A FA-XX must significantly contribute to missile defense, counter-hardened facilities, in addition to air superiority (for instance artillery sized munitions equals more fuel, more range) more than those currently proposed for the status quo to be exceeded.
from the previous rand study
IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUING THE STATUS QUO
One possibility, of course, is to not do anything to improve force projection capabilities. This means allowing the status quo in terms of vulnerabilities at Kadena AB especially, but Andersen AFB as well. This approach certainly has inertia on its side, but it entails some very important implications for U.S. power in the Pacific.
If the status quo approach is taken, the United States must recognize its vulnerabilities in the Pacific .... For example, if there is some sort of provocation from China, the United States cannot pursue its normal course of action – which is to deploy aircraft and aircraft carriers to the western Pacific as a deterrent force. While this may have worked in 1950 and again in 1996, the approach would be less deterrent today.
Recall from Cold War era nuclear deterrence studies that in order for deterrent to be credible, it must be survivable against a first strike. However, we have seen that a Chinese first strike on U.S. airbases in Okinawa or the main islands of Japan would be a devastating blow to U.S. airpower. Carrier-based airpower is also vulnerable to PLAN attack submarines and the expected modified CSS-5 anti-ship ballistic missile....
Thus, if the United States pursues its normal course of action, what once may have been a deterrent may become a temptation. If we do nothing to enhance the survivability of our forces, we must manage crisis stability differently.
Further, failing to address the power projection challenges the USAF faces sends strong signals to allies. If the United States is not willing to make the investment to stay preeminent in the western Pacific, it would clearly concern U.S. allies in the region and around the world. Old security commitments would likely be worth less. Allies may begin to hedge. U.S. power would be seen as less credible. The effects of decreased prestige would not be limited to the Pacific. U.S. influence could decrease worldwide. Prestige is the ability of a country to gain favorable conditions from its power without actually having to use it. U.S. prestige would certainly take a blow –
the United States could find itself choosing between having to use force or settling for less. Either option is clearly undesirable. ...
Continuing the status quo therefore would present problems to U.S. power and prestige in the region and globally. In the short-term, until operational problems are fixed, the United States is better off avoiding presenting vulnerable targets (and potentially losing much of its airpower in the process). In the medium- or longer-term, it behooves the United States to consider options to address the access problem or ameliorate its consequences. These options may reduce the vulnerability of close-in airbases, increase the effectiveness of aircraft at standoff airbases, or reduce the air threat by targeting PLA operations.