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Air Force planning restructure for future competition and savings | Federal News Network
The service wants to get rid of three of its air platforms.
The F-22 will transition to the Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter. NGAD will use the F-22 airframe, but will add better technology and sensors.
I think the author is just misinformed; the quote below is just silly given that stealth, payload capacity and range better than the F-22's are critical for the USAF's NGAD program, with the effort required to retrofit the F-22's design for these requirements being comparable to a clean-sheet effort (possibly even greater as at least a clean-sheet gives you more freedom):
The F-22 will transition to the Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter. NGAD will use the F-22 airframe, but will add better technology and sensors.
USAF wants to modernize the F-22 Raptor until the Next Generation Air Dominance platform comes online;
I predicted it more than 2 months ago, when they started talking about first and second iteration of NGAD, European theater NGAD not really needing so much range, them having a flying demonstrator already and so on. They are going to cover up the urgent replacement of USAF's 5G and the development of 6G proper under the guise of NGAD and digital engineering's fast development cycle, so they get two programs approved with the political excuse of developing just one. It is a nice PR effort, but they have become predictable.They speak about a modified and modernised F-22 for NGAD, is it a sign that Lockheed is the contractor ?
Ah but why did the USAF not restart the 22 line 5 years ago when they came up with the 55B figure to build 200 modernized raptors? It seemed the 55B made it a nonstarter.I predicted it more than 2 months ago, when they started talking about first and second iteration of NGAD, European theater NGAD not really needing so much range, them having a flying demonstrator already and so on. They are going to cover up the urgent replacement of USAF's 5G and the development of 6G proper under the guise of NGAD and digital engineering's fast development cycle, so they get two programs approved with the political excuse of developing just one. It is a nice PR effort, but they have become predictable.They speak about a modified and modernised F-22 for NGAD, is it a sign that Lockheed is the contractor ?
Are they talking about new F22 airframes or modifying the existing aircraft?
So they have a first series of platform designs.Air Force’s NGAD Program ‘Progressing Per Plan’
Air Force’s NGAD Program ‘Progressing Per Plan’www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
Very good newsSo they have a first series of platform designs.Air Force’s NGAD Program ‘Progressing Per Plan’
Air Force’s NGAD Program ‘Progressing Per Plan’www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
Back then the priority was to avoid threatening F-35, but it was clear from the beginning that F-22 needs attention and is the most logical basis for improving USAF's air superiority capabilities. They can use the name and approach they want, be it restarting the production line with some upgrades, the F-22/F-35 hybrid or a first iteration NGAD, they need to do something, and do it rather quick.Ah but why did the USAF not restart the 22 line 5 years ago when they came up with the 55B figure to build 200 modernized raptors? It seemed the 55B made it a nonstarter.
Digital engineering is here to stay, so the new working methods will be used but what is in discussion is whether the platforms are going to be cycled in reduced periods, right? It is unsurprising that CAPE sees the costs of that not being cheaper but actually more expensive, it looked rather an excuse to justify the two iteration approach to NGAD than a valid argument.Air Force’s NGAD Program ‘Progressing Per Plan’
Air Force’s NGAD Program ‘Progressing Per Plan’ www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
I have been around long enough to remember designing cars the old fashioned way. Digital engineering still takes 3 years to design and build a passenger vehicle. It never got us down to the 2 year wet dream. And actually its a little more than 3 years because of powertrain development. I would say digital engineering shaved 20% time. That's it. I imagine with military aircraft its about the same. I will also say that digital engineering has enormously complicated lengthy security protocols that actually make it worse than the old days from the 90s. Digital engineering isn't a panacea.Back then the priority was to avoid threatening F-35, but it was clear from the beginning that F-22 needs attention and is the most logical basis for improving USAF's air superiority capabilities. They can use the name and approach they want, be it restarting the production line with some upgrades, the F-22/F-35 hybrid or a first iteration NGAD, they need to do something, and do it rather quick.Ah but why did the USAF not restart the 22 line 5 years ago when they came up with the 55B figure to build 200 modernized raptors? It seemed the 55B made it a nonstarter.
Digital engineering is here to stay, so the new working methods will be used but what is in discussion is whether the platforms are going to be cycled in reduced periods, right? It is unsurprising that CAPE sees the costs of that not being cheaper but actually more expensive, it looked rather an excuse to justify the two iteration approach to NGAD than a valid argument.Air Force’s NGAD Program ‘Progressing Per Plan’
Air Force’s NGAD Program ‘Progressing Per Plan’ www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
Using new digital methods to design a future Air Force fighter costs more than the traditional approach, but subsequent iterations could be done faster and less expensively, senior Air Force officials said Sept. 22. They also cautioned that the “Digital Century Series” is not synonymous with the Next Generation Air Dominance program and that no decision has been made about whether to take the approach on an NGAD successor.
The results of the Air Force’s business case analysis of the Digital Century Series approach to combat aircraft design differs from that developed by the Pentagon’s Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation shop, top uniformed USAF acquisition official Lt. Gen. Duke Z. Richardson told reporters Sept. 22. The CAPE’s numbers were higher than the Air Force’s but were highly subjective anyway, he said, because assumptions play a central role in defining costs.
“The differences … are in assumptions about [operations and sustainment] costs, and O&S cost avoidance,” Richardson said. “Another one is in the area of O&S cost growth; in other words, how much you project … the sustainment costs [will be], including manpower. The third area would be the time period of analysis.” The results of any business case analysis are “really sensitive to those assumptions,” he added, and “the assumptions are hard to make; … where do you stop? A traditional program might be on a 30-year-plus cycle, whereas the Digital Century Series system might be on a 16-year cycle. So these are multiples of each other.”
The Digital Century Series was a coinage of former Air Force acquisition executive Will Roper, who suggested that quick-turn design and production of new combat aircraft every few years—produced in lots of 50-100 before being superseded by the next design—would keep the fleet fresh and hold down sustainment costs, because the aircraft would be rapidly retired when their technology grew stale.
Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall told Air Force Magazine that Roper’s ideas of what could be saved with the Digital Century Series were “highly optimistic” and agreed that CAPE’s estimate was higher than the Air Force’s, but the two organizations also applied different assumptions about the sustainment period. The CAPE’s analysis was that traditional methods cost “about 10 percent less” than digital. But digital allowed a quicker revisit of the design, and future iterations were less costly, he said.
Richardson acknowledged that CAPE’s cost estimates were higher, but added that the exercise wasn’t without value.
The Digital Century Series approach was “not an order of magnitude more expensive” than traditional methods, Richardson said. Roper’s approach also aimed to “keep the industrial base active and refreshed, being in the … design phase all the time.” There’s a “performance bump-up you get if you’re constantly refreshing your platforms. So, we think it has merit … We’re not flushing it.”
The CAPE results verified “that there’s merit to the idea,” he said. “What I like about the Digital Century Series approach—and the way we’re approaching [the Next-Generation Air Dominance program]—is that there’s always an option of doing that. That’s the beauty of it. It’s a few years out … The good news is, it’s not a decision we would need to make right away, but those assumptions do drive a lot of the results.”
In the near term, “we continue to focus on that first NGAD ‘mission design series,’ if you will, and we’ll make that other decision later.” Richardson noted, “The threat gets a vote, and also I would guess that if we were to start that second series, we would certainly look at the threat and … whether the threat warranted starting a second series early.”
To be frank, I’m not quite convinced that the “Digital Century Series” is the right approach, especially the Century Series part. From the perspective of logistics and support, it may be very difficult or expensive to operate so many disparate aircraft types, especially when USAF’s goal is to reduce the number of aircraft types in order to rein in costs. I can understand trying to emulate the rapid development of aircraft types that’s associated with the Century Series, but a digital engineering repeat of that? Eh, have my doubts.
I think the way that the LRS-B was conducted under the Rapid Capabilities Office provides a better model to follow in terms of more quickly fielding a new platform. Admittedly the RCO is largely a way to sidestep much of the DOD’s procurement bureaucracy and gives more freedom to the program, but I think that may be what’s needed at this point.To be frank, I’m not quite convinced that the “Digital Century Series” is the right approach, especially the Century Series part. From the perspective of logistics and support, it may be very difficult or expensive to operate so many disparate aircraft types, especially when USAF’s goal is to reduce the number of aircraft types in order to rein in costs. I can understand trying to emulate the rapid development of aircraft types that’s associated with the Century Series, but a digital engineering repeat of that? Eh, have my doubts.
What approach would you suggest for an adversary that will be much more well funded and educated than the Soviet Union was? At some point China's investments in STEM will result in an explosion in modernization/R&D, we're behind on that front (STEM investment), so being able to rapidly develop aircraft to maintain an asymmetric advantage is paramount.
Edit: The cost effective talking point I don't think is feasible for what they are proposing, given the extreme unpredictability of the future in regards to US & China.
Imagine China takes Taiwan and then says to the West, "no more chips for you".To be frank, I’m not quite convinced that the “Digital Century Series” is the right approach, especially the Century Series part. From the perspective of logistics and support, it may be very difficult or expensive to operate so many disparate aircraft types, especially when USAF’s goal is to reduce the number of aircraft types in order to rein in costs. I can understand trying to emulate the rapid development of aircraft types that’s associated with the Century Series, but a digital engineering repeat of that? Eh, have my doubts.
What approach would you suggest for an adversary that will be much more well funded and educated than the Soviet Union was? At some point China's investments in STEM will result in an explosion in modernization/R&D, we're behind on that front (STEM investment), so being able to rapidly develop aircraft to maintain an asymmetric advantage is paramount.
Edit: The cost effective talking point I don't think is feasible for what they are proposing, given the extreme unpredictability of the future in regards to US & China.
The US has the tech to set up manufacturing here, although it would take a lot of time and money spent. But more to the point, I honestly don't think the US would allow that to happen - at a minimum, I think they'd blast the infrastructure of Taiwan's chip industry if they couldn't defend it.Imagine China takes Taiwan and then says to the West, "no more chips for you".
Imagine China takes Taiwan and then says to the West, "no more chips for you".
That is a logical contradiction, because more STEM graduates and effort in China will result in faster, more disruptive digital engineering being implemented over there, it is not as if only US can use that, while the rest are locked in the classical approach. For instance, Sukhoi states that they have just designed the LTS in roughly one year, so by now the cat is out of the bag and everyone is going to use those new methods as intensively as they can.What approach would you suggest for an adversary that will be much more well funded and educated than the Soviet Union was? At some point China's investments in STEM will result in an explosion in modernization/R&D, we're behind on that front (STEM investment), so being able to rapidly develop aircraft to maintain an asymmetric advantage is paramount.
That is a logical contradiction, because more STEM graduates and effort in China will result in faster, more disruptive digital engineering being implemented over there, it is not as if only US can use that, while the rest are locked in the classical approach. For instance, Sukhoi states that they have just designed the LTS in roughly one year, so by now the cat is out of the bag and everyone is going to use those new methods as intensively as they can.
Sure they may have designed it one year but I bet they haven't written line of software code in one year or shrunk the certification process and paperwork to have it flown and in the hands of service pilots within another year.Sukhoi states that they have just designed the LTS in roughly one year, so by now the cat is out of the bag and everyone is going to use those new methods as intensively as they can.
Russia has been the first to officially present an aircraft designed using digital engineering, just saying...The only ones who will be left at the mercy of the classical approach will be smaller players like the EU or Russia.
Sure, there are aspects that can be optimized and others not so much. A low risk approach is to develop based on components and systems that have already been validated by the classical method like in LTS/Su-57, so virtual methods find a very strong backing of real world data for validation. But I think many other steps of the development process will still need to be done and cannot really see how low rate production of different models of different suppliers is going to be cheaper, if all you could argue an evolutionary approach could benefit greatly of these technologies, but not when systems and airframes with different origins are used. And of course, the logistics / training / sustainment of such a fleet does not promise anything good.Sure they may have designed it one year but I bet they haven't written line of software code in one year or shrunk the certification process and paperwork to have it flown and in the hands of service pilots within another year.
The T-7A is flying...Russia has been the first to officially present an aircraft designed using digital engineering, just saying...
From the interview its clear that they're referring to Concept-Design-Build-Test rather than just "build". Which is dependent on having good models linked together in a common framework - which is robust enough to serve a variety of concepts and configurations.The Skunk Works head separately said digital engineering has reduced aircraft build times by two-thirds as business has exploded in recent years.
"So why do we care about that?" Babione asked rhetorically. "Well, it dramatically compresses the time between concept and capability."
Plenty of people do, but I’m sure they want to keep their security clearance!So nobody knows what it is thenCheers.
People everywhere are little sheep with a mobile they are dead if they lost the mobile , but for sure they know nothing about military aviation.It’s more likely that nobody really cares about unmanned aircraft in the same way that enthusiasts did about the manned F-117 and B-2 way back 30 to 35 years ago. Military aerospace does not enjoy the broad public interest that it did a generation ago. Back in the Reagan era, it wasn’t uncommon for a well informed layman to have an opinion on the B-1B program. Try finding one American out of 10,000 who is aware of the B-21 Raider, let alone has an opinion on it. Today, the general public is indifferent. That is both a positive and a negative for military aviation programs. Gone is the insane journalistic criticism of programs that were ultimately successful. On the other hand, without emotional investment from the voting public, there’s no demonstrable grass level support either, except for people and communities effected by defense sector employment.So nobody knows what it is thenCheers.