A more determined France in the 1930s

[uk 75]

Winston Churchill was not alone in thinking Thank God for the French Army.

After 1933 the few remaining democracies in Europe saw France as the only effective opposition to a resurgent Germany.

I realise it is a big political ask but let us suppose France decided to work more closely with Czechoslovakia and encourage Belgium to see the dangers of neutrality.

I have never quite understood why France attached so much importance to British involvement. The Czechs had a much bigger and better Army. With help they could have improved the Air Force.

The French Navy on the other hand made little military contribution to confronting Germany. Unlike the Kaiser Hitler showed only slight interest in his Navy.

A closer military arrangement with the Czechs and a more assertive position on safeguarding existing borders might well have contained Germany.

 

[Dilandu]

The French Navy on the other hand made little military contribution to confronting Germany. Unlike the Kaiser Hitler showed only slight interest in his Navy.

Incorrect. Hitler from very beginning was building up the navy specifically to confront France. Opposing France on sea was basically the core of pre-war German naval strategy; war with Britain was (pre Plan Z) considered either impossible outright, or at very least in distant future, but the assumption was, that French Navy would try to establish blockade of Germany in North Sea and Channel.

I have never quite understood why France attached so much importance to British involvement.

Because France lacked numbers, especially with alliance with Belgium not secured. To protect the long French border, France required more troops.

 

[Archibald]

The answer is : the Daladier-Gamelin axis of stupidity. It did immense damage. Removing these two would help a lot.

 

[uk 75]

Dilandu Yes of course with the Anglo German Naval agreement the Kriegsmarine's capital ships were matching France. France also had to worry about Italy. Richelieu and Jean Bart mirror Bismark and Tirpitz.

I suppose as in WW1 150,000 British infantry even if not very well equipped can help. On paper at least the RAF also added useful numbers of aircraft.

Archibald sounds right.

 

[spikedpsycho]

People study history seriously, know France military culture didn't just slop after WWII.
Dunkirk evacuation led France to commit troops to stall German advance.
roughly 120,000 to 140,000 French soldiers were rescued and taken to Britain. French forces also played a vital rearguard role, holding off German troops so the evacuation could succeed, though about 35,000 to 40,000 remaining French troops were captured when the pocket fell on June 4, 1940.

Ironically, French resistance during Fall Rot (the German name for the final phase of the Battle of France) was far more effective than during the first phases of the battle, despite their most well-equipped and trained units being lost in Belgium and Northern France the weeks before.

 

[EwenS]

Dilandu Yes of course with the Anglo German Naval agreement the Kriegsmarine's capital ships were matching France. France also had to worry about Italy. Richelieu and Jean Bart mirror Bismark and Tirpitz.

I suppose as in WW1 150,000 British infantry even if not very well equipped can help. On paper at least the RAF also added useful numbers of aircraft.

Archibald sounds right.

Dunkerque & Strasbourg were a French response to the German pocket battleships / heavy cruisers of the Deutschland class. The Germans then scrapped plans for another pair and built Scharnhorst & Gneisenau instead.

The Richelieus were the French response to the Italian decision to build the first pair of 35,000 ton Littorios.

So really it is Bismarck & Tirpitz mirroring the Richelieus rather than than other way around.

France then intended to counter B&T with another pair intended to be Clemenceau & Gascoyne. And the Italians ordered a second pair of Littorios to try to maintain supremacy against France in the Med.

 

[Archibald]

Daladier in particular made two enormous mistakes. First, he backed Gamelin. Secondly: Munich. Not only it was an utter shame. But not helping the Czechs and even discouraging them to fight, handled the Skoda Works to Hitler on a silver platter.

The irony is, once the nazis got Skoda intact they used it to churn like crazy all the panzers that crushed France 20 months after Munich. So Daladier was twice stupid.

Another example: March 21, 1940. Paul Reynaud is France new PM, but he has to build a (precarious) political coalition. Daladier Parti Radical is just unavoidable, for such coalition. So Reynaud discuss with Daladier, but the latter insist Gamelin must stay as Generalissimo. Reynaud was smart enough to see that Gamelin was as inept as a barn door, a toilet seat and Cadorna, combined into a single person. But he needed the Parti Radical for his coalition, so Daladier while no longer PM got foreign affairs... and Gamelin kept his job.

And there is a third, final blunder by that pair of idiots: Breda. Sending Giraud 7th Army there to help the Netherlands. Overstretching the French armies, deleting any strategic reserve.

During the winter 39-40 the theoretical French encounter battle shifted from Escault to Dyle to Breda, a few hundred km west to east. At a time when Manstein and co shifted from center Belgium flatlands (leaving only a decoy force) to southern Belgium and the infamous Ardennes.

 

[uk 75]

It has been suggested that the Brits could have done a lot more:

Made a firm comnitment to training and equiping a ten infantry division BEF plus a Tank Division much earlier.

The RAF could not do much about its useless Battles though making more Blenheim squadrons and equipping the AASF with Spifires might have helped. Alternatively Hurricanes could have flown more escort missions.

 

[Elan Vital]

If we go by the Imperial Defence Committee reports that Calum Douglas talked about in some of his posts, Chamberlain himself and the Committee already considered Germany as the greatest threat in 1934, but wanted to delay the war as long as possible to complete the corresponding rearmament program in about 1939. Chamberlain obtained that said rearmament would be skewed more towards the RAF than the Army due to the threat of air forces and belief that the French Army could hold.

This does beg the question of whether the British informed the French of their assessments and measures, as evidently both countries weren't on the same page. Though the French themselves had reasons to make the diplomatic decisions they made (Rhineland crisis, Munich, not going through with the alliance with the Soviets), British pressure played a role.

The problem with eastern alliances was that the non-French countries also had their own agency and interests. The French higher-ups were concerned that the USSR wasn't completely truthful about their military capabilities or their alliance agreements, and Poland was firmly opposed to this alliance; Poland and Czechoslovakia both fed their mutual hatred for each other, which made any joint actions very difficult should Germany invade. France generally felt they could trust Poland more than the USSR.

I think the problem with Munich is that the Anglo-French massively miscalculated how the balance of forces would end up shifting. Maybe they didn't anticipate that Czechoslovakia would be completely dismembered and give away all of their weapons while the USSR would sign the M-R Pact. But arguably the Anglo-French gained far fewer "division equivalents" between Munich and September 1939 (or May 1940) than they lost to Germany (the Czechoslovakian divisions lost + the German divisions gained by arming them with Czech equipment). And unless Poland remained suicidally neutral, odds are that they would be at the very least more mobilized in a Munich war, if they don't outright fight Germany while they are still in Czechoslovakia.

Belgium isn't so simple either. France already tried quite a lot many times to get them to renounce neutrality OTL.​

 

[Dilandu]

Daladier in particular made two enormous mistakes. First, he backed Gamelin. Secondly: Munich. Not only it was an utter shame. But not helping the Czechs and even discouraging them to fight, handled the Skoda Works to Hitler on a silver platter.

The fundamental problem, cynically speaking, was that France was unwilling to demand from Poland to stop being opportunistic and choose sides; either Poland is with France (in which case it must stop demands against Czech and figure out how to work with Soviet Union), or Poland is with Germany (in which case France would be treating Poland as potential enemy, not ally).

 

[Archibald]

Finally the Czech had their own internal issues that might have disintegrated their military if not their nation while fighting Germany (Sudetes ? Pro-Germany people ? Can't remember exactly but they had internal issues)

 

[Bottleship]

Of course, France had the opportunity to be much more active on the international stage, but there was a factor called the "communists." France's natural ally against Germany was Russia. The communists, by their actions, effectively destroyed this alliance, and from the Entente's perspective, their actions in 1917-1918 could be seen as a defection to Germany. Lenin, in September 1914, wrote about the "Black Hundreds gangs of Russian tsarism," hired by evil French bourgeoisie to wage an aggressive offensive war against prosperous Germany (and his followers in the former USSR still often side with Germany in descriptions of the First World War, considering Russia the main aggressor, calling it a "fascist cesspool," etc.). At the same time, the communists seized property from various companies and citizens of France and Britain, without adequately compensating them, and, of course, without taking any responsibility for how many French and British died in 1917-1918. Because of the collapse of the Russian front—and after all this, the communists supported various terrorist cells, including in France and Britain. The USSR was essentially hostile to them. If the USSR was hostile to France and Britain, how could they put pressure on Germany? If Russia had been anything other than Bolsheviks, one could count on Russia at the very least not supporting Germany, because it was in Russia's interests. In the event of a conflict between France and Britain against Germany, the USSR could have sided with Germany and begun supplying huge quantities of resources, perhaps while formally maintaining neutrality.

Meanwhile, the French leadership, instead of modernizing its army, spent enormous sums on the Maginot Line. The idea of a vast fortified line is highly controversial, because defending against a 300-500mm siege weapon is either impossible or extremely expensive. Even in the early 1930s, bombers were already in existence that could carry bombs comparable in weight to 300-500mm artillery shells, and virtually any fortified line could have been destroyed. At the same time, the French army remained largely equipped with outdated equipment - mainly artillery from the First World War, weak aviation, mostly unsuccessful tanks, in addition, the army made little use of radio communications, had poorly prepared logistics, etc.

 

[Dilandu]

Meanwhile, the French leadership, instead of modernizing its army, spent enormous sums on the Maginot Line. The idea of a vast fortified line is highly controversial, because defending against a 300-500mm siege weapon is either impossible or extremely expensive.

The idea was actually solid; France have a long border, which must be protected. The idea of the Line wasn't that it would be invulnerable; the idea was, that penetrating the Line would require so much time, that France would be able to concentrate its forced against the potential breach and block it.

Even in the early 1930s, bombers were already in existence that could carry bombs comparable in weight to 300-500mm artillery shells, and virtually any fortified line could have been destroyed

Early 1930s bombers have virtually zero chance to hit something as small as fortification.

 

[1635yankee]

The main cause of France's defeat was the leadership of the French Army, not lack of courage. Even using exactly the same equipment that France had in 1940, Germany could have been stopped. Perhaps not pushed out of the country, but stopped. There were other causes, including domestic politics (there were established politicians hoping for an invasion to help purge the left, as was done after the Franco-Prussian War) and demographics (look at the number of men killed and severely maimed during WWI).

 

[Bottleship]

Even using exactly the same equipment that France had in 1940

The French field artillery consisted mainly of 75 mm Mle 1897 guns and 155 mm howitzers from the First World War, and a small number of 105 mm guns, which looks rather sluggish against the background of the Wehrmacht with its new 105 mm and 150 mm howitzers LeFH 18 and sFH 18, 105 mm guns sK 18 - and even the relatively old 105 mm LeFH 16 nA (of which there were less than 1,000 pieces out of more than 4,000 of all 105 mm howitzers in September 1939) and 150 mm sFH 13 L / 17 (less than 700 pieces in September 1939) were generally superior to the 75 mm guns in terms of firing capabilities, if only because they were howitzers and had a much larger caliber, and a higher The range of light 75-77mm guns could not be adequately realized (during the "Great Patriotic War," the Soviets claimed that the bursts of 76mm shells were very poorly visible and that at maximum firing range, 76mm guns were almost impossible to adjust, so the actual range was lower than claimed). Heavier French artillery (155mm and 220mm guns, etc.) were sluggish and could not be used effectively—in this regard, the French army of 1940 was generally similar to the Soviet army of 1941.

The French air force in 1940 had few modern fighters compared to Germany, which essentially meant the inevitable Luftwaffe's seizure of air superiority. If you achieve air superiority, you can use obsolete aircraft, too.

Reliance on wire communications and a lack of attention to radio is another factor that makes the French army of 1940 resemble the Soviet army of 1941.

French tanks were mostly light, with very poor armament (the 37mm Hotchkiss guns were roughly equally weak against both vehicles and infantry), and even the best tanks—the S-35 and B1—had single-man turrets housing the commander. Essentially, the fact that the tank commander must fulfill several roles simultaneously means that the tank crew will be much slower to react to changing circumstances in combat.

Furthermore, after Germany invaded France, as far as I know, the French suffered a terrible logistical mess. You can have an endlessly trained, motivated, and well-equipped army, but without the necessary resources, it will be ineffective.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The idea was actually solid; France have a long border, which must be protected. The idea of the Line wasn't that it would be invulnerable; the idea was, that penetrating the Line would require so much time, that France would be able to concentrate its forced against the potential breach and block it.

Basically, France's plan was to refight WW1.

Early 1930s bombers have virtually zero chance to hit something as small as fortification.

Dive bombers?

 

[Dilandu]

Dive bombers?

Under ideal test conditions, Ju-87 have a CEP about 50 meters. A typical GFM Cloche on Maginot Line have diameter about 1.5 meters and was of 20-cm solid steel construction - i.e. indifferent to fragments and blast wave, requiring direcrt hit. The probability of Ju-87 hitting a GFM Cloche was less than 0.05% per bomb. Under non-perfect conditions (like AA fire) it would be reduced even more.

 

[Dilandu]

Basically, France's plan was to refight WW1.

Not exactly. Their plan was to ensure that Germany would not be able to launch a surprize invasion, and use Line as backbone of border defense (thus freeing the bulk of French forces to other areas) till German field armies would be defeated in Belgium. After that, the plan was to launch a counter-attack, break through German defenses, and advance on Ruhr, ending the war in one big stroke.

 

[1635yankee]

The French field artillery consisted mainly of 75 mm Mle 1897 guns and 155 mm howitzers from the First World War, and a small number of 105 mm guns, which looks rather sluggish against the background of the Wehrmacht with its new 105 mm and 150 mm howitzers LeFH 18 and sFH 18, 105 mm guns sK 18 - and even the relatively old 105 mm LeFH 16 nA (of which there were less than 1,000 pieces out of more than 4,000 of all 105 mm howitzers in September 1939) and 150 mm sFH 13 L / 17 (less than 700 pieces in September 1939) were generally superior to the 75 mm guns in terms of firing capabilities, if only because they were howitzers and had a much larger caliber, and a higher The range of light 75-77mm guns could not be adequately realized (during the "Great Patriotic War," the Soviets claimed that the bursts of 76mm shells were very poorly visible and that at maximum firing range, 76mm guns were almost impossible to adjust, so the actual range was lower than claimed). Heavier French artillery (155mm and 220mm guns, etc.) were sluggish and could not be used effectively—in this regard, the French army of 1940 was generally similar to the Soviet army of 1941.

The French air force in 1940 had few modern fighters compared to Germany, which essentially meant the inevitable Luftwaffe's seizure of air superiority. If you achieve air superiority, you can use obsolete aircraft, too.

Reliance on wire communications and a lack of attention to radio is another factor that makes the French army of 1940 resemble the Soviet army of 1941.

French tanks were mostly light, with very poor armament (the 37mm Hotchkiss guns were roughly equally weak against both vehicles and infantry), and even the best tanks—the S-35 and B1—had single-man turrets housing the commander. Essentially, the fact that the tank commander must fulfill several roles simultaneously means that the tank crew will be much slower to react to changing circumstances in combat.

Furthermore, after Germany invaded France, as far as I know, the French suffered a terrible logistical mess. You can have an endlessly trained, motivated, and well-equipped army, but without the necessary resources, it will be ineffective.

The French Army's biggest problems -- reluctance to use radio, poor inter-unit cooperation, slow and non-reactive artillery, etc., were severely exacerbated by doctrinal and training decisions which meant the French Army was usually, tactically, on the wrong foot. It wasn't helped by poor top leadership, parts of which seemed to actively despise both each other and their country's basic form of government, as did some of France's major politicians, like Laval.

French hardware wasn't great, but some units using that hardware did quite well (some of the French tanks were immune to German anti-tank guns). One of the key effects of French Army training and doctrine was to minimize initiative. The French lost because their army was unable to react fast enough to any German actions at the corps or even division level. Swap the hardware -- and German hardware was not massively superior to French -- and France still loses because, regardless of the courage of the individual soldier, the generals couldn't organize an escape from an unlocked room without spending time changing plans, misallocating resources, and general backbiting.

 

[357Mag]

Winston Churchill was not alone in thinking Thank God for the French Army.

After 1933 the few remaining democracies in Europe saw France as the only effective opposition to a resurgent Germany.

I realise it is a big political ask but let us suppose France decided to work more closely with Czechoslovakia and encourage Belgium to see the dangers of neutrality.

I have never quite understood why France attached so much importance to British involvement. The Czechs had a much bigger and better Army. With help they could have improved the Air Force.

The French Navy on the other hand made little military contribution to confronting Germany. Unlike the Kaiser Hitler showed only slight interest in his Navy.

A closer military arrangement with the Czechs and a more assertive position on safeguarding existing borders might well have contained Germany.

All -

How 'bout a " more determined France ", NOW !?


With regards,
357Mag

 

[RedLegion]

France could compel Poland and Czechoslovakia to cooperate, especially given that their lower-ranking generals had already been collaborating. However, for this to make sense, all parties would need to begin rearming almost simultaneously to match Germany.

Poland faces the greatest problem due to its long, exposed border and economic backwardness. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, has 3 million Germans. In practice, this means the Polish-Czech side would have to implement totalitarian measures to deal with this issue.

 

[Michel Van]

The 1939 french started the Saar Offensive, then stop it and forces return back to French
I consider this one biggest blunder of France military !
They had Momentum and Hitler under pressure to take action
mean to deal with French Forces in Saarland delaying Fall Gelb & Rot
Here the British could send BEF to support the French making the Problem bigger for Third Reich.

It would also a Propaganda debacle for NSDAP, do Allies Troops fighting already on German Soil.
However now depends on what happens next if Wehrmacht follow Original Fall Gelb or the Original plan
last one was Invade Belgium, while Respecting the Neutrality of Netherlands like WW1

Fall Gelb include invasion of Netherlands Belgium and Attack true Ardennes into France
Bypassing the French and British forces in Flanders waiting for German Attack.

I think the Wehrmacht would Modify Fall Gelb, Respecting the Neutrality of Netherlands
Focusing attack true Ardennes into France to attack the Allies in Back in the Saarland.

Now it depend of France and Britain forces can move fast from Belgium and attack Wehrmacht in back.
or how many Reserve forces has France to mobilise against Wehrmacht...

 

[Dilandu]

The 1939 french started the Saar Offensive, then stop it and forces return back to French

They have no forces to maintain the offensive, and were not prepared to attack German fortifications. While they were protected by third line divisions, those divisions were specifically adapted to fight in defense, having even more machineguns and engineering equipment than first line divisions (at the cost of far less transport). Also, Germans anticipated such move, and already started to shift troops back to West, since Polish field armies were already crippled.

To summarize, France did not have forces in 1939, to launch real offensive with decisive goals. And British presence was almost token at this point. Moreover, Germans actually planned for exactly that scenario, so even if Allies would attempt an assault on German defenses, their advance would be blocked by German reinforcements ALREADY pulled from Poland.

So no, the 1939 offensive would achieve nothing. The Allied troops would suffer serious losses trying to storm Siegfried line without proper numbers and equipment, and then would be forced to retreat, facing massive German reinforcements. The influence of Poland campaign would be insignificant, anrd from propaganda point of view, Nazi would just capitalize inevitable Allies retreat as major victory.

 

[RedLegion]

The question is: what could France have provided to Poland between 1933 and 1939 (considering Poland was its only real ally on the continent) to genuinely strengthen it?

The list of Polish needs was quite extensive, and France itself without proper internal investment was in no position to supply everything, setting aside the unwise squandering of resources on the Polish end.

 

[Archibald]

France sold MS-406s to Poland but too little, too late. They never reached Poland.

 

[RedLegion]

France sold MS-406s to Poland but too little, too late.

Alternatively, additional Gnome-Rhône engines for PZL P.24 fighters to re-equip the Polish Air Force with more modern aircraft than the PZL P.11c.

 

[Dilandu]

The question is: what could France have provided to Poland between 1933 and 1939 (considering Poland was its only real ally on the continent) to genuinely strengthen it?

Rapporchement with USSR. Nothing else would help Poland much.

 

[Arjen]

With ideologies on either side of the Polish/Soviet border - exceedingly unlikely.

 

[Dilandu]

With ideologies on either side of the Polish/Soviet border - exceedingly unlikely.

Without that, Poland simply stood no chances. They can't fight one powerful neighbor without at very least assured neutrality from other one. Especially considering that Poland mostly dismissed German threat till it became too late.

 

[RedLegion]

Without that, Poland simply stood no chances. They can't fight one powerful neighbor without at very least assured neutrality from other one. Especially considering that Poland mostly dismissed German threat till it became too late.

What do you mean by "dismissed"? During the Weimar Republic, there was a continuous conflict over trade and other issues. When Hitler came to power, Poland made a proposal to France regarding preventive action against Germany. France showed no interest, so Poland moved to normalize relations with Germany.

 

[Arjen]

Rapporchement with USSR.

With that out of the way - pray for divine intervention?

 

[Dilandu]

With that out of the way - pray for divine intervention?

Well, what else? Poland was an isolated nation, with limited resources and almost no access to allies, placed between two stronger neighbors - with both of whom it managed to maintain hostile relations. It was essentially a perfect suicide recipy. Even in hypotetical case when France would be (somehow) able to launch a major offensive on West in 1939, it would not save the Poland - simply because Germans were determined to knock out the weakest opponent first.

 

[Arjen]

because Germans were determined to knock out the weakest opponent first next target after Czechoslovakia.

FTFY.

And the Soviet Union seeing an opportunity to gain some real estate in what would soon cease to be Poland. And in Finland, plus all of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Lebensraum between Germany and the Soviet Union was a bad place to be at the closing end of the 1930s. Even worse in the 1940s.

A closer military arrangement with the Czechs and a more assertive position on safeguarding existing borders might well have contained Germany.

FTFY.
Or slow Germany down.

 

[1635yankee]

FTFY.

And the Soviet Union seeing an opportunity to gain some real estate in what would soon cease to be Poland. And in Finland, plus all of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Lebensraum between Germany and the Soviet Union was a bad place to be at the closing end of the 1930s. Even worse in the 1940s.


FTFY.
Or slow Germany down.

Both Germany and Russia (the USSR inherited many of Russia's foreign policy goals) hated the existence of Poland. The chance of a reliable rapprochement with either was nil.

France had a lot of structural problems, both politically and with infrastructure. One of the political problems was a corrupt and highly inefficient military procurement system. One of the infrastructure problems was that WWI was largely fought in its most heavily industrialized areas, with the German Army destroying as much industrial plant as possible. A third problem is demographics, with something like 25% of the military-aged men lost on the war. These would be your middle managers, mid-grade officers, senior NCOs, and experienced engineers. They could have done something radical, like accept women into those roles.

 

[Archibald]

France managed to built 1100 Potez 63 but the bulk of them (700) were 63-11 for tactical reconnaissance, which were slow and vulnerable.

Sometimes I think France should have built a "Potez 63 striking force" as early as possible and in numbers, a kind of deterrent not unlike the Blenheim / Battle many squadrons (and not even mentionning the Bomber Command, you get the point).

Because the Potez is underpowered and vulnerable, replace it ASAP with a trio of much better planes a) the DB-7 b) the Martin 167F and c) the Bloch MB-175.

Other than the Potez and the Bloch, nix every single bomber like the LeO-451 and Amiot 351/354. France built them according to the Douhet playbook yet at the same time shat their pants thinking about LW repraisal raids on Paris. So, what's the point in having long range bombers if don't assume the doctrine, pros and cons ? dang.

Nixing the Amiot and LeO would "free" a shit ton of 1100 hp G&R radial engines for the Bloch 175, in passing. And the MB-152 / 155 fighters, too.

Screw the Breguet 690 series, too. Wrong doctrine, underpowered, butchered by flak with horrific loss rates: the tiny fleet was wiped out in two days and less than a dozen sorties. On the contrary, I'm fine with the LN-401 dive bomber being passed to the Aéronavale, if that gives France a Stuka...

 

[Dilandu]

Other than the Potez and the Bloch, nix every single bomber like the LeO-451 and Amiot 351/354. France built them according to the Douhet playbook yet at the same time shat their pants thinking about LW repraisal raids on Paris. So, what's the point in having long range bombers if don't assume the doctrine, pros and cons ? dang.

The deterrence, of course. The idea was, that having a long-range bomber force, capable of retaliating, would deter enemy from bombing French cities. Don't forget, that 1930s doctrines of strategic air warfare were mostly theoretical.

 

[Dilandu]

Speaking of French army terrible decisions, one of the worst was their indifference to electromagnetic plane detection. Pierre David proposed and tested his electromagnetic barriers (an early form of multistatic radar system, set as "barrier" of transmitting and recieving stations - plane crossing the barrier between stations created interference due to radiowaves reflection from plane) already in late 1920s. He constantly improved his idea, suggesting eventually a "Z matrix" - triangular lattice of stations, capable of not only detecting, but triangulating the plane position, speed and direction of flight.

By 1930s, France could have complete detection system, comparable to British Chain Home (and David's stations were small and mobile). But... very little attention was paid to David's ideas, with Army leadership only interested in acoustic detectors. Navy was more interested, and by the late 1930s created a set of barriers alongside French coastlines.