USAF/US NAVY 6G Fighter Programs - F/A-XX, F-X, NGAD, PCA, ASFS news

[F-14D]

...nd almost all of those previously delivered F-35s will have to come back for significant modification, which is one of the things driving the costs up...

The concurrency issue is a 'red herring' IMHO. I am not saying it doesn't exist but because it is something not fully determined (all the numbers given to date are estimates and they are usually on the high side for reasons previously stated) and it won't be until the actual updates are undertaken, people are using it as an easy thing to write negative things about the F-35 without a worry of being disproven for years...just the way they like it! :

Lockheed and the JSF Program Office acknowledge the issue. The problem has arisen because they thought development would go far more smoothly than previous programs and so there wouldn't be a large number built that would need to be modified. In each Lot's budget, there now is a reserve being built in for the modifications they know they'll have to do later

 

[F-14D]

As far as a Harrier replacement being its own program being canceled, I'm not so sure because such an aircraft would not have been as complex/expensive or needed all the things that are on the F-35B because the latter is a joint program.

A unique STOVL stealth fighter design with only 340 units (tops) would be affordable? I'm finding it difficult to believe it would ever make it off paper.

If all you're doing is designing a STOVL plane for CAS and self defense, do you need stealth, M 1.6 capability, the keel and structure to take off and land from a carrier, provisions for unused AF requirements, etc.? Regarding that 340 number, don't forget the requirement was for more than that. That number showed up when the Navy ordered the USMC to switch 80 of its order for Bs to Cs.

 

[GTX]

Lockheed and the JSF Program Office acknowledge the issue. The problem has arisen because they thought development would go far more smoothly than previous programs and so there wouldn't be a large number built that would need to be modified. In each Lot's budget, there now is a reserve being built in for the modifications they know they'll have to do later

I didn't say it didn't exist. Please re-read what I ACTUALLY said.

 

[XP67_Moonbat]

Now, now girls! ;D

 

[sferrin]

If all you're doing is designing a STOVL plane for CAS and self defense, do you need stealth, M 1.6 capability, the keel and structure to take off and land from a carrier, provisions for unused AF requirements, etc.?

Well, drastically reducing the requirement is one way to cut costs. Of course you're no longer comparing apples to apples.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The concurrency issue is a 'red herring' IMHO. I am not saying it doesn't exist but because it is something not fully determined (all the numbers given to date are estimates and they are usually on the high side for reasons previously stated) and it won't be until the actual updates are undertaken, people are using it as an easy thing to write negative things about the F-35 without a worry of being disproven for years...just the way they like it! :

What is there to disprove? Beginning production of an aircraft before a credible design freeze has taken place on a tested prototype is lunacy and the cost of modifying the manufactured aircraft is real and won;'t go away unless you dump the early aircraft- which just adds sunk cost.

Putting the F-35 into production years before the first test flight was acquisition malpractice...It should not have been done.*

*Frank Kendall, then acting but since confirmed, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

The key point of the RAND report seems to be what anybody objective already knows- the programme was a mess. But the end result, in spite of the programme, is going to be impressive. There is a distinct difference between criticising the structure of the programme and criticising the aircraft itself.

 

[sferrin]

What is there to disprove? Beginning production of an aircraft before a credible design freeze has taken place on a tested prototype is lunacy and the cost of modifying the manufactured aircraft is real and won;'t go away unless you dump the early aircraft- which just adds sunk cost.

So you'd waste 10 years trying to find every little bug before you'd start producing? I've got some sad news for you. They've NEVER done it that way.

 

[sublight_]

What is there to disprove? Beginning production of an aircraft before a credible design freeze has taken place on a tested prototype is lunacy and the cost of modifying the manufactured aircraft is real and won;'t go away unless you dump the early aircraft- which just adds sunk cost.

So you'd waste 10 years trying to find every little bug before you'd start producing? I've got some sad news for you. They've NEVER done it that way.

How many F-14/15/16/18 were produced before they got the design ironed out? We're up to 100 of the JSF out the door and I think the first 100 F-14/15/16/18 were a lot closer to final spec than the 35. It wouldn't be so bad if the 35 wasn't so expensive.

 

[sferrin]

What is there to disprove? Beginning production of an aircraft before a credible design freeze has taken place on a tested prototype is lunacy and the cost of modifying the manufactured aircraft is real and won;'t go away unless you dump the early aircraft- which just adds sunk cost.

So you'd waste 10 years trying to find every little bug before you'd start producing? I've got some sad news for you. They've NEVER done it that way.

How many F-14/15/16/18 were produced before they got the design ironed out? We're up to 100 of the JSF out the door and I think the first 100 F-14/15/16/18 were a lot closer to final spec than the 35. It wouldn't be so bad if the 35 wasn't so expensive.

Define "ironed out". Minor changes are constantly flowed out to the fleet. "Replace clip XYZ with Rev. E" isn't going to show up as a Block update on the list of F-16 types yet that kind of thing happens all the time. If you think the design is locked down, never to change because of things they later discovered, you're going to be sorely disappointed.

 

[F-14D]

If all you're doing is designing a STOVL plane for CAS and self defense, do you need stealth, M 1.6 capability, the keel and structure to take off and land from a carrier, provisions for unused AF requirements, etc.?

Well, drastically reducing the requirement is one way to cut costs. Of course you're no longer comparing apples to apples.

No argument on the apples. But that's the point regarding your question of affordability on a standalone program. F-35 admittedly does more than what the Marines were requiring, and they're paying for it. They needed a grape and they're in a joint program for an apple.

 

[F-14D]

What is there to disprove? Beginning production of an aircraft before a credible design freeze has taken place on a tested prototype is lunacy and the cost of modifying the manufactured aircraft is real and won;'t go away unless you dump the early aircraft- which just adds sunk cost.

So you'd waste 10 years trying to find every little bug before you'd start producing? I've got some sad news for you. They've NEVER done it that way.

How many F-14/15/16/18 were produced before they got the design ironed out? We're up to 100 of the JSF out the door and I think the first 100 F-14/15/16/18 were a lot closer to final spec than the 35. It wouldn't be so bad if the 35 wasn't so expensive.

There were 12 developmental F-14s. They were not all brought up to full spec. But when you're producing well over 100, you can't afford to do that. Also, the ones coming of the line now are not developmentals, they are considered production aircraft.

Not commenting on the ultimate quality of the aircraft, just how we're getting there.

 

[GTX]

We're up to 100 of the JSF out the door and I think the first 100 F-14/15/16/18 were a lot closer to final spec than the 35. It wouldn't be so bad if the 35 wasn't so expensive.

So what exactly do you constitute the "final spec" for the F-35 to be?

 

[sferrin]

What is there to disprove? Beginning production of an aircraft before a credible design freeze has taken place on a tested prototype is lunacy and the cost of modifying the manufactured aircraft is real and won;'t go away unless you dump the early aircraft- which just adds sunk cost.

So you'd waste 10 years trying to find every little bug before you'd start producing? I've got some sad news for you. They've NEVER done it that way.

How many F-14/15/16/18 were produced before they got the design ironed out? We're up to 100 of the JSF out the door and I think the first 100 F-14/15/16/18 were a lot closer to final spec than the 35. It wouldn't be so bad if the 35 wasn't so expensive.

There were 12 developmental F-14s. They were not all brought up to full spec. But when you're producing well over 100, you can't afford to do that. Also, the ones coming of the line now are not developmentals, they are considered production aircraft.

Not commenting on the ultimate quality of the aircraft, just how we're getting there.

And they are being used. It's not like they're just sitting in a field rotting away - you know, like the scores of F-15s were before they got the engine problem resolved. Do you think every F-16 in the inventory has seen combat? Many of them get used for training, testing, etc. and that's ALL they'll ever do. But for some reason, that's okay for other jets. Just not the F-35.

 

[F-14D]

And they are being used. It's not like they're just sitting in a field rotting away - you know, like the scores of F-15s were before they got the engine problem resolved. Do you think every F-16 in the inventory has seen combat? Many of them get used for training, testing, etc. and that's ALL they'll ever do. But for some reason, that's okay for other jets. Just not the F-35.

I don't think that's fair. In your case of the F-15s, those were production planes that met their requirements, but needed Pratt to deliver reliable engines. MDD did not have to go back and correct the design of those operational aircraft, that was handled by the development birds. It's also true that some F-16s are used for training, testing, etc., but it was always intended that some would be set aside for that purpose out of the production total. The difference here is that we are cranking out scores of aircraft that normally would be produced to initial operational standard, but in fact aren't and will have to go back for unanticipated rework to bring them to the level it was expected they would have been when they were going to be produced. This is one of the things that's kicking up costs. It is due to our vanity that weare so wise and now know so much that the plane'wasn't going to encounter the development problems that are normal for such a program, especially one this complex. As a result we went to production at the same time we were developing the plane, even though we didn't yet know what the production aircraft would entail.

 

[SpudmanWP]

These Concurrency costs need to be balanced against what it would have cost to keep EVERY plane that it replaces flying for 10-15 more years than they have to now.

 

[Triton]

Has anyone compared the cost of the first 100 F-35 fighters to the first 100 F-14, F-15, F-16, or F-18 fighters in 2013 dollars or the development costs adjusted for inflation? Is the F-35 really unaffordable when compared to other fighter aircraft at this stage of development/production? Or are we just experiencing price shock and its the most expensive defense program because things just cost more in 2013 dollars? Further, is the F-35 a force multiplier and is it worth more than one fourth-generation fighter aircraft? Also, was concurrency also a political decision to make the F-35 program more difficult to cancel?

 

[gtg947h]

What is there to disprove? Beginning production of an aircraft before a credible design freeze has taken place on a tested prototype is lunacy and the cost of modifying the manufactured aircraft is real and won;'t go away unless you dump the early aircraft- which just adds sunk cost.

These Concurrency costs need to be balanced against what it would have cost to keep EVERY plane that it replaces flying for 10-15 more years than they have to now.

And it's not just that.

Concurrency is a very, very highly calculated risk (and for those who doubt that, what else do you think all those beancounters do?).

On one hand, starting to build production items and ramping up the production rate before the test period is over does expose you to the risk that fixes will have to be retrofitted to items already produced; some of that is planned for in the program, but sometimes it's worse than expected (787 anyone?).

However, not using concurrency imposes definite costs. If your prototype/development aircraft are built on the eventual production line, then the facility and personnel will either sit idle between completing the prototypes and starting production, or they will be reassigned and later have to be refit/retrained at great cost. If you hand-build them separately, your build cost for them will be even higher than in a concurrent program, and you also lose most of your learning curve in the early part of production. Plus, as Spudman mentions above, the additional delay before entry into service might require in-service equipment to remain in service longer, at great expense.

The trick is balancing the cost risk of concurrency against the definite costs of not using it.

 

[sferrin]

Has anyone compared the cost of the first 100 F-35 fighters to the first 100 F-14, F-15, F-16, or F-18 fighters in 2013 dollars or the development costs adjusted for inflation? Is the F-35 really unaffordable when compared to other fighter aircraft at this stage of development/production? Or are we just experiencing price shock and its the most expensive defense program because things just cost more in 2013 dollars? Further, is the F-35 a force multiplier and is it worth more than one fourth-generation fighter aircraft? Also, was concurrency also a political decision to make the F-35 program more difficult to cancel?

Apples and oranges really. That'd be like comparing the costs of the F-14/ F-15 to the F-4 and arriving at the decision of, "Maybe we should have went with another Century Series instead". Doesn't tell you much more than, "gee, I guess more complicated aircraft cost more".

 

[JFC Fuller]

Except the F-35 has yet to actually replace anything...

The aircraft being built through concurrency are still being built in LRIP- they are not full rate production aircraft thus they are still expensive aircraft. Beancounters get it wrong, as admitted by the Undersecretary for Acquisition. Most of the F-35 LRIP aircraft that are being built will actually be used for training and later operationally, that is the point, these are not meant to be prototypes they are meant to be operationally ready aircraft. As it turns out they are not and they have to undergo a retrofit programme on top of there initially high unit cost as a result of being built in LRIP.

 

[sferrin]

Except the F-35 has yet to actually replace anything...

And? Are you telling me they're just sitting in a field not doing anything? Of course not. They're flying the hell out of them. So what's the problem? I hope you didn't think that the first F-35s out of the chute would be replacing line aircraft and THEN they'd decide to worry about developing training programs.

 

[Rhinocrates]

Um, there are other threads devoted to the F-35, both news only and no holds barred. I'm reading this thread because I'm interested in NGAD and its context.

 

[GTX]

Good point. Could one of the Mods please move the relevant posts?

 

[JFC Fuller]

And? Are you telling me they're just sitting in a field not doing anything? Of course not. They're flying the hell out of them. So what's the problem? I hope you didn't think that the first F-35s out of the chute would be replacing line aircraft and THEN they'd decide to worry about developing training programs.

You should have read the rest of the post. There are now 100 F-35s, most of these will require an expensive retrofit programme to be kept in service, that is the problem and that is why the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) called it "Acquisition Malpractice" and even Vice Admiral Venlet, who at the time was PEO for the F-35 programme, said “Fundamentally, that was a miscalculation” in relation to concurrency.

 

[sferrin]

And? Are you telling me they're just sitting in a field not doing anything? Of course not. They're flying the hell out of them. So what's the problem? I hope you didn't think that the first F-35s out of the chute would be replacing line aircraft and THEN they'd decide to worry about developing training programs.

You should have read the rest of the post. There are now 100 F-35s, most of these will require an expensive retrofit programme to be kept in service, that is the problem and that is why the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) called it "Acquisition Malpractice" and even Vice Admiral Venlet, who at the time was PEO for the F-35 programme, said “Fundamentally, that was a miscalculation” in relation to concurrency.

The other reason for "concurrency" is because so many airframes will be running out of hours due to the procurement holidays of the 90's and we needed to get the F-35 in the field ASAP.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The other reason for "concurrency" is because so many airframes will be running out of hours due to the procurement holidays of the 90's and we needed to get the F-35 in the field ASAP.

Not really. The life extensions to the F-16 and F-15 fleets will add eight to ten years to each airframe. The F-15 "Long term" fleet is good until 2030.

 

[sferrin]

The other reason for "concurrency" is because so many airframes will be running out of hours due to the procurement holidays of the 90's and we needed to get the F-35 in the field ASAP.

Not really. The life extensions to the F-16 and F-15 fleets will add eight to ten years to each airframe. The F-15 "Long term" fleet is good until 2030.

And I suppose you think that's free? Better to spend the money on the replacement.

 

[bobbymike]

Pentagon Sets FY-15 Plans For 6th-Generation Fighter Exploration
Posted: Jan. 02, 2014
The Defense Department's fiscal year 2015 budget proposal is expected to include seed money for a new fighter aircraft program, establishing Air Force and Navy budget lines for the joint exploration of next-generation capabilities and the possible development of a single fighter to be used by both services, according to service officials. Looking beyond the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the new program would shore up Pentagon concerns about the ability of the United States' high-performance tactical aircraft industrial base to retain its global advantage. The goal is to begin building the case for new aircraft that could mitigate capability shortfalls expected to materialize as soon as 2030, an objective that last year won the support of the Pentagon's top brass and is under review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Expecting Pentagon leaders to back the effort, the Air Force will propose a dedicated budget line in its FY-15 budget proposal to fund an analysis of alternatives of its "2030+ Air Dominance" requirement for a sixth-generation fighter. "Funding for the 2030+ Air Dominance AOA begins in FY-15," Air Force spokeswoman Jennifer Cassidy said in a Dec. 16 statement in response to questions from InsideDefense.com.

Last February, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the Air Force's new fighter requirement and directed the service to accomplish a joint analysis of alternatives with the Navy once the JROC approves the Navy's Next Generation Air Dominance Family of Systems initial capabilities document, which Pentagon officials say is expected in "early 2014." "The Services have been engaged with OSD coordinating draft AOA guidance and plans," said Cassidy. The Pentagon's acquisition executive has not yet issued a materiel development decision, which would formally transition the effort from requirements definition to early acquisition by beginning the joint AOA. "OSD is considering several courses of action which will impact the timing of a MDD," said Cassidy. "OSD guidance may require a substantial level of effort prior to a MDD. The time and resources required to accomplish that work will dictate the timing." The Navy, which in 2012 solicited industry proposals for a notional F/A-18E/F replacement, said it is supporting an "active dialogue with industry, OSD, [and] the Air Force," in support of the new requirement. "[Naval Air Systems Command] continues to plan and lay the groundwork to conduct a robust AOA for the entire trade space, to include manned, unmanned, and optionally manned capabilities, existing platforms, enhancements to existing platforms, new platform development, a review of concepts of operations, warfighting capability risk assessment and potential life-cycle solutions to affordably meet capability requirements in the 2030 timeframe," Victor Chen, a spokesman for NAVAIR, said in a Dec. 12 statement to InsideDefense.com.

The AOA is also expected to examine "linkages such as communication, intelligence, and interoperability requirements as well as risks associated with technology, integration, and cost," Cassidy said. "We anticipate we will be required to explore the advantages and disadvantages of a single solution across the Services. If a single solution is not warranted due to differing roles and missions, we expect to explore areas of commonality that can be leveraged to reduce the cost to both Services." Last month, RAND published an Air Force-commissioned report that concluded historical joint aircraft programs -- including the F-35 JSF -- experienced higher cost growth than single-service programs. The report also warned that "diverse service requirements and operating environments work against the potential for joint cost savings." Both the Air Force and Navy have been contemplating sixth-generation fighter programs for years. In 2008, the Air Force's Air Combat Command raised concerns about far-term capability gaps stemming from "threat evolution, threat proliferation, and predicted service lives of current platforms," according to Cassidy. In 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in a classified memo locking in budget and five-year program decisions, directed the Air Force to "initiate an R&D effort towards a 6th generation TACAIR capability" in FY-12, according to Cassidy.

"In order to determine the technology areas on which to focus an R&D effort, ACC/A8 completed a Next Gen TACAIR Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) in 2011 . . . [which] identified a number of air dominance capability gaps in the 2030-2050 time frame," she said. That gave rise to the 2030+ Air Dominance requirement the JROC endorsed last February. Air Combat Command's Air Superiority Core Function Team at Langley AFB, VA, has led the service's work on 2030+ Air Dominance, with support from the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, and Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Their efforts to date, according to Cassidy, include producing "technology surveys, technology roadmaps, trade space studies, detailed studies on specific technology areas such as propulsion, airframes, and Directed Energy, and basic representative aircraft concepts." In December 2009, the Navy wrapped up its own capability-based assessment, "Power Projection from the Sea Beyond 2024," which has become the basis for the service's draft Next Generation Air Dominance Family of Systems initial capability document, informally referred to as the FA/XX, according to DOD sources. The Pentagon office responsible for monitoring the health of firms that comprise the defense industrial base warned in a 2011 study that without a "near-term" sixth-generation fighter aircraft program, the U.S. aerospace industry could forfeit a five-year technological advantage over foreign combat aircraft makers. "Without a near-term investment decision to sustain . . . key engineering and manufacturing capabilities, the margin of competitive technological superiority is likely to shift against U.S. firms in many areas vital to the development of future TACAIR," according to a summary of the June 2011 "Next Generation TACAIR (F-X) Industrial Base Quick Look." Last summer, Pentagon acquisition executive Frank Kendall told the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee that the Defense Department is "concerned about the future of the United States' high-performance tactical aircraft industrial base."

With the Boeing F/A-18E/F's production slated to wind down as the aircraft-carrier variant of the F-35 comes online, Lockheed Martin's F-35 manufacturing line will soon be the nation's sole active fighter assembly line. Even "more disconcerting," Kendall said in prepared testimony, "is the gap between development programs for the F-35 and the next generation of high-performance aircraft." In FY-13, Kendall directed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to begin the air dominance initiative, "a program envisioned as leading to competitive prototyping programs" beginning in 2016. A new sixth-generation fighter program would likely carry a substantial price tag, and could -- depending on the eventual program schedule -- overlap with the Air Force's planned F-35 acquisition, which is slated to continue at peak production rates until 2037. The Air Force plans to buy 638 F-35As -- more than a third of its total planned acquisition -- between 2030 and 2037. The DARPA initiative -- a two-year, $10 million effort -- is expected to identify threats and capability gaps through 2050, funding Defense Department research and development efforts as well as "high-value" technologies and prototype opportunities. "After the study, it is envisioned that high potential prototype programs will emerge to develop technologies for future air dominance," according to FY-14 budget documents. "Early planning for future technologies will also help to define the funding baselines for DOD research and development and acquisition programs." A sixth-generation fighter program would grow the roster of big-ticket aircraft programs with reach well into the next decade, which include the F-35, the Air Force's KC-46 tanker and its new long-range strike bomber, and the Navy's Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike aircraft program. -- Jason Sherman

 

[jsport]

Thank you for posting bobbymike, very informative..glade to hear

Next Generation Air Dominance Family of Systems initial capability document has not been forgotten..though it had..

 

[dark sidius]

Great post Bobbymike

 

[bobbymike]

RAND Report; No Joint 6th Generation Development

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9759.html

 

[Rlewis]

The other reason for "concurrency" is because so many airframes will be running out of hours due to the procurement holidays of the 90's and we needed to get the F-35 in the field ASAP.

Not really. The life extensions to the F-16 and F-15 fleets will add eight to ten years to each airframe. The F-15 "Long term" fleet is good until 2030.

it needs to remembered that sleps would add eight to ten years to each ariframe that gets them not all would qualify and not all would make economic sense to upgrade. these are airframes that have already been rode harder and longer than was ever originally dreamed. no one predicted full combat loadouts for years enforcing no fly zones. in the navy we used to just replace them because when they are done they are done. cracks are real and it sucks fixing old airplanes they break more often in more places and are down for longer periods

 

[donnage99]

Hopefully after the f-35 the services dont do anymore of this joint bs. It really killed the industrial base and competition and produced largely compromised airframes

 

[sferrin]

Hopefully after the f-35 the services dont do anymore of this joint bs. It really killed the industrial base and competition and produced largely compromised airframes

So instead of "joint is bad" blah, blah, blah, we'll be hearing "there's not enough money these days for single-service aircraft". It's as predictable as the rising sun.

 

[donnage99]

Sferrin, did you read the Rand report?

​

 

[malipa]

Of course their isn´t anything to testify in the government finances. There is a couple of billion dollars which the Ministery of Defense doesn´t need to explain to the Senat. And I guess this will all happen some place in Alaska or Area 51 of some sort.

 

[Rlewis]

Sferrin, did you read the Rand report?



No definition found.

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im willing to bet with enough digging i can find a rand report from the 1990s that talks about joint programs saving money. and there brilliant analysis proving it. and someone said "did you read the rand report? thats how I know this JSF idea is a good one" now with hindsight they will tell us how it doesn't. theory and practice are two different things. just because the jsf is a disaster does not mean that joint programs are not favorable. you would be hard pressed to actually find programs that are only funded by a single source these days honestly. the DOD is more than just the JSF even though lockmarty would have you think otherwise. I think there was a rand report about how the USN should cancel the F/A-18E and wait for the JSF that would be hitting the fleet in the early 2000s.

so did you read the rand report? ;D

 

[Arjen]

im willing to bet with enough digging i can find a rand report from the 1990s that talks about joint programs saving money. and there brilliant analysis proving it. and someone said "did you read the rand report? thats how I know this JSF idea is a good one"
[...]

so did you read the rand report? ;

;D

 

[donnage99]

im willing to bet with enough digging i can find a rand report from the 1990s that talks about joint programs saving money. and there brilliant analysis proving it. and someone said "did you read the rand report? thats how I know this JSF idea is a good one" now with hindsight they will tell us how it doesn't. theory and practice are two different things. just because the jsf is a disaster does not mean that joint programs are not favorable. you would be hard pressed to actually find programs that are only funded by a single source these days honestly. the DOD is more than just the JSF even though lockmarty would have you think otherwise. I think there was a rand report about how the USN should cancel the F/A-18E and wait for the JSF that would be hitting the fleet in the early 2000s.

That doesn't validate anything. The simple logic to that is there's more evidence today than 20 years ago about modern joint program. And btw, did you read the report? It took into account all recent major programs whether it is single service or joint. JSF is but one of them

 

[GTX]

did you read the report? It took into account all recent major programs whether it is single service or joint. JSF is but one of them

Did you? As already pointed out elsewhere on the forum, there are arguably distinct flaws in the analysis used in the report including the programs used as part of the analysis.

 

[lastdingo]

Actually, there was a RAND study in 1997, here's the summary:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2007/RB35-1.pdf

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