Hopefully without sole source contracts, they wont have to have one team working on upgrades for future fighters anymore. I dont know the history behind it all, but maintaining this as sole source contract is proving to be as dumb as the navy outsourcing ship design to the private sector.

For the future though, would these upgrades still come in "block" packages every 5 - 8 years? Because that seems way too slow to compete. And how feasible is it to just break them into small pieces and Introduce them as self standing upgrades as they are developed?
 
Too true Reddington777, it was a stupid idea in the first place and they should learn from their mistakes so that the same thing does not happen again in the future.
 
Hopefully without sole source contracts, they wont have to have one team working on upgrades for future fighters anymore. I dont know the history behind it all, but maintaining this as sole source contract is proving to be as dumb as the navy outsourcing ship design to the private sector.
They won't be. F-47 for example has the government owning all of the rights and technical baselines needed to compete future production, sustainment, upgrades etc. There are upsides and downsides to this. You note the upside in your post. Downside is that if you do not end up actually doing this and getting a benefit out of it, you spend more upfront to acquire those rights with the opportunity cost associated with that.

The government is not exactly a for profit corporation or an aerospace company so whatever rights it has still need to be passed on to willing private sector firms (leaving aside software and other sustainment that the services can do on their own if they so desire) so there's obviously a risk of underperformance and barriers to entry there too. Do this enough and at scale you can end up in a situation where the government, across various services and programs, ends up owning so much IP that it has paid hundreds of million - billions for, with no direct path to commercialization or direct/indirect benefit / return on investment. That also runs the risk of incurring the wrath of the GAO/Congress and watchdog groups.

I have not yet come across any analysis of a decent size program that has taken this approach. I'm sure there will be as a number of current programs have had the government owning the baseline with JLTV being a notable example where the Army re-awarded the follow on production contract to a different source..but I have not seen the short, mid and long term benefits and ROI for the Army on that. On paper, this sounds like a really good idea but not sure how this pans out once you factor in the governments ability to mess up things that might appear really good.
 
Last edited:
This GAO report is even more disturbing in light of the Mitchell Institute’s report on the current state of the USAF.

If TR3/Block 4 has been dramatically skinnied down in terms of its deliverables, would not arrive for another two years (why not more delays?) and that these “improved” airframes will still have fundamental heat and power problems (if not worse), then shouldn’t stakeholders have a conversation about pausing TR3 until three critical thresholds have been demonstrated: a new engine core (PW), a robust PTMS upgrade and the software to tie the whole thing together?

BUT, all of the above may not be in place until the early 2030s at best, by my cynical read. And if Boeing can show its off to a great start on F-47, then perhaps it’s time for a clean sheet optionally manned MRF type fighter to complement NGAD vs continuing this madness.
 
BUT, all of the above may not be in place until the early 2030s at best, by my cynical read. And if Boeing can show its off to a great start on F-47, then perhaps it’s time for a clean sheet optionally manned MRF type fighter to complement NGAD vs continuing this madness.
I've been thinking the same thing. We're currently in a position where the only US company producing a moderately-affordable 5th gen fighter is Lockheed, and only Boeing has a contract for a next-gen fighter. Let's ignore F/A-XX as that is a Navy jet. If the F-47 is really $300M each, as has been suggested, and not in the ballpark of an F-35, then only the F-35 can provide quantities of LO multi-role fighters.

That would be acceptable if the F-35 worked, but the F-35 doesn't fucking work. Pardon my language. The USAF has taken delivery of only 500 so far? That is unacceptable. The DOD has taken delivery of no less than 174 non-combat-coded TR3 jets? Completely outrageous. Block IV capabilities were supposed to be included in the original baseline, but now Block IV has been both delayed and reduced in scope. APG-85 might require a redesign of the front part of the fuselage in order to fit the radar and the required cooling.

And at the same time, the F-35 is also the most expensive DOD program ever. There needs to be more competition. I would be in favor of a new program for a moderately-affordable, moderately-LO, exportable, realistic multi-role fighter.
 
but the F-35 doesn't fucking work.
Enough with the hyperbole. You know that is wrong.
The USAF has taken delivery of only 500 so far? That is unacceptable.
So only 500...which is more than any other fighter in their inventory except the F-16. Hmmm...
 
So only 500...which is more than any other fighter in their inventory except the F-16. Hmmm...

Here are the planned/estimated procurement quantities from 2009. The US was estimating to have ordered 2,443 by 2034. I'll leave it as an exercise to the reader to determine how the actual procurement schedule compares to this estimated/planned procurement schedule from 2009 or the current procurement schedule of 2,459 by 2049.

1757189616159.png
 
This GAO report is even more disturbing in light of the Mitchell Institute’s report on the current state of the USAF.

If TR3/Block 4 has been dramatically skinnied down in terms of its deliverables, would not arrive for another two years (why not more delays?) and that these “improved” airframes will still have fundamental heat and power problems (if not worse), then shouldn’t stakeholders have a conversation about pausing TR3 until three critical thresholds have been demonstrated: a new engine core (PW), a robust PTMS upgrade and the software to tie the whole thing together?

BUT, all of the above may not be in place until the early 2030s at best, by my cynical read. And if Boeing can show its off to a great start on F-47, then perhaps it’s time for a clean sheet optionally manned MRF type fighter to complement NGAD vs continuing this madness.
I don’t think we’ve been told that TR3 / Block 4 exceeds the cooling capability of the current F135 and PTMS, although it is likely to make things worse. The F135 can provide the necessary bleed air, even though it exceeds the engine specification and results in higher turbine temperatures and reduced durability. If it is required to have the F135 ECU to utilize TR3 / Block 4, you have now split the F135 spare engine fleet in half, greatly limiting engine supportability until all of the pre ECU engines are cycled thru depot inspection and incorporate the ECU configuration.
 
And at the same time, the F-35 is also the most expensive DOD program ever. There needs to be more competition. I would be in favor of a new program for a moderately-affordable, moderately-LO, exportable, realistic multi-role fighter.

Also do the same with Bomber, tanker and every other program. Redundancy and competition is great. But before the Air Force embarks on another $20 plus billion dollar 5th gen or 5th gen minus program, it might want to look at the state of affairs of its budget which point to a shrinking, flat, or barely growing procurement and O&S pie (depending on which outlook of the FYDP and beyond one believes) and a rapidly growing RDT&E pie leading to a serious question mark on the service's ability to convert RDT&E spend to actual meaningful capability. But yes, setting that aside, let's add yet another MRF program to inject competition to the F-35 (though this time let's build something less capable that is a decade or two late to need) while actually struggling to fund procurement of very simple and basic stuff like a modern AEW&C, munitions and weapons needed in the quantities and moving hypersonic weapons into meaningful production quantities.

I am sure if the F-35 had not run into issues the USAF would have 3x of what they do by now..because it was just that that led to the AF to 'only' have 500 in inventory as of now. Budgets and a whole host of other factors had nothing to do with that. The AF does not have money to buy the F-35's it wanted to buy back in 2000 when it likely created those initial numbers and annual buys. The pace at which it has been buying the aircraft is the pace that it can afford. This points to a 1.7K aircraft program being more like a 1K sized program which is where the AF is likely to end up. We are probably looking at another seven to eight years of additional buys before other budgetary pressures take over..and the AF moves on to other systems.

Yes, the Block 4 is behind and will remain so. Yes, the JPO needed to be disbanded and services given control of their programs years ago. And yes, there is very little that can be done to fix things in the short term. That block 4 was to be delivered no earlier than December 2030, had been known for a number of years and was reported in the program SAR from December 2023. The 174 aircraft the services took delivery to free up the production enterprise will eventually become operational over the coming months as software is released. Not optimal, but not the end of the world either. Alternate would have been more disruptive to the production program, that the government is a partner on (F-35 is a DOD run program after all). But a mature block 4 F-35A costing $100-120 Million fly-away (between 1/3 and 1/2 the likely fly away cost of F-47) in the early 2030s would be a very capable aircraft. There is literally nothing the AF can fund now..in FY26 and beyond that will magically create an equivalent fighter at those timelines. If you think they can then DM for great deals on a bridge.

Block IV has been both delayed and reduced in scope. APG-85 might require a redesign of the front part of the fuselage in order to fit the radar and the required cooling.

There are plans to potentially make some structural changes to accomodate both the -81 and 85. But that is for the government / DOD to decide. Keep in mind that the AN/APG-85 program / initiative, unlike the AN/APG-81 is not a Lockheed Martin responsibility as a prime. AN/APG-85 is government furnished equipment so any change of plans due to 1-3 years of delays on that program's ramp up (against planned cut in) is for the JPO/government to decide in terms of whether it wants the jets to be backwards compatible.

There is a need to be critical of the program and the management by the program office and lead contractor has been poor to extremely poor in certain areas. But there's also a need to be realistic and understand that the capability being added to the already highly capable block 3F configuration is excellent and will ultimately result in a significantly more capable aircraft in the 2030-2032 timeframe than what the AF was flying in the early 2020s even. But to suggest that the AF should now look to develop an inferior aircraft that will still cost $10-20 Bn of RDT&E funds (at a time USAF lacks funds to develop and procure on priority items) and not enjoy the economies of scale of the F-35 and then sometime in the mid 2030s buy it...is borderline non-serious. That ship sailed 10 years ago. Looking forward, the AF needs to invest heavily in its future programs including CCA and F-47..field them along with B-21 and block 4 F-35. The service simply does not have the funds to go out and develop a completely new aircraft when it almost couldn't afford to fund NGAD.
 
Last edited:
Here are the planned/estimated procurement quantities from 2009. The US was estimating to have ordered 2,443 by 2034. I'll leave it as an exercise to the reader to determine how the actual procurement schedule compares to this estimated/planned procurement schedule from 2009 or the current procurement schedule of 2,459 by 2049.

View attachment 783838
So you pick a production schedule from over 15yrs ago. So what? Old news and meaningless - pick me a production program that has gone to plan. As I said, the F-35 already out numbers every other US Fighter jet (USAF, USN and USMC) with the exception of the F-16 which it will overtake in the coming years. One might also point out that the F-35 has a capability far in excess of these which gives a multiplying effect to this capability as well.
 
The F-35 sits at the intersection of a poorly planned and run program, and a capable and extremely important combat system for the Joint force and allies. While it is best to avoid making similarly boneheaded decisions in the future (and B-21, NGAD et al avoid that so that's a good sign), wishing that we simply walk away and go to something that is inferior, more costly, and more time consuming than pursuing it to the max extent allowable (by budgets and priorities) is a very deeply unserious idea. For USAF, CCA's, if the investments in autonomy and low-cost/high-speed design / mfg. pays off then unmanned systems can be a real alternative from an investment stand point. But until that is proven out, other alternatives are quite a bit inferior IMHO.
 
So you pick a production schedule from over 15yrs ago. So what? Old news and meaningless - pick me a production program that has gone to plan. As I said, the F-35 already out numbers every other US Fighter jet (USAF, USN and USMC) with the exception of the F-16 which it will overtake in the coming years. One might also point out that the F-35 has a capability far in excess of these which gives a multiplying effect to this capability as well.
Yes, the F-35 inventory is closing in on the F-16 inventory. And yes, the F-35 is more capable than the F-16. However, I don't believe these are useful points of comparison that tell us anything about the strength of the F-35 as a program.

First of all, the USAF had over 2100 F-16s in inventory at one point. With something like 1300 having been retired from that peak, the primary reason that F-35 numbers have approached F-16 numbers in inventory is due to F-16 retirements, not F-35 procurement. If the USAF retires all F-16s tomorrow but one, should we be impressed that the USAF now has 500x as many F-35s as F-16s?

Second, comparing the F-35 to the F-16 in terms of capability is also not a very meaningful comparison. The argument might go something like this:

"The F-35 is 10x as capable as an F-16, so replacing 10 F-16s with 1 F-35 provides an equivalent level of capability"

This comparison doesn't provide us with much useful information. The F-35s of today are not competing with the F-16s of the 1980s. If adversary fighter capabilities had been frozen in time in the 1980s, then perhaps it would make sense to compare the capabilities of an F-35 with those of an early F-16 and conclude that a fraction of the F-35s is a sufficient replacement. But in reality, the competition today is the J-20 and J-35 of China.

A better metric would be to look at the inflation-adjusted costs. In today's dollars, an F-16 in 1985 cost about $44M. In today's dollars, an F-35A today costs about $80M. Thus, for the same price, we could purchase about half the number of F-35s as F-16s and hope that this provides the same level of capability relative to the threat as an F-16 in 1985 provided. Is an F-35 twice as capable as an F-16A? Easily. But that's irrelevant.

Yes, I showed a production schedule from 2009. So what? The fact of the matter is that the US had planned to purchase far more F-35s far more quickly than they actually have. At this point, I don't believe anyone seriously thinks that all 2400 F-35s will be purchased by 2049. The program has delivered fewer jets, far more slowly than promised, and at greatly reduced capabilities. Originally-promised capabilities were delayed to Block IV, which keeps being delayed further. TR-3 jets are not even combat-coded. A significant portion of US F-35s are non-combat-coded jets, TR3 or otherwise. The combat coded jets do not have the promised capability. The program has run enormously over budget.

The tiny number of full-mission-capable F-35s are very capable, I'm sure. The reduced-scope Block IV will be even more capable when that is eventually rolled out in the 2030s, we can assume. But when the F-35 as a program has all of these issues, when very few jets are actually fully MC, I'm not sure how you can accuse me of being hyperbolic with a straight face.
 
The questions fall on
Are over 2,000 F-35s really needed?
Do countries have a practical use for them for anything?
After the results of the Ukrainian war will most deals to the Europeans begin to cancel? Or financial situations changed?

With the MTCR being completed dead, countries with rich resources can target airbases and those with lesser capabilities are not able to target air bases and they don't have any rich resources to exploit for regime changes (except Venezuela). Most countries that we sold the F-35s to did nothing when Russia was in Syria (still have a presence in Tartus base), did nothing when they invaded Ukraine and France did nothing when Wagner with some African rebels kicked their troops out of some African country. Assuming the war is over they might have extra bodies, equipment and artillery without having to have any more worries about their western backyard to continue their incursions again in the middle east and Africa. China is developing DF-26s to target ships using satellites from their coastland and even their GEO sats have enough resolution to identify a carrier with F-35s.

If there is a lesser order of F-35s then what their intended order was before then I would completely understand because the military has to adjust itself with geopolitical changes. I see the F-35 more of as a Ferrari which is to look cool while driving and the F-16s more of as I just need a Toyota prius to drive to work. Nothing wrong if we still pull more orders for F-16s for financial reasons while still being trained to be battle ready.
 
sorry. I didn’t mean to start a fire. There are a lot of unique things about this program that presented enormous challenges that were met, but times have changed, as has the strategic picture.

This reminds me a lot of the F100 saga and the solution, to me, seems to be to introduce a F110 competitor. You might be surprised, you might end up with two great options….

But to be clear, death to JPO….
 
Fighter jet cost and capability growth trends have exceeded straight line / linear inflation growth over their previous generation counterparts. This is not just a unique F-16 > F-35 problem. Ask the Europeans and even the Chinese how their current gen systems compare to previous gen ones and the same for the ones a generation prior to that. Air power requirements, and technical capabilities have advanced considerably since the advent of jet fighters and this trend has continued to push capabilities and costs outside of those straight line trends. A DOD analysis captured this quite well (quoted part below)

Forecasting platform capability with a high standard for accuracy over a 50-year period is not feasible. [I would add cost to this as well]. To illustrate the magnitude of change in aviation technology over 50 years, consider that the first flight of the F-22 was in September 1997, approximately 50 years after the Bell X-1 was the first manned aircraft to break the sound barrier, in October 1947. Forty-four years prior to the X-1was the Wright brothers' first flight.


Some of the arguments and the strawman counterarguments following them are also not really a unique to F-35 problem. The USAF has been underfunded, and the DOD percentage of the GDP pie has been shrinking against historical norms and certainly significantly below where it was when the F-15/F-16 fleets were acquired.

You were never going to get a modern, fifth gen F-16 replacement (JSF or whatever) at $44 Million a pop in 2025. Even the F-16 does not cost that even if you were to magically triple or quadruple its production now. The answer to that possibly resides in autonomous unmanned collaborative combat aircraft. The argument goes something like this - For the cost of 1,000 F-35's in the 2035-2045 timeframe you may be able to buy 250 F-47's ($300 MM a pop) and 1,000 CCA's ($25 MM a pop). Would that be a better deal? One look at how much the USAF intends on spending on CCA RDT&E over the FYDP strongly suggests that they would quite like that if it pays off. And if so, I feel they will pivot strongly from the F-35 just due to budget dynamics alone. If they don't then they would have again wasted a bunch of RDT&E dollars at developing thinks they did not move into actual combat capability via procurement. Hopefully the CCA break that trend.

1757251038519.png
 
Last edited:
Some of the arguments and the strawman counterarguments following them are also not really a unique to F-35 problem. The USAF has been underfunded, and the DOD percentage of the GDP pie has been shrinking against historical norms and certainly significantly below where it was when the F-15/F-16 fleets were acquired.

You were never going to get a modern, fifth gen F-16 replacement (JSF or whatever) at $44 Million a pop in 2025. Even the F-16 does not cost that even if you were to magically triple or quadruple its production now. The answer to that possibly resides in autonomous unmanned collaborative combat aircraft. The argument goes something like this - For the cost of 1,000 F-35's in the 2035-2045 timeframe you may be able to buy 250 F-47's ($300 MM a pop) and 1,000 CCA's ($25 MM a pop). Would that be a better deal? One look at how much the USAF intends on spending on CCA RDT&E over the FYDP strongly suggests that they would quite like that if it pays off. And if so, I feel they will pivot strongly from the F-35 just due to budget dynamics alone.
While that is good in principal I expect you lose combat power in that ratio. Yes you have to man those 1000 F-35s and the pilot shortage is a not going away issue but I would argue the 1000 F-35s gives the USAF an ability to be in more places at once. If CCAs come along as they are meant to, noting in the YFQ-42 thread you weren't very positive on their move to autonomous ops, then a force structure of 750 F-35s and those 1000 CCAs may make more sense than the F-47 and 1000 CCA buy.

Obviously a lot of other factors in play there, like support for those assets both on the ground and in the air, but I think it would be a mistake to suggest the operational effect of the two proposed options is the same.

If they don't then they would have again wasted a bunch of RDT&E dollars at developing thinks they did not move into actual combat capability via procurement.
The RDT&E imbalance is one of the primary issues. Until 2017 the USAF spend more on procurement than RDT&E but that has flipped now and the budget is heavily leaning the wrong way if the USAF want to stop the oldest and smallest force structure in their history.

The disparity is much larger within the individual departments. In 2017, the Department of the Air Force (DAF) began to enjoy real budget growth that was not associated with a contingency for the first time in more than 26 years.

...

Bafflingly, it chose instead to devote the vast majority of that increased funding to RDT&E, which grew from $19.6 billion to $50.5 billion while funding for procurement grew from $22.4 billion to $34.1 billion—a comparatively slight increase. Before 2017, the Air Force’s budget for RDT&E had never exceeded its budget for procurement, but it has done so every year since then, and in FY 2023, funding for RDT&E ($50.5 billion) exceeded funding for procurement by $16.4 billion.
 
While it is best to avoid making similarly boneheaded decisions in the future (and B-21, NGAD et al avoid that so that's a good sign), wishing that we simply walk away and go to something that is inferior, more costly, and more time consuming than pursuing it to the max extent allowable (by budgets and priorities) is a very deeply unserious idea.
Continuing with this program as it’s run now seems unserious to me, but who cares what I say - there is no shortage of informed third parties that are essentially saying the same thing.

If the F-35 program can deliver high capability, high availability aircraft that the USN and USAF actually want to buy and take delivery of, it will not be without the existential urgency that comes from a program having a competitor. Am I am betting that NG or BA can put together a less compromised multirole fighter that’s better than everything than a F-35A/C can offer within a decade? Yes and why a decsde? Because a decade is what it’s going to take for F-35 to get the engine, power & cooling and systems/programming maturity it needs to be relevant to the DOW or whatever based on realized program milestones so far.
 
Continuing with this program as it’s run now seems unserious to me, but who cares what I say - there is no shortage of informed third parties that are essentially saying the same thing.

If the F-35 program can deliver high capability, high availability aircraft that the USN and USAF actually want to buy and take delivery of, it will not be without the existential urgency that comes from a program having a competitor.
What is the rationale that a competitor is required to correct the program trajectory? Can you name a single other manned aircraft program that has benefited from that? Even in the F100/F110 scenario mentioned earlier there isn't conclusive evidence that that competition actually resulted in either sufficient cost savings or capability improvement to warrant the funds used across the life of the engine program.

Am I am betting that NG or BA can put together a less compromised multirole fighter that’s better than everything than a F-35A/C can offer within a decade?
It might be possible but I'm frankly doubtful, neither has built a production fighter aircraft in a while and personally still think the jury is out on whether Boeing will actually be able to deliver on F-47 in the timeline required. NG has delivered on B-21 in part due to no radical technologies being used in the aircraft as the design used substantial quantities of existing subsystems albeit with B-21 refinements. See here page 5.

How much would it cost to develop the jet? Unless you are reusing a lot of the tech developed for the F-35 then you likely have to TRL up multiple different key areas. For example the engine where the XA100/101 are still not production ready and will take literally billions to get to that point.

We also know F-47 is going to take 20 billion for the EMD phase alone setting aside all the funding to date. Given F-35A/B/C cost approx $60 billion to design a competitor for F-35, that does land and sea, is going to be another $30 billion at a minimum and likely more. It isn't clear either on whether the F-47 route of the USAF owning the IP for the jet will actually be a good thing in the long run.

How much risk are you willing to accept on the test program to be able to design, developed, build, test and then production ready a jet to do it in ten years? Can you also build the supporting infrastructure and be able to build upwards of 100 a year? Will you also suffer as the F-35 program has from that supporting infrastructure, eg supplier base and engine depots etc, being underfunded or mixed signals being sent by Govt.

Yes and why a decade? Because a decade is what it’s going to take for F-35 to get the engine, power & cooling and systems/programming maturity it needs to be relevant to the DOW or whatever based on realized program milestones so far.
The aircraft is relevant today. The system was designed for the 2025 fight and has been proven in operational service already. You cannot buy another aircraft on the international market today that is as capable nor available at a similar cost.
 
A lot of Raider talk: B-21 was announced in October 2015 and in about a decade will have two airplanes flying. That’s my hard right limit for a USAF/USN MRF.

I guess if we want to have a blue pill discussion then there really is no discussion is there? The JPO/LMT administered beatings will continue until morale improves. Meanwhile, USAF will continue to gobble up F-15EX while avoiding F-35 deliveries like the plague.
 
From my perspective, the biggest problem with the F-35 outside of all the programmatic issues is China.

The scale and speed at which China is developing manned and unmanned platforms is enormous and seems to be growing.

The field is changing and has changed so radically in terms of capabilities over the last several years that you have to wonder how viable the F-35 is going forward?

If the aircraft isn’t capable of achieving parity with the latest Chinese aircraft, then a new fighter will be needed. Especially if China is supposed to be the pacing threat.
 
From my perspective, the biggest problem with the F-35 outside of all the programmatic issues is China.

The scale and speed at which China is developing manned and unmanned platforms is enormous and seems to be growing.

The field is changing and has changed so radically in terms of capabilities over the last several years that you have to wonder how viable the F-35 is going forward?

If the aircraft isn’t capable of achieving parity with the latest Chinese aircraft, then a new fighter will be needed. Especially if China is supposed to be the pacing threat.
At the very end of 2016, China allegedly had 2 stealth fighters handed over to its military. Today, it has approximately 400.

So back then China had like half of one percent of total US stealth fighters. Today, it has little over 40 percent.

The gap is closing fast. The pace and the future curve is not looking good for the DoD. Sorry, DoW.
 
Last edited:
The aircraft is relevant today. The system was designed for the 2025 fight and has been proven in operational service already. You cannot buy another aircraft on the international market today that is as capable nor available at a similar cost.
The dilemma the USAF faces is such that at this point, it might be unwise to overspend on F-35s.

On one hand, voting idiots still haven't awoken to the fact that we are in the new cold war at this point so theres absolutely no guarantee (or hope even) that funding will increase. On the other hand, while the plane is relevant and its mission profiles do take care of the majority of the fight today, every passing year going forward, it'll be increasingly unable to fulfill the air superiority needs. The software issues it faces, the block procurement scheme of said upgrades, and its intended role just doesnt lend itself to be the big lifter in a peer fight that the air force needs to fight.

The AF got on the pirate ship and now it cant get off. Buying significantly more F-35s right now is, to me, a short sighted decision. Its not to say the air force doesnt need the F35 in the future. It will and it absolutely should keep ordering modest numbers, but the priority shouldnt be there if you are concerned about the long term.

You have doubts on whether Boeing can or cannot execute. Theres no way Boeing cant execute. Only whether it can execute on time or not. Delayed or not, cost increase or not, Boeing or not there's is no other choice regarding the matter. The F-47 will get built one way or another. The infrastructure to support it will also get built one way or another. That branch of strategic capability is just as important, and if not, more so than sentinel. Just by virtue of being a dedicated air superiority fighter, the F-47 is already a better starting point for rebuilding the air force than the F-35 can ever hope to be.

The other option of 1k block 4 F35s will be noticeably disadvantaged even holding air space in the west pacific by 2030. Let alone contest enemy air space. Having the air force own the IP may not necessarily be better than LM contracting others to do the work, but at the very minimum, when one vendor fails to execute, you can jump ship to another vendor that might have a better solution. With LM, what does the USAF have except keep buying more upgrades that come 5 years too late?

Thats why the lopsided RDT&E budget allocation is justified. There's simply no reason to throw so much money into a program that may or may not get you the capabilities you need in the future when one that for sure will give you better capabilities is in development. One that is built to be flexible both engineering wise and program wise, that leaves the air force with more options if things dont go well and that is purpose built to fulfill the role that the F-35 will be challenged by beyond 2030.

I dont think the AF is making the wrong decision here. Also dont think the DoD is wrong to allocate only for a limited number of F-35s. Focus on raising readiness, give pilots more flying hours and throw the rest of the money into the real solution. You buckle in for the next 10 - 15 years and when the F-47 and CCAs start rolling off the production line, it would not only fulfill the PCA requirement that the F35 cant fulfill but also allow your F35s to actually perform better in theater.

I think its important to keep in mind whenever these painful subjects arise, that the US only really started the modernization effort 10 years ago, with at least 2 years lost due to the pandemic. 8 years for a country that sold its manufacturing core to its prime enemy is not a long time. Theres going to be a lot of tough decisions getting made, but things are getting sorted.
 
At the very end of 2016, China allegedly had 2 stealth fighters handed over to its military. Today, it has approximately 400.

So back then China had like half of one percent of total US stealth fighters. Today, it has little over 50 percent.

The gap is closing fast. The pace and the future curve is not looking good for the DoD. Sorry, DoW.
Didn't the first F35 get delivered in 2013? As of current, across all variants theres something like 600 F35s.

I dont doubt China can manufacture at a faster rate, but deterrence doesnt mean you need to match 1 to 1. It just means you have to field a credible amount to make any contest to be too costly.
 
Didn't the first F35 get delivered in 2013? As of current, across all variants theres something like 600 F35s.

I dont doubt China can manufacture at a faster rate, but deterrence doesnt mean you need to match 1 to 1. It just means you have to field a credible amount to make any contest to be too costly.
I am finding first deliveries in 2011.
With approximately 150 or so f35 delivered to DoD by end of 2016. Coupled with 185 or so f22, that's like 330 5th Gen fighters back then.

The other part of the comment would probably need a different topic, as it could quickly devolve into politics.
 
Last edited:
Regarding the arguments to justify the slowdown in procurement, people should not forgot that LM setup a gigantic assembly line to match DoD requirements and such line, that employ thousands of people trained to do a specific task, can not output quality with an ever varying numbers of airframe delivered.
If TR3 is not ready, Block 3 or a faux-Block 4 (as it today) should be acceptable. The rigid view prevailing today is of no help to the program.
 
What I find fascinating is that LM, P & W and the JPO clearly have serious issues, regularly highlighted by GAO and others, with real world consequences and costs....but neither seems to be capable of reform or change that moves the dial. 10+ years of a clearly broken programme and contractual arrangements and neither party appears to have the intellectual capability, willpower or desire to speed up, change direction and in some cases even appear to just realise that there is a problem...

It's September 2025...anyone remember $25k for 25? (LM were 'hoping' to hit $25k per flight hour in 2025).

Has that born fruit? Or is everyone memory holing it?
 
The dilemma the USAF faces is such that at this point, it might be unwise to overspend on F-35s.

On one hand, voting idiots still haven't awoken to the fact that we are in the new cold war at this point so theres absolutely no guarantee (or hope even) that funding will increase. On the other hand, while the plane is relevant and its mission profiles do take care of the majority of the fight today, every passing year going forward, it'll be increasingly unable to fulfill the air superiority needs. The software issues it faces, the block procurement scheme of said upgrades, and its intended role just doesnt lend itself to be the big lifter in a peer fight that the air force needs to fight.

The AF got on the pirate ship and now it cant get off. Buying significantly more F-35s right now is, to me, a short sighted decision. Its not to say the air force doesnt need the F35 in the future. It will and it absolutely should keep ordering modest numbers, but the priority shouldnt be there if you are concerned about the long term.
Disagree. While I will say this is IMO I have much higher confidence in the F-35 being able to technically achieve the capabilities advertised compared to platforms coming out of China or Russia. While that may not be a popular opinion with some of the forum my experience to date justifies that position.

You have doubts on whether Boeing can or cannot execute. Theres no way Boeing cant execute. Only whether it can execute on time or not. Delayed or not, cost increase or not, Boeing or not there's is no other choice regarding the matter. The F-47 will get built one way or another. The infrastructure to support it will also get built one way or another. That branch of strategic capability is just as important, and if not, more so than sentinel.
Note that I said in the timeline required...

Just by virtue of being a dedicated air superiority fighter, the F-47 is already a better starting point for rebuilding the air force than the F-35 can ever hope to be.
Again I disagree. The F-47 is a niche capability, it will be very expensive to procure and likely similarly expensive to operate.
The other option of 1k block 4 F35s will be noticeably disadvantaged even holding air space in the west pacific by 2030. Let alone contest enemy air space. Having the air force own the IP may not necessarily be better than LM contracting others to do the work, but at the very minimum, when one vendor fails to execute, you can jump ship to another vendor that might have a better solution. With LM, what does the USAF have except keep buying more upgrades that come 5 years too late?
You are very much under selling the capability of the jet to operate in that environment and over estimating the capability of the adversary.

Yes the contract structure is a mess but that is an easier issue to fix than trying to procure a new aircraft as was suggested.
Thats why the lopsided RDT&E budget allocation is justified. There's simply no reason to throw so much money into a program that may or may not get you the capabilities you need in the future when one that for sure will give you better capabilities is in development. One that is built to be flexible both engineering wise and program wise, that leaves the air force with more options if things dont go well and that is purpose built to fulfill the role that the F-35 will be challenged by beyond 2030.
The consensus from a huge majority is that the ratio is the wrong way. You talk about cold war but then ignore that the ratio was the other way for all of it and the end result was the right one.
I dont think the AF is making the wrong decision here. Also dont think the DoD is wrong to allocate only for a limited number of F-35s. Focus on raising readiness, give pilots more flying hours and throw the rest of the money into the real solution. You buckle in for the next 10 - 15 years and when the F-47 and CCAs start rolling off the production line, it would not only fulfill the PCA requirement that the F35 cant fulfill but also allow your F35s to actually perform better in theater.
And between now and then operate a geriatric force that is even less capable of the conflict in the western Pacific you fear is coming?
 
Last edited:
A lot of Raider talk: B-21 was announced in October 2015 and in about a decade will have two airplanes flying. That’s my hard right limit for a USAF/USN MRF.
So really it isn't realistic. Those time-frames are industry and country wide. No one is rolling out a new airframe in less than that timeframe.
I guess if we want to have a blue pill discussion then there really is no discussion is there? The JPO/LMT administered beatings will continue until morale improves.
I's rather talk reality than pipedreams and the reality is we can't fix the past but can change what happens over the next ten years. A lot of that can be done at the program level. Meanwhile LM is pumping out 156 a year and air forces are very happy to take them.
Meanwhile, USAF will continue to gobble up F-15EX while avoiding F-35 deliveries like the plague.
EX deliveries are not consistent and the USAF has changed the program numbers multiple times. They are not that invested in the program, it is more about keeping a second production line going until another, F-47, is available.
 
While that is good in principal I expect you lose combat power in that ratio. Yes you have to man those 1000 F-35s and the pilot shortage is a not going away issue but I would argue the 1000 F-35s gives the USAF an ability to be in more places at once. If CCAs come along as they are meant to, noting in the YFQ-42 thread you weren't very positive on their move to autonomous ops, then a force structure of 750 F-35s and those 1000 CCAs may make more sense than the F-47 and 1000 CCA buy.
Yes. Absolutely. Its a trade and the ability to constantly surge and be present around the world vs fielding combat capability for a specific role and warfighting needs. There is less posturing and signaling that you can do with CCAs vs manned multi role fighters.

On autonomy etc., this really looked at in the post 2035 space so a decade out. In my scenario (#2) the AF would still keep receiving F-35As till then and field a force of between 1,000 and 1,200 which is a little more than double of what it currently has operational or on order.

Continuing with this program as it’s run now seems unserious to me, but who cares what I say - there is no shortage of informed third parties that are essentially saying the same thing.

If the F-35 program can deliver high capability, high availability aircraft that the USN and USAF actually want to buy and take delivery of, it will not be without the existential urgency that comes from a program having a competitor. Am I am betting that NG or BA can put together a less compromised multirole fighter that’s better than everything than a F-35A/C can offer within a decade? Yes and why a decsde? Because a decade is what it’s going to take for F-35 to get the engine, power & cooling and systems/programming maturity it needs to be relevant to the DOW or whatever based on realized program milestones so far.
I think there's a lot of disconnect between reality and what you are proposing.

i. F-47 almost did not happen because the USAF's civilian boss at the time said that the service did not have the funds and if it moved things around it would have had really difficult strategic decisions to make to fund the program at the expense of other more pressing needs and higher priorities.

ii. E-7 AEWC was effectively cancelled by the current service leadership and/or DOD and is now being hopefully reinstated through Congressional intervention.

iii. The DOD wants to move the Navy's F/A-XX to the right by a couple of years because it feels that the industrial base may not be able to support all these next gen programs and pursuing F/A-XX now may delay the F-47 which it believes is a higher priority.

iv. The AF wants to pour money to ramp up the B-21 production to hopefully acquire a greater number than the 80-100 jets it had initially planned.

v. What are RDT&E and acquisition priorities for each service? For the Navy it is F/A-XX and MQ-25. For the Air Force it is F-47, B-21 and CCAs. The two services will do well to keep all these RDT&E accounts flush with enough cash to see them through.

But despite of all this, you suggest that the DOD squeeze together USAF and USN MRF requirements for a fifth gen minus program and fund another $20 Bn plus of RDT&E..just so that someone at Boeing, or Northrop Grumman could put together a program to rival the F-35 and its supply chain with its 150+. aircraft a year production plan? And design, develop, test and produce at scale this competitor in about a decade so that the DOD could then begin buying it. By the time this is delivered, the Marines would have completed their acquisition, and the DON would have taken delivery of more than 2/3 of its intended F-35B's and Cs. The USAF would have taken delivery of more than a 1000 F-35As etc. That's 60% of its intended 1,700 aircraft buy, or 80+ percent of where I think they'll eventually land with their F-35 buy. Yet, when this mythical new MRF is developed and begins to be fielding, the individual services would also in parallel be standing up depot capacity, trainer, maintainer, CLS infrastructure to convert hopefully a working 5th gen minus platform into a warfighting one.

Also, will not take a decade to finish the F-35 Block 4 capability to include the engine core upgrades. Most of the capabilities are currently expected to be delivered by 2030 with the engine and thermal system upgrades likely moving a year or so past that. Given the chronic underperformance of the JSF program, Block 4 is likely to be the last major 'all encompassing' block upgrade on the aircraft with subsequent modernization likely to be farmed out to individual services and be much smaller in scope or cost.

Block 4 capability does not require a completely new engine; hence one is not being pursued at this time. While the program did look and the USAF did fund an adaptive engine in the F-35 class, the Navy was not interested in paying for it and the AF saw that as too large an expense (between $5 Bn and $10 Bn IIRC). so its not likely you will get a clean sheet adaptive engine for this mythical new MRF that you propose to be operational inside a decade.

Finally, you seem to be extremely pessimistic about the F-35 while at the same time being extremely optimistic about whatever alternative that exists in your mind. Just go out and find a company to build an F-35 rival for pocket change and within ten years supplant it as dominant MRF in NATO and US. Like if it was that easy and that affordable to do something like that.

IMHO, the CCA effort will likely, if successful, provide a path forward as will the F-47 derivatives of which can potentially be developed to cover other missions and roles in the post 2035 - post 2040 environment. F-35 TR3 jets are being delivered now and will be combat coded / operationally configured once they receive software over the next year or so. Block 4 capability to include new radar, new EO sensors, EW upgrades and weapons will be rolling in over the next five years hopefully to be followed by engine and thermal system upgrades. You are not going to beat those timelines with a clean sheet design even if you offered a blank check to Boeing or Northrop Grumman who likewise just don't have the engineering talent pool and workforce waiting to staff up a thousand jet MRF program on top of everything else they are working on.

The best course of action is the one being pursued IMHO. The Air Force has slowed its orders down to a trickle and not included any F-35A's in its UPL whils including F-15EX's - Since acquisition budgets are finite..every dollar that goes to add F-15EX's is currently at the expense of buying F-35's which acts both as a reward to Boeing and as a check on Lockheed. USAF is likely headed towards restoring to a full 144 F-15EX's with the ANG as it had originally planned under the first Trump administration. The Navy is launching its next generation strike fighter program hopefully soon with Congressional approval. All these things point to both services not really interested in restoring the DOD F-35 buys to 90-100 range until the follow on modernization effort gets back on track and they have combat coded TR3 jets in hand. You do not have to create a rival to the F-35 to apply pressure on the program and contractor. You have to move money to fund other priorities and needs especially if those programs are delivering on promises better. Or cut your buys down which is basically what the USAF has done since there's no chance in hell they will ever get to a F-35A fleet size of 1.7K. F-15EX in the near term and F-47, B-21 and CCA in the mid term will be those efforts for the AF. Hopefully F/A-XX becomes that for the Navy.

If and when JPO / LM begin delivering the promised block 4 capabilities, the F-35 will again become quite a good value for each of these two services at its sub $100 MM CTOL and sub $120 MM CV variants. At that point, I think you will see the AF more willing to climb back up to 60 aircraft per year which is closer to its intention and needs though the lengthy delays, first with SDD, and now with FoM, has likely shaved off at least 500 F-35's from the DODs eventual buy if not significantly more. That's probably mid to high single digit Billion in profits that LM won't be making because of those delays, overruns and f*ck ups. Lockheed is also, for a while, out of the 6GFA game so that's another added dimension of pressure (not awarded F/A-XX or NGAD) and incentive (F-35 is LM's only fighter for a while) for it to perform.
 
Last edited:
Disagree. While I will say this is IMO I have much higher confidence in the F-35 being able to technically achieve the capabilities advertised compared to platforms coming out of China or Russia. While that may not be a popular opinion with some of the forum my experience to date justifies that position.

You are very much under selling the capability of the jet to operate in that environment and over estimating the capability of the adversary.
I have no idea where your confidence comes from when there are two 5th gen production lines already pumping out fighters while past 2035 the two 6th gen production lines will be active as well. Even if you assume Chinese and Russian equipment are worse, just the sheer amount of sensors and combat mass in the vicinity of where the air force wants to operates requires something more. Also no idea how where you get this confidence from when it takes 5 years minimum to get upgrades for the F-35 when your pacing threat updates their jets every whatever is available at a much faster rate. I'm not here to have another F-35 vs xyz discussion. I also don't think I've sold it short. It just won't be able to do the PCA role that the F-47 was built to do. Without a fighter capable of that in 2027 isn't as big a problem. The same cannot be said in 2030 and beyond, when the PCA role requires you to compete directly with 6th gen fighters. I'd rather over estimate the enemy than find out they were a lot better than we anticipated.

Yes the contract structure is a mess but that is an easier issue to fix than trying to procure a new aircraft as was suggested.
Really now? It's 2025 and that still hasn't happened. The F-47 isn't just a niche fighter either. More than actually fulfilling the niche PCA role, the F-47's program brings about the flexibility that is much more important than how capable the plane is initially or what roles it can or cannot fulfill. Your upgrades cannot take 5 + years to roll out when your pacing threat introduces new tech every 2 - 3 years. Even though the F-35's own blocks have it's tech introduced in smaller batches, it's still not the truly continuous delivery that is required to compete with thepacing threat. You aren't going to out compete a country when the core of your air force essentially rests on the employees of a single company plus whatever subcontractors there are. Instead, if the USAF takes advantage of the F-47's program in the way they say they would, then you can bring a much greater pool of man power to bear to solve the same problem with the added benefit of expanding and growing the ecosystem. More so than actual fighters, it's the organizational and programmatic changes that are more important for the future.

Again I disagree. The F-47 is a niche capability, it will be very expensive to procure and likely similarly expensive to operate.
Again - this all comes down to whether you think the F-35 will prevail against two enemy 5th + 6th gen and CCAs beyond 2035. The only reason I didn't say drop F-35s entirely is because F-47 will be expensive. The F-35 might not be able to do the PCA requirement, but it can still do the majority of other tasks and be the manned affordable mass of the force.

The consensus from a huge majority is that the ratio is the wrong way. You talk about cold war but then ignore that the ratio was the other way for all of it and the end result was the right one.
I don't really care about what the huge majority thinks. The large majority happens to think that our military spending as of now is more than enough to achieve the strategic goals they want even though that isn't true either.

We are in the cold war but we are hardly in the same cold war nor are we in the same position as we were in during the cold war. We didn't start the last cold war having to modernize almost all the systems of a military that will soon fall behind a peer threat. The ecosystem is also different today as there is neither the political will to increase military spending nor is there the same ecosystem of military contractors as before. The dilemma I delineated in my previous comment just didn't exist when we were entering the last cold war.
And between now and then operate a geriatric force that is even less capable of the conflict in the western Pacific you fear is coming?
If your sights are set on Taiwan as the end all be all of US - PRC competition with 2027 as the horizon, then sure dump all the money to buy new F-35s. Not sure how that's going to help you when your F-35As can't even reach the air battle without refueling from vulnerable (and increasingly more vulnerable) tankers. Also not sure how buying more will help when your readiness rates for the F-35 still isn't improving. Fact of the matter is, with F-35s alone, the USAF won't be the more relevant branch in the pacific anyway. If you want to fight in 2027, it ought to be the navy and marines buying more F-35s.

I'm not proposing that the USAF stop buying F-35s or even that the air force should always buy lower numbers. What I am proposing (and which is being done now) is that the USAF buys a calculated number of F-35s and focus on developing the F-47 while in the near term put greater focus into readiness. If you've managed to improve readiness, you're already able to commit a greater number of aircraft towards the fight. Nothing is more immediate than that. When F-47s enter LRIP, then sure lets ramp up block 4 F-35 buys alongside the F-47 to get an ideal force mix.

The fact of the matter is whether its the navy with it's shipbuilding or the air force with its fighters - you must make a calculated risk sometime between now and 2040. Either your calculated risk is you have less fighters for 2027, or you risk being out competed in 2040. I'd rather risk it when F-35's aren't completely outmatched and the PLA still is a majority 4th gen force than take the risk when the enemy's force structure has changed dramatically again while we are still stuck with 4th / 5th gens.
 
Last edited:
If your sights are set on Taiwan as the end all be all of US - PRC competition with 2027 as the horizon, then sure dump all the money to buy new F-35s.

Nope. If your eyes are set on 2027 or even 2030 then you should stop buying fighters and pump everything you've got into munitions, readiness, spares etc. What you are buying now is really going to show up 24-36 months from now, and those flying it and those maintaining it will take another 2-3 or more years to become proficient with it. F-47 might show up in the early 2030s with some initial few units but it will be well into 2030s that we realize its potential with enough in service with trained crews and maintainers. The same things apply to PLAAF but we just assume that they don't and we assume that since there is no transparency in the form of auditor reports, test and evaluation summaries, program SARs or published budget docs, that everything must be not only on track but ahead of anything that LM and co are capable of i.e smoother developments, easy inductions into service, no test discoveries or shortcomings and everything on track from a schedule and cost stand point.
 
If your eyes are set on 2027 or even 2030 then you should stop buying fighters and pump everything you've got into munitions, readiness, spares etc.
I agree with that. The fact that we haven't done that yet makes me think the Air Force's current predicament wasn't arrived at accidentally or as a matter of circumstances. They made a purposeful choice to lean towards the long term solution with some greater focus on near term readiness rather than buying more air frames in significant numbers. This aligns with the not batshit insane strategic plan where we look beyond 2027/2030, beyond Taiwan, and see ourselves with platforms and programs that are in better positions to compete against China in the long term (and better yet, force LM to sell of the IP to the air force to truly get more continuous upgrades for your affordable mass of manned fighters but who am I kidding? this is the US of A).

I think having modest buys of more F-35s would make a middle of the path kind of sacrifice to both 2027-2030 and to keep the USAF running on fumes until mid to late 2030s when 6th gens are introduced in significant numbers. IMO in the 2027 - 2035 time frame, with the currently modest F-35 force + CCAs, I still wouldn't characterize the USAF as being out matched, but the cost of having no 6th gens in service in sufficient numbers by the late 2030s will leave the USAF at an overwhelming disadvantage..
 
Last edited:
IMO in the 2027 - 2035 time frame, with the currently modest F-35 force + CCAs, I still wouldn't characterize the USAF as being out matched, but the cost of having no 6th gens in service in sufficient numbers by the late 2030s will leave the USAF at an overwhelming disadvantage..

The USAF has put itself on a path towards being a fraction of its numerical strength a decade or two from now. Retirements continue to outpace induction with no end in sight. It skipped buying 4.5 generation fighters when it made most sense to buy these and continues to buy new hardware at a pace well short of need. F-47 will not change that. The CSAF and senior leaders won't even commit to buying a large number of these or formally increasing the B-21 inventory objective to a number needed to deter China. The question then becomes how much smaller the AF wants to get. I don't think we've hit rock bottom yet. At some point as I and others have opined, there will be hard questions to answer in terms of what exactly the ROI has been on pumping vast sums of money into RDT&E with no clearly outlined plan for translating those dollars into actual capability. Leadership will change every few years so its not likely you can bring folks back from retirement to hold them accountable.

The Block 4 issue is a short term one. Instead of it being a 2024-2027 timeframe capability, it will be a 2030-2032 timeframe capability. AF has adjusted its buys down given this developmental miss by the program. Once they feel confident that the follow on modernization plan is back on track they will probably again look at 48 if not 60 jets a year. Once F-47 and CCA move from RDTE funding to procurement then I think all bets are off depending on how well those programs do.
 
The USAF has put itself on a path towards being a fraction of its numerical strength a decade or two from now. Retirements continue to outpace induction with no end in sight. It skipped buying 4.5 generation fighters when it made most sense to buy these and continues to buy new hardware at a pace well short of need. F-47 will not change that. The CSAF and senior leaders won't even commit to buying a large number of these or formally increasing the B-21 inventory objective to a number needed to deter China. The question then becomes how much smaller the AF wants to get. I don't think we've hit rock bottom yet. At some point as I and others have opined, there will be hard questions to answer in terms of what exactly the ROI has been on pumping vast sums of money into RDT&E with no clearly outlined plan for translating those dollars into actual capability.

I really don't know what else can be said about the situation. I don't know how America is supposed to be this security guarantor for allied Asian nations in the mid-2030's. I just don't see how their support will be viewed as credible.
 
I really don't know what else can be said about the situation. I don't know how America is supposed to be this security guarantor for allied Asian nations in the mid-2030's. I just don't see how their support will be viewed as credible.
Draw a red line with nuke tipped LRHWs. If said "allies" oppose that, they have CCP majorities in control. Simple yet effective.
Taiwan is not credible.
 
The USAF has put itself on a path towards being a fraction of its numerical strength a decade or two from now.
Is that really an air force issue? I'll concede that yes it should of bought more 4th gens when it made sense to, but to get out of the current predicament - is the solution really in the air force's own hands?

On one hand, your exquisite capabilities can't fall behind the pacing threat. On the other hand you need mass to replace the old fleet. At this point the air force has to choose one of these things to pursue with the flat budget that it's given. Choosing numbers would necessarily mean less funds for the cutting age capabilities. Choosing cutting edge capabilities necessarily means you are sacrificing numbers. The limiting factor here to me isn't so much what the air force can do but how much funds it's given to do the things you want it to do. And from the air force's own perspective, having the tech and ramping up production is arguably less arduous then not having the tech and needing to wait for it to finish development.
 
Is that really an air force issue? I'll concede that yes it should of bought more 4th gens when it made sense to, but to get out of the current predicament - is the solution really in the air force's own hands?
Yes. The service has agency over where it decides to allocate its funds. And to an extent its priorities. It has chosen to do so on RDT&E as evidenced by the fact that RDTE account growth has outpaced both readiness, and procurement. The shrinking force structure and aging fighter and bomber force is what happens if you keep doing that over and over again ignoring realities that you have a geriatric force in desperate need of modernization. It is certainly a choice though I'm sure the service could really use a double digit billion boost in funding each year.
 
I really don't know what else can be said about the situation. I don't know how America is supposed to be this security guarantor for allied Asian nations in the mid-2030's. I just don't see how their support will be viewed as credible.
I don't mean to be rude, but I've seen your comments all over this forum and they all sorta... fall into the same doom and gloom (which sometimes I feel the same about).

But @Ozair has a point:
You are very much under selling the capability of the jet to operate in that environment and over estimating the capability of the adversary.
While I don't at all doubt China's ability to execute and produce quality in addition to quantity, China has become increasingly more vocal about things. Before someone starts telling me the PLA is opaque about everything allow me to remind you that there is more to the Chinese strategic apparatus than the PLA or what the PLA announces and doesn't announce. In contrast, the US reporting has become more and more opaque and polemic regarding China reporting (as reporting, no matter in what country you live in, is also an arm of the strategic apparatus). It just so happens that Ozair and I disagree on what level the relative comparisons stand at.

In addition, the way China undertakes modernization, procurement and development is also very different from the way the US. While the same things are being worked on, China tends undertakes research and technology maturation through more breakthrough oriented ways while the US (and particularly the DoD) matures technology through subsystem integration first and once the integration problems have been mitigated, builds a new system altogether. China also started it's modernization with its sights set in place long before the US did the same. In practice, China's modernization had it's roots in the 90's and by the mid 2000's it was already well underway. In contrast, the US mood in the US began shifting a mere 10 years ago. With 2 years of pandemic in between, 8 years is not exactly a long time for a country seeking to re-arm after selling off its manufacturing to its greatest adversary.

So if you imbibe everything at face value, if you believe nothing is changing, and if you think all there is is all that's been said, then yes - you reach the conclusion that all is without hope. If you imbibe everything, recognize the relative strengths and weaknesses of both sides, and listen to the more serious opinions of each side talking about themselves (which is often much less extreme and much more enlightening than listening to the opposing side talk), you'd reach a much more tepid conclusions.
 
Last edited:
Yes. The service has agency over where it decides to allocate its funds. And to an extent its priorities.
Yeah it has agency, but I mean that it's range of choices is narrow and each also painful with its given budget.
It has chosen to do so on RDT&E as evidenced by the fact that RDTE account growth has outpaced both readiness, and procurement. The shrinking force structure and aging fighter and bomber force is what happens if you keep doing that over and over again ignoring realities that you have a geriatric force in desperate need of modernization.
Maybe this is lost on me since I'm not terribly familiar with PLA force structure and readiness rates, but the question here really is how much of our current 4th gens, which are getting upgraded with new sensors and missiles, will still be mission capable in, say, 2035. I'm somewhat familiar with PLA numbers though not confidently so, but I have no idea about the US numbers.

Some crude estimates for 2035 indicate something like 2400 to 2600 PLAAF/PLAN fighters with a higher but still unknown aircraft availability rate to 1200 actually available US fighters (i've seen some estimates saying 2100-2500 total aircraft by 2035) and an about equal percentage of 5th gens + US having older 4th gens. Sure - it's lopsided if you consider that those numbers for the US are spread around the world while the PLA is focused on one theater, but even with a newer fleet, that doesn't change either.
It is certainly a choice though I'm sure the service could really use a double digit billion boost in funding each year.
And that I think is the real atrocity here - after making the mistake of selling out production capacity for 20 odd years, we start talking big talk without putting the money where our mouth is, and then point to the people who actually want to back up that big talk and tell them it's their damn fault while we the american people keep kneecapping their budget. As much as people want to "do more with less", that just doesn't happen. Not without eating a whole box of crayola. I'll stop there since this is too political at this point.
 
Last edited:

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom