Alternative RAF, 1936-41?

[tomo pauk]

If I had time I would do a table to prove that the 1,256 Bothas ordered were intended to replace the Anson in the 11 G.R. squadrons in Coastal Command and to equip more than a few G.R. squadrons that were to be formed in the Overseas Commands as part of Schemes F & L. The Beaufort was to equip the existing torpedo-bomber squadrons in Coastal Command & Singapore and the new squadrons to be formed at Hong Kong & Malta as part of Schemes F & L.

Unfortunately, reality was that Botha was a waste of time and resources (both material and that of man-hours). RAF's intentions and hopes notwithstanding.
So again: I suggest that whole Botha program is axed before the mock-up stage.

Unless you're being sarcastic No. 608 squadron went from Ansons to Bothas not the other way around. Then it operated Blenheims for a few months before converting to the Hudson

Sorry, I've misread this:

The sole squadron that was equipped with the type (No. 608) was a G.R. squadron that had formerly been equipped with Ansons.

 

[riggerrob]

Airplanes like Botha and Defiant should only be built in small numbers. Test fly them a few times, then write down lessons-learned and move on to better flying airplanes.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

If I had time I would do a table to prove that the 1,256 Bothas ordered were intended to replace the Anson in the 11 G.R. squadrons in Coastal Command and to equip more than a few G.R. squadrons that were to be formed in the Overseas Commands as part of Schemes F & L. The Beaufort was to equip the existing torpedo-bomber squadrons in Coastal Command & Singapore and the new squadrons to be formed at Hong Kong & Malta as part of Schemes F & L.

Unfortunately, reality was that Botha was a waste of time and resources (both material and that of man-hours). RAF's intentions and hopes notwithstanding. So again: I suggest that whole Botha program is axed before the mock-up stage.

Airplanes like Botha and Defiant should only be built in small numbers. Test fly them a few times, then write down lessons-learned and move on to better flying airplanes.

Neither of those suggestions will work because from about 1936 the RAF started ordering aircraft into production "off the drawing board" which means they placed production contracts before the prototype flew and in some cases before it was even ordered. This was in order to cut several years off the development phase to get the aircraft into service sooner.

Before this policy was implemented the prototypes were evaluated by the A&AEE or MAEE & production contracts were placed for the best one or two. This process also allowed lessons learned from the prototype to be incorporated into the production aircraft.

Had the old procedure been followed the ALT-Botha would have entered RAF service free of the defects that plagued the real aircraft and this would have included more powerful engines. This would have been because the problems (such as it was under powered) would have been revealed when the prototype was tested and the required improvements would have been incorporated into the production aircraft. However, it would have entered service up to two or three years later than the Real-Botha.

Therefore, some of the types ordered in this period were bound to be failures and (as far as I know) the Air Ministry knew that but it was a risk that had to be taken.

For what it's worth I agree that the Botha and Defiant should have never been ordered in the first place and to that list I'd also add the De Havilland Don trainer and Saro Lerwick flying boat. However, we need different causes to achieve the desired effect.

 

[alertken]

We are drifting from ALT to Fantasy, because we are informed by hindsight. No-one ordered Lerwick &tc expecting failure, just as Freeman did not know his Folly, a wooden unarmed Speed Bomber, would become...what it did. Spitfire would have been chopped in 1938 if Beaufighter, Whirlwind, cannon had been a bit better a bit sooner. Ministers did what seemed a good idea at the time. Risk. Damned if they do, damned if they don't.

ALT is of value only when we can suggest a course realistic at the time decision-makers did what they did, not as we now ALT-propose. So: I've just persevered through an ALT that fails on that test: G.Baughen, RAF on the Offensive, 1940-41, which castigates all involved in choosing Heavy, over (disdained) Army Co-op, thus causing the succession of retreats by the pre-War Regular (Colonial garrison) Army.

Go to the UK Election, 14/11/35 that UK PM Baldwin won, instantly funding for blockade/bombardment by Battleships, armoured carriers, Heavies, to the detriment of a large Expeditionary Force to sit behind the Maginot ready to mow them down, Somme-like. At the time that was not only a good idea, but was also courageous: some of the Projects then funded were kept secret, not from Germany but from us, the funding-voters. As late as the day before Austrian Anschluss, the Labour Opposition and much of the public, were Opposed to Merchants of Death, and were loudly for Disarmament by Example.

So the actual ALT, 11/35-4/38 would be: no Re-armament, not Better Re-armament. We should thank Chancellor, then PM Chamberlain for what was done: after Munich, 9/38: "Never from No.10 did any order come to slow up anything....we were encouraged and approved to double our efforts" (e.g.: to buy anything that flew, or might soon, in US) U/SoS Air H.Balfour, Wings Over Westminster,P.111.

 

[red admiral]

One of the points in ordering multiple types to the same spec (ish) was the expectation of failures. This wasn't some winner takes all competition.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Is there anything realistic that can be done to get the Centaurus & Griffon engines into service sooner and to avoid the Sabre's extended teething troubles & the failure of the Vulture?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I asked the above question in relation to the "RAF with better bombers" thread as well as this one. Having reliable engines in the power class of the Centaurus, Griffon, Sabre & Vulture in the second half of 1940 opens up some interesting possibilities.

 

[ArtosStark]

Is there anything realistic that can be done to get the Centaurus & Griffon engines into service sooner and to avoid the Sabre's extended teething troubles & the failure of the Vulture?

AIUI though both engines had their difficulties a major reason the Centaurus and Griffon were slow to come to use was that the earlier engines (Merlin’s and Hercules) absorbed the development and there wasn’t a strong call for an engine in the 2000 hp range immediately. So to get them in place earlier you probably either need a stronger official desire for them sooner (possibly at the expense of work on earlier engines) or more development resources to throw around.

The Sabre probably needed new management. Napier had some good engineers but no chief designer and the company leadership were a little reluctant to spend scarce resources on R and D or on modernizing production. So Napier had a very outdated primary production facility and too few people to oversee the expansion through the shadow scheme. This led to poor reliability and slow development. The loan from Bristol of Taurus cylinders showed them the way forward on their largest engineering problem but IIUC it took EE to supply the management and the resources necessary to make the company a viable producer. So to improve the Sabre you probably have to put EE in charge earlier. Maybe in 1935/1936 when the Shadow scheme is getting underway?

 

[robunos]

Is there anything realistic that can be done to get the Centaurus & Griffon engines into service sooner and to avoid the Sabre's extended teething troubles & the failure of the Vulture?

Ha !!
My favourite hobby horse . . .
Since Bristol were already 'helping' Napier with the Sabre engine sleeves, have Bristol take over Napier, chop the Sabre, move 'the simple stuff' ( Pegasus, other 'small' engines), to Napier's and let Bristol concentrate on Centaurus and Hercules.
As for Griffon Vulture / Griffon, the problem was that both of these engines were RR products, and were competing for resources with each other, and the Merlin. AIUI, the Vulture was effectively sorted out when it was chopped, and it was chopped for production / industrial reasons, rather than technical ones . . . As for Griffon, Merlin was the priority, and developed Merlins were soon producing equivalent power to contemporary Griffons in a smaller package.

cheers,
Robin.

 

[robunos]

I've been thinking of a way to get more use out of the Defiant in this scenario . . .
If, IF, the Air Staff can be reminded of the role played by the RAF's ground attack DH.5s and Camels, could the concept be resurrected in 1939 or 1940?. Either switch the Hurricane to ground attack, effectively becoming the 'Hurribomber', and make up the fighter shortfall with the BP P.94 single seat Defiant, or, given that removing the turret, guns, ammo, and gunner saves 787lbs weight from the Defiant, and adding back four guns, their ammo, and a gunsight still leaves 590lbs available for bombs and maybe some armour, use the Defiant in the ground attack role instead . . .

cheers,
Robin.

 

[alertken]

We need Calum Douglas, Secret Horsepower Race. He and others may offer thoughts on metallurgy, valves poppet and sleeve, lubricants and superchargers. May I offer some points on the business side, where the established "Ring" of qualified designers simply prejudiced Defence of the Realm. RAE/A.M funded Hyper Power amply; industry stumbled amply. “Peregrine, Vulture, Sabre, Hercules VI, Centaurus, Griffon are outstanding examples of (hopes) disappointed or deferred” Postan,Official History, War Prodn,P167. Napier Design Dept. “devoid of drive...inadequacy (MAP) forced through a drastic reform.” Postan, A/c Prodn. Quality, Pp.37/8/133.

Ministers, seized by the notion that "draughtsmen" Ruled OK!, were in short supply, declined licence Proposals from wannabee newbies (for small engines and for Hispano-Suiza, P&W); Fairey spent £100K, with a modest A.M. contribution to run P.24 Monarch (2,200hp, 1938/9). But the workload of bringing <2,000hp engines to a level of reliability and ease of fabrication fit to meet Rearmament demand meant that the Ring could not also do Hyper. How did Hives think RR (ready to exit Aero in 1935) in 1939 could turn greenfields into high-volume producers, while trying to develop multiple new types, whilst ever-improving Merlin? If he banished his best and finest Managers thither, who is left to mind the home shop?

What Ministers did was:
* to give Napier a new Agency Factory in Liverpool, staffed by bright girls wishing to be taught how to give our boys the tools to do the job - Sabre engines. When Napier failed to do that MAP put in a Management team from Standard Motors. When that didn't work MAP invited English Electric to buy Napier;
* urged HS Group to get a grip on ASM to produce and support Cheetah/Tiger and to stop wasting effort on various Hounds (upto 4,000hp) when they couldn't churn out puppies;
* culled RR's aviary, to attend to more Merlins, to make Griffon work, asked them to thank MAP nicely for giving them Crewe and Hillingdon Agency Factories, and now please to aid Ford and Packard (RR had tried in 1939 to drag their feet on aid to imposed second sources, asserting proprietary interest in the product). There was a War in prospect.
* explored licenced Centaurus in GM and Canada, Bristol seen to be slow and already attempting yet bigger Orion; and:
* to accelerate US production, truly vast sums were spent (by France, too) on expanding US capacity (a "British Wing" was built at P&W/Hartford).

So, to OP's Q: what was not done, that could have been done? Well: choose in 1937-ish one of Bristol, RR to do Hyper, the other to stay with Hercules/Merlin.
It was truly shocking that MAP built at humungous cost an underground factory at Corsham to build Centaurus even if Patchway were bombed, yet so slow and bugged was Centaurus that its sole combat success was U-927, 24/2/45, Warwick G.R.V. But if that had been foreseen and all bets placed on Griffon...would that have arrived quicker?

I think the A is...nothing really.

 

[Apophenia]

...
* explored licenced Centaurus in GM and Canada, Bristol seen to be slow ...

Does that mean that wartime Centaurus production in North America was seriously considered?

Does "in GM and Canada" mean options of by GM in the US and in Canada? Or are we talking about GM in Oshawa?

 

[alertken]

"seriously": maybe not.
House of Commons was told by Air Ministry 14/2/39 that no RAF aircraft built in Canada would have engines built in Canada, so Hampden was to have Bristol-built Pegasus; Stirling II, US-built Wright R-2800. Air Ministry (14/5/40: MAP) 4-8/40 explored much in US, authorised to spend $ "recklessly". Scope of discussion included US licences for UK kit, almost all abortive, not, as is Received Wisdom, Not Invented Here - UK was to pay, but on very practical issues such as fastener standards. That would be a factor in UK not deploying, say P-36 on hand but unpacked when our backs were to the wall that summer.

Licenced Centaurus was one item. Outcome was led by GM President W.S.Knudsen (to be US Army's sole 3 star recruit) in National Defense Advisory Committee, who caused all US industrialists except Henry Ford to decide to take our money. UK bought 3,174 Wright Cyclones (inc for 140 Stirling II on order from CAA, Canada) for $51.5Mn (UK cash: no US Lend/Lease till 4/41), inc >$20M for plant capacity expansion. We also gave GM >$6Mn for expansion at Allison, $20Mn for Packard, $15Mn P&W. (Source: P.88,HD Hall/SS Wrigley, Official Hist WW2, Civil Series, Studies of Overseas Supply, HMSO,1956 and Pp 288/9, HD Hall N.American Supply,HMSO,1953).

So "GM" probably meant its Allison Div.