Nuclear Weapons - Discussion.

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sferrin

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In trying to keep the NEWS ONLY thread NEWS ONLY I'm starting this one for general -non political- discussion. SJW spamming/trolling will be reported. That said, this system seems tailor-made for stirring $hit and walking the gray area:

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,14114.msg258640.html#msg258640

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-building-nuclear-armed-drone-submarine/

talk about jacking up tension levels. In theory Russia could park this in international waters just off the coast and sit there perfectly legally. Parking a 100 Mt warhead 12.1 NM off the coast would take international trolling to a whole new level. Tow it to it's deployment spot and have it drop anchor. Even setting it off IN PLACE is going to cause a LOT of damage. How does a country deal with something like this? Blow it up as soon as it shows up? During peacetime? Park an ASW right next to it? The ASW would get zero notice and be vaporized when the thing went off. Equip it with short range, high speed missiles and they could be on target before the decision maker could even order the thing blown up.
 

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sferrin said:
In trying to keep the NEWS ONLY thread NEWS ONLY I'm starting this one for general -non political- discussion. SJW spamming/trolling will be reported. That said, this system seems tailor-made for stirring $hit and walking the gray area:

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,14114.msg258640.html#msg258640

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-building-nuclear-armed-drone-submarine/

talk about jacking up tension levels. In theory Russia could park this in international waters just off the coast and sit there perfectly legally. Parking a 100 Mt warhead 12.1 NM off the coast would take international trolling to a whole new level. Tow it to it's deployment spot and have it drop anchor. Even setting it off IN PLACE is going to cause a LOT of damage. How does a country deal with something like this? Blow it up as soon as it shows up? During peacetime? Park an ASW right next to it? The ASW would get zero notice and be vaporized when the thing went off. Equip it with short range, high speed missiles and they could be on target before the decision maker could even order the thing blown up.
And something like IIRC 70% of US imports/exports go through 5 main ports. Five weapons and the entire economy is dead for years if not decades [forever].

Also, outside our SSBN sites planned to destroy as many of our subs as possible. Do any of the proponents of "SSBNs only" for deterrence want to comment?
 
I've often wondered why they didn't (apparently) plan something like this but with Oscars and nuclear-armed Shipwrecks. 24 supersonic sea-skimmers easily capable of carrying megaton-class warheads. One Oscar II parked off Virginia could take out many high value targets in a matter of minutes.
 
sferrin said:
I've often wondered why they didn't (apparently) plan something like this but with Oscars and nuclear-armed Shipwrecks. 24 supersonic sea-skimmers easily capable of carrying megaton-class warheads. One Oscar II parked off Virginia could take out many high value targets in a matter of minutes.

Gee ... thanks.

David
 
There seem to be two possibilities here, which the article didn't really distinguish from:

A. Something akin to a Super-Cavitating megaton yield torpedo. Nuclear armed torpedo, but with longer range and higher speed.

B. A ultra-long range (possibly nuclear powered) UUV with a megaton yield warhead. In this case, I am uncertain about the 'high-speed' element here, other than high strategic speed?

Viewed from one point of view, this is an excellent way of negating US strategic submarine superiority without requiring that Russia develop more attack submarines or dedicate existing attack submarines to strategic targets.

A tricky part is that having nuclear weapons based on the seabed goes against some arms control treaty (I forgot which one). Russia may not want to violate that, hence the emphasis on long range UUV. E.g. if the UUV is continuously cruising, then there is no technical violation of that treaty. Russia is also banking on the US not wanting to resume strategic arms race (which seems to be a safe guess right now).

As for defenses, perhaps something like a shore-based ASROC tied into a SOSUS barrier? Get an extended range ASROC, 100nm +, and connect interconnect that into a shoreline defense grid. Still requires a torpedo capable of hitting a, possibly, super-cavitating warhead.

I do think that we will start seeing arguments for revitalized homeland defenses, be it against cruise missiles or sub launched weapons. But that requires the will to spend money and ideas about how to push defense costs low enough to be affordable.
 
Oh, joy.

DrRansom said:
A tricky part is that having nuclear weapons based on the seabed goes against some arms control treaty (I forgot which one). Russia may not want to violate that, hence the emphasis on long range UUV. E.g. if the UUV is continuously cruising, then there is no technical violation of that treaty. Russia is also banking on the US not wanting to resume strategic arms race (which seems to be a safe guess right now).

I think we can safely predict that we will be saying bye-bye to yet another arms control treaty in the not too distant future, this one in the form of the Seabed Treaty.
 
Grey Havoc said:
Oh, joy.

DrRansom said:
A tricky part is that having nuclear weapons based on the seabed goes against some arms control treaty (I forgot which one). Russia may not want to violate that, hence the emphasis on long range UUV. E.g. if the UUV is continuously cruising, then there is no technical violation of that treaty. Russia is also banking on the US not wanting to resume strategic arms race (which seems to be a safe guess right now).

I think we can safely predict that we will be saying bye-bye to yet another arms control treaty in the not too distant future, this one in the form of the Seabed Treaty.
Actions such as these combined with INF Treaty violations are why I have always feared a Russia 'break-out' from New START as well, remember there is no 'reserve' warhead limits. Russia still employs four times as many people in its nuclear weapons complex and has active warhead production lines. Now this married to all their large MIRV capable systems (Sarmat the SS-18 replacement will be capable of 10 to 15 warheads IIRC) we wake up one day to a 5000 warhead arsenal.

Why I have been a proponent of the GBSD being at least Peacekeeper sized housed in new super hardened silos with reserve warheads to upload it, the Trident D5 and our bombers to the maximum warhead limit if required
 
Triton said:
What a bunch of BS that this topic was going to be a general non-political discussion of nuclear weapons.
Which are the overtly political comments? Discussions of force levels, weapon systems, treaties that limit nuclear weapons, possible deployment concepts?? Help me out here?
 
merriman said:
sferrin said:
I've often wondered why they didn't (apparently) plan something like this but with Oscars and nuclear-armed Shipwrecks. 24 supersonic sea-skimmers easily capable of carrying megaton-class warheads. One Oscar II parked off Virginia could take out many high value targets in a matter of minutes.

Gee ... thanks.

David

What?
 
Discussion about nuclear weapons tends to be political. Discussion of rumours about scary Russian nuclear robot submarines posted on websites with dubious past records for accuracy is inherently political.
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
Discussion about nuclear weapons tends to be political. Discussion of rumours about scary Russian nuclear robot submarines posted on websites with dubious past records for accuracy is inherently political.
Interesting that is has a Pentagon codename, no? Interesting that former head of Stratcom Gen. Kehler commented on the weapon system and did not dismiss? Seems to be a couple of Pentagon officials that commented as well. A former CIA agent with a background in Russian affairs is quoted.

Also, I have not seen Bill Gertz called out for any intentional deceit in his reporting. If he has links to those counter articles would be welcome.

But in a general sense when you have civilian control of the armed forces and democratically elected officials in charge of the defense budget process OF COURSE there is always a political dimension.

So to me here is a fair point followed by an unfair political point.

Fair point
1) The US should counter this system by building X, Y & Z
Unfair political point
2) But Obama won't because X, Y & Z

Now the opposite side of the spectrum

Fair point
1) This article is hyperbole Russia wouldn't build something like this is would be too strategically dangerous
Unfair political point
2) Republicans are making this up to scare us into another arms race to benefit the Military Industrial Complex

I think the examples are easy to distinguish
 
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/09/will-subdrones-cause-world-war-iii/120383/?oref=d-topstory
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
Discussion about nuclear weapons tends to be political.

Which is why I put "non political" in the opening post. Talking about technical or operational aspects of nuclear weapons is no more inherently political than any other weapon system, and it's not difficult to distinguish between a political post and a non-political post. I think we all know the difference. What I'm attempting here in this thread is to be able to have discussion without all the emotional BS that inevitably raises it's head whenever politics are dragged into the discussion.
 
sferrin said:
merriman said:
sferrin said:
I've often wondered why they didn't (apparently) plan something like this but with Oscars and nuclear-armed Shipwrecks. 24 supersonic sea-skimmers easily capable of carrying megaton-class warheads. One Oscar II parked off Virginia could take out many high value targets in a matter of minutes.

Gee ... thanks.

David

What?

I live in Virginia Beach

David
 
merriman said:
sferrin said:
merriman said:
sferrin said:
I've often wondered why they didn't (apparently) plan something like this but with Oscars and nuclear-armed Shipwrecks. 24 supersonic sea-skimmers easily capable of carrying megaton-class warheads. One Oscar II parked off Virginia could take out many high value targets in a matter of minutes.

Gee ... thanks.

David

What?

I live in Virginia Beach

David

Oh. Nothing personal. Just a lot of high value targets in the area. (DC, the Pentagon, Newport News, Langley, etc. )
 
The concept is laughable. Slow moving, underwater, unmanned. It is just begging for a group of Navy Seals to swim up to it and do all those terrible things Navy Seals are really, really good at doing.
 
sublight is back said:
The concept is laughable. Slow moving, underwater, unmanned. It is just begging for a group of Navy Seals to swim up to it and do all those terrible things Navy Seals are really, really good at doing.

"The UUV is equipped with a deadman's switch to discourage tampering. If it moves more than 100 yards from it's station or any breach of the hull is detected it goes off. " It would be a piece of cake to set it up so no Secret Squirrel is going to disable it. Ultimately it would come down to a game of chicken. Besides, wouldn't tampering with another country's nuclear deterrence be considered an act of war?
 
sublight is back said:
The concept is laughable. Slow moving, underwater, unmanned. It is just begging for a group of Navy Seals to swim up to it and do all those terrible things Navy Seals are really, really good at doing.

Did you read the story? There is this odd reference to "High-Speed." I don't get how you make a high-speed UUV with any appreciable range, but that is what the story says.

We can think of two high-speed regimes:
A. > 15kts, e.g. fast for a submarine
B. Super-cavitating

From what the story says, I suspect that high-speed refers to A. However, both cases are beyond the ability of SEALs to disable it.
 
sferrin said:
sublight is back said:
The concept is laughable. Slow moving, underwater, unmanned. It is just begging for a group of Navy Seals to swim up to it and do all those terrible things Navy Seals are really, really good at doing.

"The UUV is equipped with a deadman's switch to discourage tampering. If it moves more than 100 yards from it's station or any breach of the hull is detected it goes off. " It would be a piece of cake to set it up so no Secret Squirrel is going to disable it. Ultimately it would come down to a game of chicken. Besides, wouldn't tampering with another country's nuclear deterrence be considered an act of war?

How many of these will blow up alone in international waters before they stop deploying them? You guys need to stop sniffing the propaganda and relax. The Navy has this covered.
 
sferrin said:
"The UUV is equipped with a deadman's switch to discourage tampering. If it moves more than 100 yards from it's station or any breach of the hull is detected it goes off. "

This is a quote from The Washington Free Beacon story? I can't seem to find it.
 
Triton said:
sferrin said:
"The UUV is equipped with a deadman's switch to discourage tampering. If it moves more than 100 yards from it's station or any breach of the hull is detected it goes off. "

This is a quote from The Washington Free Beacon story? I can't seem to find it.

Probably because it wasn't in there. I merely pointed out it would be very easy to discourage tampering.
 
sublight is back said:
How many of these will blow up alone in international waters before they stop deploying them?

Who says it actually has to be rigged that way? Who would take the chance that it might be though?

sublight is back said:
You guys need to stop sniffing the propaganda and relax. The Navy has this covered.

Well that was certainly useful. ::) [/quote]
 
sferrin said:
sublight is back said:
How many of these will blow up alone in international waters before they stop deploying them?

Who says it actually has to be rigged that way? Who would take the chance that it might be though?

sublight is back said:
You guys need to stop sniffing the propaganda and relax. The Navy has this covered.

Well that was certainly useful. ::)
[/quote]

I just cant believe you are entertaining the plausibility of such an absurd platform. Nobody would put a booby trap on a sub full of nukes. No platform like this, even without nukes, would make it through deployment without having an unforeseen "accident" in extremely deep international waters, where nobody could ever say for certain what exactly happened. Given the nature of classified programs and espionage, I wouldn't be surprised if they had already deployed some autonomous submersibles and that we'd already had our way with them.

I may or may not be overselling the Navy's capabilities, but they certainly have a spectacular and almost completely classified history of undersea espionage the likes of which wont be fully known for generations to come.
 
I see a great deal of conjecture, of the usual paranoid variety, being posted.

I can see several reasons why the Russians would not deploy such a weapon - primarily the hated political/strategic ones which we are supposedly forbidden to mention. Despite what many may claim, the Russian Federation leadership lives with the same fear that the fUSSR's leadership lived with - a decapitation strike and if they were to deploy such a weapon, it's use would open the doors to the US deploying similar (not identical) weapons which were intended to wipe the Russian leadership out first. As most American weapons are inherently more accurate and reliable than most Russian ones, I suspect I know who would be the losers in such an exchange.

It appears to me that a lot of people desire a return to the Cold War. Do they really miss it that much?
 
The Free Beacon article seems highly speculative.

I'm highly conscious of the Russian leadership's evolving irresponsibility in the international arena but if one seeks more immediate concerns, well, there are plenty of easily verifiable ones. Perhaps the most recent is an exercise of their forces featuring "winnable" scenarios of nuclear weapons use. Some of these are actually (and doctrinally quite cynically) called "de-escalatory" strikes, in effect hitting targets which they apprise as not likely to trigger symmetrical retaliatory (or MAD) responses from the West. That being said a nuclear armed AUV does somehow fit with the harebrained if not feverish duginist (as in neo-stalinist far right whatever Alexey Dugin's, whom Putin seems to entertain as he seems fit and convenient) ideologies of the US as a "sea power" and Russia as a "land power".

Even so, the decision process in deploying and controlling a nuclear armed AUV seems highly reckless - perhaps unless the intention from the get-go is to actually use it to full effect which is of course beyond reckless. Thus there's not much incentive to not interfere with such a project symmetrically (or rather, prohibitively forcefully) as early as possible. But one must also be conscious here of the russian penchant for deception ("maskirovka") and so-called "reflexive control" i.e. getting the adversary to do one's own bidding through manipulation. So how might the US change its actions if there was even a semi-credible possibility of a potentially immediate homeland threat? Two precedents spring to mind - 9/11 and the Cuban missile crisis.

The current Russian leadership seeks to break out of the current European security arrangement which it sees as constraining and re-establish a "Eurasian" Russia as a global heir to the Soviet empire. Central to this is severing the transatlantic relationship of western and/or democratic nations. 9/11 got the US to act highly unilaterally which ultimately did some real damage to friendly relations (and continues to severely destabilize the southern and southeastern flank of the EU). It also drastically increased CONUS security spending and focused even US external ops largely around that rather than a larger, more holistic geopolitical stance. The Cuban missile crisis also caused the US to step back part of its European deterrence and arguably helped the soviets to cement the partition of Europe and geopolitical "buffer zones of influence" (for as long as it lasted).

Floating a trial balloon (or in this case submerging an AUV into media) as to the reaction of the US to an immediate homeland threat seems more likely than an actual project having been given the full go-ahead. Russians, after all, are mostly leveraging old refurbished equipment at the moment and even their psyops aren't that unprecedented. And with all due respect to the Free Beacon, it is some way to the obscure end of the spectrum as far as general visibility goes. But reactions do matter, for russian tactics are, if anything, opportunistic and they do like to gamble. Confronting a possible nuclear armed AUV, even if it were only in terms of imagery and not much beyond that ("Nothing is Real and Everything is Possible", a very enlightening book by Peter Pomerantsev about current Russia), must necessarily involve a steadfast, joint and resolute commitment to a common defense of the transatlantic alliance and a thorough, unmistakable dimension of acting as a true global power.

These sorts of things (a vague report of an AUV) may not require an escalation as such, it might even be detrimental. This is not a symmetric struggle. The current russian leadership of authoritarian siloviki and cronies are probing our weak points from an economy the size of Italy based on endemic graft, fundamental disrespect of personal property and informal patronage (collectively known as "sistema" which has lived on in different guises through Imperial Russia, Soviet Union and current Russia) while not really minding terribly of incurring costs on the majority of their own citizens and on people living under other authoritarian regimes or failed states, i.e. "allies".

Whatever pain, worry or inconvenience they may occasionally manage to cause must not deter us from acting with confidence and determination commensurate with our much greater prowess and capacity to act. The current Russian leadership has tended to complain loudly whenever NATO and the US have considered installing missile defense systems in, say, Poland as if Russia should be free to incinerate Europe on some whim. Given the ridiclousness of their argument perhaps we should start there, unilaterally and in a comprehensive way. Russia has completely depleted any remaining mutual trust anyway by their actions in Ukraine so there's really no excuse not to do this.

That would at least give out the message that we reserve a right to deploy any purely defensive system against any nuclear threat anywhere and use them (this would also come handy as Russia has its "de-escalatory" strike doctrine) at any time. AUVs included, speculative or otherwise.
 
Kadija_Man said:
I see a great deal of conjecture, of the usual paranoid variety, being posted.

I can see several reasons why the Russians would not deploy such a weapon - primarily the hated political/strategic ones which we are supposedly forbidden to mention.

If spouting your political opinion is so important why don't you just start your own thread on it instead of trying to ruin this one?
 
sublight is back said:
I just cant believe you are entertaining the plausibility of such an absurd platform. Nobody would put a booby trap on a sub full of nukes. No platform like this, even without nukes, would make it through deployment without having an unforeseen "accident" in extremely deep international waters, where nobody could ever say for certain what exactly happened. Given the nature of classified programs and espionage, I wouldn't be surprised if they had already deployed some autonomous submersibles and that we'd already had our way with them.

I may or may not be overselling the Navy's capabilities, but they certainly have a spectacular and almost completely classified history of undersea espionage the likes of which wont be fully known for generations to come.

Dismissing what the other guy appears to be doing out of hand seems doesn't seem like the wisest thing to do. I'm reminded of Bob Gates' infamous "it will take 20 years for China to build a stealth fighter" comment. History is littered with this kind of thought coming back to bite people hard. In fact I can't think of a single instance where sticking one's head in the sand has had a positive result. That said, there is nothing technically impossible with this idea, nor is it necessarily a bad one (depending on what one's goals are). (Which is not saying it's a wonderful, trouble-free idea.)
 
sferrin said:
Kadija_Man said:
I see a great deal of conjecture, of the usual paranoid variety, being posted.

I can see several reasons why the Russians would not deploy such a weapon - primarily the hated political/strategic ones which we are supposedly forbidden to mention.

If spouting your political opinion is so important why don't you just start your own thread on it instead of trying to ruin this one?

I am not trying to ruin anything. I am attempting to participate in the discussion. You appear to believe that only one side of the aisle should be heard here. I wonder why?

Anyway, that aside, you appear unwilling to participate in any discussion of the realities of the deployment or possible use of WMDs by anybody other than the United States for reasons that you accept. Why not simply declare Putin, "evil" and be done with the entire thing? In reality, Putin is attempting to protect his position and his regime from what he perceives - perhaps mistakenly - as Western "aggression". Your viewpoint appears to reinforce his views.

As far as I am concerned, this entire issue is speculative in the extreme. You are relying on a tabloid source to reinforce your own views on the issue. I'll leave you to it, if that is what you want.
 
Kadija_Man said:
sferrin said:
Kadija_Man said:
I see a great deal of conjecture, of the usual paranoid variety, being posted.

I can see several reasons why the Russians would not deploy such a weapon - primarily the hated political/strategic ones which we are supposedly forbidden to mention.

If spouting your political opinion is so important why don't you just start your own thread on it instead of trying to ruin this one?

I am not trying to ruin anything. I am attempting to participate in the discussion. You appear to believe that only one side of the aisle should be heard here. I wonder why?

Anyway, that aside, you appear unwilling to participate in any discussion of the realities of the deployment or possible use of WMDs by anybody other than the United States for reasons that you accept. Why not simply declare Putin, "evil" and be done with the entire thing? In reality, Putin is attempting to protect his position and his regime from what he perceives - perhaps mistakenly - as Western "aggression". Your viewpoint appears to reinforce his views.

As far as I am concerned, this entire issue is speculative in the extreme. You are relying on a tabloid source to reinforce your own views on the issue. I'll leave you to it, if that is what you want.

Three paragraphs of deliberate misinterpretation and sour grapes. Yes, please, "leave us to it" and start your own thread. (Predicts he won't go away.)
 
"US report calls for dual-capable F-35C and tactical nukes"
22 June, 2015 BY: James Drew Washington DC

Source:
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-report-calls-for-dual-capable-f-35c-and-tactical-413936/

Clark Murdock of the Center for Strategic and International Studies floated the idea of a return to carrier-based nuclear weapons in a new report published on 22 June.

The US government has committed to outfitting only the land-based F-35A with nuclear weapons as a “dual-capable aircraft,” namely the Boeing B61-12 thermonuclear guided bomb.

According to Murdock though, the F-35C should also receive nuclear weapons in the future as a “visible manifestation” of the United States’ commitment to protecting its allies.

“While I think bombers are an important hedge capability, what’s really important are nuclear-capable aircraft that can be forward-deployed on the territory of our allies,” he said at a report unveiling in Washington. The report, titled Project Atom, considers alternative nuclear strategies and force postures in the 2025 to 2050 time frame.

Murdock believes the “nuclear umbrella” the United States extends to its allies is more effective and reassuring when it is planted in allied territory instead of relying solely on long-range nuclear bombers, ballistic missiles and submarines.

According to the US Air Force, the first full-up B61-12 nuke will be assembled by 2020 and early aircraft integration activities with the F-35A are due to begin next year. The current time line would see the F-35A achieve dual-capable status by 2024 as part of the Block 4 configuration.

“We had 7,000 nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe at the pinnacle of the Cold War,” says Murdock. “In Asia, we had almost 1,000 deployed on the Korean Peninsula. About 3,000 total were in the Asia Pacific theatre.

“When the Soviets looked out at their borders, they didn’t just see a ring of American men and women in uniform, they saw a ring of nuclear weapons. They knew that any major, conventional aggression on their part would go nuclear because all the weapons were there.”

Murdock’s analysis also concludes that America needs to field range of nuclear weapons, at least one for every rung of the nuclear escalatory ladder, from low-yield, tactical nukes right up to those capable of mass destruction. The current US strategy favours a massive retaliatory response as the primary deterrent against a nuclear attack, leading some to question how the West will respond in the event of a lower-lever crisis.

Murdock as well as contributing author Elbridge Colby of the Center for a New American Security believe America needs a variety of air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons, including low collateral, enhanced radiation, earth penetration, electromagnetic pulse “and others as technology advances”.

“US nuclear weapons should and need to do more than threaten unhindered devastation,” says Colby. “It’s not very credible if the United States threatens to loose apocalyptic destruction that would call forth a matching response over something less than a very central or grave interest. It’s a bad idea.

“I do think the US should reserve the right and the ability to use nuclear weapons first in extreme circumstances to respond to aggression.”

The conversation about the strategic nuclear force structure comes as the US Defense Department embarks on a major recapitalisation of its nuclear triad, which critics and supports alike say is unaffordable.

It also comes as the West’s former Cold War rivals Russia and China invest heavily in their nuclear infrastructure, while America’s nuclear weaponry ages out.

The DOD is requesting billions of additional dollars from Congress to buy a new nuclear-capable bomber, submarine, ballistic missile, cruise missile and nuclear command-and-control apparatus.
 
"Commentary: Sustaining Nuclear Deterrence Requires New Capabilities"
By Clark Murdock and Thomas Karako 1:18 p.m. EDT July 13, 2015

Source:
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/07/13/commentary-sustaining-nuclear-deterrence-requires-new-capabilities/30084823/

US Defense Secretary Ash Carter recently visited Berlin to assure allies that the US would deter aggression. NATO leaders are worried that Russia might invade the Baltics in a Crimea-style fait accompli, and then threaten nuclear escalation unless the alliance backs down.

Moscow's treaty violations and "nuclear sabre rattling," Carter warned, raise "questions about Russia's commitment to strategic stability" and to "the profound caution that world leaders in the nuclear age have shown over decades to the brandishing of nuclear weapons."

This is but the latest confirmation that we've entered a new nuclear age — one characterized by different rules, more actors, less predictability and the paradox that America's conventional superiority may make deterrence harder.

After noting that opponents might be tempted to employ nuclear weapons to overcome conventional inferiority, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review observed that US nuclear forces should deter nuclear-armed adversaries from escalating their way out of failed conventional aggression.

"Escalate to de-escalate" tactics have already been publicly embraced by Russia but could also be used by North Korea or China. Instead of graduated rungs along an "escalation ladder," adversaries may well be tempted to lower their nuclear thresholds to forestall conventional defeat.

Last November, then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel called nuclear deterrence the department's "highest priority mission." But it is official US policy to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and pursue a world without nuclear weapons. This may weaken nuclear deterrence because allies and adversaries will wonder how the US might respond to limited nuclear employment.

Plotting to offset US conventional superiority has prompted some states, like North Korea and Iran, to pursue nuclear weapons, and others, like Russia, to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons.

To keep the nuclear threshold elevated in the minds of potential adversaries, the US must have more flexible and credible means to control escalation. The distinction between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons is long obsolete. Any use of a nuclear weapon could have profound strategic effects.

In a new report, "Project Atom," we recommend that in addition to retaining our traditional strategic deterrent, the US needs to acquire nuclear capabilities that enable it to respond proportionately to employment of a nuclear weapon. Specifically, the US should develop options for more forward-deployed assets and more discriminate weapons.

Proliferation by Iran or others could strain extended deterrence and invite allies to re-evaluate their non-nuclear status. During the Cold War, large-scale conventional aggression was not deterred by US or NATO declaratory policy, but by the significant presence of nuclear weapons in Europe and the Pacific. Establishing credibility may require greater nuclear burden-sharing and forward-basing.

Nuclear submarines and ICBMs should remain the highly survivable foundation of US deterrence. Dual-capable F-35s on land and aboard carriers would provide forward-based or rapidly deployable aircraft. Penetrating bombers remain a visible complement to both missions.

More discriminate weapons may be needed. The future B61 gravity bomb will retain lower-yield options and no longer require a parachute for delivery, catching up to 1990s JDAM-like guidance. Credibility would be further enhanced through low-yield weapons deliverable across the triad, as well as additional nuclear-capable standoff cruise missiles from air, sea and land.

But new thinking from Washington is also required. Both statutory restrictions and policy limitations prevent the US from developing new weapons, components, missions or capabilities. The average weapon in today's stockpile is over 28 years old. Current modernization plans will further limit options, since there is no path to replace the B61-11 earth penetrator. In the near term, the national laboratories could be freed to begin researching new designs for lower cost; more safety, security and reliability; lower yields; and other effects.

After a long procurement holiday, the US deterrent is now entering a bow wave of investment and recapitalization. Over the next two decades, a new set of post-Cold War delivery systems will be built, and many of today's weapons will be life-extended. Infrastructure modernization is also badly overdue; uranium facilities in Tennessee, for instance, date to the Manhattan Project.

Current modernization plans are critical just to retain current capabilities, and avoid disarmament by rust. While requiring 3 to 6 percent of the defense budget over the next decade, these investments should be made with an eye to future geostrategic realities.

Broadening options available to a president would strengthen US extended deterrence, discourage proliferation among allies and communicate that there are no potential gaps for adversaries to exploit. This is not about "war fighting" or making weapons "more usable," but making deterrence more credible. Failure to adapt to new realities could invite nuclear use by creating false perceptions that the US would be self-deterred.

Our conventional superiority tempts our adversaries into lowering their nuclear thresholds. A newer, more flexible and more credible US nuclear deterrent designed for 21st century challenges would raise that threshold and help make nuclear employment less attractive.

Clark Murdock is a senior adviser and Thomas Karako is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. They are respectively the lead and contributing authors of the "Project Atom" report.
 
"The Most Dangerous Nuclear Weapon in America's Arsenal"
by Zachary Keck
July 28, 2015

Source:
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-most-dangerous-nuclear-weapon-americas-arsenal-13433

The United States maintains an extensive nuclear arsenal. According to the Federation of Atomic Scientists, in April of this year the United States maintained an arsenal of over 7,200 nuclear bombs. Of those, more than 2,000 were deployed (1,900 strategic nuclear weapons and 180 non-strategic weapons).

America also maintains a plethora of delivery options for its nuclear bombs. As part of its nuclear triad, it maintains some 94 nuclear-capable bombers (B-2s and B-52s), over 400 Minuteman III ICBMs and 12 Ohio-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines. The latter are equipped with modern Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which are drastic improvements over their land-based competitors.

Indeed, as Keir Lieber and Daryl Press have noted, “In 1985, a single U.S. ICBM warhead had less than a 60 percent chance of destroying a typical silo… Today, a multiple-warhead attack on a single silo using a Trident II missile would have a roughly 99 percent chance of destroying it.”

Yet the most dangerous nuclear bomb in America’s arsenal may be the new B61-12.

Much has been written about the B61-12, most of which has focused on its enormous cost. And for good reason—it is the most expensive nuclear bomb project ever.

In terms of sheer destructive capability, the B61-12 is nowhere near America’s most dangerous nuclear weapon. Indeed, the bomb has a maximum yield of just 50-kilotons, the equivalent of 50,000 tons of TNT. By contrast, the B83 nuclear bomb has a maximum yield of 1.2 megatons (1,200 kilotons).

What makes the B61-12 bomb the most dangerous nuclear weapon in America’s arsenal is its usability. This usability derives from a combination of its accuracy and low-yield.

In terms of the former, the B61-12 is America’s first nuclear-guided bomb, As Hans Kristensen of FAS notes, “We do not have a nuclear-guided bomb in our arsenal today…. It [the B61-12] is a new weapon.”

Indeed, according to Kristensen, existing U.S. nuclear bombs have circular error probabilities (CEP) of between 110-170 meters. The B61-12’s CEP is just 30 meters.

The B61-12 also has a low-yield. As noted above, the bomb has a maximum yield of 50 kilotons. However, this yield can be lowered as needed for any particular mission. In fact, the bomb’s explosive force can be reduced electronically through a dial-a-yield system.

This combination of accuracy and low-yield make the B61-12 the most usable nuclear bomb in America’s arsenal. That’s because accuracy is the most important determinate of a nuclear weapon’s lethality (Yield of warhead^2/3/ CEP^2).

As one scholar explains: “Making a weapon twice as accurate has the same effect on lethality as making the warhead eight times as powerful. Phrased another way, making the missile twice as precise would only require one-eighth the explosive power to maintain the same lethality.” Furthermore, radiological fallout operates according to Newton’s inverse square law.

In practical terms, all this means that the more accurate the bomb, the lower the yield that is needed to destroy any specific target. A lower-yield and more accurate bomb can therefore be used without having to fear the mass, indiscriminate killing of civilians through explosive force or radioactive fallout.

Lieber and Press have documented this nicely. Indeed, using a Pentagon computer model, they estimated that a U.S. counterforce strike against China’s ICBM silos using high-yield weapons detonated at ground blast would still kill anywhere between 3-4 million people. Using low-yield weapons and airbursts, this figure drops to as little as 700 fatalities!

This makes using nuclear weapons thinkable for the first time since the 1940s. The B61-12 only encourages this trend further.
 
"Questioning the case for new nuclear weapons"
Adam Mount
08/21/2015 - 06:37

Source:
http://thebulletin.org/questioning-case-new-nuclear-weapons8671

Recent developments—Russian aggression in Ukraine, China’s expanding territorial claims, and the need to modernize the US nuclear arsenal—have caused scholars to revisit a labyrinthine world of nuclear strategy largely neglected since the end of the Cold War. But this new wave of theory has resurrected some dubious arguments. In recent months, a number of strategists have argued that the United States needs to develop a new generation of low-yield nuclear warheads to deter its adversaries from a particular scenario of nuclear escalation. Under this concept, a US adversary could employ a small nuclear warhead in an attempt to force the United States to back down from a crisis. Though such a possibility is a serious concern, looking closely at the strategic calculus of nuclear retaliation shows that it is not a reason to develop and forward-deploy new nuclear weapons.

This new concept for nuclear weapons use follows from the principal feature of international security today: With sufficient time and preparation, the United States can apply overwhelming conventional military superiority against any actor on the face of the Earth. This has changed how other countries think about the role of nuclear weapons in their national defense. Today, there are signs that US adversaries, especially Russia, plan to employ nuclear weapons to truncate any escalating conflict with the United States. In a recent article in Survival, I refer to this concept of nuclear use as “offset escalation:” An enemy hopes to offset US conventional superiority by escalating to the nuclear level. Because this is the likeliest scenario for nuclear use today, the question of how to deter or avoid it is a key challenge for defense strategists. For example, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review argues that a primary mission of the US nuclear deterrent is to ensure that adversaries “cannot escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression”—or, to phrase it another way, to make sure that US adversaries can’t cover their crimes with their nuclear arsenal.

Elbridge Colby, the Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, has been instrumental in sounding the warning about the possibility of offset escalation. For Colby and others, offset escalation is made more likely by the structure of the US nuclear arsenal. An arsenal designed for massive retaliation against a Soviet first strike lacks the “discrimination and flexibility” necessary to deter the kinds of lower-yield, electromagnetic pulse, or nonlethal strikes that an adversary might employ to force the United States to back away from a gathering conflict. To fill the gap, Colby argues, “the United States should develop capabilities, options, and doctrine to enable limited and tailored nuclear strikes—including with varying yields, trajectories, and target types…”—in short, the “capabilities needed to fight a limited nuclear war more effectively than plausible adversaries.”

There is much to recommend Colby’s argument. It is incumbent upon all civilian and military officials to ensure that any operation is discriminate and proportional to the original attack; flexibility is a desirable property of any inventory of weapons systems—especially one that can be reconfigured only rarely. It is intuitive and plausible that like weapons are needed to deter a limited offset escalation strike.

However, the US government needs better evidence before it shifts nuclear strategy in potentially destabilizing ways. In the Survival article, I explain the strategic logic of nuclear restraint: If deterrence fails and a US adversary employs a nuclear weapon, the United States has strong reasons to refrain from nuclear retaliation. Prevailing in the conflict at hand, projecting an image that will serve US interests in future conflicts, and creating a stable world over the long run may require Washington to instead press a conventional response. In some circumstances—against a powerful adversary, for example, or in the case of a highly destructive first strike—the case for nuclear restraint may be outweighed by other considerations.

But a close look at hypothetical scenarios of nuclear use suggests that the costs of nuclear retaliation would be even higher in response to cases of offset escalation. As a result, concerns about offset escalation make conventional responses relatively more appealing and nuclear retaliation relatively less so.

For example, it would almost certainly not be in the American interest to reciprocate a nonlethal nuclear blast. An adversary like Russia or China could detonate a nuclear weapon high over a regional battlefield, generating an electromagnetic pulse that damaged electrical equipment but did not produce casualties from its blast effects. If the United States were to respond in kind, this exchange of demonstration strikes would harm the global nonproliferation regime, signal other states that they could provoke a nuclear reaction at will, and dilute the global opprobrium the attacker would face for using a nuclear weapon first. At the same time, in-kind retaliation would do little to dissuade the adversary from continued nuclear use, nor would it ensure a favorable resolution of the crisis. These considerations cast serious doubt on the need to develop “special effects” weapons like ones optimized to produce an electromagnetic pulse. It is not at all clear that possession of such a warhead would deter an adversary from employing one.

The question of how to respond to a low-yield but lethal nuclear strike is more complex. For example, if North Korea detonated a small nuclear weapon at a location chosen to produce limited military casualties and few civilian ones, the pressure to respond in kind might be great. However, many of the costs the United States would incur from employing a nuclear weapon would still apply, regardless of the yield. Certainly, international opprobrium would be greater following a highly destructive strike, but even a lower-yield blast would generate massive disapproval and damage America’s standing as a member of the international community.

In other ways, if the United States employed a new, low-yield nuclear warhead, it could suffer greater costs than it would, if the response involved existing, nonnuclear weapons. A lethal low-yield strike would erode the nuclear taboo at least as much as a larger-yield blast. Such a strike would stand as a moral statement that the United States believed using low-yield nuclear weapons was a legitimate instrument of escalation control. Shattering the nuclear taboo would lead to significantly higher proliferation pressures—on non-nuclear states to launch new programs to build “usable” systems, and on existing nuclear states to update their arsenals to reflect this new reality. It is far safer to maintain that nuclear weapons are not an effective means of controlling escalation, for both the United States and its adversaries.

While proponents of the new, smaller warheads will assert that the US president should have every possible option available in a crisis, the simple fact is that this is not how military planning works. US policymakers would be hesitant to spend money on weapons that are less likely to be useful when there are several large conventional procurement programs for systems that are likely to be useful. As military budgets tighten, it will become more and more important to reject categorical and limitless statements like “we must provide a president with every possible option.”

The costs of building any new nuclear weapons—including low-yield warheads—are not only monetary. A new warhead program would accelerate foreign modernization efforts, increase proliferation pressures, damage the nonproliferation regime, and shatter the nuclear taboo. In short, the cost of building new nuclear weapons not only crowds conventional defense programs; it also distracts from other national priorities, and potentially erodes international security.

Proponents of the new weapons will hasten to point out that we don’t build nuclear weapons with the intention of using them; we build them so that they need not be used—that is, for deterrence. Why, then, should low-yield weapons be subject to different standards?

It is a fair question, but it shifts the tenor of the conversation from the need to build weapons that the United States must have for specific employment scenarios, to the capabilities necessary to maintain deterrence. This in turn shifts the burden of proof to the proponents of new systems. Before, they could rightly claim that opponents of low-yield weapons needed to provide an alternative theory for how to deter offset escalation. But, adding the costs of employing a low yield weapon to the equation raises more pressing questions. For instance: If the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon is not in the American interest, will these weapons’ marginal advantage as credible deterrents really be decisive in shifting an adversary’s calculation about first use? In other words, how confident should we be that a low-yield weapon will suffice to deter an offset escalation strike, where a larger one would not?

Furthermore, the strategic logic of nuclear restraint suggests that conventional deterrence, properly calibrated, may outperform nuclear deterrence as a means of preventing offset escalation. If there is reason to believe that a conventional response will lead to a better resolution of some crises, why should the threat of conventional attack be less effective at deterring the strike in the first place? Are there steps that US policymakers can take to better communicate the devastating consequences of conventional war? Certainly, the tendency in Washington to denigrate the effectiveness of conventional deterrence (like, for instance, many arguments in favor of building low-yield nuclear weapons) decreases its efficacy as a tool of statecraft.

Though much has changed since the end of the Cold War, the effectiveness of a nation’s nuclear deterrent still depends on the credibility of the threat to use those weapons. While the threat to employ a low-yield weapon has greater credibility because it risks fewer casualties, this is not the only consideration that matters. The use of any nuclear weapon will have negative effects that resonate through the international system, and many of these broader costs are indifferent to the yield of the warhead. In other ways, the production and use of a low-yield warhead will incur greater costs than continued reliance on existing US weaponry.

The case for sub-kiloton, low-yield, and special effects weapons depends on them being more usable than high-yield weapons, but the credibility of a nuclear threat depends substantially on whether it would be in the national interest to carry out that strike. There is good reason to doubt that it would be in the US national interest to use a low-yield nuclear weapon, especially in cases in which an enemy hopes to offset US conventional superiority by escalating to the nuclear level. If there is a case to be made for building new, low-yield nuclear weapons, it won’t be convincing unless it accounts for all the costs of employing them. As the debate unfolds, strategists should not assume that the possibility of offset escalation is a reason to develop new warheads. It may be a better reason not to.
 
"Beware the Nuclear Experts"
By James Doyle, an independent nuclear security specialist supported by the Ploughshares Fund and non-resident associate of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. 9:15 p.m. EDT August 20, 2015

Source:
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/08/20/beware-nuclear-experts/32083997/

In their July 13 Defense News commentary, Clark Murdock and Thomas Karako advocate a mobilization of America’s nuclear weapons industry to build a new generation of forward-deployed, low-yield nuclear weapons. Their commentary is a summary of recommendations from their “Project Atom” study recently completed at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). America should think twice before heeding the advice of these so-called nuclear experts.

Nuclear deterrence is risky business to be sure, but Murdock and Karako’s recommendations suffer two fundamental flaws: They ignore the lessons of history and neglect a fundamental requirement of nuclear strategy. That requirement is the need to assess how America’s nuclear weapon deployments will be perceived by her potential nuclear-armed adversaries.

With respect to Murdock and Karako’s recommendation that the United States develop and deploy additional “tactical” nuclear weapons to its NATO allies, it is critical to remember that we have been down this road before. We know that deployments such as those proposed by the CSIS study can increase rather than decrease the risk of nuclear war by miscalculation.

In the early 1980s the United States deployed the stealthy nuclear ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) to the UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and Italy, and the highly accurate Pershing II nuclear ballistic missile to Germany.

These deployments, ostensibly in response to the Soviet Union’s deployment of its SS-20 nuclear ballistic missile, came at a time of high tensions between Washington and Moscow. The GLCMs and Pershing II together provided the US and NATO the theoretical potential to launch a nuclear strike destroying the Soviet political and military leadership in eight to 10 minutes from the time the Pershings were fired.

This led the Soviets to believe that they could only inflict similar nuclear damage on the West if they launched their nuclear forces immediately following the reception of warning of a NATO nuclear attack, but before the incoming NATO and American nuclear weapons detonated on their forces.

This need to “launch on warning” under extreme time constraints is the classic definition of lowering the nuclear threshold, not raising it, as is desired. In fact, the closest the United States and the Soviet Union came to nuclear war, other than the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, was during the “Able Archer” NATO nuclear command exercise in November 1983, following the GLCM deployments and just before the Pershing IIs arrived in Germany. The Soviets believed that the exercise was a deception for a real attack from the West and ordered nuclear-armed bombers to prepare for attacks on Europe.

Ironically, Murdock and Karako urge the US and NATO to brandish new nuclear weapons in response to what they call Russian “nuclear sabre rattling.” They believe that some particular future combination of nuclear weapons capabilities that they claim the US now lacks will convince potential adversaries that the US can control nuclear escalation in a region like Central Europe.

The idea of “controlling nuclear escalation” in Europe or any other nuclear-armed region was discredited decades ago. As the authors admit, “the distinction between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons is long obsolete and any use of a nuclear weapon could have profound strategic effects.”

Still, they worry that the US and NATO lack the capabilities to respond “proportionately” to employment of a nuclear weapon by Russia in Europe or North Korea in East Asia.

Use of a Russian or North Korean “non-strategic” nuclear weapon would be an unprecedented act of destruction and the United States possesses a full range of nuclear weapons with which to retaliate, should it decide that is the correct response. These capabilities include accurate low-yield nuclear weapons deliverable from aircraft, missiles and submarines.

In short, contrary to what Murdock and Karako claim there are no gaps in US nuclear capabilities that could be reliably exploited by an adversary. A new arsenal of nuclear weapons designed to make our potential adversaries believe our nuclear threats are “more credible” will also make them worry that we may use them first in a crisis to weaken their ability to retaliate.

This lowers the nuclear threshold because potential adversaries are put in a “use them or lose them” situation with respect to their nuclear forces.

The fundamental basis of nuclear strategy is not only to be prepared to retaliate to a nuclear attack but also to see the balance of nuclear forces through the eyes of your potential nuclear-armed adversaries. In other words, in the nuclear age your adversaries’ sense of security becomes your concern.

No side prevails in a nuclear exchange. Both will suffer consequences that far outweigh any advantage that was sought by their initial use. Only the maintenance of a strategic dialog, serious efforts to reduce tensions and the establishment of operational and diplomatic means to resolve periodic crises can avoid nuclear war. These are the essential lessons of the Cold War.

So-called nuclear experts have long conjured arcane, paradoxical “gaps” in nuclear forces or doctrine steeped in jargon for which they offer their pet solutions. In this way they justify their own value and continue the endless spiral of nuclear weapons competition. Murdock and Karako’s fear that the Russians or other potential nuclear foes will “escalate to de-escalate” and the US might be “self-deterred” from responding proportionately to nuclear attack are just the latest examples of this dubious counsel.

The bottom line is that no one has an expert understanding of the requirements of nuclear deterrence because it cannot be known with any precision how national leaders will react in a security crisis. No magic combination of nuclear weapons or other external means have been proved to reliably influence their decisions. This is why the threat of nuclear miscalculation is ever-present while nuclear arsenals exist.

The real danger is when both sides lack an understanding of the mentality of the other. Deploying another generation of mini-nukes as urged by the “Project Atom” report without seeking to improve this understanding through diplomatic means will make nuclear war more likely.
 
I believe that the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon and a nuclear escalation ladder by an adversary to forestall defeat in a conventional war is of much more serious concern than a nuclear-powered UUV armed with a nuclear weapon in the tens of megatons. I don't know if the response to low-yield nukes should be similar magnitude mini-nukes , the continued application of conventional force, or a high-yield nuclear strike and possible Mutual Assured Destruction. Are we also looking at the potential proliferation of mini-nukes and a low threshold for nuclear weapon use?
 
Triton said:
I believe that the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon and a nuclear escalation ladder by an adversary to forestall defeat in a conventional war is of much more serious concern than a nuclear-powered UUV armed with a nuclear weapon in the tens of megatons. I don't know if the response to low-yield nukes should be similar magnitude mini-nukes , the continued application of conventional force, or a high-yield nuclear strike and possible Mutual Assured Destruction. Are we also looking at the potential proliferation of mini-nukes?
What it tells me is the US needs a whole new family of strategic and tactical warheads from megaton class to sub-Kt in order to affect the broadest deterrent base given the myriad of possible contingencies WHILE at the same time investing in conventional capabilities like CPGS in order to forestall as long as possible the escalation ladder climbing. The key word missing from a lot of deterrence discussions is the use of the word 'credible' over the entire spectrum of warfare and weapons.
 
bobbymike said:
Triton said:
I believe that the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon and a nuclear escalation ladder by an adversary to forestall defeat in a conventional war is of much more serious concern than a nuclear-powered UUV armed with a nuclear weapon in the tens of megatons. I don't know if the response to low-yield nukes should be similar magnitude mini-nukes , the continued application of conventional force, or a high-yield nuclear strike and possible Mutual Assured Destruction. Are we also looking at the potential proliferation of mini-nukes?
What it tells me is the US needs a whole new family of strategic and tactical warheads from megaton class to sub-Kt in order to affect the broadest deterrent base given the myriad of possible contingencies WHILE at the same time investing in conventional capabilities like CPGS in order to forestall as long as possible the escalation ladder climbing. The key word missing from a lot of deterrence discussions is the use of the word 'credible' over the entire spectrum of warfare and weapons.


I'm not comfortable with this. If someone pops a nuke, it should be clearly understood that our response is going to be nuclear, be painful and involve very little proportionality. Having a wide range of options especially involving sub-kiloton weapons seems to be an invitation to use these things "After all, it's just a little one!" It also would seem to facilitate for tit-for tat brinkmanship that is all the more likely to give the impression that the aggressive party can win such a situation.

In that vein, downgrading the B-61s to 50kt and getting rid of the megaton class B-83 seems ill advised as it might send a psychological signal that gives some adversaries the idea that they can "win" a war.

Triton, the reason that the multi-megaton robot nuke is a disturbing concept is that it is inherently a first strike weapon. It doesn't deter anything unless its deployed and if its deployed the balloon will go up. It's stupid if one is looking for deterrence rather than destabilization. The Russians aren't stupid. Thus, that such a weapon is even being developed in a country that is rather strapped for cash indicates that such an attack is on the table of some planners desk in the rolodex of options that are actually being considered.
 
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