US Next Generation Bomber Studies

[bobbymike]

Beyond the Family of Systems

—Marc V. Schanz 9/11/2015

​Although the Long-Range Strike Bomber will be a critical component of the “family of systems” strike concept, it has the potential to evolve beyond that, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Dean retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula told a Capitol Hill audience Sept. 10. The family of systems conversation tends to reflect some “old think,” reflecting a desire to kluge “stovepiped systems” together, said Deptula, discussing his new study, “Beyond the Bomber.” In the future, a “combat cloud” information network would introduce the notion of ubiquitous sharing of information across all elements of the strike enterprise, an admittedly “lofty and challenging goal,” he acknowledged, but one that takes the family of systems concept “to the next level” and truly realizes the LRS-B’s potential. Deptula said any discussion about the size of the bomber force should remain informed by national security strategy. If the US maintains the current strategy, which states that forces must be globally engaged as well as capable of fighting expeditionary wars when compelled, forces must be shaped to do this, he said. With 10 Air Expeditionary Forces in USAF today, this would necessitate a force closer to 175 bombers (counting training assets and attrition reserve), said Deptula. However, any number should be a figure based on a balance between risk, capability, and goals of a strategy, he added.


Senators Endorse Need for Bomber Recap

—Marc V. Schanz 9/11/2015

​The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies on Sept. 10 rolled out a new study exploring the need for and capabilities of a next generation long-range strike aircraft. The report is authored by Mitchell’s dean, retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula. A bipartisan group of senators and congressmen also offered remarks during the Capitol Hill event, saying the US must ensure the success of the Long-Range Strike Bomber. Bombers bring enormous value to the United States and its ability to project power around the globe, including long-range strike and loiter capability, the ability to reassure and shape pre-conflict scenarios, unrivaled capacity, and limited vulnerability to adversary attack, said Sen. Mike Rounds (R-S.D.). The bomber forces, and air superiority, are key to maintaining the overmatch against potential adversaries around the world, and preserving this is vital to shaping potential global threats, he added. Rounds praised the study, adding it would inform the “doctrinal underpinnings” of how the LRS-B will be acquired and employed, helping to keep America’s bomber force credible. Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.) noted the US bomber force is vital to maintaining a credible strategic deterrent to de-escalate tensions, pointing to a ​2013 B-2 mission to South Korea. “It is in fact the deterrent effect … that is such a powerful message,” she added. (Read the full study; Caution, large-sized file.)

 

[Triton]

"Experts: USAF needs more than 80 to 100 new bombers"
10 September, 2015 BY: James Drew Washington DC

Source:
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/experts-usaf-needs-more-than-80-to-100-new-bombers-416593/

A former commander of the USAF’s bomber force says 80 to 100 new Long-Range Strike Bombers are not enough to meet American national security objectives, and the service should consider buying more to rejuvenate its “withering” combat fleet of Boeing B-1s and B-52s.

In his testimony to Congress 9 September, Lt Gen Robert Elder, who directed the 8th Air Force before his retirement, said the production target released by the air force is too few, even though the new aircraft will be more capable.

“Our capabilities are withering and we have less than 100 combat-ready bombers with an average age of 38 years,” he told members of the House Armed Services Committee.

“The newer B-52s remain potent but are few in numbers, and my belief quite frankly is the 80 to 100 aircraft is not going to be enough to replace the B-1 and B-52 fleet, even though it's capability against the target set will be greater.”

He says there needs to be more aircraft to satisfy the number of rotational commitments currently being experienced.

This view was seconded by the two other witnesses, Washington defence analysts Mark Gunzinger of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Rebecca Grant, president of IRIS Independent Research. The witnesses, and some members of congress, also stated the air force should speed up the procurement and beat the current 2030 full operational capability date.

The quantity and schedule concerns come as the air force prepares to award a bomber development contract to either Northrop Grumman or a Boeing-Lockheed Martin team. It also comes one week after the air force stated that the competing bomber designs are more technologically mature and deliverable than previously disclosed.

As of this month, the air force has 158 bombers (63 B-1s, 20 B-2s and 76 B-52) which average 39 years of age, and only 96 are currently funded for combat service. Gunzinger says today’s 20-aircraft B-2 fleet can muster just 12 combat sorties on any given day, and without a sizable order of new bombers, American won’t be able to overcome the air defences of sophisticated adversaries.

“If we don't buy the LRS-B, well, then the B-2 eventually will not be able to penetrate into China, into Iran, and some other areas. The B-1s and the B-52s already can't penetrate into those higher threat areas,” he explained.

During the briefing, several lawmakers including Paul Cook and Steve Knight, who both represent aerospace hubs in California, expressed tentative support for the next-generation bomber programme, so long as it doesn’t overrun initial cost estimates was the case with the Lockheed Martin F-22, F-35 and Northrop B-2 projects.

“I will support this, as long as we keep the price down and it accomplishes the mission,” says Knight, who also questioned whether it would be wiser to pursue three overlapping bomber procurement programmes than just one example designed with a 50-year operating life. He says "flying the wings off" a single type makes the US force less flexible to emerging threats.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/09/air-force-bomber-missions-bombs/120881/?oref=d-topstory

 

[LowObservable]

LaPlante's "brief the think-tankers and let the media get the stories from them" comms strategy is apparently working as well as one might expect.

 

[Mr London 24/7]

Beyond the Family of Systems

—Marc V. Schanz 9/11/2015

​Although the Long-Range Strike Bomber will be a critical component of the “family of systems” strike concept, it has the potential to evolve beyond that, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Dean retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula told a Capitol Hill audience Sept. 10. The family of systems conversation tends to reflect some “old think,” reflecting a desire to kluge “stovepiped systems” together, said Deptula, discussing his new study, “Beyond the Bomber.” In the future, a “combat cloud” information network would introduce the notion of ubiquitous sharing of information across all elements of the strike enterprise, an admittedly “lofty and challenging goal,” he acknowledged, but one that takes the family of systems concept “to the next level” and truly realizes the LRS-B’s potential. Deptula said any discussion about the size of the bomber force should remain informed by national security strategy. If the US maintains the current strategy, which states that forces must be globally engaged as well as capable of fighting expeditionary wars when compelled, forces must be shaped to do this, he said. With 10 Air Expeditionary Forces in USAF today, this would necessitate a force closer to 175 bombers (counting training assets and attrition reserve), said Deptula. However, any number should be a figure based on a balance between risk, capability, and goals of a strategy, he added.


Senators Endorse Need for Bomber Recap

—Marc V. Schanz 9/11/2015

​The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies on Sept. 10 rolled out a new study exploring the need for and capabilities of a next generation long-range strike aircraft. The report is authored by Mitchell’s dean, retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula. A bipartisan group of senators and congressmen also offered remarks during the Capitol Hill event, saying the US must ensure the success of the Long-Range Strike Bomber. Bombers bring enormous value to the United States and its ability to project power around the globe, including long-range strike and loiter capability, the ability to reassure and shape pre-conflict scenarios, unrivaled capacity, and limited vulnerability to adversary attack, said Sen. Mike Rounds (R-S.D.). The bomber forces, and air superiority, are key to maintaining the overmatch against potential adversaries around the world, and preserving this is vital to shaping potential global threats, he added. Rounds praised the study, adding it would inform the “doctrinal underpinnings” of how the LRS-B will be acquired and employed, helping to keep America’s bomber force credible. Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.) noted the US bomber force is vital to maintaining a credible strategic deterrent to de-escalate tensions, pointing to a ​2013 B-2 mission to South Korea. “It is in fact the deterrent effect … that is such a powerful message,” she added. (Read the full study; Caution, large-sized file.)

https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AFA/def574d3-a429-454b-a3e8-e5073c93ca6b/UploadedImages/MI%20DD%20Bomber%20final.pdf

 

[jsport]

Beyond the Family of Systems

—Marc V. Schanz 9/11/2015

​Although the Long-Range Strike Bomber will be a critical component of the “family of systems” strike concept, it has the potential to evolve beyond that, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Dean retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula told a Capitol Hill audience Sept. 10. The family of systems conversation tends to reflect some “old think,” reflecting a desire to kluge “stovepiped systems” together, said Deptula, discussing his new study, “Beyond the Bomber.” In the future, a “combat cloud” information network would introduce the notion of ubiquitous sharing of information across all elements of the strike enterprise, an admittedly “lofty and challenging goal,” he acknowledged, but one that takes the family of systems concept “to the next level” and truly realizes the LRS-B’s potential. Deptula said any discussion about the size of the bomber force should remain informed by national security strategy. If the US maintains the current strategy, which states that forces must be globally engaged as well as capable of fighting expeditionary wars when compelled, forces must be shaped to do this, he said. With 10 Air Expeditionary Forces in USAF today, this would necessitate a force closer to 175 bombers (counting training assets and attrition reserve), said Deptula. However, any number should be a figure based on a balance between risk, capability, and goals of a strategy, he added.


Senators Endorse Need for Bomber Recap

—Marc V. Schanz 9/11/2015

​The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies on Sept. 10 rolled out a new study exploring the need for and capabilities of a next generation long-range strike aircraft. The report is authored by Mitchell’s dean, retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula. A bipartisan group of senators and congressmen also offered remarks during the Capitol Hill event, saying the US must ensure the success of the Long-Range Strike Bomber. Bombers bring enormous value to the United States and its ability to project power around the globe, including long-range strike and loiter capability, the ability to reassure and shape pre-conflict scenarios, unrivaled capacity, and limited vulnerability to adversary attack, said Sen. Mike Rounds (R-S.D.). The bomber forces, and air superiority, are key to maintaining the overmatch against potential adversaries around the world, and preserving this is vital to shaping potential global threats, he added. Rounds praised the study, adding it would inform the “doctrinal underpinnings” of how the LRS-B will be acquired and employed, helping to keep America’s bomber force credible. Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.) noted the US bomber force is vital to maintaining a credible strategic deterrent to de-escalate tensions, pointing to a ​2013 B-2 mission to South Korea. “It is in fact the deterrent effect … that is such a powerful message,” she added. (Read the full study; Caution, large-sized file.)

https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AFA/def574d3-a429-454b-a3e8-e5073c93ca6b/UploadedImages/MI%20DD%20Bomber%20final.pdf

wow, Sir London thank you posting.

 

[bring_it_on]

Panel Discussion AFA ASC15, - Beyond The Bomber - Lt Gen Dave Deptula, USAF Ret., Lt Gen Robert Elder, USAF (Ret.),
Lt Gen Christopher Miller, USAF (Ret.) and Mark Gunzinger

http://secure.afa.org/events/Conference/2015/transcripts/Monday-4pm-BomberPanel.asp

 

[sublight_]

Or a direct link to the MP3 file, if you would rather have that.

 

[bring_it_on]

LaPlante - " Very Soon Very Soon"...

http://secure.afa.org/events/Conference/2015/transcripts/Tuesday-3pm-LaPlante.mp3

 

[flateric]

http://m.aviationweek.com/editorial/editorial-pentagon-must-better-explain-plans-next-bomber

 

[sferrin]

http://m.aviationweek.com/editorial/editorial-pentagon-must-better-explain-plans-next-bomber

Somebody sounds upset at being cut out of the loop. All they really need to tell anybody is "this is how much we planned to spend vs how much we're actually spending, and this is why and the results". They don't owe anybody any details whatsoever about the aircraft itself.

 

[bring_it_on]

USAF Pledges To Disclose Bomber Development Costs

 

[bring_it_on]

Richard Aboulafia on wall-street's odds - "Boeing/LMA - 60%, Northrop Grumman - 40%"

http://secure.afa.org/events/Conference/2015/transcripts/Monday-2pm-AerospaceSector.mp3

 

[LowObservable]

Well, that's a lock for Northrop Grumman, then.


It's peachy that the AF is willing to disclose the development cost (which for Wall Street reasons they would find hard to avoid) but it doesn't mean a whole lot unless you know what it's paying for. Is it a Block 10 with vanilla F135s and a downsized B-2 radar and half the capabilities in the post-EMD program, or an all-new supersonic, ultra-stealth aircraft?


And if you think that government secrecy is automatically justified, because the classifying authority knows what is right, higher authority knows what the classifying authority is doing, and why, and is equally always right, and Congress can be trusted to do the right thing when nobody's watching... well, good on you, but I'm not sure why you think you need a vote.

 

[Ian33]

....it doesn't mean a whole lot unless you know what it's paying for. Is it a Block 10 with vanilla F135s and a downsized B-2 radar and half the capabilities in the post-EMD program, or an all-new supersonic, ultra-stealth aircraft?


And if you think that government secrecy is automatically justified...

I personally respect your position, but I think on this you are wrong. The longer the shape and speed is hidden from the world, the more of a surprise it will be to those who plan enemy air defences. This alone justifies the secrecy.


Sure it's an exquisite agony for us out here beyond the fence, but, this time secrecy is justified.

 

[DrRansom]

About security, I wonder if the USAF has seen foreign R&D efforts aimed at defeating F-35? Foreign countries have will have about 15 years to prepare countermeasures to other F-35, before F-35 reaches the fleet in large numbers. This is a nice fixed target to develop your countermeasures against.

That might explain some of the secrecy.

 

[sferrin]

And if you think that government secrecy is automatically justified, because the classifying authority knows what is right, higher authority knows what the classifying authority is doing, and why, and is equally always right, and Congress can be trusted to do the right thing when nobody's watching... well, good on you, but I'm not sure why you think you need a vote.

Typically the general public is the least qualified to make those assessments. (One only look at who we keep voting into office to realize that.) If they deliver payload X to a range of Y with an RCS of NOYFB at a speed of Z why do you need to know how it was done if it's on time and on budget? Explain the burning need for pretty pictures and structural detail.

 

[LowObservable]

I don't have to explain anything, because we don't live in Singapore, China or the UAE. It's up to the government to explain why it wants to keep certain things secret.

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/09/why-america-needs-the-long-range-strike-bomber-rep-forbes/

 

[bobbymike]

http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/what-should-we-do-if-the-bomber-cant-get-through/

What if the bomber can't get through? Why I advocate building several thousand IRBMs ;D

 

[Steve Pace]

Tomorrow's the 18th - the 68th anniversary of the USAF. Perfect date for the announcement. My fingers are crossed. -SP

 

[Ian33]

Tomorrow's the 18th - the 68th anniversary of the USAF. Perfect date for the announcement. My fingers are crossed. -SP

Rolls out the hanger. "Here is LRS-B, ready for daylight testing."

 

[sferrin]

I don't have to explain anything, because we don't live in Singapore, China or the UAE. It's up to the government to explain why it wants to keep certain things secret.

"National security." Happy?

 

[LowObservable]

Nope! There are no automatic blanket exemptions.


I'm not arguing that there are no grounds for security, which would be no smarter than accepting that something is secret because someone in the Executive Branch says it should be. But somewhere between "a contract worth $xx billion was awarded to..." and putting the RCS plot on the Internet is a happy medium that allows effective oversight/helps prevent the burial of mistakes (cough FIA cough) and does not make it any easier for the PLA or VVS to shoot the bleeder down.

 

[sferrin]

Nope! There are no automatic blanket exemptions.


I'm not arguing that there are no grounds for security, which would be no smarter than accepting that something is secret because someone in the Executive Branch says it should be. But somewhere between "a contract worth $xx billion was awarded to..." and putting the RCS plot on the Internet is a happy medium that allows effective oversight/helps prevent the burial of mistakes (cough FIA cough) and does not make it any easier for the PLA or VVS to shoot the bleeder down.

Financial and performance metrics can't tell you that? If you can't demonstrate an actual NEED to know the technical specifics why should they tell you? And who says they don't already have oversite? Just because they don't ask a bunch of bloggers for their input doesn't mean there is no oversite.

 

[quellish]

About security, I wonder if the USAF has seen foreign R&D efforts aimed at defeating F-35? Foreign countries have will have about 15 years to prepare countermeasures to other F-35, before F-35 reaches the fleet in large numbers. This is a nice fixed target to develop your countermeasures against.

That might explain some of the secrecy.

DoD certainly has.
DoD efforts look at ways to make it very difficult for an adversary to break the kill chain.
What can be done to make it difficult for a range of potential adversaries to break *our* kill chain?
What can we do to weaken theirs?


One of the people involved in these efforts has written something that I think explains this process well:

The Air Force Red Team is much more than a systems analysis group to explore these questions. Much of the Red Team's work involves the development and testing of prototypes of potential future threat systems. Importantly, these prototypes are not based solely on intelligence estimates of what technologies our adversaries are investing in. Instead, the red team process uses systems analysis to determine the technologies that would result in the most pertinent threat capabilities, and then develops prototypes that could be used to test the real-world impact of those technologies in tactically relevant scenarios. Prototyping and testing alone, however, can rarely be used to explore the full impact of a potential threat in a broad range of tactical situations. Therefore, the results of the testing are used to validate the systems analysis models, which can then be extended to assess a range of relevant scenarios. This integrated program of systems analysis, prototyping, and instrumented testing is the core of the highly successful Air Force Red Team. The real benefit of the analysis in this context is to sort through the large number of potential threat responses and narrow down to the few that are most important. those few can be the subjects of more intensive prototyping and testing campaigns to understand the full impact they might have on our systems.

For each air defense element (surveillance, fire control, missile seeker, and fuze), the air defense can use a variety of sensor technologies, including active or passive radar (radio frequency), infrared, or a range of other less conventional sensors. The unconventional approaches proposed as counter-stealth technologies may run the gamut from acoustics to cosmic rays to gravimeters; however, in each case, it is critical to consider not just whether or not a technology can theoretically detect an aircraft, but whether it meaningfully contributes to the adversary's kill chain. For a number of good physics reasons, air defenses rely primarily on radar and infrared sensors. Compared to infrared, radar has the advantage of offering long-range detection with minimal interference from weather or other environmental factors. It is no accient that the most important long-range surveillance and fire-control systems continue to be active radars. One disadvantage of radar systems is that they are potentially susceptible to jamming, also called electonic attack. Therefore, for as long as air defenses have been invested in radars, aircraft designers have invested in electronic-attack countermeasures to those radars, and, in turn, radar designers have invested in electonic-protection counters to those countermeasures in an endless cycle. The key on each side of the cycle is to invest in technologies that are as robust as possible to the other side's likely response.


One class of electonic attack that the United States has invested in is called a towed decoy, illustrated in Figure 6.2. Towed decoys are countermeasures to radar-guided missiles, wether those missiles are guided by a fire-control radar or by a missile seeker. The basic concept of the towed decoy is to detect the radar energy, and to amplify and rebroadcast that energy to the radar, thereby providing a more attractive target to the radar than the aircraft itself. Because our adversaries are well aware that the United States has invested in and deployed towed decoys, it is safe to assume that they are investing in electonic-protection countermeasures, and that the United States should be investing in counters to those countermeasures. However, there are a wide range of countermeasures that our adversaries may pursue, and that is the role of the Air Force Red Team to assess those options from the adversary's perspective to prioritize the ones the United States should be investing in countering.

 

[DrRansom]

quellish - that is certainly an interesting topic.

I guess my question is more immediate, has there been a demonstrated advance in the past ~5 years which makes USAF concerned about F-35 penetration capability. And, did that advance compel the USAF to hide all LRS-B capabilities as long as possible to avoided a similar process here.

 

[Flyaway]

Could this indicate anything in relation to NG's prospects in the contest?

http://www.janes.com/article/54527/northrop-grumman-board-approves-usd4-billion-share-repurchase-plan

 

[sublight_]

There was some PDF posted a few pages back from the "Potomac research group" that said tomorrow (Sept 18th) was the big day....

 

[quellish]

quellish - that is certainly an interesting topic.

I guess my question is more immediate, has there been a demonstrated advance in the past ~5 years which makes USAF concerned about F-35 penetration capability.

No. F-35 penetration capability was never specified to be as good as F-22, B-2, etc. The F-117 penetrated adversary defenses to conduct surgical strikes against defended targets. That role is now served by the F-22 (and to some extent the B-2), not the F-35.

And, did that advance compel the USAF to hide all LRS-B capabilities as long as possible to avoided a similar process here.

No. The new bomber has been in progress for a long time. For much of that time the capabilities being developed were openly acknowledged in the public domain.

 

[SpudmanWP]

The F-35's penetration ability is better than the F-22 due to better SA (SAR, EOTS, EODAS, HMDS, SATCOM), EA, and better weapons.

 

[seruriermarshal]

The F-35's penetration ability is better than the F-22 due to better SA (SAR, EOTS, EODAS, HMDS, SATCOM), EA, and better weapons.

Air to air or Air to ground ?

 

[LowObservable]

Obviously, flying through the defenses 20000 feet higher and 90 per cent faster is insignificant.

 

[SpudmanWP]

The F-22 will start to get increment 3.2b in 2018 which will give it 9x and 120D, but the F-35 has the 9x now and will get the 120D a couple of years after that. So, for that specific 2-3 year period, the F-22 will have better A2A weapons than the F-35 but it will never have better A2G weapons.


The ease of upgrade will ensure the F-35 get's the newest weapons MUCH sooner than the F-22 along with the best sensors to use them.

 

[SpudmanWP]

Obviously, flying through the defenses 20000 feet higher and 90 per cent faster is insignificant.

Especially if you can't ID what you are flying over or hit what you ID but can't find.

 

[Sundog]

Obviously, flying through the defenses 20000 feet higher and 90 per cent faster is insignificant.

Especially if you can't ID what you are flying over or hit what you ID but can't find.

Wow, I hadn't heard the F-22 had those problems. I guess everyone gushing over it's performance in Syria is making it up? Also, why use the more survivable platform (F-22) to take out the greatest threats, when you can use the less survivable option (F-35)? Of course, if flying too high and too fast is the problem, I guess it's a good thing we still have A-10's, right?

 

[quellish]

The F-35's penetration ability is better than the F-22 due to better SA (SAR, EOTS, EODAS, HMDS, SATCOM), EA, and better weapons.

The only thing the F-35 is better at penetrating is the taxpayer.

 

[Grey Havoc]

The F-35's penetration ability is better than the F-22 due to better SA (SAR, EOTS, EODAS, HMDS, SATCOM), EA, and better weapons.

The only thing the F-35 is better at penetrating is the taxpayer.

;D

 

[sferrin]

Obviously, flying through the defenses 20000 feet higher and 90 per cent faster is insignificant.

Especially if you can't ID what you are flying over or hit what you ID but can't find.

Wow, I hadn't heard the F-22 had those problems. I guess everyone gushing over it's performance in Syria is making it up? Also, why use the more survivable platform (F-22) to take out the greatest threats, when you can use the less survivable option (F-35)? Of course, if flying too high and too fast is the problem, I guess it's a good thing we still have A-10's, right?

What makes you think the F-22 was doing anything but receiving a set of GPS coordinates and dropping a bomb on it? (Somebody else did the hard part.) Oh, and on the subject of the A-10, "..., how well do YOU think a pair of A-10s would have been able to prosecute 40 different time-critical targets in the CAS environment simultaneously?"

 

[Ian33]

There is an X- band to X- band Hunter out there that partners the F22 over the middle east #cough Syria #. The Hunter finds targets with passive EO and other sensors, then feeds the target data to the F22 via its radar. Once the F22 done it's magic the drone does battle damage assessment. There was briefly a discussion on the subject online till the DoD jumped on it with two feet from a great height.....

Same great height their uncensored drone strike camera footage accidently showed.