is the airportable element, rather than airdoppable. All of this was unwound in the mid 1970s, the same time as Transport Command lost significant lift capability but experimentation continued resulting in the late 1980s reorganisation that brought back the 24th Air Mobile Brigade as an air mobile anti-tank "speed bump" in the Cold War European theatre role, though largely helicopter based.

Crudely, airdroppable vehicles are a function of what you can drop from a plane without it being damaged on landing. Airpotable is a vehicle you can get inside an aircraft and with which the aircraft can take off. M1 Abrams are airportable in C-17 and C-5. Designing an operation around airportablity is about the ability to sustain transported forces as well as the transport of forces themselves.

 

[riggerrob]

Air portable armoured forces require the invader to first capture an airfield, Secondly Air-land vehicles, thirdly have a massive transport fleet that can deliver hundreds of tons per day of fuel, ammo, rations, spare parts, etc.
Only a handful of modern air forces have that many transport planes.

 

[Foo Fighter]

My understanding of the soviet airborn units was to get behind the main defence line to be a distraction to the main defence. Any briefings I attended they were seen as sacrificial in nature to allow the main advance to gain traction/ground. Is this not the only real mission against peer or near peer adversaries?

 

[Foo Fighter]

"I think we can guess whose side the IRA would have been on".

I am sorry but that is a totally senseless and pointless post, what makes you think the IRA would want Russian/Soviet/Warsaw pact occupation of Ireland?

 

[Grey Havoc]

Actually, both the Soviet Union and NATO had contingency plans for Ireland ranging from limited incursions to full scale invasions. Shannon Airport in particular was seen as a very strategic location by both sides. In both Soviet and NATO scenarios for it airborne forces would have figured heavily in securing it, with naval and amphibious forces subsequently securing the nearby major city & port of Limerick in full fledged invasion plans. Of course, the Cloak and Dagger Brigades from both sides had plans & covert assets in place for situations for where the military solution was undesirable or not available. Basically denying the use of the airport to the enemy by any and all means necessary. There have been reports over the years that the Soviets at least also had Shannon pencilled in for a sub-strategic nuclear strike if the situation should demand it, e.g. if the KGB and GRU (including pre-deployed Spetsnaz units) had been unable to prevent the airport falling into NATO hands intact and conventional options were not otherwise available.

Interestingly, Galway was apparently another priority strategic location so far as the Soviets were concerned, though in that case it would have been the Soviet Navy and Naval Infantry that would have played the primary role in securing it.

 

[JFC Fuller]

My understanding of the soviet airborn units was to get behind the main defence line to be a distraction to the main defence. Any briefings I attended they were seen as sacrificial in nature to allow the main advance to gain traction/ground. Is this not the only real mission against peer or near peer adversaries?

Courtesy of the CIA we have a translated 1959 manual from the USSR Ministry of Defence for the employment of airborne forces available here. Equally interesting is this 1969 report on Soviet airlift capability.

Pertinent to this thread, generally the Soviets deployed a 31 strong special assault gun battalion of ASU-85s with each VDV division. Each of the three regiments within a VDV division had its own 9 gun ASU-57 company. This held until BMD's replaced the ASU-57s and the Nona-S replaced the ASU-85s. There was consideration in the late 1960s of an airborne light tank instead, this would have had the 2A48 100mm anti-tank gun, two competing prototypes were built (Objects 685 and 934) but no procurement took place.

 

[TomS]

"I think we can guess whose side the IRA would have been on".

I am sorry but that is a totally senseless and pointless post, what makes you think the IRA would want Russian/Soviet/Warsaw pact occupation of Ireland?

I expect the policy would have been much like the Republic during WW2 -- ally with the second invader against the first.

 

[kaiserd]

Actually, both the Soviet Union and NATO had contingency plans for Ireland ranging from limited incursions to full scale invasions. Shannon Airport in particular was seen as a very strategic location by both sides. In both Soviet and NATO scenarios for it airborne forces would have figured heavily in securing it, with naval and amphibious forces subsequently securing the nearby major city & port of Limerick in full fledged invasion plans. Of course, the Cloak and Dagger Brigades from both sides had plans & covert assets in place for situations for where the military solution was undesirable or not available. Basically denying the use of the airport to the enemy by any and all means necessary. There have been reports over the years that the Soviets at least also had Shannon pencilled in for a sub-strategic nuclear strike if the situation should demand it, e.g. if the KGB and GRU (including pre-deployed Spetsnaz units) had been unable to prevent the airport falling into NATO hands intact and conventional options were not otherwise available.

Interestingly, Galway was apparently another priority strategic location so far as the Soviets were concerned, though in that case it would have been the Soviet Navy and Naval Infantry that would have played the primary role in securing it.

Sources for these statements?

 

[kaiserd]

No source. I like the idea of the USSR respecting neutrality though. I merely shifted Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising from Iceland to Ireland. Borrowing from what the Sovs did in Prague in 1968. Using Aeroflot markinged transports to capture and hold Shannon Airport at the beginning of hostilities and disrupt air travel across the Atlantic. Ireland had virtually no Armed Forces and I think we can guess whose side the IRA would have been on. Most UK units in Ulster would have reinforced BAOR leaving a few infantry formations. Bears and Backfires staging through Shannon would have been worth the risk of transiting relatively undefended Scottish and Ulster airspace, RAF Lightnings being focussed on the East Coast, so only a sqn of Phantoms at Leuchars. And given Mrs T's attitude to Ireland we would have left you to deal with the problem.

“...we would have left you to deal with the problem.” is the end of a mountain of fantasy and absurdity (in line with your comments I’m sure Thatchers attitude would actually have been “yeah go ahead Russians, that’ll teach them Irish”).

So the USSR would start WW3 via Shannon Airport staff wondering why so many Russian business men had turned looking to purchase duty-free (a lot of Bailey’s, Guinness and Arran jumpers). Really?
How could Bears and Backfired use Shannon Airport for staging if they landed there probably not taking off? How would they even get there? Has the US (armed forces and nation) also conveniently ceased to exist, ditto RAF Strike Command?
Why your complete overrating of the significance of the IRA to this “topic” while belittling of the far more relevant Irish defence forces?
Wouldn’t most of NATO and the Warsaw Pact be in the process of becoming intimately more familiar with the treats of a post-nuclear exchange existence well before any such scenario would ever be remotely likely to play out?

 

[GARGEAN]

Ideas about airborne troops being useless or too vulnerable to AD network are going from not proper understanding of their roles. They are not there to create fighting fronts nor they are there to be close to main fighting area. They can fly far, using areas with absent or least dense ADN, land in area with prematurely supressed AA that is located far away (up to thousands km) from expected main acting area, and capture/disrupt/destroy something valuable enough that this would require answer from opponent. This will either include good chunk of airforce or rapid redeployment of some ground force elements (most probably both).
Airborne troops themselves don't need to fight hard, tank shots from cannons/ATGMs and so on. They need to drag and spread forces of enemies in crucial hours of action. And there is no other element that can do something remotely comparable. Anything ground based will take orders of magnitude more time for that approach and can be countered in process by timely relocation of opposing forces. Airstrikes can cause only so much damage and can't *capture* areas, so no beneficial thinning of enemy forces.

 

[uk 75]

"I think we can guess whose side the IRA would have been on".

I am sorry but that is a totally senseless and pointless post, what makes you think the IRA would want Russian/Soviet/Warsaw pact occupation of Ireland?

Is this the same IRA which used Czech supplied explosives and tied down more than a division's worth of NATO's finest infantry for countless years?

 

[Grey Havoc]

Sources for these statements?

One of my sources was a piece by RTE (our national broadcaster) from the late 2000s on Aeroflot's presence at Shannon Airport over the years, including during the Cold War era. Not online unfortunately. In 1978 Aeroflot, with the assistance of the U.S.S.R.’s Ministry of Civil aviation, actually got permission to set up refuelling facilities including a dedicated Fuel Farm at Shannon, much to the concern of both Britain and the United States (especially given that the Soviets were actively supporting the Provisional IRA and others in their attempts to overthrow the Irish government and replace it with a presumably more pro-Soviet government), even more so when December 1979 rolled around. The Aeroflot staff stationed in Shannon had throughout the Cold War standing orders to ensure the destruction of the fuel farm in the event of the outbreak of open hostilities, doubtless backed up by undercover KGB operatives among the staff members. Aeroflot's presence in Shannon was, needless to say, not always smooth sailing, such as this incident. Aeroflot stopped using the facility in the mid-1990s with the acquisition of new longer ranged aircraft, but retained it for emergencies and as a still handy source of hard currency.

 

[Grey Havoc]

"I think we can guess whose side the IRA would have been on".

I am sorry but that is a totally senseless and pointless post, what makes you think the IRA would want Russian/Soviet/Warsaw pact occupation of Ireland?

Is this the same IRA which used Czech supplied explosives and tied down more than a division's worth of NATO's finest infantry for countless years?

Though to be fair, a lot of that was down to ROE restrictions during the 1960s and 70s.

 

[uk 75]

Kaiserd I now understand your feelings about the British which has surfaced in other threads.
I chose Ireland (I notice you didnt feel so upset about Austria which I chose for similar reasons) because unlike Finland and Sweden which demonstrated their willingness and ability to defend themselves, Ireland prefered to put its faith in unarmed rneutrality.
Unlike in World War 2 the UK had few land forces available to send.
As for starting a war in Ireland I simply took the plot of RedStormRising ( apologies to the late Mr Clancy) which as you will recall does not involve nuclear use by anyone.
As for the reference to MrsT it was uncalled for, though Brighton has the same resonance with Tories as Oklahoma City does with Americans. The 80s were a very different time from now.

 

[uk 75]

As a rider to the above, although I have never been to Ireland, I have known many fine people from all over the island, North and South.
The Soviet intervention above was only intended to facilitate the war against NATO (as in RSR), the Russians know their history and would not have been as stupid as to try and something which even the Third Reich had not been daft enough to attempt, though like me here they did wargame it.
The Irish would have resisted Soviet oppression every bit as strongly as they did the Brits.

 

[Jemiba]

Just a reminder : This is a theme about "what could have been ..."
... and it's in the Bar, the section of this forum, where, I cite "..any offtopic postings" are ok, as long, as they aren't offensive.
I can see different opinions here, and, yes, some bias, but still yet, I cannot see the latter !
So, why some of you, and oddly , always the same, aren't capable either of tolerating other opinions, or, worse, much worse,
trying again and again to use it as a weapon ??

Those who dislike such a theme, simply can ignore it ! There's absolutely no pressure to read it, even less to participate !

WHAT'S THE DIFFICULTY ABOUT THAT ??!

If this behaviour won't stop, I see no other way, than to prosecute those, who are regarding the report-system as a
gun in their personal holster !

 

[uk 75]

I ought to explain that I have been involved in NATO wargaming since the early 1970s when I bought a copy of SPI's NATO boardgame in the sixth form at school. From the 80s on as a civil servant I found myself on the fringes of the real versions.
From these experiences I can confirm that together with Sir John Hackett's two books about a Third World War in 1985, Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising is one of the best accounts of what we expected a Soviet attack to look like.
As I mentioned above, in Prague in 1968 and in Kabul in 1979 the Soviets had used their elite airborne divisions to initiate an invasion.
NATO nations and countries like Sweden were well aware of this and had peace time air patrols to investigate unusual air traffic.
The two exceptions in Western Europe were Austria and Ireland, which had some trainer/light jets but relied on their neutral status. However, Austria had well equipped ground forces with main battle tanks and medium artillery. In Ireland, north and south, there were plenty of infantry units but no mbts or medium artillery. Furthermore, the overstretched resources of RAF Ukadge were mainly geared to defending the main UK and US strike bases in the South and East and bases in Scotland.
Shannon airport, as has been explained above, was well known and used by both sides. Securing its unimpeded use in the initial phase of the war would have been a typical use for Soviet airborne troops. Once secured and defended by mobile SAMs, it would have taken a major effort by NATO to dislodge or impede its use. The arriving US forces would have done so in time, but it would have deflected them from key NATO roles.

 

[uk 75]

JFC described the composition of the UK Strategic Reserve with 3 Division and 16 Para Brigade. It is worh adding that briefly from 1968 the UK added another 3 brigade sized formation: 5 Division. The Northern Ireland crisis led to this being disbanded in 1970.
Combined with 3 Royal Marine Commando Brigade this gave the UK an impressive capability. RAF Air Support Command had been given Andover, Hercules, Belfast, and VC10s as well as older Britannia, Comet and Twin Pioneer with specialised ground attack aircraft (Hunters,Harriers,Phantoms) in 38 Group. The RN had 2 Commando carriers, 2 LPDs, and 5 LSLs.
By 1968 the lessons of Suez and the 1961 Kuwait intervention had been learnt and implemented. The new CVR family and 105m light gun would complete the job.
The calamitous economic performance of the UK had unraveled much of this force by 1982. Fortunately enough was left to show what it could have achieved at full strength.

 

[kaiserd]

I ought to explain that I have been involved in NATO wargaming since the early 1970s when I bought a copy of SPI's NATO boardgame in the sixth form at school. From the 80s on as a civil servant I found myself on the fringes of the real versions.
From these experiences I can confirm that together with Sir John Hackett's two books about a Third World War in 1985, Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising is one of the best accounts of what we expected a Soviet attack to look like.
As I mentioned above, in Prague in 1968 and in Kabul in 1979 the Soviets had used their elite airborne divisions to initiate an invasion.
NATO nations and countries like Sweden were well aware of this and had peace time air patrols to investigate unusual air traffic.
The two exceptions in Western Europe were Austria and Ireland, which had some trainer/light jets but relied on their neutral status. However, Austria had well equipped ground forces with main battle tanks and medium artillery. In Ireland, north and south, there were plenty of infantry units but no mbts or medium artillery. Furthermore, the overstretched resources of RAF Ukadge were mainly geared to defending the main UK and US strike bases in the South and East and bases in Scotland.
Shannon airport, as has been explained above, was well known and used by both sides. Securing its unimpeded use in the initial phase of the war would have been a typical use for Soviet airborne troops. Once secured and defended by mobile SAMs, it would have taken a major effort by NATO to dislodge or impede its use. The arriving US forces would have done so in time, but it would have deflected them from key NATO roles.

Wouldn’t an essentially still undefended civilian airport been extremely easy to render unusable out with one (relatively small) air strike?
The Goose-Green equivalent of one crater?
Or would the airborne units also had to take full Soviet air defence units with them? So not only have you to fly in the airborne forces but multiple SAMs, radars, entire Soviet air defence regiments? And even if you did isn’t the RAF or USAF flying the short distance from UK bases still taking the civilian airport (no hardened shelters etc.) out of operation within a couple of hours at most? The Soviet’s would know that they would....

With all the previous comments about the distance from Soviet bases and having to transverse NATO defended airspace to even get there in the first place.

And all for the opportunity costs of what all else all these (surviving and mostly shot down) forces would be required to do in a wider WW3.

And without the civilian airport wouldn’t everybody more or less left the Soviet airborne forces alone as they will be essentially wasting their time otherwise?
And even if they had could have got over all those problems could that airport have ever facilitated any Soviet bombers etc. with virtually zero logistic support and vulnerability on the ground?
Or is it more regiments worth of Soviet support forces, spare parts/ engines, repair/ construction crews, bulldozers etc. that also would have to flown in and maintained.

Shannon would never have been busier....

In this context I’d also note this is very much not a “what-if” topic. This is all being contended seriously, as I understand it.

 

[riggerrob]

As an aside, during the Cold War, Aeroflot routinely re-fuelled airliners at Gander, Newfoundland. These Aeroflot airliners carried communist tourists to vacations in sunny Cuba.
Circa 1989, I met a Czech doctor who defected to Canada while returning from Cuba.

The Irish diaspora is pretty thick along the east coast of the Island of Newfoundland. With only the Royal Newfoundland Regiment (Canadian Army Reserve) they were too weak to militarily repulse an invasion, so would have invited Russian invaders home for a kitchen party involving plenty of singing and drinking and dancing and “shagging.” Newfies are one of the few clans that can drink Russians under the table!
Hah!
Hah!

 

[JFC Fuller]

The 5th Infantry Division under Army Strategic Command consisted of the 2nd, 8th and 39th Infantry Brigades, these have been described as little more than holding units for battalions resting in the UK between operational commitments. Either way, they were a long way from the rapid airportable concept that applied to 3 Division. From 1968 the Royal Marines had four Commandos, having had five in the early 1960s. Harold Watkinson had advocated for a sixth Commando as Minister of Defence in 1962.

With the UK in mind. In the 1950s one of the Transport Command objectives was to be able to lift one division, I assume 3 Division was the one in mind, to the Far East in one month. A force of 32 Beverleys and 24 V.1000's was deemed necessary to achieve this. This brings us back to the challenges of airborne armour, of those two types only the Beverley could carry large vehicles and its maximum payload was 45,000lbs, the same as for the AW.681 and early C-130 variants and at the bottom end of the Contentious weight range. A Beverley is reported as having dropped 40,000lbs in October 1959 using eight 66ft parachutes, this sounds a lot like the 17.5 ton drop mentioned in the Dark Age of Tanks, there is no evidence the RAF ever dropped anything heavier. Ordinarily the largest single drop the RAF could do was 35,000lbs using the Heavy Stressed Platform and this was mostly used for engineering loads such as the BK10 grader. With a 45,000lb load a Beverley was only going to go a bit over 200 miles, though the AW.681 and C-130 could do a lot better and would be available in larger numbers than the Beverley. Even so, each aircraft would still only be able to carry a single 20 ton Contentious. Even a Belfast, with a 78,000lb payload, would only be able to carry a single Contentious. Whilst carrying a Contentious these aircraft would be able to carry little else, thus significantly increasing the requirement for airlift capacity to meet stated objectives.

 

[uk 75]

Kaiserd
To begin with your last point first. This is only a "what if' and not a serious present day problem as the USSR no longer exists and as far as I know no published war plans for its airborne divisions exist.
The operation I describe would have been intended to distract NATO from the main Central Front attack on the eve of war.
It would have lasted at most a couple of days and the runway and fuel farm would have helped refuel and recover Bear and Backfires engaged in attacking NATO reinfiorcement shipping.
Soviet Airborne forces had Sam 8 and 9 wheeled vehicles attached. Unless France obliged, NATO would have already had its hands full with work on the Central Front. Timing would have been everything.
The Sovs had at least seven of these divisions so they could have spared part of one at least for a classic distraction operation

 

[uk 75]

JFC As usual your research and detailed knowledge is very helpful. Fills many holes in my knowledge.
Malkara on Hornet wheeled vehicles were briefly replaced by the FerretV withSwingfire.
( There was a Ferret4 with similar big wheels but these never caught on either?)
The Scorpions, Scimitars and Strikers with Swingfire seem a better bet as Airportable armour than Contentious. Were any of them ever air dropped as well?

 

[uk 75]

I had not really spent much time on my Ireland or Austria scenarios the Soviet Airborne Divisions other than trying to find something worthwhile for them to do in heavily defended Western Europe.
Since it provoked such a strong reaction I thought I would look again at the Irish Defence Forces.
The Army has a justifiably high reputation for its discipline and effectiveness as a peacekeeping force. It acquired Scorpion light tanks and 105m light guns from the UK in the period I covered. Obliquely it is clear that knowledge between the British and Irish Army was exchanged. So my Soviet desant on Shannon was even more unlikely than suggested.

 

[jsport]

If you can't mostly match Russsian and PLAA airborne armored vehicles (ie before their airborne mobile IADS completely prevent airborne ops) to save islands like Taiwan, Japan, UK than ur S out of L?

 

[Stovepipe]

Point to note: regardless of Mrs Thatcher's opinion, the Irish Defence Forces and the UK military have always engaged with each other in a very professional and friendly fashion, right from the foundation of the State and continue to do so to this day, both publicly and covertly. That's despite the Troubles. Our relations with them work well, despite politics and the stupidities of Governments.